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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the Internet was made publicly accessible, it has become increasingly popular and 
its deployment has been broad and global thereby facilitating a range of available online 
services such as Electronic Mail (email), news or bulletins, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 
and World Wide Web (WWW). Progressively, other online services such as telephony, 
video conference, video on demand, Interactive Television (ITV) and Geographic 
Information System (GIS) have been integrated with the Internet and become publicly 
available. 
 
Presently, Internet broadband communication services incorporating both wired and 
wireless network technologies has seen the emergence of the  concept of a digital 
community which  has been growing and expanding rapidly around the world. Internet 
and the ever expanding online services to the wider digital community has raised the 
issue of security of these services during usage. Most local councils throughout Western 
Australia have resorted to delivering online services such as library, online payments 
and email accessibility. The provision and usage of these services have inherent security 
risks. Consequently, this study investigated the concept of a secure digital community in 
the secure provision and usage of these online services in selected local councils in 
Western Australia (WA).  
 
After an extensive review of existing literature, information security frameworks were 
derived from the adaptation of various resources, such as the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C: 
Internet Technology Security benchmark which was used as the main template. In 
addition, this template was enhanced into a framework model by incorporating other 
benchmarks such as NIST, CIS, ISSAF as well as other sources of information. These 
included information security related books, related ICT network and security websites 
such as CERT, CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI, Juniper, MS, NESSUS and NMAP together 
with journals and personal interviews. The proposed information security frameworks 
were developed to enhance the level of security strength of the email and online web 
systems as well as to increase the level of confidence in the system security within the 
selected local councils in WA. All the investigative studies were based upon the 
available selected local councils’ data and the associated analyses of the results as 
obtained from the testing software. In addition, the interpretive multiple-case study 
  
iv
principles were used during the investigation to achieve or fulfil the purpose of this 
study. The findings from this study were then abstracted for use in a framework and 
made available for use as a model for possible adaptation and implementation to other 
similarly structured councils or organisations. 
 
As a result, the study confirmed that the proposed information security frameworks 
have the capability and potential to improve the level of security strength. In addition, 
the level of satisfaction and confidence of council staff of the selected local councils in 
WA in the system security would also be increased due to the application of these 
frameworks. 
 
Although these information security frameworks may be recommended as practical and 
supporting tools for local councils, the findings from this study were specific only to the 
selected local councils used in this study. Further research using other councils, may be 
necessary in order for the information security frameworks to be adopted within a wider 
range of councils or organisations in WA or elsewhere. 
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 1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the research 
 
In the preceding decades, a number of nations worldwide have increasingly  availed 
themselves of advances in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), 
particularly in Internet technologies as a key business component in various 
organisations (Al-Mashari, 2007; Steyaert, 2000). This is mainly due to the 
pervasiveness, popularity and usage diversity of the Internet. These factors have 
prompted various public and private organisations to adjust their business strategies in 
the achievement of their goals (Teece, 2010). The advent of Internet technologies, as a 
component of ICT tools, has enabled most government and commercial organisations to 
adjust to the change of making a worldwide business presence through its powerful 
capabilities (Reddick, 2005; Shan & Wang, 2009).  
 
Additionally, ICT has been considered as an information competence tool as it provides 
information and related services, and supports interaction and cooperation among the 
users (Pazalos et al., 2010). The increasing availability of high speed Internet broadband 
communications infrastructure is an enabler of communication. Distribution of 
information and knowledge for both government and non-government sectors have 
become highly interactive and dynamic as a characteristic of the global digital 
community (Gillett et al., 2004; Ishida, 2003; Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & 
Valli, 2011a, b, c; Ortiz & Tapia, 2008a, b; Pazalos et al., 2010; Tanabe et al., 2002; 
Tapia et al., 2006). 
 
According to Intel Corporation (2005a, b, c), a “digital community” is a connected 
community or social networking entity which uses the Internet communication and 
computing infrastructure to provide flexible and innovative services to respond to users’ 
demands (Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c). Therefore, most 
significant cities around the world have made large investments of money for the 
development of large network infrastructures to facilitate high-speed connections for the 
online service of their local public and private organisations (Gillett et al., 2004; Ishida, 
2003; Ortiz & Tapia, 2008a, b; Pazalos et al., 2010; Tanabe et al., 2002; Tapia et al., 
2006).  
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Specifically, government organisations have engaged the above mentioned technologies 
in providing additional Information Technology (IT)-based development facilitators to 
commence and supply online information and services to their residences (in the case of 
local government councils) and partnerships (Al-Mashari, 2007; Shan & Wang, 2009; 
Torres et al., 2005). This facilitation may enhance a level of service satisfaction, ease of 
access, correctness, confidentiality, effectiveness within governments and partnerships, 
provide rapid and better services delivery, promote their recent products and services, 
and diminish service costs (Abie et al., 2004; Al-Mashari, 2007; Hirwade, 2010). As a 
result, their residences and partnerships may have increased and better electronic 
communication with their local and national governments and increase the knowledge 
of the general populace (Shan & Wang, 2009).  
 
The values aforementioned produce a suitable background to this research as they 
present the potential benefits to engage in research that may be useful for broader 
implementation scope or practitioners in similar or dissimilar circumstances and 
societies. These benefits include the developed approaches and methods as 
recommendations for future revisions or improvements for successfully operating their 
correlated initiatives in an efficient manner. This research therefore commenced with 
the intention of analysing three reported case studies of electronic systems in 
government organisations for cyber security. The particular emphasis was on email and 
online web systems in order to investigate and reveal the factors which have impacted 
upon these systems and their security. An additional aim of the research was to search 
for solutions to provide performance efficiency for these systems. 
 
1.2 Background to the statement of the problem 
 
The amount of users employing online services via Internet technologies have been 
increasing recently (Australian Communications and Media Auhtority, 2008; Phiri & 
Agbinya, 2006). Most countries have been utilising online services in recent decades 
and attempting to find an effective method to deal with the security and privacy of their 
users (Economic Commission for Africa, 2003; Paul et al., 2011; Phiri & Agbinya, 
2006). Nevertheless, Internet users are continually at risk, as they may have a credible 
chance of being attacked and are easily vulnerable to outside attackers or hackers 
(Farahmand et al., 2003; Farahmand et al., 2005).  
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Consequently, this may impact directly or indirectly on the current unsecured network 
communications for the security and privacy of the users or service providers. This may 
result in increased prevention and protection costs in terms of maintenance, upgrades 
and performance issues for the providers. 
 
With the continual development of new technology in ICT, the Internet has currently 
become one of the quickest growing global network technologies (Al-Ahmad & Al-
Kaabi, 2008). However, its usage comes with major concerns in security, trust and 
privacy for public and private organisations, as it relates directly to the online exchange 
of personal, organisational or financial data or information (Kim et al., 2006; 
Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c). Therefore, a well-secured 
network system is considered a good solution for preventing and protecting unexpected 
attacks, and to enhance privacy and security for the assurance of a degree of 
confidentiality in Internet usage (Hwang et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006). 
 
Particularly, the World Wide Web (WWW) and email are the most well-known Internet 
technologies that are being used in most councils in Western Australia (WA) 
(Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c; WALGA, 2010a). 
Nevertheless, there are other Internet related or convergence technologies that have 
been employed in several councils in WA such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), 
Voice over Wireless Local Area Network (VoWLAN), wireless LAN, Geographic 
Information System (GIS), Global Positioning System (GPS) and digital radio 
(Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c; personal communications with 
the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
 
These technologies provide services such as online payment, online library services, 
security patrol, digital surveillance, telephony (VoIP), online GIS and Internet café to 
local government employees, residents and community groups. As the digital 
community concept starts to develop, Internet related services will be more widely 
available to the public. Electronic voting, electronic polling, electronic health and 
Internet radio are all examples of services to the digital community. 
 
In addition, security is one of the most important factors for the digital community as it 
must ensure confidentiality and privacy of users’ information over the Internet (Intel 
Corporation, 2005a, b, c; Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c). 
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Therefore, this research is aimed to analyse and test the security of common Internet 
technologies which are currently in use at the selected local councils in WA. In this 
research, the email and online web systems were tested in the selected councils. 
Furthermore, this research provided recommendations to the selected councils. These 
included the creation of the developed information security frameworks and analyses of 
security weaknesses for the email and online web systems, as well as recommendations 
related to the security weaknesses and steps required to reduce risks to all users. 
 
There were several known ICT security risks related to incidents that had occurred to 
the various councils’ systems. These risks were indentified based on work done by the 
network administrators over the past seven years at the local councils in WA. Elicitation 
of these threats was centered on several private discussions with other IT managerial 
and IT operational staff from various local councils in WA (personal communications 
with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Email spamming, online 
web hacking and wireless hijacking were some of the examples of the incidents that 
were encountered and communicated during those exchanges.  
 
Additionally, one of the common key issues that emerged from the discussions with the 
IT managerial and IT operational staff was that the security breaches occurred as a 
result of the general lack of security awareness and apathy by the IT managerial and IT 
operational staff. 
 
Thus, three research questions were addressed in order to investigate possible solutions 
to the problems that were uncovered. These research questions were enumerated as: 
  
i. has the current system been implemented securely in a way that meets the 
national and international security standards?;  
ii. how the developed information security frameworks can potentially improve a 
level of security strength for the use of  the email and online web systems in the 
three selected councils in WA?; and  
iii. how the developed information security frameworks can be employed to 
incorporate functionalities of the current systems at the selected WA local 
councils? 
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The research examined the level of security in the deployment of the email and online 
web systems in the selected local councils in WA by adapting the Open Source Security 
Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) 2.2 Section C: Internet technology security 
as a security testing benchmark and model (Herzog, 2006). According to personal 
communications with Professor Dr. Craig Valli (2007), the OSSTMM is a solid 
information security framework and moreover, it is freely avalible on the Internet unlike 
the proprietary International Standard Organization (ISO) standard. Consequently, the 
OSSTMM 2.2 Section C was chosen as a security testing benchmark for this research. 
 
In addition, other open source information security standards including The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Center for Internet Security (CIS) and 
The Information Systems Security Assessment Framework (ISSAF) were also utilised 
in conjunction with the OSSTMM methodology.  
 
Other resources included information security related books, journals, personal 
interviews as well as information bulletins from Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT), CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI Software, Juniper, Microsoft (MS), NESSUS, 
Network Mapper (NMAP)  and related ICT network and security websites. 
 
1.3 Contributions of the research 
 
The developed information security frameworks for the security of the email and online 
web systems were generated for the selected councils by examining, and expanding 
upon preliminary research into the WA councils’ ICT services (personal 
communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007). This earlier research 
contributed to identification of potential risks in the email and online web systems.  
 
Security approaches were employed to data handling and information particularly in the 
areas of email, network, web and database security techniques in order to deal with the 
councils’ complex data sets with a view to enhancing administration.  
 
The IT operational staff at the selected councils had limited usage and awareness of 
cyber security software commonly used in the industry by system administrators, in 
particular NMAP version 5.0 and GFI LANguard version 9.0. This research served to 
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extend awareness of the usage nuances for these tools through advanced techniques, 
thereby extending the knowledge base for the IT operational staff in this area. 
 
The innovation in this research lies in the realistic application of the applied security 
techniques. The implementation of these techniques also served to generate confidence 
in the selected councils’ IT managerial and IT operational staff in developing and 
maintaining systems in unsecured environments especially in relation to the email and 
online web systems. 
 
Several investigations were conducted to verify the feasibility of the developed 
information security frameworks. Real-time data was used to generate the email and 
online web systems testing results (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6 for details of the way in 
which data was allocated to the developed information security frameworks and for 
testing of each of the selected councils respectively). 
 
All the security testing and analysis for both these systems were carried out using actual 
and real-time data. Consequently, the developed information security frameworks may 
readily be applied in the actual email and online web systems.  
 
The developed information security frameworks provided an alternative security 
pathway for possible adoption by the selected councils. The research provided a means 
of enhancing the planning and operations of the councils’ ICT systems and its 
compliance with the current ICT policies. Results from this research were considered to 
be good examples of security based implementations of the email and online web 
systems within the selected councils according to the councils own IT operational staff.  
 
In addition, the IT operational staff in the selected councils considered the security 
recommendations from the developed information security frameworks for future audits 
and tests within the existing councils as well as for other councils and/or organisations 
for external validity. 
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1.4 Thesis structure 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised into six chapters. Each chapter begins with an 
introduction and ends with a summary and conclusions. 
 
Chapter 2, which contains the discussion of the existing literature, is organised into six 
subsections: studies on the demand and use of Internet technologies related services in 
WA, studies on general risks analysis associated with the online services deployment, 
studies on the standard online services systems testing, studies on the email system, 
studies on the online web system and finally the conclusion of the chapter. Each of the 
six aspects presents an overview and discussion of current literature and integrates the 
conclusions drawn from previous research. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology and the developed information security 
frameworks. The research methods are presented within seven subsections: the 
background to the research method, the interpretive multiple-case study principles, 
research design and procedures, research materials, the theoretical frameworks and 
conceptual adaptations, the limitations to the research and a brief summary of the 
chapter. The materials used in the research described are the architecture, configuration 
codes and vulnerability of internal border routers, firewalls, switches, Intrusion 
Detection System/Intrusion Prevention System (IDS/IPS), email, database and online 
web servers datasets. The software packages used, namely NMAP version 5.0 and GFI 
LANguard version 9.0 are also detailed here. 
 
Additionally, details of the data analysis procedures, materials, components and 
working processes of the developed information security frameworks are provided in 
this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 is the beginning of discussion of the data selections and collections. It also 
provides detailed testing procedures as carried out at the first selected council. This is 
followed by some background information, recordings of the pre-interview consultation, 
document review, interview investigation, existing architecture discovery, email system 
testing analysis, online web system testing analysis and recommendations. The last part 
of the chapter contains the related discussions on the research topic. 
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Chapter 5 focuses exclusively on the second selected council. It describes a similar 
process to that of Chapter 4, in terms of considering the available data, conducting 
testings and presenting, analysing and evaluating the email and online systems testing 
results. 
 
Chapter 6 contains the investigation and discussion of the third selected council. It 
follows along the lines of enquiry as Chapters 4 and 5, in terms of examining the 
available data, performing testings and demonstrating, analysing and assessing the 
email and online systems testing results. 
 
Chapter 7 includes a discussion on the findings from this research, together with a 
section on the seven common issues discovered from Chapters 4, 5 and 6 as well as 
another section on the identification of the limitations of this research. 
 
Chapter 8 contains a summary of the key issues and conclusions of this research, with 
reference to the findings presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It also includes 
recommendations borne out from this research and offers suggestions for future 
research directions. 
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This literature review is based around the examination of the security issues of the 
common Internet related technologies currently deployed at the selected local councils 
in WA. In this chapter, the literature reviewed relates to: (1) studies on the demand and 
use of Internet technology related services in WA; (2) studies on general risks analyses 
associated with the online services deployment; (3) studies on the standard online 
services systems testing; (4) studies on the email system; (5) studies on the online web 
system; and (6) the conclusion of the chapter. 
 
Overall, the selection of the literature reviewed was based on the relevance to the first 
five points as enunciated and all the reviews were therefore from the associated panel of 
experts in these specified areas. The selection method could therefore be considered a 
semblance of the Delphi technique (McDonald et al., 2009). 
 
2.1 The demand and use of Internet technologies related services in WA  
 
There are 141 local councils in WA which make up approximately 23 percent of the 
total of all local councils in Australia. Some local councils voluntarily share resources 
in order to provide better services to their residents and users through a collaborative 
initiative (Limwiriyakul, 2009; Stanton, 2004). 
 
Findings released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) show that the number of 
WA households with access to a home computer has increased correspondingly since 
1998 from 44 percent, to 81 percent in 2009 (ABS, 2009). Apparently, the number of 
WA households with Internet access has also grown from 15 percent in 1998 to 75 
percent in 2009 (ABS, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, at the end of 2009, the number of WA households with broadband Internet 
access has risen to 64 percent while the number of WA households with dial-up Internet 
access has dropped to only 10 percent (ABS, 2009). 
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According to other research released by the ABS between 2004 and 2005, 
approximately 48 percent of businesses employ electronic lodgements with government 
organisations via the Internet or online services. Approximately 30 percent of 
businesses utilise online payment systems as the most common online activity to make 
payments via the Internet to government organisations (ABS, 2006; Limwiriyakul, 
2009). 
 
These studies indicate that Internet availability and usage have been increasing, and the 
demand for government agencies to provide electronic lodgements or online payment 
services such as fees, rates, licence renewals and infringements payments has been 
growing as well.  
 
In 2007, according to the Western Australian Local Government Association WALGA 
(2007), 132 of the 141 total local councils in WA have their own website  in WA 
(Limwiriyakul, 2009). Currently, all local councils in WA have developed their own 
websites for the public to gain online access to the available online information and 
services (WALGA, 2010b). Online library services via a third-party service provider 
such as the State Library in WA make up the largest portion of the most common online 
services being used. These services are followed by, Internet access services for general 
purpose usage and online payment services via a third-party service provider such as 
Australia Post, which make up the second and the third largest portions of the most 
common online services accessed respectively. 
 
Figure 2.1 summarises the available online services and Internet related technologies 
provided by the local councils in WA (Limwiriyakul, 2009). 
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Figure 2.1. The available online services and Internet related technologies provided by 
the 132 local councils in WA 
 
The use of email, online web, online library, online GIS and online GPS systems are the 
five major online services systems provided by the local councils in WA (personal 
communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Details 
of these services are described below. 
 
2.1.1 The email system 
 
Since its inception, email usage has become one of the most common methods of 
electronic communication in the world as well as in Australia today (Australian 
Communications and Media Auhtority, 2008; Fadia, 2006). This is due to the fact that it 
is easier to use, is faster, inexpensive, reliable and easier to manage or filter as 
compared to traditional mail. It increasingly has become part of all businesses means for 
exchange of information.  
 
All WA councils have their own email address available to its residents or anyone for 
inter-staff communication. Many of the councils also have their own email service 
available to their staff for intra-staff communication (Limwiriyakul, 2009).  
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2.1.2 The online web system 
 
The online web system covers online information and online payment services. There 
are 105 WA councils who provide Internet and online access to their residents and 
others. The online access provides for the councils’ general and specific information, 
often replacing and extending paper based information. There are 72 councils out of 
these 105 which provide online payment systems that fully rely on third-party payment 
services such as BPOINT (Commonwealth Bank of Australia, n.d.) and POSTbillpay 
(Australia Post, n.d.). 
 
Furthermore, there are nine WA councils who have their own online payment systems 
which provide online payment services to residents. Some examples of the councils who 
provide these services include the City of Joondalup, the City of Mandurah, the City of 
Melville, the City of Perth, the City of South Perth, the City of Swan and the town of 
Vincent. These online payment systems are provided either through third-party 
application software or in-house application software that is developed and managed 
internally. 
 
2.1.3 The online library system 
 
There are 114 WA councils who provide an online library system using a third-party 
service provider such as the State Library in WA. However, there are 26 WA councils 
who provide their own online library services direct to residents via the Internet. The 
City of Albany, the City of Armadale, the City of Joondalup and the City of Melville 
are some examples where this is done. 
 
The online library system allows anyone to do catalogue searches such as author, title 
and subject. It also allows a library member to reserve, request or check the availability 
of the required books, Compact Discs (CDs) or other materials. Network enabled online 
public access catalogue (NetOpac) is one of the more popular online library applications 
being used in some of the libraries of the WA councils. 
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2.1.4 The online GIS 
 
GIS is being used at some of the WA councils to provide a wide range of spatial and 
mapping services which include data capture, map production and GPS technologies. 
There are several WA councils which provide a useful online interactive mapping 
system to its residents or anyone to view street trees, properties, plans and aerial photos 
via the web. The City of Armadale, the City of Cockburn, the City of Melville, the City 
of Swan and the Town of Victoria Park are some of the WA councils who provide this 
online GIS service. 
 
IntraMaps is one of the most popular online GIS application software packages being 
used at all the above mentioned WA councils. IntraMaps was developed by the Digital 
Mapping Solutions (DMS) and runs on either MS Windows Servers 2003 or 2008. 
IntraMaps supports various spatial data formats such as MS and Oracle spatials (DMS, 
n.d.). 
 
2.1.5 The online GPS 
  
Presently, GPS technology is being widely used in navigation and positional tools. With 
the combination of GPS and the Internet, GPS tracking or monitoring has been made 
possible. 
 
For example, the online vehicle GPS tracking software is a tool which has the benefit of 
increasing the productivity, safety and security to council services such as bin collection 
and security patrol. The City of Melville has merged its GPS technology services with 
its ICT system in order to provide an online GPS service for its security patrol vehicles. 
This online GPS system allows for online monitoring of the activity of the vehicles in 
real-time. 
 
Nevertheless, the objective of this research was to place emphasis on the email and 
online web systems as they provide a good test case study for the investigation. This is 
due to the fact that these two selected systems are the main online services used within 
the local councils in WA.  
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In terms of business criticality, email and online web systems can be considered as 
important online services due to their inherent popularity as well as functionality. Email 
communication has largely superseded fax and traditional mail communication due to 
its efficiency and cost benefits. As such email communication has become fundamental 
to business operations in most organisations. Data communicated via email has the 
added benefit of security as there is no consequent need to shred sensitive information 
as would be the case for hardcopy communications. All WA councils utilise email 
services for communication between their staff, residential and other organisations. 
 
Furthermore, online web systems (static, dynamic and payment) also play a critical role 
in terms of providing services to several WA councils’ residential and other 
organisations. Councils provide these various online web services in the form of online 
tendering, online web information, online feedback forms, online rate payments and 
online voting. These services are critical to their large business operations and provide a 
level of data security as they are robust enough to protect against interruption of 
services and loss of any sensitive data. 
 
In addition, the email system is deployed in all local councils in WA whereas the online 
web system including the online payment services may be adopted in all major local 
councils in WA in the near future as a distinct possibility. Consequently, the findings 
from these two systems may be used as a guideline for other councils or organisations 
for further consideration, adaptation and implementation.   
 
2.2 The studies on general risks analysis associated with the online services 
deployment 
 
Several local councils in WA provide online payment services by utilising a 128 bit 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) technology over Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
(HTTPS) (personal communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009). Rates, fees, licence renewals, invoices, infringements are specific 
examples of these payment services. 
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Nevertheless, the significant missing part from the SSL transaction is a method for the 
resident to confirm his/her identity as a valid user to the council while using the online 
services (personal communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, there is no method for the council to ensure the legitimacy of the identity 
of the resident. Even though SSL provides a secure communication channel, it does not 
provide a way to verify the uniqueness of each resident when dealing with the online 
services (personal communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009; Secure Computing Corporation, 2006). 
 
In terms of the number of perceived risks to the three selected councils, the followings 
are some examples of the past security concerns which occurred between the year 2006 
and 2009: 
 
 In the year 2007, Council A’s email system was subjected to a flood of 
spamming incidents. These occurrences caused significant problems in terms of 
the accumulation of massive amounts of junk mail and a consequent reduction in 
internet speed. As a result, two Symantec spam filtering servers were deployed 
into their email system (personal communications with Council A, 2008); 
 Council C experienced a similar incident of email spamming in the year 2008. 
These occurrences caused Council C’s IT staff a lot of time and effort to manage 
the issue which also consequently led them to deploy an external spam filtering 
system to filter their email network traffic (personal communications with 
Council C, 2009); and 
 In the year 2009, the frontend web server (IIS 6.0) of Council B was 
compromised due to the fact that the server had not installed the most up-to-date 
patches (personal communications with Council B, 2009). 
 
In addition, various local councils in WA have deployed wireless network technologies 
to provide the online services that facilitate real-time online access to the councils’ 
information systems, such as Internet access, surveillance cameras and mobile 
computing (personal communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009).  
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Nonetheless, the nature of a wireless network technology is less secure than a wired 
network technology or a conventional technology counterpart (Australian Government: 
Attorney-General's Department, 2006; Limwiriyakul, 2009; Stanford University 
Residential Computing, 2007). Therefore, a wireless network technology may introduce 
a new level of potential risks during online access to services (Limwiriyakul, 2009). 
 
There are several potential risks and threats associated with the online services usage 
such as viruses, hackers, Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS), fake websites, identity theft or online Identity (ID) theft and data integrity. 
Furthermore, Domain Name Server (DNS) vulnerability is another potential risk where 
an intruder gains control of the DNS, to do phishing and farming attacks thereby 
misleading all other users of the DNS (Fontana, 2007). The following lists some 
examples of services and their associated risks specific to the online services provided 
by the local councils in WA: 
 
1) Data integrity: This includes data loss and data corruption that may be caused by 
virus infected emails or through intruders who infiltrate the database of a 
council; 
2) DoS and DDoS: These denial of services are usually caused when the website, 
firewall, database, library and online payment systems of a council are affected 
by severe interruptions or delays  as experienced by both the staff and residents 
of the council;  
3) Data security: The councils’ databases contain personal information relating to   
the staff and residents that may be stolen, intercepted or exploited by an intruder 
using spyware or other mechanism and which may or may not be detected; 
4) Misuse of resources: The council library and community centres may be at risk 
through the general misuse of the online services by the staff, residents and the 
public such as the possible unauthorised browsing of pornography, racism, 
strong violence and crime websites; and 
5) System penetration security risks: The councils may be at risk from infected 
Internet download files or executables containing potential viruses that may 
compromise the information systems. 
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Consequently, it is essential for the local councils in WA to apply a powerful ICT 
security strategy in order to shield their systems from intrusion, corruption and 
exploitation of information. The ICT security should be performed through well-
articulated policies and procedures and technical solutions for the staff including 
training, controlling, monitoring and enforcement (Allen et al., 2007). 
 
Risk assessment typically refers to a security analysis carried out through interviews 
and research which includes business, legal and industry specific criteria. Security 
testing is a project-oriented risk assessment of systems and networks through the 
application of a professional analysis on a security examination where penetration is 
habitually utilised to validate false positives and false negatives (Herzog, 2006). 
 
Table 2.1 illustrates the potential threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or 
contingencies and policy recommendations of the online services provided by the local 
councils in WA. (L represents low, M represents medium and H represents high). The 
following summary has been adapted from Whitman and Mattord (2007, pp. 57-59). 
 
Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and 
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA 
 
Threats Assets Impacts Countermeasures or 
contingencies 
Policy recommendations 
1. Brute 
force and 
dictionary 
attacks 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems and 
information 
reputation 
 
 
M Security education for user 
System passwords change 
frequency 
Strong system password policy 
Control and encryption of all  
communication ports by the 
councils’ IT teams 
Filter/disable unnecessary ports 
and protocols on the Internet 
gateway firewall 
Audit trail software to show 
logins and failed logins 
Use of encryption technology to 
protect all transmitted and 
stored information 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to brute force and 
dictionary attacks 
Backup media stored in 
an external location  
Regularly update the 
software, patches of all 
online systems 
Using encryption 
technology to protect 
information in all online 
systems 
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and 
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued) 
 
Threats Assets Impacts Countermeasures or 
contingencies 
Policy recommendations 
2. 
DoS/DDoS 
attacks 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems and 
information 
reputation 
 
 
M/H Security education for user 
Filter/disable unnecessary ports 
and protocols on the Internet 
gateway firewall 
Guidelines on regular backups 
of critical data to be issued, 
audited and verified 
Software and hardware 
configurations to be controlled 
by the councils’ IT teams only 
Control and encryption of all  
communication ports by the 
councils’ IT teams 
Regular patching of all the 
applications and OS software of 
all the online services  
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Random audits of both 
software and hardware are 
to be conducted 
Removal of any IT 
equipments is to be 
authorised by the 
councils’ IT teams 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to DoS attacks 
Backup media stored in 
an external location  
All ICT configurations are 
to be controlled by the 
councils’ IT teams 
3. Dust and 
temperature 
damage 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems 
L/M Security education for user 
Check/clean all online IT 
systems and devices/equipment 
to ensure there is no dust 
Install air condition controls and 
dust filtering systems or 
position the equipment to take 
advantage of the prevailing 
environmental conditions 
Insure all assets 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to dust contamination 
Backup media stored in 
an external location  
Regular maintenance on 
air conditioning and 
filtering systems or 
environmental area 
4. Electrical 
power fail 
/unstable/ 
surge 
Email, online 
web, online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems 
H Security education for user 
Backup all software and 
configurations files of all online 
systems and store in different off-
site locations 
Check/monitoring/test 
Uninterruptible Power 
Supply/Uninterruptible Power 
Source  (UPS) or surge protector 
on regular basis 
Insure all assets 
All assets must be insured 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to electrical power 
failure 
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and 
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued) 
 
Threats Assets Impacts Countermeasures or 
contingencies 
Policy recommendations 
5. Eaves-
dropping 
attacks 
Email, online 
web, online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems 
M/H Security education for user 
Control and encryption of all  
communication ports by the 
councils’ IT teams 
Filter/disable unnecessary ports 
and protocols on the Internet 
gateway firewall 
 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Regularly update the 
software, patches of all 
online systems 
Using encryption 
technology to protect 
information in all online 
systems  
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to eavesdropping 
attacks 
6. Fires,  
flooding, 
earthquake 
or any other 
natural 
hazards/ 
disasters  
Email, online 
web, online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems and 
information 
reputation 
 
H Security education for user 
Backup all software and 
configuration files of all online 
systems and store in different off-
site locations 
Permanently mark all online 
systems equipment as council 
property  retrieval message  
Contingency plan in place in case 
of emergency 
Insure all assets 
All assets must be insured 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
All councils’ assets must be 
clearly labelled as the 
council property and 
audited twice a year 
Regularly check drains, 
water pipes, for fire hazards 
or earthquake proofing. 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to natural 
hazards/disasters 
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and 
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued) 
 
Threats Assets Impacts Countermeasures or 
contingencies 
Policy recommendations 
7. Hacker 
attacks 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems and 
information 
reputation 
 
M/H Security education for user 
Filter/disable unnecessary ports 
and protocol on the Internet 
gateway firewall 
Install IDS/IPS at the Internet 
gateway system 
Guidelines on regular backups 
of critical data to be issued, 
audited and verified 
Software and hardware 
configurations to be controlled 
by the councils’ IT teams only 
Control and encryption of all  
communication ports by the 
councils’ IT teams 
Patching all applications and 
Operating System (OS) software 
of all  online services systems 
regularly 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Physical and software 
measures are to be used 
on all online systems to 
minimise modification 
and unauthorised access 
Random audits of both 
software and hardware are 
to be conducted 
Removal of any IT 
equipments is to be 
authorised by the 
councils’ IT teams 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to hacker attacks 
Using encryption 
technology to protect 
information in all online 
systems  
Deploy IDS/IPS 
Backup media stored in 
an external location  
All ICT configurations are 
to be controlled by the 
councils’ IT teams 
8. 
Interference 
and 
jamming 
and attacks 
Online GPS 
system and 
information 
reputation 
M/H Security education for user 
Implement filtering/detecting 
system to monitor or detect any 
strong interference signals 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to jamming and 
interference attacks 
Regularly review and 
update the facilities policy 
and GPS usage devices 
policy 
Backup media stored in 
an external location  
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and 
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued) 
 
Threats Assets Impacts Countermeasures or 
contingencies 
Policy recommendations 
9. Internal 
theft of 
online 
systems 
devices/ 
equipments 
at the 
selected 
councils’ 
premises 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems and 
information 
reputation 
 
M/H Security education for user 
Lock up all laptops when not in 
use 
Background/identity checks 
conducted on staff/contractors 
Access controls within the 
company buildings 
Permanently mark all online 
systems equipment as council 
property  retrieval message  
Regular audits of hardware by 
the councils’ IT teams 
All assets must be insured 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Random audits of both 
software and hardware are 
to be conducted 
Removal of any IT 
equipments is to be 
authorised by the 
councils’ IT teams 
All councils’ assets must 
be clearly labelled as the 
council property and 
audited twice a year 
Background/identity 
checks will be conducted 
on staffs/contractors 
Physical and software 
measures are to be used 
on all systems to 
minimise modification 
and unauthorised access 
All ICT  configurations 
are to be controlled by the 
councils’ IT teams 
10. 
Malicious 
active code 
attacks 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems 
M Enable filtering features on the 
councils’ firewalls systems to 
filter/limit Java applets and 
Active X objects 
Minimise the number of users 
access to Java applets or Active 
X objects on all councils’ online 
services systems 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to malicious active 
code attacks 
11. Social 
engineering 
attacks 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems 
L/M Security education for user 
Background/identity checks 
conducted on staffs/contractors 
The councils’ IT staff are not 
permitted to give out 
information to unauthorised 
personnel 
Restrict/minimise access to 
confidential information 
regarding all online services 
systems 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Only authorised personnel 
to access security 
information 
Regularly review and 
ensure that the insurance 
policy covers replacement 
due to social engineering 
attacks 
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and 
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued) 
 
Threats Assets Impacts Countermeasures or 
contingencies 
Policy recommendations 
12. Staff 
damage 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems 
H Security education for user 
Backup all software and 
configuration files of all online 
systems and store in different 
off-site locations 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
All assets must be insured 
Regularly update the 
policy 
13. Virus, 
malware 
and worm 
introduction 
through 
Internet 
usage 
Email, 
online web, 
online 
library, 
online GIS, 
online GPS 
systems 
H Automatic malware, virus and 
worm and protection software 
used and automatically updated 
Security education for user 
Guidelines on regular backups 
of critical data to be issued, 
audited and verified 
Software and hardware 
configurations to be controlled 
by the councils’ IT teams only 
Control and encryption of all  
communication ports by the 
councils’ IT teams 
Patching all applications and OS 
software of all  online services 
systems regularly 
Staff to undertake security 
education on induction 
Physical and software 
measures are to be used 
on all online systems to 
minimise modification 
and unauthorised access 
Random audits of both 
software and hardware are 
to be conducted 
Removal of any IT 
equipments is to be 
authorised by the 
councils’ IT teams 
Backup media stored in 
an external location  
All ICT  configurations 
are to be controlled by the 
councils’ IT teams 
 
(Source: Adapted from Whitman & Mattord, 2007, pp. 57-59) 
 
2.3 The standard online services systems testing  
 
This research specifically examined the level of security of the email and online web 
systems that are presently employed at the selected councils. Adaptations from various 
testing techniques, open source information security standards, guidelines and 
recommendations from recognised organisations have been utilised.  
 
An example of the IT security testing techniques was the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C: 
Internet technology security as a main testing benchmark methodology model. The IT 
testing techniques from other sources included NIST, CIS, ISSAF combined with 
related ICT network and security websites such as CERT, CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI, 
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Juniper, MS, NESSUS and  NMAP. Other testing information was compiled from 
related books and journals and personal interviews were also used as a source of 
information gathering. 
 
In addition, there were several testing techniques covering a range of different security 
categorisations of ICT. Examples of the security objects were email systems, DoS, 
firewall systems, web applications, intrusion detection systems, port scanning, password 
cracking, Internet border router systems, system fingerprinting and vulnerability.  
Details of these testing techniques are provided in Table 2.2 which has been adapted 
from Herzog (2006, pp. 49-67). 
 
Table 2.2 A summary of the common testing techniques 
 
Testing 
techniques 
Descriptions Sample tasks and expected results utilised in 
the testing process 
1. Email system 
testing 
Email system specification 
details together with any 
weaknesses that may cause 
information leakage such as 
email server types, footers, 
encryption techniques, Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP) server paths and 
bounced mails. 
Investigate email headers, read receipts and 
bounced mails for the email server trails  
Examine email spoofing for an internal connect, 
egression, and internal and external relaying 
2. DoS and 
DDoS testing 
This DoS and DDoS testing is 
to ensure that the network and 
server system is capable of 
handling the several types 
DoS attacks such as ping of 
death, teardrop, SYN flooding 
and the User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) flooding 
(Fadia, 2006). 
Examine the exposure restrictions of systems to 
distrusted networks 
Investigate the extent of load bearing of server and 
network for hits and traffic 
Inspect detail of weaknesses in the online 
availability including identification of any single 
points of failure 
Inspect detail of DoS vulnerable systems testings 
3. Firewall 
testing 
Firewalls are deployed to 
control and manage the flow 
of the network traffic between 
internal networks, the 
Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) 
servers and the Internet based 
on the security policies of the 
organisations. It utilises ACLs 
to allow or deny network 
packets. The objective of 
firewall testing is to guarantee 
that only authorised network 
traffic is allowed to gain 
access into the network, and 
all other traffic be denied. 
Indicate information on the firewalls as services 
and system as well as the features performed on 
the firewalls 
Outline of the network security policy by Access 
Control Lists (ACLs)  
Test ACLs against the network security policy or 
against the "Deny All" rule  
Verify that the firewalls actively filter local 
network traffic 
Verify that the firewalls perform address spoof 
detection 
Validate Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and 
UDP scanning to server logs 
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Table 2.2 A summary of the common testing techniques (continued) 
 
Testing 
techniques 
Descriptions Sample tasks and expected results utilised in 
the testing process 
4. Internet 
application 
testing 
The purpose of this Internet 
application testing is to search 
for “security bugs” in client-
server applications of the 
systems, ability to defend 
against any internal or external 
threats. 
Note: This testing was not 
conducted due to time 
constraints.  
Decompose the binary codes where accessible 
Locate potential brute force password guessing 
access points in the client-server applications 
Find legitimate login credentials with password 
grinding if possible  
Trace the  authentication system using spoofed 
tokens 
Assemble sensitive information with Man-In-the-
Middle attacks 
Insert excess/fake information with session-
hijacking techniques 
Collect excessive information with a direct 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL), direct 
instruction, action sequence jumping and/or page 
skipping 
5. IDS testing The focus of this IDS testing 
is on the IDS performance and 
sensitivity. 
Inspect any packets and protocols which were not 
scanned by the IDS 
Examine a list of IDS false positives and missed 
alarms 
Investigate the IDS architecture and a list of 
unmonitored paths into the network 
Investigate the IDS sensitivity, the reaction time 
and the IDS performance under a heavy load 
6. Password 
cracking testing 
This password cracking 
testing technique is a process 
to check for password 
validation and strength by 
deploying automated 
password-testing tools. 
Note: This testing was not 
conducted due to time 
constraints. 
Execute automated dictionary and brute force 
attacks on the password file where applicable 
Execute automated password crackers on 
encrypted files such as Portable Document Format 
(PDF) or MS Word documents  
Obtain the password file containing  usernames 
and passwords using smbpasswd for Unix systems 
and Sam._ for Windows NT systems 
Examine the list of systems and documents that 
are potentially vulnerable to crack 
6. Port scanning 
testing 
It is the invasive probing of 
the network and transport 
level of the system ports. 
Various network port scanning 
tools are employed to gather 
and check the information of 
the network system.  
 
Inspect details of open, closed or filtered ports 
Inspect Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of all live 
systems 
Inspect the internal system network addressing 
Examine the list of discovered tunnelled and 
encapsulated protocols 
Investigate the list of discovered routing protocols 
supported 
Inspect the active services and the network map 
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Table 2.2 A summary of the common testing techniques (continued) 
 
Testing 
techniques 
Descriptions Sample tasks and expected results utilised in 
the testing process 
7. Internet border 
router testing 
The action of this Internet 
border router testing technique 
is to protect, control and filter 
the network traffic flow for 
both the Intranet and the 
Internet is based on the 
security policy. It runs ACLs 
to facilitate the permission or 
blockage of the network traffic 
packets.  
Examine the router type and its specified features  
Verify that the router is implementing the address 
spoof detection 
Check and confirm which router  provides 
Network Address Translation (NAT) 
Check the ACLs against the written security policy 
or the "Deny All" rule 
Check the router outbound capabilities from the 
inside 
8. System 
fingerprinting 
testing 
The purpose of this system 
fingerprinting testing 
technique is to test system 
responses. 
Verify the patch level 
Verify the type of the OS 
Verify the type of the system 
Verify the system enumeration 
Verify internal system network addressing 
9. Vulnerability 
testing 
Various automated tools have 
been deployed in this 
vulnerability testing 
technique. 
Determine feasible DoS vulnerabilities 
Determine loops and holes of the systems 
 
(Source: Adapted from Herzog, 2006, pp. 49-67) 
 
Although the focus of this research was on the email and online web systems only, it 
was necessary to utilise firewall, IDS/IPS, Internet border router, port scanning, system 
fingerprinting and vulnerability testing techniques as they are all related and required 
for as part of comprehensive testing of these systems. Nevertheless, DoS and DDoS 
techniques were not fully covered in the review as this type of testing was not 
conducted in the current research due to the possible interruption to the councils’ 
network systems and the associated disruption to normal business operations. 
 
In addition, a review of both the Internet application itself and password integrity tests 
were not conducted as they were deemed to be out of the scope of this research.  
 
2.4 Studies on the email system 
 
This section is divided into two subsections, which include email vulnerabilities and 
risks as well as a general description of the email system testing  
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2.4.1 Types of email vulnerabilities and risks 
 
The email vulnerabilities and risks in terms of attack techniques frequently used by 
hackers are described in this section. This is followed by detailing the testing of each 
stage such as network surveying and its architecture, Internet border router, firewall, 
IDS, switches review, services and system identification, port scanning, vulnerabilities, 
spoofing, vendor security benchmark auditing and security policy reviews. The email 
system is one of the most common targets that attackers aim at and it includes both the 
email system and the email clients. 
 
Typically, an email system consists of email server(s) and its network infrastructure 
such as firewall and IDS. All of these devices have vulnerabilities that can be protected 
through the use of proper configuration. Furthermore, potential risks can be minimised 
by simply designing and applying a good security practice policy. Table 2.3 displays a 
summary of the common methods of attacks to the email system. 
 
Table 2.3 A summary of the common methods of attacks to the email system 
 
Attacking techniques Descriptions 
Email bomber Massive emails generated which can be the same or different messages from 
an individual sender or a group of senders. 
Email spamming Any unwanted advertisements for services or products which were included 
in an email message. 
Email sniffing and 
spoofing 
A way of intercepting email traffic using a network sniffer tool which 
allows the attacker to capture all the email contents. 
Email scam Fraud or unwanted email that usually claims the prospect of a bargain or 
something for nothing. 
Email phishing Emails which were created to collect (phish) personal information (identity 
theft) such as usernames, passwords, credit card and bank account. 
Email borne viruses  Emails that have an attached virus, worm or Trojan. 
Buffer overflows By sending a long HELO command or long email names in MAIL or RCPT 
commands to the target email server can create a buffer overflow and 
possibly interrupt the email system (Basta & Halton, 2008). 
DoS This attack may crash or destabilise the target email server by attempting to 
open multiple connections to the server (SMTP flooding). 
Third-party mail relay Or open relay is a target email server which receives email from an 
unknown sender. Then sending it on to recipient(s) which are not users of 
the email system (Stewart, 2003). 
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2.4.2 A general description of the email system testing 
 
The email system testing can be categorised into five stages as described briefly in the 
following.  
 
1) Network surveying: This network surveying stage is utilised to gather 
information relating to the council’s email system such as network architecture, 
email server, reverse proxy server and spam blocker. In addition, both identified 
issues and recommendations are included as part of the information gathering. 
2) Email system’s infrastructure (Internet border router, firewall, IDS/IPS and 
switches) review: This email system’s infrastructure stage is used to collect 
specifications and configuration codes of the email system infrastructure devices. 
3) Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing: This 
services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing stage 
is employed to audit and review the email server, the spam blocker appliance and 
the reverse proxy server (if any) on services, system identifications, patching 
status, TCP and UDP ports and possible vulnerabilities. 
4) Spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark on the email server application 
software: Spoofing testing covers the testing on internal connectivity, internal 
and external relaying on the email system of the council. In terms of vendor 
security benchmark on the email server application software, it benchmarks 
against the council’s email application software using open source benchmark 
guideline such as the CIS benchmark for MS Exchange 2007 for Windows 
Server 2003 version 1.0. In addition, any modifications to the benchmark made 
to suit the council’s email system. 
5) Email security policy reviews: This email security policy reviews stage is 
concerned with a review of the related email information security policy 
including the technical policy that is in current use at the council. 
 
2.5 Studies on the online web system 
 
The two subsections in this section include the types of online web vulnerabilities and 
risks and a general description of the online web system testing. 
 28
2.5.1 Types of online web vulnerabilities and risks 
 
Tracy et al. (2007, p. ES-1) states that “web servers are often the most targeted and 
attacked hosts on organizations’ networks”. It follows therefore that public web servers 
such as the online web servers, frontend web servers, application web servers will be 
even more targeted. A summary of specific security risks, threats and vulnerabilities on 
the common web servers is shown in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4 A summary of the common online web’s attack/threat techniques 
 
Attack/threat techniques Descriptions 
Web pilfering Attackers search through web pages for key flaws and vulnerabilities 
manually or with automated tools (Scambray et al., 2001). 
DoS Attackers may directly or indirectly attack web servers or the supporting 
network infrastructure such as firewalls or routers. This may result in 
denying or interrupting customers or users accessing its services. 
Input validation (injection) These intrusions include Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) 
injection, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Structured Query Language 
(SQL) and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) injections. 
Attackers target sensitive information of web applications which 
normally provide links to its supported backend database servers. This 
can cause loss of confidential data, open the data to manipulation (insert, 
delete, update), or interrupt the use of the database application. 
Interception Attackers may intercept transmissions of unencrypted information 
between the web server and the browser. The information may include 
sensitive data such as login names and passwords. 
Exploiting software Attackers may take advantage of software bugs in the web server 
platform. Some examples are the security holes in Internet Information 
Services (IIS), Apache Tomcat, Active Server Page (ASP) and 
Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) applications. This may allow attackers 
access to private files or folders in the web server. 
Buffer overflows “Attackers use buffer overflows to corrupt the execution stack of a web 
application” (The Open Web Application Security Project or OWASP, 
2009, p. 2). This can also cause interruption to web servers and can 
create significant risks to users mainly centred around the manipulation 
of the system applications and data. 
Web authentication threats Examples are username/password threats, username enumeration, 
password guessing and eavesdropping (Scambray et al., 2006). This can 
lead to identity theft. 
Web authorisation threats  Fingerprinting authorisation and both attacking ACLs and tokens are 
classic examples of web application threats (Scambray et al., 2006). This 
can lead to part or full control of the compromised web application and 
its backend system. 
Web services vulnerabilities This includes attacking Extensible Markup Language (XML) web 
services including Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Web 
Services Description Language (WSDL) and Universal Description, 
Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) for vulnerabilities. 
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2.5.2 A general description of the online web system testing  
 
The online web system testing can be classified into five stages as depicted briefly in 
the following.  
 
1) Network surveying: This network surveying stage is used to gather information 
relating to the council’s online web system such as network architecture, web 
server(s), application server(s), backend database server(s) and Content 
Management System (CMS) server(s) (if they exist). In addition, both identified 
issues and recommendations are also included. 
2) Online web system’s infrastructure (Internet border router, firewall, IDS/IPS 
and switches) review:  This online web system’s infrastructure review stage is 
employed to collect specifications and configuration codes of the online web 
system infrastructure devices. 
3) Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing:  This 
services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing stage 
is deployed to audit and review the related servers such web, application, 
backend database and CMS server(s) (if they exist) to audit on services, system 
identifications, patching status, TCP and UDP ports and feasible vulnerabilities. 
4) Vendor security benchmark online backend database server: This vendor 
security benchmark online backend database server stage is utilised to do 
benchmark test against the council’s online backend database application 
software employing open source benchmark guideline such as the CIS – security 
configuration benchmark for MS SQL Server 2005 version 1.2.0. In addition, 
details of modifications to the benchmark made to suit the council’s online 
backend database server. 
5) Online web system security policy reviews: This online web system security 
policy reviews stage is used to review the current related online web system 
including the online payment system security policy of the selected councils. 
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2.6 Summary 
 
Findings from the literature review point to a need for a process of enhancing the level 
of security for common Internet technologies in a comprehensive way as it appears 
there is possibly no facility for this in the local councils in WA. It is also apparent from 
the number of personal interviews with the local councils in WA during the period 2005 
to 2009 with respect to improving the level and strength of security in Internet 
technologies such as the email and online web systems; this has not been achieved to 
any significant level of satisfaction. Consequently, further research studies into these 
aspects may be warranted as they may serve to expand general knowledge in this area 
and increase the level of confidence in the security of these objects. 
 
In relation to the face-to-face formal interviews, all the three IT managers from the 
selected councils were agreed that there was a need of enhancing the level of security of 
their email and online web systems. For examples, Council A’s IT manager had a strong 
concern about their current online payment system particularly in security of their SQL 
database servers (personal communications with Council A, 2007, 2008, 2009). Council 
B’s IT manager was also concern on their online in-house payment system particularly 
in security setting on the frontend payment web server (personal communications with 
Council B, 2009). Furthermore, both the IT manager and system administrator of 
Council C were seriously concern about security of their newly deployed online 
payment system (Epathway) (personal communications with Council C, 2009, 2010). 
 
In addition, it is feasible that this research may serve as a framework on which to base 
security testing for similarly structured organisations using the email and online web 
systems. The uncovering of the deficiency in the level of security is exactly the novelty 
in this research, as there has been no efficient set of criteria that address the potential 
risks that may occur while using the email and online web systems as used by the local 
councils in WA. Therefore, an investigation undertaken through the use of well-known 
software may prove beneficial in testing the developed information security frameworks 
at the selected local councils in WA. The details on the method and materials utilised in 
this research are presented in Chapter 3. 
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As a result, it may provide the useful and practical information security frameworks as a 
guide or model that may enhance the level of security in the councils’ systems in terms 
of planning, monitoring, controlling, managing and implementation. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPED 
INFORMATION SECURITY FRAMEWORKS 
This chapter aims to present the interpretive multiple-case study principles, as well as 
the research method and techniques applied in this research. It also defines the scope 
and limitations of the research design. A description of how this research was 
implemented is presented in seven subsections. Firstly, the background to the research 
method is detailed to demonstrate how the research method was derived in Section 3.1. 
The following Section 3.2 deals with introducing the interpretive multiple-case study 
principles wherein the seven principles of case study research are described. The 
subsequent Section 3.3 is concerned with research design and procedures. It covers the 
reasons for selecting the organisations, data sources, research analysis process, data 
collection and analyses. Research materials including primary and secondary data 
sources and open-source and propriety software are also covered in Section 3.4. This is 
followed by a review of the theoretical frameworks and conceptual adaptations in 
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 examines the limitations to the research and a brief summary of 
the chapter is finally presented in Section 3.7. 
 
3.1 Background to the research method used in the research 
 
Qualitative research involves an in-depth understanding of certain behaviours and the 
reasons that control them. It relies on rationales behind a range of aspects of behaviour 
and focuses on samples, and categorises data into patterns for organising and reporting 
results (Cacho-Elizondo & Loussaïef, 2009). The most common qualitative research 
method in Information Systems (IS) research is the case study method (Alavi & 
Carlson, 1992; Myers, 2009; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
 
According to Klein & Myers (1999, p. 68), “IS research can be classified as interpretive 
if it is assumed that our knowledge of reality is gained only through social constructions 
such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents, tools, and other 
artefacts”.  
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Similarly, another quotation states that “interpretive researchers start out with the 
assumption that access to reality is only through social constructions such as language, 
consciousness and shared meanings” (Limwiriyakul, 2009, pp. 132-133; Myers, 1997, 
p. 2). Interpretive research method in IS is declared by Walsham (1993, pp. 4-5) as 
“aimed at producing an understanding of the context of the IS, and the process whereby 
the IS influences and is influenced by the context”. 
 
In general, such interpretive research concentrates on the entire complexity of human 
sense making, since the incident becomes manifest in which there are no requirements 
for pre-identified dependent and independent variables (Glanz, 2003; Kaplan & 
Maxwell, 1994; Klein & Myers, 2001). 
 
Myers and Walsham (1998) classified the interpretive research approach into three 
categories as positivist, interpretive and critical. Similarly, Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
clarified this research approach into four types, namely positivist, post-positivist, 
constructivist and critical. This research applied Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991)’s 
framework in order to decide whether the research categorisation was positivist, 
interpretive or critical. The positivist approach is used to determine the prior fixed 
relationships within phenomena examined by employing structured techniques. It assists 
researchers to do theory testing and enhance understanding in predictive occurrences. 
Propositions’ evidence, scientific measurement of variables, hypotheses testing and the 
inferences of phenomena depiction retrieved from a sample to a population, are some 
examples of the positivist category Guba & Lincoln (1994). 
 
Interpretive approach supposes that people generate and correlate their thoughts by 
interrelation with others around the world. Furthermore, it is suitable for natural setting 
studies that have social interactions between researchers and people to learn from the 
background of their actions and attempt to understand the ideas and feelings of target 
subjects or an understanding of the subjective or people experience. Therefore, it 
supports researchers in the complete understanding of phenomena through the meanings 
that people allocate to them (Berger & Kellner, 1981; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Neuman, 
1997). 
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The critical category of research is used to assess the status quo by revealing the history, 
the beliefs and the contradictions of existing social systems for the purpose of 
facilitating their liberation. Critical evidence towards assumptions on organisations and 
IS, and a dialectical analysis are samples of the critical category (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994).  
 
Given the previous definitions and precepts, this research followed on from a traditional 
theoretical background to generate a theoretical formulation or a phenomenal 
interpretation as a construct in the form of a framework. In addition, there was an 
emphasis on the "subjective" as justification for the research. Multiple-case studies are 
classically included in the interpretive study and as a result it was the main research 
method used in this research. 
 
Interpretive multiple-case studies were selected in order to validate the findings, as they 
were not simply a consequence of the unconventional behaviour of a specific case 
(Miles & Huberman, 1984). Thus the selection of the various independent local councils 
served to enhance critical, social and organisational understandings, which were linked 
to the ICT adjustment and/or implementation in all organisations. Conducting and 
depicting common implications in the test cases physically allowed for logical 
replication in other environments in order to obtain external validation. The reason for 
using multiple-case studies was because multiple experiments inherently have the 
capability to strengthen research findings (Benbasat et al., 1987; Limwiriyakul, 2009; 
Williamson, et al., 2002). 
 
Furthermore, it allowed the researcher to examine a particular phenomenon in diverse 
settings and conduct cross-case analysis and comparison (Limwiriyakul, 2009; 
Williamson, et al., 2002). Therefore, the research method adopted in this research after a 
detailed examination of related research methods was to conduct interpretive multiple-
case studies (Benbasat & Weber, 1996; Cavaye, 1996; Davis et al., 1992; Klein & 
Myers, 1999; Lee, 1989; Walsham, 1995) in the selected local councils in WA during 
the period between July 2009 and September 2010. Three designated local councils 
were selected for this research. It is believed that this selection was sufficient to achieve 
the objectives of this research due to the extensiveness of the data collection and 
collation, and subsequent analyses stages. 
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The majority of data collection techniques used in this research was semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation, group discussion and documentation analyses. 
These appropriate and qualitative tools were used to increase the richness and reliability 
of the case study.  
 
In addition, two developed information security frameworks for the email and online 
web systems were implemented for the initial testing of each selected test case. 
Nevertheless, further testing should be developed according to individual organisational 
constraints, as each of the test cases was an independent research with decided 
individuality. 
 
3.2 Seven principles for the interpretive multiple-case studies 
 
Klein and Myers (1999) proposed a set of seven principles for conducting and 
evaluating interpretive case studies in IS research based on hermeneutic orientation. 
This may assist the researchers and may be used as a guide to gain understanding of the 
fundamental ideas of interpretive study. Based on their suggestion, the researchers 
should figure out how and what principles are suited for their research conditions. These 
seven principles were adopted to formulate the research design as follows:  
  
 The fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle; 
 The principle of contextualisation; 
 The principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects; 
 The principle of abstraction and generalisation; 
 The principle of dialogical reasoning; 
 The principle of multiple interpretations; and 
 The principle of suspicion. 
 
The use of these seven principles may enhance the validity and clarity of the research. 
Details of these seven principles and how they applied to this research are outlined in 
the following sections. 
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3.2.1 The fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle 
 
This principle recommends that subjective or people understanding is attained by 
considering the partial and entire meaning of their actions (Klein & Myers, 1999). Klein 
and Myers (1999, p. 71) stated that “the process of interpretation moves from a 
precursory understanding of the parts to the whole and from a global understanding of 
the whole context back to an improved understanding of each part”. Therefore, the 
research method in each case study necessitates being the partial and total understanding 
of the subjective or people experience, namely the performance and management of the 
IT managerial and IT operational staff incorporated with the current ICT system 
security patterns or policies of the selected councils in WA. This requirement provides a 
better understanding of the interchange patterns of each part as a whole depiction. 
 
Additionally, Klein and Myers (1999, p. 73) suggest that “during repeated cycles of the 
hermeneutic circle, all of the suggested principles can be applied iteratively, forming a 
complex web of interpretations”. Consequently, this research deployed several stages of 
data analysis with the use of several analysis tools to facilitate the iterations. 
 
In addition, this research is proposed to be interpretive research as it works on the 
contextual and is limited within the selected councils in WA. There are several 
significant factors that have an effect on the performance and management of the IT 
managerial and IT operational staff within the selected councils.  
 
These include a wide range from hard technical issues such as network surveying, 
internetwork infrastructure review, services and system identification, port scanning and 
vulnerability testing, and vendor security benchmark auditing, through to soft social 
issues such as performance and management style, and ICT system security policy 
enforcement. Thus, there has to be consideration of all issues individually together with 
a combination into one piece in order to achieve an understanding of the total problem 
situation. 
 
3.2.2 The principle of contextualisation 
 
This principle relates to the critical explanation of the social and historical background 
or the context of the research setting. It describes how the circumstances have been 
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developed and occurred (Klein & Myers, 1999). In this research, the concept of a digital 
community or ICT including system security threats and risks is related to this principle 
as it intensely describes the situation background that occurs within the selected 
councils. 
 
Additionally, this research collects security policy documents, personal interviews and 
computer data as research artefacts in order to produce an intensive understanding of the 
contexts that arise within the selected councils. Consequently, these may lead it to be a 
more crucial and concentrated consideration of the research circumstances particularly 
on the social and historical background in each of the selected councils.  
 
3.2.3 The principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects 
 
This principle relates to the association between the researchers and the subjects as it 
necessitates that the researchers place themselves and the research subjects within a 
historical context. The researchers examine and interpret the interaction of the research 
subjects and data in order to produce the facts, documents or artefacts. Generally, the 
researchers need to consider carefully their actions as they may influence and affect the 
subjects while conducting the research (Klein & Myers, 1999). Nevertheless, the impact 
of this interaction for this research was reduced, as it did not relate directly to human 
subjects. Consequently, it may eliminate the feasibility of Hawthorne effects (Mayo, 
1933) by the subjects. 
 
In addition, this research utilised both primary and secondary data sources to obtain the 
results and findings. Furthermore, it employed the accredited software to analyse the 
primary data from each selected council (see Section 3.3.2 for further detail on the data 
analysis procedures). 
 
The interviews, as one of the primary data sources, and documentation, as the secondary 
data source, from each selected council were used to compare and support in the 
analysis of the empirical data obtained from the software. This was deemed to be a good 
opportunity to assist the researchers in adjusting the interpretation in order to gain a 
better and clear understanding on the research subjects and/or data. 
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3.2.4 The principle of abstraction and generalisation 
 
Klein and Myers (1999, p. 72) stated that this principle “requires relating the 
idiographic details by the data interpretation through the application of principles one 
and two to theoretical, general concepts that describe the nature of human understanding 
and social action”. 
 
Furthermore, they suggested that theory and its formation including concepts, contents, 
frameworks and processes play an essential role in interpretive research to receive 
abstraction and generalisation from the findings. Therefore, the analysis in each case or 
council may display comprehensively how the developed information security 
frameworks had been adopted and implemented as the practical models are the 
significant issues in the interpretation. The in-depth information in each case may be 
disclosed by the interpretation that associated with theory and its general concepts. The 
case may be employed to simplify the concepts from theory (Klein & Myers, 1999). 
 
3.2.5 The principle of dialogical reasoning  
 
This principle requires the sensitivity of the researchers to deal with the feasible 
contradictions among the theoretical preconceptions, which lead the research design and 
the actual findings (Klein & Myers, 1999). This may be revised and done several times 
in the cycle of the research process to enhance the understanding of each subsequence 
stage in the research process. While conducting the data analysis procedures, the 
outcomes from some of the analyses were different from the theoretical preconceptions. 
As a result, several tests were required to be repeated in order to investigate and clarify 
the differences. 
 
3.2.6 The principle of multiple interpretations  
 
This principle requires sensitivity from the researchers to observe and investigate the 
potential dissimilarities or contradictions in interpretations in conjunction with the 
reasons from different participants in the research setting (Klein & Myers, 1999). Each 
participant may understand and interpret in a variety of ways of thought even if they 
confront the same situations or problems. 
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This principle was applied to this research by comparing and evaluating the interview 
data and the data obtained from the software that effectively present the differentiation 
between the recognition and actuality of the circumstances. In the same council, 
employees may have different viewpoints on a situation or problem, which is based 
upon their individual theoretical perspective. This perspective may have an influence on 
their interpretations in a situation or problem in which it may depict or guide towards 
any potential conclusions, ideas or even generate principles or fundamentals. 
 
For instance, the IT operational staff may have different visions of the circumstances in 
comparison with the IT managerial staff. Nevertheless, when investigating and 
presenting the findings to the council both of the viewpoints were collated into the 
statement.  
 
3.2.7 The principle of suspicion 
 
This principle requires the sensitivity about the probable biases and systematic 
distortion from the researchers in narration and data gathered from the participants 
(Klein & Myers, 1999). This principle may relate to the various sources of context 
which may lead to be regarded with suspicion such as personal biases, personal 
opinions or comments that may influence other people's thoughts, and/or infer 
inaccuracy or unreliability of data.   
 
Even though, this research conducted the interviews from the IT managerial and IT 
operational staff, it did not have any inherent suspicions due to the nature of the 
research. The interview data obtained from each council were merely the minor 
components with respect to the use of software in data analysis, which was the major 
component in this research. Therefore, the findings attained from the software may be 
claimed to be unbiased and/or accurate data.  
 
In conclusion, this research deployed both quantitative and qualitative methods in order 
to enhance validity and reliability of the research findings. The use of these methods 
may generate a better and solid understanding of the research context under the 
investigation (Cavaye, 1996). The document review as the quantitative method was 
utilised to validate and triangulate the findings derived from the use of software and 
interviews as the qualitative method.  
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According to Cavaye (1996), there is no preset amount of cases that is required to be 
studied. Consequently, three to five councils would be deemed sufficient for this 
purpose. Thus, for this research, it was decided to select three councils as these 
particular councils have the potential to provide useful and appropriate data and 
information for subsequent testings and analyses. 
 
3.3 Case study research design and procedures 
 
3.3.1 Selection of local councils in WA 
 
The case studies were selected from a number of local councils. The selection was 
limited to WA because of the accessibility to the organisations. Two of the main 
attributes within each of the case studies were the various Internet services such as 
WWW, email, GIS, GPS, VoIP and wireless LAN provided, and in-house network 
infrastructure of the organisations. Accordingly, the selected councils were deemed 
suitable in that they would provide sufficient and relevant data for testing and analysis 
and subsequent interpretation and evaluation of the results.  
 
In addition, the selected councils were willing to provide real-time data, due to the fact 
that they would in-turn derive some benefits in the way of a measure of their security 
robustness and tightening through the post evaluation recommendations. 
 
Furthermore, there was an element of trust and confidence in the researcher as a result 
of previous work done by the researcher for the selected councils. 
 
3.3.2 Data analysis procedures 
 
This research specifically examined the level of security of the email system that is 
currently deployed at the selected councils in WA. Various testing techniques such as 
open source information security standards, guidelines and recommendations from 
recognised organisations, were adapted for the purposes of this research. Some of these 
techniques were derived from sources such as the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C: Internet 
technology security and which was specifically used as a model for benchmark testing.  
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Other information security standard resources include CIS, ISSAF, NIST together with 
a host of information from other media such as WWW, journals, books and personal 
interviews integrated with information from CERT, CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI, Juniper, 
MS, NESSUS, NMAP and related ICT network and security websites. 
 
The two data analysis procedures employed for testing purposes were for the email and 
online web systems. Each data analysis procedure consisted of five stages, which 
covered (1) network surveying; (2) internetwork infrastructure review; (3) services and 
system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing; (4) vendor security 
benchmark auditing; and (5) security policy review. 
 
The data analysis framework procedures for the email and online web systems were 
exactly the same except for Stage 4. The email system analysis procedure contained 
both vendor security benchmark auditing and email spoofing testing (Figure 3.1), 
whereas the online web system analysis procedure tested only the backend database 
server of each of the selected councils (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.1. Data analysis framework: A stage module diagram for the analysis of the 
email system 
 43
 
 
Figure 3.2. Data analysis framework: A stage module diagram for the analysis of the 
online web system 
 
Details of each of the five stages of data analysis procedures for both the email and 
online web systems are explained below. 
 
Stage 1: Network surveying 
 
There were two sets of network surveying stages for each of the selected councils. Each 
network surveying stage consisted of specific internetwork data and information 
collection related to either the email or online web systems collected from each of the 
selected councils through the use of the following three artefacts: 
 
 44
 Overall network diagram for the internetwork link, the DMZ infrastructure 
connectivity of the related email or online web systems; 
 Configuration codes of all internetwork devices such as the Internet border 
router, the Internet firewall(s), the DMZ’s switch(s), the reverse proxy server and 
the related email or online web systems; and 
 Device specifications of all internetwork devices, namely the Internet border 
router, the Internet firewall(s), the DMZ’s switch(s), the reverse proxy server and 
the related email or online web systems. 
 
The network surveying stage for the email system collected information on 
specifications of the email server(s) and the spam blocker appliance(s). Conversely, the 
network surveying stage for the online web system collected information from the static 
web and application servers. Information from the CMS (if applicable) and the backend 
database system were also collected in this network surveying stage. 
 
All the public IP addresses of the network of the selected councils were concealed 
through the use of alias names to prevent any potential security risks. These 
designations were as follows: 
 
 “A” represents subnetwork group 1; 
 “B” represents subnetwork group 2; 
 “C” represents subnetwork group 3; and 
 “D” represents subnetwork group 4. 
 
Stage 2: Internetwork infrastructure review  
 
This internetwork infrastructure stage involves a review of the related specification and 
configuration codes data collection of the internetwork infrastructure devices for both 
the email and online web systems at the selected councils. The devices included the 
Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall(s), the DMZ switch(s) for all selected 
councils and the reverse proxy server for Council C only. This information was securely 
recorded on a workstation and later analysed for the purposes of this research only. 
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Stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing 
 
In this third testing stage, a network scanning technique was used for all three testing 
steps (services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing). Both 
NMAP and GFI LANguard network scanning tools were used for scanning the email 
and online web systems. These software applications are well known and widely used in 
the network industry. NMAP is a free open source application whereas GFI LANguard 
is a commercial application.  
 
NMAP with GUI standard (open source Zenmap version 5.0) for MS Windows XP 
version was run. The slow comprehensive scan option was used in the test in order to 
collect as much information as possible from the email and online web systems relating 
to TCP, UDP ports, vulnerabilities, patches, services, software and hardware. In 
addition, GFI LANguard version 9.0 with the full scan option was run in order to fully 
test and gather the target email and online web systems information. 
 
The services and system identification were categorised into two groups. These were the 
system information policy results and the system patching status results. The system 
information policy results was further summarised into three groups. These groups were 
the services, the password policy and the security audit policy. Additionally, the system 
patching status results were categorised into two groups. These groups were the missing 
service packs and the missing patches.  
 
The port scanning testing on the target servers of both the email and online web systems 
were run with the following options: 
 
 Full comprehensive scan in NMAP testing of all TCP and UDP ports; and 
 Comprehensive scan in GFI LANguard testing on all TCP and UDP ports. 
 
Stage 4: Vendor security benchmark auditing  
 
The email system testing involved two steps which included the general email spoofing 
testing and vendor security auditing as follows: 
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 Email spoofing testing: This step was adapted from an email spoofing template 
from the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C: Internet technology security as a guideline. 
The purpose of this email spoofing testing was to discover generally whether the 
email server was secured against any spoofing attacks; and 
 Email vendor security auditing: This specific auditing was modified to suit the 
email application server system of each of the selected councils. However, as 
each of the selected councils used the same template from CIS Benchmark for 
Exchange 2007 for Windows Server 2003 version 1.0 – Recommended Security 
Setting for Exchange Controls, there was no need for further adaptation. 
 
On the other hand, there was only one testing step carried out for the online web system 
as shown in Figure 3.2: Testing stage 4. This fourth testing stage was the vendor 
(database) security benchmark auditing on the backend database server of the selected 
councils. The database auditing template was designed to suit the application platform 
of the backend database in each of the selected councils.  
 
However, as each of the selected councils deployed the Security Configuration 
Benchmark for MS SQL Server 2005 version 1.2.0 from CIS, the database auditing 
template was the same for all. 
 
Stage 5: Email and online web systems security policy review 
 
The purpose of this email and online web systems security policy review stage was to 
review the IT security policy in relation to the email and online web systems. This email 
and online web systems security policy review stage included the investigation of the 
security related to the internetwork infrastructure and its devices, the email server(s), the 
backend database server(s) and the web server(s).  
 
Furthermore, this review covered an information security policy in general for the 
overall enterprise and technical security policy particularly on issue-specific and 
systems-specific security policies of the email and online web systems in each of the 
selected councils.  
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3.4 Research materials 
 
The sources of data and materials utilised in this research are described below.  
 
3.4.1 Primary data 
 
The primary data was made up of interviews and testing analysis as presented below in 
details.  
 
3.4.1.1 Interviews 
 
Several semi-structured interviews were conducted with the IT managerial staff (IT 
managers) and the IT operational staff (application, database, network, system, 
telecommunication and web administrators). 
 
The IT managerial staff were selected for this exercise as the responsibility of the 
decision making rested with them. This responsibility included advising the IT 
operational staff and providing direction for the protection of the organisations’ ICT 
systems. It also included the potential to support IS implementations and managerial 
judgement to enforce organisation policy for the success of the organisation (Pinto & 
Slevin, 1989; Robey, 1979). 
 
The inclusion of the IT managerial staff for the interviews was important as they were 
also responsible for the following activities associated with the security testing: 
 
 “Coordinating the development and maintenance of the organisation’s 
information security policies, standards and procedures; 
 Ensuring the establishment of, and compliance with, consistent security 
evaluation process for departments throughout the organisation; and 
 Participating in developing processes for decision-making and prioritisation of 
system for security testing” (Wack et al., 2003, pp. 2-4).  
 
 
 
 48
In addition to the IT managerial staff, the IT operational staff were selected as key 
stakeholders because of their day to day responsibilities such as network and system 
monitoring and maintenance. Their responsibilities included the implementation of the 
network and system securities and guidelines derived from the organisation policy for 
the utilisation of the IT system. It was considered important to include them in the 
interviews, as their security practices would facilitate better understanding of any 
security issues faced by the selected councils.  
 
Semi-guided interviews were deployed as an outline for open-ended answers. These 
were carried out in two steps with the IT managerial and IT operational staff at each of 
the selected councils. These interviews formed an initial baseline prior to the analysis of 
the data. The initial baseline interview was to establish the level of security policies for 
the email and online web systems technologies and the associated enforcement by the 
key stakeholders. The testing analysis interviews with post-interview reporting were 
designed to obtain the feedbacks or comments on the findings of the initial testing 
analyses with the aim of suggestions for further improvements.  
 
Additionally, no interviews were conducted with general end-users due to time 
constraints as well as the fact that such an exercise would be beyond the scope and 
reach of the charted research. 
 
3.4.1.2 Testing analysis  
 
There were two data gathering phases to obtain security data and information of the 
email and online web systems for the testing at each of the selected councils. This was 
to identify any potential security vulnerabilities or risks at these sites. Additional details 
were discussed and provided in Section 3.3.2.  
 
3.4.2 Secondary data 
 
The secondary data was made up of the document review. This review was a detailed 
inspection of all existing information, network diagrams and related IT security policies, 
and procedures documentation in both paper-based and electronic-based formats was 
done as permitted by each of the selected councils. 
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These documentations were used for analysis and comparison with particular 
references, for the internetwork infrastructure, system details and security policy of both 
the email and online web systems at each of the selected councils. They were later used 
as suitable guidelines for these councils in the reporting stages of the research. 
 
3.4.3 Software  
 
The software used to test both the email and online web systems were NMAP, GFI 
LANguard and Telnet. Both NMAP and GFI LANguard are well-known network 
scanning tools, which are powerful and widely used by IT security professionals. In 
addition, both NMAP and GFI LANguard use different algorithms for testing the 
network and extracting system information such as hardware, software, service(s), 
patch(s), port(s) and vulnerability(s) (personal communications with Professor Dr. Craig 
Valli and Dr. Andrew Woodward, 2008, 2009), thereby complementing each other. 
 
3.4.3.1 NMAP  
 
NMAP is the open source software available freely from the Internet. NMAP with GUI 
standard called Zenmap version 5.0 for MS Windows XP version was used. In order to 
obtain as much information as possible from the email and online web systems’ servers, 
the slow comprehensive scan option was used in all tests. This option returned all 
relevant information about TCP, UDP ports, vulnerabilities, patches, services, software 
and hardware (Lyon, 2009). 
 
3.4.3.2 GFI LANguard 
 
GFI LANguard version 9.0 is the commercial software that was deployed in all of the 
tests. The full scan option of GFI LANguard was used in order to fully test and collect 
the email and online web systems information. The software collected TCP, UDP ports, 
vulnerabilities, patches, services, software and hardware information. It also provided 
the vulnerability information which assisted in the analysis of both the email and online 
web systems (GFI, 2009). 
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3.4.3.3 Telnet 
 
MS Telnet software was employed to test against the email system for spoofing of email 
at each of the selected councils. This was conducted by telnetting to port 25 (SMTP) 
and manually probing the systems. 
 
3.5 Conceptual framework 
 
Figure 3.3 is the conceptual framework for each interpretive case study within the 
selected local councils in WA. This conceptual framework demonstrated a process as 
well as some techniques to collect and analyse data from a variety of sources. The use 
of interviews, document review and systems testing results and analyses provided a 
context for the examination and interpretation of the level of security information from 
a variety of perspectives, and was used to generate the report details of the testing 
analyses back to the selected councils. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. A conceptual framework for the processes involved in the audit of any case 
study 
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There were five main procedures in the conceptual framework and details are as below. 
 
1) Document review of the selected local councils in WA: This procedure related to 
the review of the current internetwork diagrams, the specifications and the 
configuration codes of internetwork devices, the policy documentations and the 
literature relating to the use of the email and online web systems in the selected 
councils. 
2) Interviews with the selected local councils in WA: This procedure focused on the 
interviews of the IT managerial and IT operational staff regarding and relating to 
the use of the email and online web systems in the selected councils. 
3) Analysis of testing results: This procedure involved the use of three network 
application analysis tools to investigate the email and online web systems for 
further assessment. These tools were NMAP, GFI LANguard and Telnet.  
4) Reporting details of the testing analysis back to the selected local councils in 
WA: This procedure was about the findings from the testing analysis of the email 
and online web systems that were reported back to the selected councils for 
further assessment, consideration and implementation. 
5) Post-interview analysis: This procedure involved the post-interview analysis of 
the IT managerial and IT operational staff about their perceptions and thoughts 
about the findings from both the email and online web system testing analyses. 
 
3.6 Limitations of the research 
 
There were two major factors that limited the research. A common criticism of case 
study methodology is that its dependence on a single case renders it insufficient and 
incompetent of providing a generalising conclusion (Hamel et al., 1993; Myers, 2000; 
Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1984, 1993, 1994). However, this limitation was offset as the findings 
were replicated from the multiple-case studies. Due to the extensiveness of data 
collection and collation and its subsequent analysis, it is believed that three to four case 
studies may provide a good logical model of information security frameworks for local 
councils in WA. Although the selected councils needed to have had reasonable Internet 
infrastructure and related technologies installed, this situation may not be applicable to 
small regional councils/shires. 
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However, the information security frameworks developed as results of this research, 
provide recommendations which may be adopted by any other councils and/or 
organisations for their information security implementation. 
 
Another limitation of this research was that the selected councils have moderately been 
alerted to the existing security problems of their email and online web systems. As a 
result, it would probably have introduced some bias into the selection and subsequent 
assessment of the cases.  
 
3.7 Summary  
 
This chapter described the research method, background and the developed information 
security frameworks for the email and online web systems deployed in this research. 
Klein and Myers (1999)’s principles of interpretive multiple-case studies was the design 
model used for conducting this research.  
 
Case study research design and procedures were served to integrate a proper alternative 
of qualitative techniques to raise the prosperity, validity and reliability of the research. 
Research materials were then explained in detail in Section 3.4. An outline of the 
possible limitations in case study research design and procedures, together with a 
strategy to minimise these weaknesses have also been provided. 
 
Accordingly, the research method deployed in this research was adopted and applied 
into each case which can be leaded to the results and fidings to the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS: A 
CASE STUDY OF COUNCIL A 
This chapter aims to illustrate the results and findings from Council A’s email and 
online web systems investigated in the research. It consists of five subsections as (1) 
background information; (2) methodology; (3) CouncilA’s email system results; (4) 
Council A’s online web system results; and (5) analysis and discusion. 
 
4.1 Background information 
 
Council A is a WA local government council which has its own IT department. 
Currently, the council’s main computer network is located at the external host Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) location which is connected to all the council sites including 
central and remote sites via fibre optic, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and Asymmetric 
Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) connections. The council is connected to the outside 
world or the Internet through the external ISP via a fibre optic connection. The network 
architecture of Council A is identified as star topology architecture. All the council’s IT 
service systems such as email, Intranet, property, GIS, financial and online web systems 
are located at the external host site. In addition, all the IT systems including both email 
and online web systems are managed by its own internal IT staff members. 
 
Council A’s email system has over 1,000 mailboxes which serve mainly its staff as well 
as the councillors and external contractors. MS Exchange 2007 is used by the council as 
an email application server whereas MS Outlook 2007 is used as the email client and 
personal information management tool. Furthermore, webmail or the web-based email 
(OWA – Outlook Web Access) feature is available to its staff for accessing the 
mailboxes externally from the web. 
 
In terms of the online web system services, the council provides general information, 
mailing lists and online community groups to its residents and interested persons. In 
addition, the council provides online payment services to its registered residents and it 
uses a third-party software called “Epathway” (Infor, 2009) for its online payment 
system.  
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4.2 Methodology 
 
This subsection aims to provide the details on methodology utilised in this research. It is 
categorised into six parts: (1) pre-interview consultation; (2) document review; (3) 
interview investigation; (4) existing architecture discovery; (5) email system testing; 
and (6) online web system testing. 
 
4.2.1 Pre-interview consultation  
 
Firstly, there was an initial open-ended meeting between the researcher, the principal 
supervisor and the council’s IT manager in order to determine the scope of the project. 
As a result, all involved parties agreed that both email and online web systems would be 
audited in order to determine any potential risks and recommendation solutions. 
 
The council agreed to an overall time frame of six months which included an estimate 
of three months for each report produced. Furthermore, the IT manager stipulated that 
this project was to be undertaken at no cost to the council and the council could end or 
abort this project at anytime as desired. It was also agreed that two reports with 
recommendations would be presented and distributed to the council in succession which 
were email and online web systems respectively. 
 
4.2.2 Document review  
 
Two types of related documents, which were specification documents hardware and 
software and the council policy documents were available. 
 
Several documents relating to Council A’s email and online web systems were 
collected. For example, configuration codes and specifications of the Internet border 
router, the IDS/IPS, the Internet border switch, the DMZ switch, the internal switch, the 
firewalls, the email server, the spam blocker appliances, the web servers and the 
backend database server. In addition, copies of the DMZ internetwork and overall 
network diagrams were collected. 
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In terms of IT security in relation to the email and online web systems, it was advised 
that both the enterprise information security and technical (both issue-specific and 
systems-specific) security policies were non-existent. Currently, Council A has the 
internet usage policy for a library community access to the internet (see Appendix A24).  
 
4.2.3 Interview investigation 
 
Several interviews were conducted with the three stakeholder groups as follows: 
 
 The IT manager of Council A; 
 The council’s IT operational staff (network, application and telecommunication 
administrators); and 
 The council’s external IT staff (database administrator). 
 
The face-to-face interview with the IT manager was used to obtain a general overview 
of Council A’s overall network and services, particularly with regards to the email and 
online web systems. The scope of the project was discussed including any possible 
potential risk issues overall, while conducting the project.  
 
Several ongoing interviews were conducted with the network, the Epathway 
application, the telecommunication and the database administrators. Several interview 
techniques were used such as face-to-face, telephone and email. 
 
The interviews carried out with the council’s network administrator and the 
telecommunication administrator were mainly related to discussions of the council 
infrastructure and its network connectivity which includes the firewalls, the Internet 
border router, the IDS/IPS, the switch, the virus protection system, the email server, the 
Active Directory (AD) and the DNS. In addition, the related configuration codes of all 
the related devices were discussed. 
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In terms of the web, application and database servers, there were several testing 
analyses and interviews conducted with the online payment application (Epathway) and 
the external database administrators. These testings covered the configurations of the 
council’s online payment system servers which are the frontend web server, the 
application server and the backend database server. 
 
4.2.4 Existing architecture discovery  
 
This section details the discovery of the existing architecture and structural operation 
relating to the email and online web systems of Council A. 
 
4.2.4.1 The existing email system architecture of Council A 
 
The email system of Council A has one email server and one spam blocker appliance. 
Both devices are connected together within the council’s network infrastructure at the 
data centre which is located at the council’s ISP. The email server resides in the internal 
network while the spam blocker appliance is located in the DMZ area.  
 
In terms of the infrastructure devices, the council has one Internet border router, one 
firewall, and three switches.  
 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the email system related devices connectivity and allowed 
email protocols in a high level network diagram. 
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Figure 4.1. A current high level network diagram for the email system of Council A 
 
In addition, two related email protocols, HTTPS and SMTP are allowed in the network. 
Both protocols provide typical email and secured webmail (HTTPS) services 
respectively to the council’s staff. In terms of webmail, the current email server (MS 
Exchange 2007) is configured to support the Client Access Server (CAS) form via MS 
Outlook Web App/Outlook Web Access (OWA). Other CAS forms such as MS Outlook 
Anywhere and MS ActiveSync are not supported. Furthermore, Council A’s webmail 
service uses 128-bit encryption with standard validation SSL certificate (Limwiriyakul 
& Valli, 2011c). 
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4.2.4.2 The existing online web system’s architecture of Council A 
 
Council A has two online web systems which are the static web system and the online 
payment system. The council’s online web system (online payment system) serves its 
residents in terms of online payment services such as rates and infringements. The 
online web servers are located in the DMZ and the internal network areas. As 
previously mentioned, the council’s online static web system was not tested. Therefore, 
the online static web system is only briefly discussed in the following section.  
 
4.2.4.2.1 The existing static web system architecture 
 
The council static web system consists of two web servers which are the Internet web 
server and the Intranet web server. The Internet web server is located in the DMZ and 
the Intranet web server is located in the council’s internal network. Both the Internet 
web and the Intranet web servers interact with each other in a one-way direction from 
the inside through the DMZ area via HTTP web protocol. This means that only the 
Intranet web server can send HTTP web traffic to the Intranet web server. In addition, 
the council’s media staff periodically pushes the updated data to the Internet web server. 
 
4.2.4.2.2 The existing online payment system architecture 
 
The council’s existing online payment system can be considered as a multi-tiered (3) 
client-server architecture which consists mainly of a frontend web, application, and 
backend database servers (Microsoft Corporation, 2010).  
 
The existing system is comprised of the frontend web server (CoA-DMZ-Epathweb), 
the application server (CoA-Pathway) and the backend database SQL server (CoA-
SQL) as depicted in Figure 4.2.  
 
The frontend web and application servers perform all of the application logic. The 
backend database server performs the data logic. In terms of application software, the 
council uses a third-party Pathway application with the online payment feature. 
Typically, three-tiered client-server architecture consists of the following three 
components: 
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 Presentation logic – displays information and content which is normally related 
to the user interface and user interactions via the client web browser; 
 Application logic (business, middle tier, data access) – synchronises the 
application, processes necessary commands and calculations required from the 
web and application servers; and 
 Data logic – deals with the storage and retrieval of information from the database 
or file server (Microsoft Corporation, 2010). 
 
There are benefits of deploying a three-tier client-server architecture as compared to 
traditional application architectures (host-based and client-based architectures). They 
are as follows: 
 
 Improved availability – redundant application servers can be deployed in case of 
hardware failure for critical applications; 
 Scalability – the system can be expanded to deploy more application servers 
(Microsoft Corporation,  2010); 
 Better security – no direct connection between client and database thereby 
ensuring data integrity. Moreover, the database is transparent; 
 Reduced distribution – changes to application/business logic are done once only 
on the server with no requirement to be distributed to all the clients; and 
 Easier to implement – “complex application rules are easy to implement in 
application server” (Kambalyal, n.d., p. 12). 
 
In addition, the council used an external gateway security payment service to provide a 
secured online payment service for its residents. Both the council’s online payment 
system and the external gateway security payment services communicate using the 
HTTPS protocol over a SSL connection which uses 128-bit encryption with standard 
validation SSL certificate same as its webmail system (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c). 
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Figure 4.2. The high level online payment system including network traffic protocols 
currently in use by Council A 
 
4.2.5 Email system testing  
  
There were five stages which are summarised as follows:  
 
 Network surveying includes discovery of the network architecture of the email 
system of Council. See Section 4.2.4.1 for more details. This testing stage also 
gathers information on the specifications of the email server and the spam 
blocker appliances of council A; 
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 Auditing and configuration codes review of the council’s Internet infrastructure 
including Internet border router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switching devices; 
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the 
email server; 
 Email spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark auditing on the email 
server and the spam blocker appliance; and 
 Email system security policy review. 
 
4.2.6 Online web system testing  
 
The online web system of the council can be categorised into two distinct application 
profiles which are the static web system and the online payment system. Both the static 
web and online payment systems have their own separate hardware for servers.  
 
However, the testing analysis was restricted to the on the online payment system as 
requested by the council’s IT operational staff. This online web system testing analysis 
which was conducted consists of five stages which are summarised as follows:  
 
 Network surveying: comprises the network architecture of the online payment 
system of Council A. See Section 4.2.4.2 for more details. This testing stage also 
gathers information from the static web, application and backend database 
servers related to the online web system of the council; 
 Identified risks review for the council’s internetwork infrastructure devices 
which related to Council A’s online payment system; 
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the 
council’s online payment system’s servers;  
 Vendor security benchmark auditing on the council’s online payment database 
server; and 
 Reviewing the council’s online payment system security policy. 
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4.3 Council A’s email system results 
 
The architecture design, the device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the email 
system servers, the email spoofing, the vendor security benchmark and the security 
policy were successfully tested, audited and reviewed. The following sections describe 
all the results of these testings in detail. 
 
4.3.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying 
 
In this first testing stage, information of the council’s email system which includes the 
email and spam blocker appliances, the infrastructure architecture and devices were 
collected. The following information was collected: 
 
 Overall network diagram for the Internet link, the DMZ infrastructure 
connectivity including the email system; See Section 4.2.4.1 for more details; 
 The specification and related email configuration codes of the Internet border 
router, the Internet firewall, the Internet switch and two DMZ switches; 
 The email server’s specification summary; and 
 The spam blocker appliance’s specification summary. 
 
The following sections describe the overall summary specifications of the email and 
spam blocker appliances and the associated identified risks. 
 
4.3.1.1 The email system devices 
 
There are two specific devices which are the email server (MS Exchange 2007) and the 
Symantec spam blocker appliance in Council A’s email system. 
 
4.3.1.1.1 The email server 
 
The current email server of Council A was migrated from its old MS Exchange 2003 
email server. The email server has MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with 
service pack 2 as an OS. MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1 is used as the email 
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application. The current MS Exchange 2007 email application configuration of the 
email server was configured as a simple single-server architecture which consisted of 
three of five server roles which are the Mailbox server, the Hub Transport server and the 
CAS roles. 
 
Nevertheless, the other two MS Exchange 2007 feature server roles; the Edge Transport 
and the Unified Messaging servers were not installed. This was due to the fact that 
Council A uses the Symantec spam blocker and the Cisco Unity voice mail system 
which perform the same function as the Edge Transport server role and the Unified 
Messaging server role respectively. Table 4.1 summarises the email server 
specifications. 
 
Table 4.1 A summary of the email server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Email application software MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1 
Email scanning software None 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2  
Hardware 8 Gigabyte (GB) Random Access Memory (RAM), Hard disks C: 
20GB, e: 180GB, f: 200GB 
IP address 172.16.25.251/24 
MS Exchange 2007 server roles Mailbox, Hub Transport, CAS combined 
Email service protocols SMTP and HTTPS 
Other software None 
 
In addition, according to Microsoft TechNet (2007a), a simple single-server architecture 
(MS Exchange 2007) should only be deployed in Windows’s Small Business Server 
(SBS) which is suitable for small network environments. 
 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture based on a single-role 
server. 
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Figure 4.3. The MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture based on a single-role server 
(Source: Microsoft TechNet, 2007a, p. 37) 
 
Furthermore, the following summarises the MS Exchange 2007’s server roles 
(Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team, 2009). 
 
 CAS(s): to support Post Office Protocol 3 (POP3) and Internet Message Access 
Protocol 4 (IMAP4) clients, MS Exchange ActiveSync, MS Office OWA and 
MS Outlook Anywhere and new MS Outlook 2007 client functions; 
 Edge Transport server(s): to handle message traffic to and from the Internet, run 
spam filters and handle SMTP relay; 
 Hub Transport server(s): to perform the internal message transfer, distribution 
list expansions, and message conversions between Internet mail and MS 
Exchange Server message formats; 
 Mailbox server(s): to manage mailboxes, store databases and provide MS Office 
Outlook clients and CAS with access to the data; and 
 Unified Messaging server(s): to integrate voice and fax with email messaging 
and run Outlook Voice Access. 
 
 
 65
4.3.1.1.2 The spam blocker appliance 
 
The spam blocker appliance was running on a Symantec hardware appliance with mail 
security for MS Exchange Server 2007 software. The purpose of this box is to filter all 
incoming email (SMTP) against virus and worm threats and to block spam emails. The 
spam blocker appliance has two network interfaces which are 192.168.1.92 and 
192.168.1.93. When incoming SMTP traffic enter the council’s network it goes through 
the 192.168.1.92 interface of the spam blocker appliance. Then, the SMTP traffic is 
checked and cleaned by the spam blocker appliance before forwarding the cleaned 
SMTP traffic to the firewall via its 192.168.1.93 interface. See Figure 4.4 for the detail 
on the demonstrated network connectivity of the council’s spam blocker appliance. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. A high level diagram of Council A's email spam blocker appliance 
 
As compared to MS Exchange 2007 server roles, this spam blocker appliance performs 
the same as the MS Edge Transport server role. Table 4.2 summarised the spam blocker 
appliance role.  
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Table 4.2 A summary of the spam blocker appliance specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Spam blocker application software Symantec Mail Security Suite 5.0.0-36 
OS Symantec 
Hardware Stand alone appliance 
Interfaces 192.168.1.92 for sending and receiving SMTP traffics 
between outside/external and DMZ networks 
192.168.1.93 for sending and receiving SMTP traffics 
between the council A inside/internal and DMZ networks 
Feature roles Scan virus, block spam email, block emails blacklist  
 
4.3.1.2 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of testing stage 1 for Council A’s email system are described 
in the following sections. 
 
 Risk 1: Virus protection software 
  
The current email server does not have any virus protection software installed. This may 
be a source of potential risks against virus and worm attacks. 
 
 Risk 2: Single point of failure 
 
Council A’s current email architecture may be considered as a simple single-server 
architecture as previously mentioned. As per recommended best practices by Microsoft 
Exchange Documentation Team (2009), a simple single-server (MS Exchange 2007) 
architecture should only be installed in MS Windows SBS which is typically designed 
for small network environments and low network loads. However, the current Council 
A’s email system and its network environment are considered to be a medium-sized 
network as the email server handles over 1,000 mailboxes and provides email services 
to over 700 staff.  
 
The current email server performs three MS Exchange 2007 server roles concurrently as 
previously mentioned. Therefore, this may be considered as being a single point of 
failure due to the single email server having to handle all three MS Exchange server 
roles. 
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 Risk 3: Same subnetwork 
 
The existing email server is positioned in the council’s internal network and on the 
same subnetwork Virtual Local Area Network 5 (VLAN5) with all the other council’s 
servers. This configuration may be exposing the council to potential risks as there are no 
filtering mechanisms in place to separate or isolate traffic between the email and the 
other council’s servers. 
 
This may cause possible direct or indirect interruptions to Council A’s IT services in the 
case of the email server being compromised, thereby allowing any infections or 
intrusions to spread to other servers within the network. The filtering of network traffic 
to and from the email server may therefore prevent or reduce this risk. The network 
traffic filtering can be performed at Council A’s core switch. 
 
4.3.2 Testing stage 2: The email system’s infrastructure – Internet border router, 
IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews 
 
The data collection of the device configuration codes for the Internet border router, the 
IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switch were reviewed and are presented in the following 
sections. 
 
4.3.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
Council A’s Internet border router is designed for routing purposes to route either 
forward or reverse the council’s internetwork traffic or supported protocols such as 
Citrix server and client services, email and WWW. The current router is also configured 
to filter unnecessary traffic which means only permitted protocols are allowed to enter 
and leave the council’s network. Table 4.3 summarises the specifications of the Internet 
border router. 
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Table 4.3 A summary of the Internet border router specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device type Cisco router 2811 
OS Cisco Internetwork OS (IOS) 12.4 
Memory 256 Megabyte (MB) RAM, 64MB flash  
Interface (2) 2 x Ethernet 10/100 full duplex 
IP address A.B.D.62/30, A.B.C.65/29 
 
4.3.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
The Internet border router and the firewall of Council A have their own built-in IDS/IPS 
and IPS features respectively. However, the IPS features on both these devices were 
currently disabled. It is important to have an active IDS/IPS system to provide early 
warning information about intrusions or intrusion attempts to the network or system 
administrators. 
 
This information may reduce any potential risks against the network including the email 
system by allowing the network or the system administrator ample time to counteract 
the intrusion threats. 
 
4.3.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
The firewall of Council A provides filtering of both incoming and outgoing 
internetwork traffic. The firewall also performs NAT. Table 4.4 summarises the 
specifications of the firewall. See previous Figure 4.1 for illustration of the firewall 
network architecture. In addition, the summary of the firewall configuration codes 
including NAT related to the email system are summarised in Appendix A1.  
 
Furthermore, Appendix A2 shows the summary of the firewall codes with respect to 
Council A’s email system. 
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Table 4.4 A summary of the firewall specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device type Cisco ASA 
OS ASA version 7.1 (2) 
Memory 512 MB RAM, 64MB flash 
Interfaces 5 x Ethernet 10/100 full duplex 
IP addresses Interface gigabit 0/0: A.B.C.66  
Interface gigabit 0/1.16: 172.16.23.254, Interface gigabit 0/1.69: 192.168.1.254 
Interface gigabit 0/2.31: 172.33.0.1 (Virtual Private Network or VPN), Interface 
gigabit 0/2.67: A.B.C.x (VPN) 
Interface gigabit 0/3.10: LAN failover, Interface gigabit 0/3.11: state failover 
Interface management 0/0: 10.1.80.11 
 
In addition, the access to the firewalls for administration purposes is already securely 
configured as it only allows authorised staff (IT administrators) access based on 
computer IP addresses. Both Secure Shell (SSH) and HTTPS are the only secure 
communication methods which only permit valid username and password combinations.  
  
4.3.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
Council A has three Ethernet switches which provide connectivity for the council’s 
internetwork. The Outside_sw provides connections between the Internet border router 
and the firewalls. The Fwswitch and DMZ_sw switches provide DMZ connections for 
the council’s DMZ servers.  
 
In addition, the Fwswitch is connected to the council’s core switch (Cisco Catalyst 
6500). The council’s core switch provides backbone and internal server connectivity. 
The current overall hardware and software details of the three switches are depicted in 
Table 4.5. The details on ports, VLANs including its connectivity are provided in 
Figure 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 Current switches hardware and software details of Council A’s 
internetworking system 
 
Attributes Details 
Device name Outside_sw 
Device type Cisco Catalyst 3650 SM switch 
OS Cisco IOS version 12.2 
Memory 256 MB 
Port 24 x 10/100 MB Unshielded Twisted Pair (UTP) Ethernet ports, 2 x GB 
Small Form-Factor Pluggable (SFP) ports 
Operate at Layer 2 Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
IP address A.B.C.69 
VLAN number 1 
 
Device name Fwswitch 
Device type Cisco Catalyst 3650 SM switch 
OS Cisco IOS version 12.2 
Memory 256 MB 
Port 24 x 10/100 MB UTP Ethernet ports, 2 x GB SFP ports 
Operate at Layer 2 OSI 
IP address None 
VLAN number(s) 20, 254 
Device name DMZ_sw 
Device type Cisco Catalyst 3650 SM switch 
OS Cisco IOS version 12.2 
Memory 256 MB 
Port 24 x 10/100 MB UTP Ethernet ports, 2 x GB SFP ports 
Operate at Layer 2 OSI 
IP address 192.168.1.250/24 
VLAN number(s) 1, 16, 31, 67, 69 
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Figure 4.5. A current low level network diagram of the email system for Council A 
 
4.3.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues 
 
The following section details the identified risk issue for the council’s email 
infrastructure system (Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the 
switches). 
 
 Risk 1: Unnecessary ACL coding on the Internet border router 
 
There was a single unnecessary configuration code (see Appendix A2: Policy number 3) 
uncovered on the Internet border router. 
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 Risk 2: Internet border router’s IDS was disabled 
 
Currently, the built-in IDS/IPS feature of the Internet border router (Cisco 2811) is 
disabled which may be a potential security risk due to being vulnerable to scanning and 
spoofing attacks.  
 
 Risk 3: Firewall’s IPS was disabled 
 
The current IPS feature on the firewall (Cisco ASA) is disabled which means both 
incoming and outgoing SMTP and HTTPS email related protocols are not inspected. 
This may cause potential risks, such as DoS and malicious code attacks (Check Point 
Software Technologies Ltd., 2010) to the council’s network and email system.  
 
 Risk 4: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP and HTTPS 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix A2: Policy number 1) allows the spam blocker 
appliance (interface 192.168.1.92) access anywhere via HTTP and HTTPS ports. 
 
 Risk 5: Unused firewall ACL coding – LDAP, MS-DS 
 
The current firewall rules (see Appendix A2: Policy numbers 4, 8 and 9) are configured 
to allow the decommissioned internal server (172.16.5.70) and the spam blocker 
appliance to communicate via LDAP and MS-DS ports.  
 
 Risk 6: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – SMTP  
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix A2: Policy number 10) allows the spam blocker 
appliance (interface 192.168.1.92) to directly access the email server via SMTP port, 
which is an inadequate configuration code. 
 
 Risk 7: Unused firewall ACL coding – MS-WBT-Server 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix A2: Policy number 16) is configured to allow 
the email server to access the decommissioned server (192.168.1.89) in the DMZ via 
TCP port 3389.  
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 Risk 8: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations 
 
There were some insufficient switch security configuration codes on all the three 
Ethernet switches. These may cause potential security risks such as Address Resolution 
Protocol (ARP) spoofing, ARP poisoning and broadcast storm attacks to Council A’s 
internetwork.  
 
4.3.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning, 
vulnerability testing and results 
 
NMAP and GFI LANguard were the network scanning tools used for all three testing 
steps of this third testing stage. Both the software applications were run with full scan or 
comprehensive options in order to collect as much information as possible, as well as to 
fully test the council’s email system at the same time. This use of the applications in this 
way creates scanning that is rigorous and intense. 
 
4.3.3.1 Services and system identification results  
 
The results of the services and system identification of Council A’s MS Exchange 2007 
email server are described in the following sections. However, there was no testing on 
the spam blocker appliance conducted as it was prohibited by the council’s IT manager. 
More details are provided in Appendices A3 and A4. 
 
4.3.3.2 Port scanning results  
 
The port scanning testing analysis using both NMAP and GFI LANguard was 
successfully performed on the council’s email server. However, no port scanning was 
performed on the council’s spam blocker as requested by the IT staff.   
 
Full details of the port scanning results of the council’s email server are found in 
Appendix A5. 
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4.3.3.3 Vulnerability testing results  
 
The vulnerability testing was successfully conducted on Council A’s email server. 
However, as previously mentioned, testing of the spam blocker appliance was 
prohibited. Therefore, there was no vulnerability testing done on the spam blocker 
appliance. The vulnerabilities of the email server are categorised into four security 
levels which are high (H), medium (M), low (L) and potential (P) based on GFI 
LANguard analysis software. Full details of the vulnerability testing results of the 
council’s email server are presented in Appendix A6. 
 
4.3.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council A’s email system are described 
as follows. 
 
 Risk 1: System information policy results for the email server 
 
There were inadequate measures of the system information policy’s configuration of the 
council’s email server which may cause potential risks to the council’s email system.   
 
 Risk 2: System patching status results for the email server 
 
Both GFI LANguard and NMAP network scanning tools were used to test the system 
patching status of the council’s email server. There were vulnerability issues uncovered 
which may create possible threats to the email server. The scan uncovered that the 
service packs were current but there were nine missing patches on the email server. See 
Appendix A4 for more details. 
 
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on the email server 
 
There were no issues found on the UDP ports. However, there were some issues 
uncovered on the TCP ports of the email server. These TCP ports were unnecessarily 
opened ports which pose potential risks to the council’s email server. Table 4.6 displays 
the total numbers of TCP service ports opened on the email server. Furthermore, the full 
details of all both opened TCP and UDP service ports including the possible mitigation 
recommendations for the email server are listed in Appendix A5. 
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Table 4.6 List of the number of open TCP and UDP ports on the email server 
 
Server name Opened TCP ports Opened UDP ports  Comment 
Email server 31 5 Refer to Appendix A5 
 
 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on the email server 
 
In terms of identified risk issues, there were two high, seven low and three potential risk 
categories uncovered issues found on the council’s email server. For examples, there 
were unnecessary TCP services left opened such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and 
POP3. TCP services were inadvertently left opened which may cause potential risks to 
the council’s email system. Table 4.7 shows the total numbers of the vulnerabilities 
found on the email server.  
 
Table 4.7 The overall of Council A’s email server – vulnerabilities 
 
Server name H M L P Overall vulnerability level Comment 
Email server  2 0 7 3 High (10/10) Refer to Appendix A6 
 
4.3.4 Testing stage 4: Spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark email server 
auditing  
 
4.3.4.1 Email system spoofing testing results  
 
There were several spoofing testings conducted on the email server. Furthermore, at this 
time the council’s IT manager permitted testing the council’s spam blocker appliance. 
Therefore, both interfaces (192.168.1.92 and 192.168.1.93) of the spam blocker 
appliance were also tested. A CIS template was used for the spoofing testings. There 
were identified risk issues found on the email server and the spam blocker appliance 
(interface 192.168.1.92). In terms of spoofing, there was no identified risk found on the 
spam blocker appliance (interface 192.168.1.93).  
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In addition, there was an egression testing on Council A’s email system. As per best 
practice guidelines recommended by OSSTMM (Herzog, 2006) the council’s email 
system correctly disallowed sending email from an internal address to either an internal 
or external address using a third-party POP3 server such as Yahoo Mail server. The 
egression testing result is presented in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8 The egression testing result and recommendation for Council A’s email 
system 
 
Testing technique Purpose Result Recommendation 
Sending an email from one 
internal address to either an 
internal or external addresses 
using an external, a third-
party POP server. 
To test egression Unsuccessful None 
 
4.3.4.2 Specific email security vendor auditing results  
 
CIS for MS Exchange 2007 for MS Windows Server 2003 version 1 was modified to 
suit Council A’s email system. The modified auditing checklist was successfully tested 
on the council’s email server. The current MS Exchange 2007 email server was not 
configured for both the Exchange Edge Transport and Unified Messaging server roles. 
Therefore, both server roles were not included in the modified auditing checklist. 
 
The summary auditing results and mitigation recommendations of the MS Exchange 
2007 email server are categorised into three server roles which are the Mailbox server, 
the Hub Transport server and the CAS roles. Tables 4.23, 4.24 and 4.25 on Section 
4.5.1.1 provide details of these auditing results. 
 
4.3.4.3 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues for the email spoofing, the Mailbox server, the Hub Transport 
server and the CAS roles of the council’s email server are presented as follows. 
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 Risk 1: The email server allowed relaying 
 
Both internal and external relaying was allowed to be sent internally on the email 
server. This mail relaying may be a cause of potential risks from internal spoofing 
attacks to the council’s email server. 
 
 Risk 2: The spam blocker appliance (interface 192.168.1.92) allowed relaying 
 
Similar to the situation on the email server, emails from both internal and external 
source addresses were allowed to be sent to the 192.168.1.92 interface destined for the 
council’s internal or external email addresses. This situation is yet another cause of 
potential risks to the council’s email system as the system allows anyone from the 
council’s internal network to distribute email message via the spam blocker appliance 
without go to the council’s email server. 
 
 Risk 3: The Mailbox server role 
 
Council A’s Mailbox server role has one mailbox. As per best practice guidelines 
recommended by CIS (2007), there were a number of mis-configurations on the 
council’s Mailbox server role. For examples, both the email send and receive size were 
set to unlimited. This may a cause an unnecessary increase in the storage area of the 
email server. It may also create unnecessary network traffic to the council’s network. 
This extra network traffic may affect the speed of the valid network traffic due to the 
increased volume caused by the extra load. See Table 4.23 for more details. 
 
 Risk 4: The Hub Transport server role 
 
Council A’s Hub Transport server role has one default group this is not optimal. As per 
best practice guidelines recommended by CIS (2007), the current setting on the Hub 
Transport server role of the council’s email server should be reconfigured to provide 
better security to the MS Exchange 2007 email server of the council. See Table 4.24 for 
more details. 
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 Risk 5: The CAS role 
 
As previously mentioned, both the POP3 and IMAP4 related mail protocols are not 
being used at Council A. Therefore, both features of the CAS role were not included in 
this modified checklist. There were some inadequate settings on the council’s CAS role. 
These inadequate settings may cause potential risks to the council MS Exchange 2007 
email server. See Table 4.25 for more details.  
 
4.3.5 Testing stage 5: The email system security policy review 
 
There was only a community access to Internet policy (see Appendix A24) on library 
usage for the council. This library usage policy clarified the conditions of use for 
community access to the Internet via Council A’s computer network. However, no other 
information security policy or any technical policy (either issue-specific or systems-
specific security policy) was in existence for staff of the council. Consequently, there 
were no rules, policy or procedure guidelines for the IT operational staff of the council 
to follow.  
 
4.3.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues 
 
The lack of any related email security guidelines can create a source of vulnerability to 
potential risks to the council’s email and related systems in the form of unintended 
interruptions or intentional misuse of the email service. 
 
 Risk 1: Interruption of the email service 
 
The lack of an email security guideline such as any email server configuration 
documentation may lead to misconfigration of the email server which may be a cause of 
potential downtime to the server and its email service to the staff of Council A. 
 
 Risk 2: Misuse of the email service 
 
The lack of an email security guideline may also lead to poor communication of risk in 
terms of the email system which may create a cause of potential risk which can allow 
unauthorised persons to use the email server as a source to launch abuse or attacks in the 
form of spam email to the staff of Council A.  
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4.4 Council A’s online web system results 
 
The architecture design, the device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the online 
system servers, the vendor security benchmark and the security policy were successfully 
tested, audited and reviewed for Council A. The following sections describe all the 
results of these testings in detail. 
 
4.4.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying 
 
This network surveying stage was conducted in a similar way as completed in the 
Testing stage 1 of the email system. In summary, the following network specifications 
and policy documents of the council’s online web system were collected:  
 
 The overall network diagram for the Internet link, the DMZ infrastructure 
connectivity, and the ACL codes and specifications of the firewall which related 
to the council’s online web system; 
 The council’s online web system related configuration codes for the Internet 
border, the IDS/IPS and the internetwork switches specifications; and 
 The summary of three online payment servers (the DMZ frontend web, the 
application and the backend database servers) specifications. 
 
The following sections describe the overall summary specifications of the online 
payment system devices at Council and the associated identified risks.  
 
4.4.1.1 The online payment system devices 
 
There online payment system comprised of three specific devices which were the 
frontend web server (the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb), the application server (the CoA-
Pathway) and the backend database server (the CoA-SQL). 
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4.4.1.1.1 The frontend web server 
 
The location of the council frontend web server is in the council’s DMZ area. It 
provides the frontline interface to the client web browser. The council’s residents can 
access the frontend web server through the council’s website 
(https://services.coa.wa.gov.au) and make payments using their valid assessment 
number for rates, payment reference for applications or ticket numbers for 
infringements. The frontend web server synchronises with the application server via the 
HTTP port. 
 
In addition, the application server performs SQL queries directly to the backend 
database server using the assigned specific TCP port (2134). Table 4.9 displays the 
overall details of the frontend web server specifications. 
 
Table 4.9 A summary of the frontend web server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name CoA-DMZ-Epathweb 
Application software Epathway, Epathweb 
Other application software Trend Micro virus protection software 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2 
Hardware IBM eServer BladeCenter 
IP address 192.168.1.84/24 
 
4.4.1.1.2 The application server 
 
The application server functions as a middle tier application server which interacts with 
the frontend web server and the backend database server. It synchronises the 
transactions of the Pathway application, the processes commands and the calculations 
from the backend database server. Table 4.10 summarised the application server 
specifications. 
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Table 4.10 A summary of the application server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name CoA-Pathway 
Application software Pathway 
Other application software Trend Micro virus protection software 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2 
Hardware IBM eServer BladeCenter 
IP address 172.16.25.173/24 
 
4.4.1.1.3 The backend database server 
 
The backend database server is a physical MS SQL Server 2005 cluster which consists 
of two servers (the CoA-SQL1 and the CoA-SQL2). The two clustered servers work as 
part of a redundant system where one server is in active mode and the other one is in 
standby mode. The database server has most of the council‘s database applications such 
as accounting, human resources, building, and recreation systems. These software 
applications are running concurrently.  
 
In terms of the online payment system, the backend database server keeps all the 
important information such as payment numbers, rate and infringement notice reference 
numbers, usernames, passwords and addresses. In addition, it holds sensitive 
information such as credit card numbers and an expiry dates. Table 4.11 presents the 
summarised of the backend database server specifications. 
 
Table 4.11 A summary of the backend database servers’ specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name CoA-SQL1 
Application software MS SQL Server 2005 
Other application software Trend Micro virus protection software 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise x64 Edition with service pack 2 
Hardware IBM eServer BladeCenter HS21, 4 x Central Processing Unit (CPU) 
EM64T 3 GHz, 16 GB RAM 
IP address 172.16.25.222/24, 10.90.0.100/24 (Heartbeat: redundancy) 
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Table 4.11 A summary of the backend database servers’ specifications (continued) 
 
Attributes Details 
Name CoA-SQL2 
Application software MS SQL Server 2005 
Other application software Trend Micro virus protection software 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise x64 Edition with service pack 2 
Hardware IBM eServer BladeCenter HS20, 4 x CPU EM64T 3 GHz, 10 GB RAM 
IP address 172.16.25.224/24, 10.90.0.101/24 (Heartbeat: redundancy) 
  
Name CoA-SQL 
IP address 172.16.25.227/24 
Role SQL server cluster 
 
4.4.1.2 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of testing stage 1 for Council A’s online payment system are 
described in the following sections. 
 
 Risk 1: Sensitive data stored in the backend database server 
 
As previously mentioned, the council’s backend database server holds the council’s 
resident sensitive information such as credit numbers, expiry dates and credit card 
types. These sensitive data have been entered manually by the council’s payroll staff.  
 
Furthermore, the sensitive data is kept in unencrypted (clear text) format and can 
therefore be viewed openly by anyone accessing the system. This means any staff 
members that have access to the backend database server are able to view the sensitive 
information. This scenario poses a very high risk in terms of staff access and may cause 
the council susceptibility to loss of trust, identity theft and damage to the council’s 
reputation. 
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 Risk 2: The application and the backend database servers are located in the same 
subnet 
 
Both the online payment application server and the online payment backend database 
server are located in the council’s internal network. Both the application and the 
backend database servers have the same subnet or IP address range and is also the same 
as the other internal servers. Common attacks such as viruses, Trojans and DoS may 
cause potential risks against the council’s online payment system particularly to the 
backend database server and the other internal servers as well. 
 
4.4.2 Testing stage 2: The infrastructure of the online web system – Internet 
border router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews 
 
This second testing stage consisted of the review of the software configuration codes for 
the router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switches. 
 
4.4.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
The council’s Internet border router specifications were previously discussed in Section 
4.3.2.1. In terms of the council’s online payment system, the Internet border router was 
configured correctly providing routing connectivity. 
 
4.4.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
As previously mentioned in Section 4.3.2.2, both the current IDS and IPS features have 
been disabled. 
 
4.4.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
The details of the Internet firewalls specifications can be found in the previously 
discussed in Section 4.3.2.3. 
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4.4.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
Council A’s internetwork has three switches as previously mentioned. Details of the 
architecture, the configuration codes and the hardware specifications are previously 
discussed and addressed in Section 4.3.2.4. Nevertheless, details on ports and VLANs, 
including connectivity for the council’s online payment system are displayed in Figure 
4.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. A current low level network diagram of the online payment system for 
Council A 
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4.4.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues 
 
The following section details the identified risk issues for the online payment 
infrastructure system (Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switches) 
of the council. 
 
 Risk 1: Firewall’s IPS was disabled 
 
As previously explained in Section 4.3.2.5, the IPS of the council was disabled which 
meant that incoming online payment web traffic (HTTPS) was not inspected for 
abnormal patterns. According to Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. (2010) 
security guidelines, this can cause potential risks such as DoS attacks, to the council’s 
online payment system. 
 
 Risk 2: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTPS inwards 
 
Currently, the firewall permits HTTPS traffic from anywhere (see Appendix A7: Policy 
number 1), allowing access to the online payment frontend web server. As per standard 
firewall configurations best practice, this can be a cause of potential risks to the 
frontend web server. 
 
 Risk 3: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – Allows IP protocol from specific 
computer to the frontend web server 
 
The firewall permits two specific internal IP addresses (the IT operational staff’s 
computers) to access the online frontend web server via IP protocol (see Appendix A7: 
Policy numbers 5 and 6). This may cause potential risks in the form of an internal 
attacker taking control of the IT operational staff’s computers. 
 
 Risk 4: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – Allows two-way communications via 
TCP port 2134 between the frontend web server and the internal backend database 
server 
 
The firewall rule allows two-way communications between the frontend web server and 
the internal backend database server (the CoA-SQL) via the assigned TCP port 2134 
(see Appendix A7: Policy numbers 9 and 21). This allows an SQL query from the CoA-
DMZ-Epathweb server to the CoA-SQL server directly (personal communications with 
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Council A, 2009). This may cause potential risks such as a DoS and SQL injection into 
the council’s CoA-SQL backend database server which could lead to corruption, 
extraction or possible manipulation of data from any database being served.  
 
For example, an attacker may use a SQL injection manipulation or function call 
injection attack technique to manipulate or modify the contents of the online payment 
database of the council (Joshi, 2011). The manipulation of the database file contents can 
be in the form of deletion or modification of the individual record details of residents of 
the council. Preventing this two-way communication on the firewall will prevent this 
type of vulnerability. See Figure 4.7 for more details. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. The high level online payment system including network traffic protocols 
currently in use by Council A 
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 Risk 5: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP and DNS outwards 
 
The firewall permits the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server access to anywhere via HTTP and 
DNS (UDP port 53) (see Appendix A7: Policy numbers 13 and 14). This may be a 
source of potential risk in case of the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server being used as a proxy 
for staging further attacks on systems internal and external to the council. 
 
 Risk 6: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP inter-devices 
 
The firewall allows the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server access the internal servers (IP 
172.16.25.214, 172.16.25.194, 172.16.25.193) via HTTP port 80 (see Appendix A7: 
Policy numbers 17, 19 and 20). As per best practice recommendations to standard 
firewall configurations, this may be a cause of potential risks as the DMZ web server 
may directly access to the internal servers via HTTP port. This HTTP port may consider 
as an unsecure web port when compared with HTTPS. 
 
 Risk 7: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations 
 
This point has been previously discussed in Section 4.3.2.5 
 
4.4.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning, 
vulnerability testing and results 
 
Similarly techniques in Section 4.3.3 of the email system were used in this third testing 
stage. Both network scanning tools (NMAP and GFI LANguard) were conducted on all 
the testings steps (services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability 
testings). 
 
4.4.3.1 Services and system identification results  
 
Appendices A8, A9, A10 and A11 provide the full details of the services and system 
identification testing results for the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb, the CoA-Pathway and the 
CoA-SQL servers. Furthermore, this section can be identified issues into two groups 
(system information policy results and system patching status results) similar to Section 
4.3.3.1. 
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4.4.3.2 Port scanning results  
 
Similarity to Section 4.3.3.2, both NMAP and GFI LANguard were used to scan the 
council online payment web servers. Moreover, both unnecessary TCP and UDP ports 
were identified in all the three servers (the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb, the CoA-Pathway and 
the CoA-SQL servers). Full details of the port scanning results are found in Appendices 
A12, A13 and 14. 
 
4.4.3.3 Vulnerability testing results  
 
Similar to Section 4.3.3.3, the vulnerability testing result can be categorised into four 
groups which are the high, medium, low and potential security risks based on the GFI 
standard. There were vulnerabilities identified on all the three servers of the online 
payment system. Full details of the vulnerability testing results are found in Appendices 
A15, 16 and 17. 
 
4.4.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council A’s online payment system are 
described as follows. 
 
 Risk 1: System information policy results for all the three servers 
 
There were some insufficiently secured services, poor password and security auditing 
policies presented in the MS Windows configuration settings on all three online 
payment servers at Council A. These configurations may create potential vulnerabilities 
to the council’s online payment system. More details are provided in Appendices A8, 
A9 and A10. 
 
 Risk 2: System patching status results for all the three servers 
 
There were no missing service packs and patches on the CoA-Epathweb and the CoA-
SQL servers. However, there were missing service packs as well as patches on the CoA-
Pathway server. These missing service packs and patches are a source of potential risks 
to the council’s online payment system. 
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 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on all the three servers 
 
There were 22 TCP and 11 UDP opened ports which include unnecessary ports on the 
CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server. On the CoA-Pathway server, there were 22 TCP and nine 
UDP opened ports which include unnecessary ports. Furthermore, there were 23 TCP 
and 14 UDP opened ports on the CoA-SQL server. These unnecessary opened TCP and 
UDP ports are a cause of potential risks such as manipulation of the database, 
unauthorised access and DDoS attacks to the council’s online payment servers.  
 
Table 4.12 displays the overall opened TCP and UDP ports of three servers of the 
council’s online payment system. The overall opened TCP and UDP ports together with 
the recommended opened ports for the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb, CoA-Pathway and CoA-
SQL servers are provided in Appendices A12, A13 and A14 respectively. 
 
Table 4.12 Overall opened TCP and UDP ports of all Council A’s online payment 
servers 
 
Server names Opened TCP ports Opened UDP ports Comments 
CoA-DMZ-Epathweb 22 11 Refer to Appendix A12 
CoA-Pathway 22 9 Refer to Appendix A13 
CoA-SQL 23 14 Refer to Appendix A14 
 
 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on all the three servers 
 
There were Ports 1 and 8012 opened on the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server which may 
lead to a source of potential risks from Trojan attacks. Table 4.13 depicts the summary 
of the overall vulnerability testing results of the three servers, whereas the full details of 
vulnerability testing results and possible mitigation recommendations of the three online 
payment servers are provided in Appendices A15, A16 and A17 respectively. 
 
Table 4.13 Overall vulnerability of the three online payment servers of Council A 
 
Server names H M L P Overall vulnerability levels Comments 
CoA-DMZ-Epathweb 6 0 7 2 High (10/10) Refer to Appendix A15 
CoA-Pathway 1 0 2 0 High (8/10) Refer to Appendix A16 
CoA-SQL 2 0 2 2 High (8/10) Refer to Appendix A17 
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4.4.4 Testing stage 4: Vendor security: Database security benchmark auditing  
 
This fourth testing stage pertains to the audit and analysis of database security on the 
council’s backend database server (the CoA-SQL). 
 
4.4.4.1 Database security benchmark results  
 
MS SQL server 2005 is the database application software which is used in Council A’s 
backend database server. The Security Configuration Benchmark for MS SQL Server 
2005 version 1.2.0 January 12th, 2010 from CIS Benchmark was used and adapted as a 
prime benchmark auditing tool. According to CIS (2010), the CIS benchmark auditing 
tool consists of nine categories as follows: 
 
1. OS and network specification configuration; 
2. SQL server installation and patches; 
3. SQL server settings; 
4. Access controls; 
5. Auditing and logging; 
6. Backup and disaster recovery procedures; 
7. Replication; 
8. Application development best practices; and 
9. Surface area configuration tool. 
 
Furthermore, the risk rating can be categorised into four groups as follows: 
 
 “H” represents a high risk level which may cause highly impact interruption to 
the council backend database server and related system; 
 “M” represents a medium risk level which may cause negatively impact 
performance and utility to the council backend database and its applications; 
 “L” represents a low risk level which may cause minor or little impact to the 
council backend database server and its applications; and 
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 “P” represents a potential risk level which may be a cause of potential risks to 
the council backend database server and its database applications. 
 
Group one to six were successfully audited. However, group seven to nine were not 
audited as they were not applicable to the council’s backend database environment. 
 
4.4.4.2 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues for the configuration of the MS SQL 2005 database on the 
council’s backend server are presented as follow. 
 
 Risk 1: Inadequate configuration for the database application of the backend 
database server 
 
There were some identified security issues on the CoA-SQL server from the auditing. 
These security issues are a cause of potential risks to the backend database server. The 
overall security issues uncovered (unsatisfactory) together with the risk rating of 
Council A’s online payment backend database server based on the six audited category 
groups are presented in Table 4.14. Appendices A18, A19, A20, A21, A22 and A23 
provide the full details of all the findings and the possible mitigation recommendations. 
 
Table 4.14 The overall risks of the six audited categories of the online payment backend 
database server (the CoA-SQL) 
 
Category no. Risks 
(H) 
Risks 
(M) 
Risks 
(L) 
Risks 
(P) 
Comments 
1) OS and network specification 
configuration 
1 0 6 3 Refers to Appendix A18 
2) SQL server installation and patches 0 2 0 1 Refers to Appendix A19 
3) SQL server settings 1 2 4 8 Refers to Appendix A20 
4) Access controls 1 3 0 0 Refers to Appendix A21 
5) Auditing and logging 0 0 0 43 Refers to Appendix A22 
6) Backup and disaster recovery 
procedures 
0 1 3 1 Refers to Appendix A23 
7) Replication N/A N/A N/A N/A None 
8) Application development best 
practices 
N/A N/A N/A N/A None 
9) Surface area configuration tool N/A N/A N/A N/A None 
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4.4.5 Testing stage 5: The online web system security policy review 
 
In terms of the online payment system, there is currently no existing information 
security policy including any technical and specific system security policies.  
 
4.4.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues 
 
The lack of policy guidelines can be a cause of serious risks to the council’s online 
payment system.  The cause of these risks could be attributed to the following issues. 
 
 Risk 1: Poor communication of risk 
 
This was evident from the lack of discussion and discourses related to risk assessment 
and risk management as these topics were notably absent from the weekly IT 
operational staff meetings (personal communications with Council A, 2009, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, there were some specific verbal discussions in relation to the lack of IT 
security policy issues between the network administrator and the telecommunication 
officer during the beginning of year 2010 (personal communications with Council A, 
2010). However, there was no written outcome or action plan instituted in order to 
address this shortcoming. 
 
 Risk 2: Possible misdirection of resources 
 
The lack of IT information security policies could also be ascribed to a misdirection of 
funds and resources directed to the establishment and maintenance of a security policy. 
The budgetary constraints of the council permitted some of the IT operational staff to 
work on a part-time basis (one day per week). The staff affected by this constraint 
included the network administrator, the online payment application administrator, the 
database administrator and the GIS officer. 
 
Moreover, each staff was assigned on a different day of the week. Not only did this 
constraint affect the formulation of an information security policy, but it also resulted in 
a lack of communication between the affected staff in having discussions about 
information security policy. 
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Consequently, there was no allocation of budget, time and resources towards developing 
any IT security related policy up until the beginning of 2011, at which point the 
council’s executive management team began allocating funds for the development of an 
organisational IT security policy. 
 
 Risk 3: Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor 
management/strategic oversight 
 
This factor was evident from the fact that some of the council’s IT staff not being fully 
aware of potential risks and their impact to the council’s online payment system. For 
example, the online application software (Pathway) administrator was unaware that the 
council residents’ confidential information was not stored in a secure format 
(encryption). 
 
Another instance of the lack of understanding of the risk was the fact that over 100 
database file systems were located on a single cluster server. These cost saving 
measures were implemented at the expense of the risk of a single point of failure. An 
implemented security policy would have rated the risk of a single point of failure higher 
than any cost saving initiative (personal communications with Council A, 2010). 
 
4.5 Analysis and discussion 
 
The analysis and discussion on both Council A’s email as well as online payment 
systems are detailed in the following sections. 
 
4.5.1 Analysis 
 
The analysis can be separated into two sections for each of the analysis of Council A’s 
email and online payment systems. 
 
4.5.1.1 Council A’s email system analysis – possible mitigations 
 
The possible mitigation recommendations for the identified issues of Council A’s email 
system are described in the following sections. Each of the mitigations described relate 
to the identified risk issue number. 
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4.5.1.1.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
A virus protection software server version is recommended to be installed on the email 
server in order to minimise potential attacks from virus and worms. Where possible this 
should use a different antivirus scanner than the client computer. 
 
 Risk 2 
 
It is recommended that the council deploy an extra dedicated server to perform as a 
CAS. This additional server may reduce the potential risk of a single point of failure. 
The new CAS server can be a physical server or a Virtual Machine (VM) but on 
independent hardware. The network connection between both the new CAS and the 
existing email server should ideally be a gigabit connection with a high network 
bandwidth and low-latency as per recommended best practices by Microsoft 
Corporation (Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team, 2009).  
 
In addition, virus protection software for the new CAS server is recommended to be 
included in the new CAS. Table 4.15 displays the summary specifications of a new 
dedicated CAS. Figure 4.8 illustrates details of its architecture including the new CAS. 
 
Table 4.15 Recommended summary of the new CAS specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Email application software MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1 
OS MS Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition with service pack 1 
Hardware 8GB RAM, Hard disks C: 20GB, e: 100GB 
MS Exchange 2007 server role CAS 
Exchange support MS OWA, MS Outlook Anywhere,  MS ActiveSync 
TCP protocols HTTPS, Remote Procedure Call (RPC), LDAP 
IP network Different subnet with other email servers (isolate) 
Network connection Gigabit link between Client Access and Mailbox servers 
ACL Permits only allowed or required protocols 
Other software Virus protection software  
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 Risk 3 
 
A new CAS may be installed on a different subnetwork in order to minimise any 
potential risks that may take place. The current internal router (the layer 3 core switch) 
may also be configured using an ACL to only allow the required network 
communication protocols between the new CAS and the council’s network. See Figure 
4.8 for more details. Figure 4.8 demonstrates the council’s email network diagram with 
an extra MS Exchange Server 2007. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. A recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an extra MS 
Exchange Server 2007 (CAS role) for Council A 
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4.5.1.1.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
The current router allows anyone access to the external IP address (A.B.C.89) of the 
email server via the web or Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic. This is 
considered to be unnecessary as the required and allowed protocol should be HTTPS 
only. Therefore, this configuration code could be removed. See Table 4.16 for more 
details. 
 
Table 4.16 The ACL configuration codes recommendation for Council A’s Internet 
border router 
 
Policy 
no. 
Rules Protocol 
types 
From 
(source) 
To 
(destination) 
Ports 
(service) 
Recommendations 
1 Permit TCP Any A.B.C.82 SMTP Satisfactory 
2 Permit TCP Any A.B.C.89 HTTPS Satisfactory 
3 Permit TCP Any A.B.C.89 HTTP Remove 
 
 Risk 2 
 
Enabling the IDS/IPS feature on the current Internet border router may provide an 
additional prevention from scanning and spoofing attacks. More details are provided in 
Table 4.17. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
The existing firewall (Cisco ASA) can provide stateful packet inspection to external 
HTTPS traffic. This feature may serve to reduce any potential risks as previously 
mentioned. Therefore, the council may wish to enable IPS on the two firewalls for 
HTTPS inspection. See Table 4.17 for more details. However, managing traffic in this 
way may not be practical because of the size and dynamic nature of the Internet. 
Therefore, the council may consider using the existing old MS Internet Security and 
Acceleration (ISA) Server 2006 which is currently unused to provide stateful inspection 
and application-layer filtering on all HTTPS traffic. This technique enables the ISA 
server to block any HTTPS traffic that appears out of context. 
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With this option incoming traffic will not overload the current firewall and also add no 
cost to the council’s IT budget. Figure 4.9 demonstrates the MS Exchange Server 2007 
Client Access architecture for external clients via HTTPS using ISA. In addition, Figure 
4.10 illustrates the council’s email network diagram with the CAS and ISA Server 2006.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Client access architecture for external clients 
(Source: Microsoft TechNet, 2007a, p. 55) 
 
From Figure 4.9 above, it can be seen that the ISA Server analyses the payload in data 
packets, which requires ISA Server 2006 to decrypt the SSL stream. The SSL 
connections from external network (the Internet) terminates on the ISA server and “then 
re-establishes a new SSL connection between the ISA server and the Client Access 
server. This SSL bridging process enables ISA Server 2006 to filter invalid data packets 
before the traffic reaches the Client Access servers while maintaining the confidentiality 
of client-to-server communication as it transits both external and internal networks” 
(Microsoft TechNet, 2007a, p. 54). An external trusted SSL certificate must be installed 
on the ISA server. Furthermore, for connections between the ISA Server 2006 and the 
CAS either external or internal trusted SSL certificates may be used. 
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Table 4.17 A summary of the IDS/IPS of the council’s internetwork system 
 
Products Current issues Recommendations Descriptions 
IDS on the Internet 
border router 
Disabled Enable (turn on) For blocking of any 
spoofing/scanning attacks. 
IPS on the firewall Disabled Option 1: Enable (turn 
on) 
For real-time inspection of HTTPS 
traffic for the purposes of blocking 
and preventing any malicious or 
unwanted behaviour in real-time. 
IPS on the firewall Disabled Option 2: Deploy the 
existing ISA 2006 
For real-time inspection of HTTPS 
traffic. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. A recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an extra MS 
Exchange 2007 (CAS role) and the existing MS ISA Server 2006 for Council A 
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 Risk 4 
 
As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, the council 
may allow the current spam blocker appliance access to only the required specific 
places either via HTTP or HTTPS ports. 
 
 Risk 5 
 
These firewall rules may be removed as the internal server has been decommissioned. 
The removal of obsolete configuration codes serves to prevent any confusion that may 
arise in the future as to why a code which refers to a non-existent server is present. This 
allows clean and possible no confusion of the firewall configuration codes to the 
council’s network administrator. 
 
 Risk 6 
 
This firewall rule may be removed as the incoming SMTP traffic should forward traffic 
from the spam blocker appliance interface 192.168.1.93 rather than 192.168.1.92. 
 
 Risk 7 
 
The firewall rule may be removed as the DMZ server (192.168.1.89) has been 
decommissioned. 
 
 Risk 8 
 
The overall configurations including the possible mitigation recommendations are 
presented in Table 4.18. As per best practice recommendations of switch configurations 
and ISSAF (Rathore, 2006) guidelines, all the measures that are currently not 
implemented may be activated in order to protect against such attacks as previously 
mentioned.  
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Table 4.18 Switches security identified issues and recommendations for Council A 
 
Security features Recommendations 
Outside_sw Fwswitch DMZ_sw 
ACL applied to block unwanted devices To do To do Satisfactory 
Access to the device via HTTP is disabled Satisfactory Not Applicable 
(N/A) 
Satisfactory 
Access to the device via Telnet is disabled To do N/A To do 
Activate Loop protection on all ports To do To do To do 
Apply appropriate log server To do To do To do 
Apply appropriate timestamps debug time Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory 
Apply appropriate timestamps log time Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory 
Apply appropriate time zone Satisfactory To do To do 
Appropriate Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) used 
N/A N/A Satisfactory 
Appropriate VLAN used To do Satisfactory Satisfactory 
Best practice user name and/or password used To do To do To do 
Configure appropriate warning banner message To do To do Satisfactory 
Disable/shutdown unused switch ports To do To do To do 
Disable trunking on ports that do not need it To do To do To do 
Enable feature against ARP poisoning attacks To do To do To do 
Enable feature against ARP spoofing attacks To do To do To do 
Enable port broadcast storm control To do To do To do 
Enable port security limits MAC address to a port To do To do To do 
Ports connected to identified devices that do not 
support spanning-tree should be configured with 
Bridge Protocol Data Unit (BPDU) filtering 
Satisfactory To do Satisfactory 
Ports not connected to anything yet should be 
configured with protection 
To do To do To do 
Set Data Tools Platform (DTP) on all ports not 
being used for trunking 
To do To do To do 
Set strong password (Message-Digest Algorithm 5 
or MD5) for authenticating VTP message 
To do To do Satisfactory 
Strong password encryption (MD5) used To do To do Satisfactory 
Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) service is 
disabled 
To do N/A To do 
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4.5.1.1.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
Table 4.19 displays the summary of the overall system information policy testing result 
of the Council A’s email system server. Furthermore, Appendix A3 provides the overall 
system information policy testing results, uncovered issues and possible mitigation 
recommendations of the council’s email server.a 
 
Table 4.19 Overall system information policy of Council A’s email server 
 
Server name Password policy Security audit policy Comment 
Email server  Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Refer to Appendix A3 
 
 Risk 2 
 
Appendix A4 provides the specific details of the missing service pack and patches 
information as well as recommendations for updating of the email server. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
Table 4.20 presents the total number of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on the 
email server. 
 
Table 4.20 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on the 
email server 
 
Server name Recommended open 
TCP ports 
Recommended open 
UDP port 
Comment 
Email server 8 1 Refer to Appendix A5 
 
 Risk 4 
 
Refer to Appendix A6 for full details of the identified risk issues and the possible 
mitigation recommendations. 
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4.5.1.1.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
The overall spoofing testing results including possible mitigation recommendations are 
presented in Table 4.21. 
 
Table 4.21 The spoofing testing results and mitigation recommendations for Council 
A’s email server 
 
Testing techniques Purposes Results Recommendations 
Telnet to the email server and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to another 
internal address. 
To test internal 
connectivity of the 
email server 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow mail 
relaying 
Sending an email from one 
external address to another 
external address using the 
target email server. 
To test external 
relaying of the 
email server  
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow mail 
relaying 
Sending an email from one 
internal address to an external 
address using the target email 
server. 
To test internal 
relaying of the 
email server  
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow mail 
relaying 
Sending an email from one 
external address to an internal 
address using the target email 
server. 
To test email 
relaying of the 
email server 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow mail 
relaying 
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 Risk 2 
 
The overall results and mitigation recommendations are provided in Table 4.22.  
 
Table 4.22 The spoofing testing results and mitigation recommendations for Council 
A’s spam blocker appliance (interface 192.168.1.92) 
 
Testing techniques Purposes Results Recommendations 
Telnet to the spam blocker 
appliance (interface 
192.168.1.92) and sending an 
email from one internal 
address to another internal 
address. 
To test internal 
connectivity of the 
email server 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow email 
relaying 
Sending an email from one 
external address to another 
external address using the 
spam blocker appliance 
(interface 192.168.1.92). 
To test external 
relaying of the 
email server  
Unsuccessful (does  
not allow relaying) 
None 
Sending an email from one 
internal address to an external 
address spam blocker 
appliance (interface 
192.168.1.92). 
To test internal 
relaying of the 
email server  
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow email 
relaying 
Sending an email from one 
external address to an internal 
address spam blocker 
appliance (interface 
192.168.1.92). 
To test email 
relaying of the 
email server 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow email 
relaying 
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 Risk 3 
 
Table 4.23 lists overall of the default settings, auditing results and mitigation 
recommendations based on the CIS suggestions. 
 
Table 4.23 The overall results of auditing and recommendations Mailbox server role of 
Council A’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council  A Recommendations 
Restrict email deletion retention 7 (days) 14 (days) 7 (days) 
Restrict mailbox deletion retention 30 (days) 30 (days) 30 (days) 
Restrict deletion of mail or mailboxes until 
archival 
Unchecked Unchecked Checked 
Mounting of mailbox database at startup Unchecked Unchecked Unchecked 
Ensure mailbox database cannot be overwritten Checked Unchecked Unchecked 
Verify default mailbox storage limits (issue 
warning at, prohibit send at, prohibit send and 
receive at) 
Custom 1991680 
Kilobyte 
(KB) 
209752KB 
2411520KB  
Custom 
Ensure public folder database cannot be 
overwritten 
Checked Unchecked Unchecked 
Verify default public folder storage limits (issue 
warning,  prohibit send and receive at (KB) 
Custom 1991680KB, 
-, 10240KB 
Custom 
Audit public folder client access Custom Custom Custom 
Audit public folder administrative access Custom Custom Custom 
Verify proper permissions on public folder 
database 
Custom Custom Custom 
Mounting of public folder database at startup Unchecked Unchecked Unchecked 
Restrict email send size (mailbox identity, mail 
contact identity and distribution group identity) 
 Unlimited 
Unlimited 
Unlimited 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict email receive size (mailbox identity, 
mail contact identity and distribution group 
identity) 
 Unlimited 
Unlimited 
Unlimited 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict max recipients 5000 Unlimited 2000 
Audit mailbox spam bypass settings False False False 
AntiSpam updates Disabled Disabled Disabled 
Zero out deleted database pages False False True 
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 Risk 4 
 
Table 4.24 lists overall default settings, results of auditing and mitigation 
recommendations based on the CIS suggestions. 
 
Table 4.24 The overall results of auditing and recommendations the Hub Transport 
server role of Council A’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council  A Recommendations 
Audit DNS lookup servers None Custom Custom 
Restrict email send size (max send size, max 
message size) 
30MB 
30MB 
30 MB 
30 MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict max recipients (max recipients per 
message) 
5000 5000 
 
2000 
Restrict email receive size (max receive size, max 
message size, external Delivery Status 
Notification (DSN) max message attach size and 
internal DSN max message attach size) 
30MB 
30MB 
10MB 
10MB 
30MB 
30MB 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict IP range for receive connectors None None Custom 
 
 Risk 5 
  
The overall results of auditing, factory default settings and mitigation recommendations 
based on the CIS suggestions are presented in Table 4.25. 
 
Table 4.25 The overall results of auditing and recommendations CAS role of Council 
A’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council A Recommendations 
Remove legacy web applications Installed Installed Removed 
Restrict web authentication methods* See note See note See note 
Require SSL for web applications Checked 
Unchecked 
Checked 
Unchecked 
Checked 
Checked 
Disable web anonymous access Unchecked Unchecked Unchecked 
Enable logging for default website Checked Checked Checked 
Enable policy for MS ActiveSync** None See note See note 
Forbid MS ActiveSync NonProvisionable devices Checked Checked Unchecked 
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Table 4.25 The overall results of auditing and recommendations CAS role of Council 
A’s email server (continued) 
 
References Defaults Council A Recommendations 
Forbid MS ActiveSync simple device 
password 
Checked Checked Unchecked 
Disable MS ActiveSync Windows 
SharePoint Services (WSS)/Universal 
Naming Convention (UNC) access 
Checked 
Checked 
Checked, 
Checked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Require MS ActiveSync password Unchecked Unchecked Checked 
Require MS ActiveSync alphanumeric 
password 
Unchecked Unchecked Checked 
Require MS ActiveSync minimum 
password length 
Checked, 4 Checked, 3 Checked, 8 
Require MS ActiveSync password 
expiration 
Unchecked Unchecked 60 
Restrict MS ActiveSync attachment size Unchecked Unchecked Unchecked 
3MB 
Require MS ActiveSync policy refresh None None 24.00:00:00 
Restrict MS ActiveSync maximum 
password attempts 
8 8 8 
Require MS ActiveSync Certificate Based 
Authentication 
Ignore Client 
Certs 
Ignore Client 
Certs 
Require Client 
Certs 
Require MS ActiveSync inactivity lockout 
time 
Enabled Enabled Disabled 
 
Note:  
Refers to restricted web authentication methods* 
This task is to ensure that unneeded authentication methods for the MS Exchange web 
applications should be disabled. Refer to CIS (2007, p. 76), the MS Exchange 2007 
recommendation “for web services and applications that cannot be disabled and 
removed from IIS ensure reasonable authentication methods are selected. These include 
Autodiscover, Exchange, Exchange Web Services (EWS), Exadmin, Exchweb, 
Microsoft-Exchange-ActiveSync, Offline Address Book (OAB), OWA, Public, and 
Unified Messaging (UM)”. By doing this you limit the opportunity for unknown clients 
to connect to unneeded services. See more details in Table 4.26. 
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Table 4.26 The overall results and recommendations of auditing web authentication and 
access control of Council A’s email server 
 
Council A Integrate Digest Basic Passport 
Autodiscover X  X  
Exchange X  X  
Exchange Web Services  (EWS) X    
Exadmin X  X  
Exchweb X  X  
MS-Exchange-ActiveSync   X  
Offline Address Book (OAB) X    
Outlook Web Access (OWA)   X  
Public X  X  
Unified Messaging (UM) X    
 
Recommendations Integrate Digest Basic Passport 
Autodiscover X    
Exchange X    
Exchange Web Services  (EWS) X  X  
Exadmin X    
Exchweb X    
MS-Exchange-ActiveSync   X*  
Offline Address Book (OAB)   X  
Outlook Web Access (OWA)   X  
Public X  X  
Unified Messaging (UM) X    
 
X represents enabled 
X* represents only if not using Certificate 
 
Refers to enable policy for MS ActiveSync** 
This task creates and assigns policy for the MS ActiveSync service. Enabling and 
configuring the MS ActiveSync policy may assist to ensure that all corporate (Council 
A’s) mobile devices are in line with its policy. This therefore may reduce the potential 
risks to the MS Exchange infrastructure in case of a mobile device disappearing (out of 
sync) from the network (CIS, 2007).  
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4.5.1.1.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risks 1 and 2 
 
As per general best practice guidelines, a technical policy such as firewall and server 
(email) rules should be implemented in order to provide better security of the council’s 
email and related system. 
 
4.5.1.2 Council A’s online payment system analysis – possible mitigations 
 
The possible mitigation recommendations for the identified issues of Council A’s online 
payment system are described in the following sections. Each of the mitigations 
described relate to the identified risk issue number. 
 
4.5.1.2.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
In the interest of best practices suggested by Kiely (2006), it is recommended that the 
council deploys or applies an encryption method in order to secure the sensitive data 
after it is entered. There are two important factors when considering using encryption in 
a database. These two factors are performance and data bloat (or increase in size) 
(Kiely, 2006). 
 
 Performance: Typically, “the more secure the algorithm and the larger the key 
size, the more processing cycles are required” (Kiely, 2006, p. 3). Therefore, it is 
recommended that only the sensitive data be encrypted; and 
 Data bloat: How much bloat really “depends on the algorithm, key size, and the 
clear text that is being encrypted” (Kiely, 2006, p. 3). Table 4.27 represents the 
increase in size of the encrypted data over the clear text. 
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Table 4.27 Increased sizes of encrypted data over its clear text 
 
Encryption 
types 
Algorithms Maximum 
increase 
Minimum 
increase 
Average 
increase 
Symmetric Triple Data Encryption Standard (DES) 3.80 0.45 1.77 
Symmetric Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128 5.40 0.54 2.51 
Symmetric AES 192 5.40 0.54 2.51 
Symmetric AES 256 5.40 0.54 2.51 
- Certificate 11.80 0.54 5.16 
Symmetric DES 3.80 0.45 1.77 
Symmetric Data Encryption Standard XORed (DESX) 3.80 0.45 1.77 
Symmetric Rivest Cipher (RC)2 3.80 0.45 1.77 
Symmetric RC4 3.60 0.43 1.73 
Asymmetric Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) 1024 11.80 0.54 5.16 
Asymmetric RSA 2048 24.60 2.08 11.31 
Asymmetric RSA 512 5.40 1.06 3.23 
 
(Source: Adapted from Kiely, 2006, p. 3) 
 
It is recommended that asymmetric encryption keys with RSA 1024 algorithm on the 
sensitive data be used. This method will selectively restrict access to the sensitive data, 
thereby allowing only holders of the private key to decrypt and view the data. 
 
In addition, the encryption method may apply only to the council’s sensitive data 
(customer credentials) rather than the entire database and all its tables. This will 
consume fewer loads and space on the backend database server (MS SQL 2005) (Dave, 
2008; Microsoft Corporation, 2005). 
 
 Risk 2 
 
Both the online payment application and the backend database servers should be 
configured into different subnetworks or a VLAN. Additionally, appropriate ACLs 
should be configured to tighter or filter network traffic between the application and the 
backend database servers as well as the subnets. This technique may mitigate the above 
mentioned potential risks. 
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4.5.1.2.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
The HTTPS traffic should be inspected in order to provide better security to the 
council’s online payment system. 
 
 Risk 2 
 
The firewall rule may be reconfigured to allow from anywhere (any) to outside 
(external). This may minimise potential risks against the online payment frontend web 
server (the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb) from both the DMZ and the internal networks. The 
purpose of the council’s frontend web server is to serve its residents to access the 
frontend web server from outside of the network only. 
 
Therefore, allowing access to the frontend web server from both the DMZ and the 
internal networks is unnecessary as it will increase the chance of potential risks such as 
virus and DoS attacks from either the DMZ or the internal networks in the event that 
attackers gained access to the internal network or the DMZ. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
This rule may be tightened by allowing only the required TCP or UDP ports to the two 
IP addresses. For example, TCP ports 22 for SSH and 443 for HTTPS connections to be 
designated for administration purposes only. 
 
 Risk 4 
 
In order to mitigate the potential risks, as per discussion with the network administrator 
and the online payment application administrator, the firewall rule may be disabled. 
Therefore; no communication will be allowed between the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb and 
the CoA-SQL servers. On the one hand, the current Epathweb software configuration on 
the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server may be reconfigured for SQL queries to the CoA-
Pathway rather than to the CoA-SQL server. The Pathway software configuration on the 
CoA-Pathway server may also be reconfigured to allow SQL queries with the CoA-SQL 
backend database server. 
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This can minimise any potential risks of direct access from the frontend web server to 
the internal backend database server. In addition, as per best practice recommendations 
to standard firewall configurations, no network traffic communication should be 
permitted between both the frontend web server and the backend database server.  
 
 Risk 5 
 
This potential risk can be mitigated by reconfiguration of the firewall rules from the 
current destination setting which is anywhere (any), to outside (external) the network. 
 
 Risk 6 
 
As per discussion with the council’s network administrator, these firewall rules were 
unnecessary and were subsequently removed by the network administrator except for 
the firewall rule which, allows HTTP traffic between the frontend web server (the CoA-
DMZ-Epathweb) and the Pathway application server (the CoA-Pathway). This was due 
to the fact that, HTTP is the required protocol for the frontend web server for 
communication with the Pathway application server.  
 
In order to minimise the potential risk associated with the HTTP protocol, the council 
should consider using the existing old MS Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) 
Server 2006 to provide stateful inspection and application-layer filtering on all HTTP 
traffic. This practice allows the ISA server to filter any HTTP traffic that appears out of 
context. 
 
Figure 4.11 demonstrates the recommended high level online payment system including 
network traffic protocols and the existing MS ISA Server 2006 for the council. 
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Figure 4.11. The recommended high level online payment system including network 
traffic protocols and the existing MS ISA Server 2006 for Council A 
 
 Risk 7 
 
See previously discussion on Section 4.5.1.1.2 for more details. 
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4.5.1.2.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
In order to prevent any potential vulnerability that may arise as a result of poor 
configuration on both the password and security auditing policies at all of the three 
online payment system servers (the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb, the CoA-Pathway and the 
CoA-SQL), it is recommended that the MS Windows password be reconfigured. In 
addition the auditing policies should be reviewed at CoA-SQL server only as the DMZ 
server is governed by a satisfactory audit policy as indicated in Appendix A10. 
 
Appendices A8, A9 and A10 depict the system information policy review including 
possible mitigation recommendations of the online payment servers pertaining to 
Council A’s online payment system. 
 
 Risk 2 
 
There was one missing service pack and two missing patches on the Council A’s CoA-
Pathway server as indicated in Appendix A11. One of these missing patches is 
categorised as critical. It is therefore, recommended to install the patch to the server as 
soon as possible. Furthermore, Appendix A11 displays the system patching testing 
analysis and possible mitigation recommendations of the council’s CoA-Pathway 
server. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
Table 4.28 presents the total number of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on all 
the council’s online payment servers. 
 
Table 4.28 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on all 
Council A’s online payment servers 
 
Server names Recommended open 
TCP ports 
Recommended open 
UDP ports 
Comments 
CoA-DMZ-Epathweb 3 1 Refer to Appendix A12 
CoA-Pathway 6 1 Refer to Appendix A13 
CoA-SQL 9 2 Refer to Appendix A14 
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 Risk 4 
 
Refer to Appendices A15, A16 and A17 for full details of the identified risk issues and 
the possible mitigation recommendations. 
 
4.5.1.2.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
Appendices A18, A19, A20, A21, A22 and A23 provide the full details of all the 
findings (satisfactory and unsatisfactory) and the possible mitigation recommendations. 
 
4.5.1.2.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risks 1, 2 and 3 
 
As per general recommendations to best practices, the council may wish to implement a 
related general information security policy together with associated technical security 
policies and procedures. The policies and procedures should cover the areas of the 
internetwork infrastructure, the web server and the database server. The implementation 
of these recommendations will serve to enhance the level of the information security of 
the online payment system of the council. 
 
4.5.2 Discussion 
 
The research activities carried out at Council A revealed that the implementation of both 
the email (MS Exchange 2007) and the online payment system were lacking in  meeting 
both national and industry standards. Consequently, these sub-standard implementations 
pose a potential risk to the email, the online payment as well as the other related 
systems of Council A. However, the recommendations to mitigate the risks have been 
provided in the analysis section of this thesis. 
 
Furthermore, the recommended frameworks for both the email and the online payment 
systems demonstrated that these frameworks can be used in order to improve or audit 
the security of systems within a similar environment. More details with references to the 
research questions and examples are provided in Chapter 8: Section 8.3. 
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There were seven main factors identified which may be a cause of potential risk to the 
Council A’s email, online payment and other related IT systems. The risks can result in 
interruptions, extraction of personal details and destruction of data to the council’s 
email as well as the online payment systems. 
 
For example, a lack of specific knowledge by staff in proper configuration of the 
firewall will result in potential interruptions, modifications and destruction of the 
councils email and online payment data. Any consequential compromise to the integrity 
of the systems concerned will result in downtime while the systems become unavailable 
during repair. 
 
Furthermore, extraction of the personal details of the council’s residents becomes a 
distinct possibility as IT staff were unaware that residents’ personal details information 
should be stored in an encrypted format for security. Non encryption of such personal 
detail information will result in a compromise to the confidentiality aspect of the 
security of information held within these databases and systems. 
 
The seven factors were the lack of IT security standards awareness, inadequate domain 
or service specific knowledge, inefficient communication, limited IT training as a result 
of restricted training budget, insufficient time for task completion, reliance on external 
consultant for specific IT projects and no valid testing environment in place. The 
following paragraphs provide an explanation of the seven factors in full detail. 
 
Firstly, the lack of IT security standards awareness was examined. There were several 
discussions with the council’s IT operational staff (the network administrator, the 
Pathway application administrator, the system administrator, the telecommunication 
administrator and the external database administrator) over a period of several months. 
There were a number of potential risks apparent due to the lack of IT security standards 
awareness disclosed in the investigation. 
 
For example, the email (MS Exchange 2007) system’s architecture was not designed 
following the MS Exchange 2007 architecture recommendation. The MS SQL Server 
2005 database configuration on the backend database server was also not following the 
industrial best practices standard recommended by CIS (2010). 
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In addition, the Pathway application administrator was not aware that the sensitive 
information (the client’s credentials) should be recorded in encryption format. These 
represent serious knowledge gaps in human resource and should be addressed by further 
training or supplementing through consultancy. Table 4.29 summarises the findings 
related to the lack of IT security standards or general industrial best practices by the 
staff of Council A 
 
Table 4.29 The summary of the issues uncovered related to the lack of IT security 
standards awareness by the IT staff 
 
Results related to lack of IT security standards awareness by IT staff of the council Council A 
Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed No 
IDS/IPS deployed and currently in use No 
Encryption of client sensitive information No 
Design of email server architecture based on the MS Exchange 2007 recommendations 
to best practices 
No 
 
Secondly, the inadequate domain or service specific knowledge was outlined. This was 
evident from the inadequate configuration on the three internetwork switches 
configuration codes, the firewall rules, the unnecessary ports and the services installed 
on the related servers. According to the network and system administrators, the 
council’s IT operational staff have never been trained in specific knowledge such as 
email (MS Exchange 2007) server and firewall (Cisco ASA) related courses. See the 
following table for more details. 
 
Table 4.30 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific 
knowledge 
 
Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff 
of the council 
Council A 
Firewall configuration related to the email and online web systems Insufficient 
Switch configuration related to the email and online web systems Insufficient 
Setup and configuration of the email server application (MS Exchange 2007) Incorrect 
Setup and configuration of the online database application (MS SQL Server 2005) Incorrect 
Application of updated software patches on the email server No 
Application of updated software patches on the online web server No 
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Table 4.30 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific 
knowledge (continued) 
 
Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff 
of the council 
Council A 
Application of updated software patches on the online payment server No 
Internal email spoofing allowed Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email server Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online web server Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online payment server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online web server N/A 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server Yes 
 
Thirdly, the inefficient communication was highlighted. It was noticeable that there 
were mis-configurations on the ACL codes of the firewall related to the online payment 
system as a result of personal communications between the network administrator and 
the Pathway application administrator. 
 
Furthermore, currently there were no change management procedures. There was also 
no apparent IT record of auditing systems in place. Introduction of a change 
management will assist the council’s IT manager as well as operational staff to manage, 
plan, track and predict any changes that may occur efficiently. IT record auditing 
systems and documentation such as simple log books for firewall, email, database and 
web servers would also provide benefits to the IT operational staff. 
 
For example, properly maintained system log books will allow IT staff to review, report 
or audit changes made, roll back changes made to previous states and minimise any 
risks of inaccurate data and configurations. 
 
In addition, both change management procedures and IT record auditing systems and 
documentation procedures will also serve to increase the lack of communication 
between the IT operational staff. Table 4.31 summarises the issues uncovered that can 
contribute to the inefficient communication between the council’s IT operational staff. 
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Table 4.31 The summary of results uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient 
communication  
 
Results uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient communication  Council A 
Existence of change management procedures  No 
Availability of simple specific technical log books  No 
Updated documentation of the IT email system  No 
Updated documentation of  the IT online web system related  No 
 
Fourthly, the limited IT training as a result of a restricted training budget was examined. 
According to the council’s IT manager, each year the IT department receives a restricted 
IT training budget  resulting in each individual IT operational staff  not being able to 
attend specific IT training courses every year. This deficiency in funded training would 
contribute further to the lack of specific IT knowledge within the council’s IT 
department. See details in Table 4.32. 
 
Table 4.32 The summary results related to the limited IT training as a result of limited 
training budget 
 
Issues uncovered in relation to the  limited IT training budget Council A 
Formal industry or equivalent  firewall training of the IT operational staff  No 
Formal industry or equivalent  training of the email application (MS Exchange 2007)  of 
the IT operational staff  
No 
Formal industry or equivalent training of database application (MS SQL Server 2005 or 
equivalent) of the IT operational staff. 
No 
Formal IT Security training of the  IT operational staff  Partly 
IT training yearly budget allocation for each IT operational staff member  Partly 
 Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT operational staff  Yes 
 
Fifthly, the matter of insufficient time for task completion was looked at. The council’s 
IT team has one IT manager, six IT operational staff and two part time staff (network 
and database administrators). Both the network and database administrators are 
contractors and only work one day per week. The council’s IT team has to manage a 
wide range of ICT areas such as GIS, GPS, library, email, Intranet, online payment, 
online website, payroll, property, telecommunication and telephony systems. According 
to the telecommunication, the network and system administrators, only just enough time 
is available for them to complete their day to day operation tasks.  
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Additionally, they do not have any time left for documentation. This was evident from 
the uncompleted or partly completed network and system documentation. Table 4.33 
summarised the insufficient time for task completion by the council IT operational staff. 
 
Table 4.33 Results uncovered related to the inefficient time for task completion  
 
Issues uncovered in relation to the inefficient time for task completion Council A 
The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems task simultaneously Yes 
Use of enterprise information security policy  No 
Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security policy  No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT email system  No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system  No 
 
Sixthly, the factor of the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects was 
analysed. The council’s IT team always relies on outsourcing to solve the expertise 
problems that may arise. This may result in a lack of knowledge transfer between the 
external contractors to the council’s IT operational staff. 
 
For example, in the projects which were completed by the contractors, there was a 
distinct lack of documentation such as for the email system (MS Exchange Server 2007) 
and the online payment system (Epathway). This indicates poor contract management 
by the council when initiating and finalising projects as these basic elements should be 
in the performance contract. See Table 4.34 for more details. 
 
Table 4.34 Summary of issues uncovered relating to the reliance on external consultants 
for specific IT projects 
 
Issues in relation to the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects Council A 
Implementation of the firewall system by external consultants Yes 
Appropriate documentation for the firewall installation and management provided  by 
the external consultants 
No 
Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application server by external consultants Yes 
Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 2007) installation and 
management provided by the external consultants 
No 
Deployment of the online payment system by external consultants Partly 
Appropriate documentation for the online payment system (Epathweb) installation and  
management provided by the external consultants 
Partly 
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Finally, there was no valid testing environment in place at Council A. The IT 
department did not have any proper testing systems in place even though specific VM 
servers were allocated as testing servers for the database, and online payment systems.  
 
Additionally, there was no testing system for the network communication equipment 
that would accurately match the testing environment to the architecture of the 
production system in totality. A totally mirrored testing environment would minimise 
any potential risks to down time and loss of productivity due to hapless mis-
configurations, faulty installations or upgrades to the IT system carried out  directly on 
the production environment, as these would be fully tested in the testing environment 
prior to a scheduled replication on the production system. The following table presents 
more details of the summary of issues uncovered related to the lack of a valid testing 
environment.  
 
Table 4.35 Summary results uncovered related to no valid testing environment on place 
at the council 
 
Summary results related to the lack of a valid testing environment  Council A 
Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure No 
Existence of a testing environment for the email system Partly 
Existence of a testing environment for the online payment system Partly 
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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS: A 
CASE STUDY OF COUNCIL B 
This chapter is presented in five subsections: (1) background information; (2) 
methodology; (3) Council’s B email system results; (4) Council’s B online web system 
results; and (5) analysis and discussion. Its objective is to exemplify the results and 
findings from the examination of Council B’s email and online web systems in this 
research. 
 
5.1 Background information 
 
Council B is a local government council in WA which runs its own IT department. The 
council has an Ethernet network which connects its central and remote sites via fibre 
optic, DSL and ADSL. The council’s central site is connected to the outside world or 
the Internet via a fibre optic connection. The council’s network architecture is 
considered to be structured in a star topology format. Council B runs an in-house email 
system which provides email service to its staff. The council’s email system has over 
1,000 mailboxes, the majority of which serves its staff. Furthermore, the email system 
provides service to other indirect staff such as the councillors and external contractors 
as well. The council’s email server is MS Exchange 2007 and MS Outlook 2007 is used 
as an email client and personal information management tool. 
 
In addition, the email system has a web-based email or webmail feature, which allows 
the council’s authorised personnel to access their email via a web browser anywhere 
over the Internet.  
 
Council B also offers an online web system service to its residents. This online web 
system provides general information, mailing lists, online community groups and online 
payment services. Anyone can view the general information, join the online mailing 
lists and become part of the community groups.  
 
Additionally, the council offers online payment system to its residents for paying their 
rates, applications, infringements, licence renewal and other invoices using their valid 
type of payment numbers as follows: 
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 Assessment number for rate payment; 
 Payment reference number for application and licence renewal; 
 Reference and invoice numbers for other invoices as meals on wheels payments; 
and 
 Ticket number for infringements such as dog, litter and parking fines. 
 
These valid types of payment numbers are assigned to the council’s residents based on 
their individual application. In addition, both the email and online web systems are 
managed in-house by the council’s IT staff. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
 
The purpose of this subsection is to provide a detailed description of the methodology 
used in this research. All the facets of the methodology including pre-interview 
consultation, document review, interview investigation, existing architecture discovery, 
email system testing and online web system testing are presented in the six sections. 
 
5.2.1 Pre-interview consultation 
 
Prior to the detailed analysis provided herewith, a pre-interview consultation was 
conducted in order to determine the scope of the project. This interview was in the form 
of initial open-ended meetings and discussions that were undertaken between 
participants including the researcher, both the principal and associate supervisors, the 
council’s IT managerial staff and IT operational staff. 
 
All involved parties agreed that both the email and online web systems would be 
audited as the findings may prove both useful and also serve to enhance security for 
both the email and online web systems. In addition, all parties agreed that this 
investigation may serve to increase the security awareness for the council’s IT staff. 
Furthermore, the reports produced would serve to highlight any improvements to the 
systems that may be required in order to fine tune the efficiency and security of the 
email and online web systems. 
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Council B agreed to an overall time frame of five months based on the estimate of two 
and half months for each report produced. Additionally, the council agreed upon the 
recommendation that the analysis be done in stages in order to minimise the disruption 
to normal services. 
 
It was also agreed that this project was to be undertaken at no cost to the council and the 
recommendations would be presented to the council as a set of two reports: 1) the email 
system and 2) the online web system. Additionally, the council would be under no 
obligation to implement any of the recommendations contained in the reports and the 
council may at its discretion, elect to abort the project at any time as desired. 
 
5.2.2 Document review 
 
There were two types of documents describing the email and online web systems that 
were available. These were the hardware and software specification documents and the 
organisation policy documents. The software documents consisted of in-house software 
systems as well as the third-party software systems. 
 
Several documents relating to both the council’s email and online web systems were 
collected. These documents included specifications and records of configuration codes 
of the Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the DMZ switch, the firewalls, the email 
server, the spam blocker appliances, the static web servers, the application server and 
the backend database server. Furthermore, a copy of the DMZ internetwork diagram 
was collected. 
 
From the interviews conducted it was established that both the email and online web 
systems technical security policies were non-existent apart from a general email usage 
policy. These omissions were due to the lack of time required for the implementation of 
security policies for these systems. 
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5.2.3 Interview investigation 
 
Several interviews were conducted with the two main stakeholders as follows: 
 
 Council B’s  IT managerial staff (IT manager); and 
 The council’s IT operational staff (database, network, Pathway application, 
system and web administrators). 
 
The interview with the IT managerial staff were a face-to-face interview to ascertain a 
general overview of the council’s email and online web systems. In terms of outcomes, 
an outline of the council’s expectation from the project was discussed. It emerged that 
the council was interested in overall system documentation and risk analysis of both the 
email and online web systems. 
 
Ongoing testing analysis interviews were conducting using several interview techniques 
such as face-to-face, telephone and email between the researcher, the network and the 
web administrators. 
 
Interviews conducted with the network administrator were related to discussions of 
network connectivity of the various hardware entities. These included the firewalls, the 
Internet border router, the switch, the static web servers, the email, the AD, the DNS 
and the database servers. The ACL and configuration codes pertaining to the relevant 
devices were also discussed. 
 
Testing analysis interviews were conducted with the web administrator, relating to the 
configurations of the backend database server, the static web servers, as well as the 
application logic surrounding the online web payment system. 
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5.2.4 Existing architecture discovery 
 
This section describes the discovery of the existing architecture at Council B in relation 
to their email and online web systems. 
 
5.2.4.1 The existing email system architecture of Council B 
 
Council B’s email system consists of one email server, and two spam blocker 
appliances. These devices are connected together within the council’s internetwork 
infrastructure. The email server is located in the council’s internal network whereas 
both the spam blocker appliances are located in the council’s DMZ area. The 
infrastructure has one Internet router, two firewalls and one switch as its components. 
The only two email related network traffic protocols allowed in the network are HTTPS 
and SMTP which are used for webmail and traditional email respectively. In terms of 
HTTPS, Council B uses 128-bit encryption with standard validation SSL certificate for 
its webmail connectivity (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c).  
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates all the devices connectivity and allowed email network traffic 
protocols in a high level network diagram. 
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Figure 5.1. A current high level network diagram for the email system of Council B 
 
5.2.4.2 The existing online web system’s architecture of Council B 
 
The council’s current online web system provides the council’s general information 
such as rates, libraries, events, facilities and jobs. Council B’s online web system can be 
categorised into three different groups based on their features and architectures. These 
three groups are as follows: 
 
 The static web system; 
 The CMS web system; and 
 The online payment system. 
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5.2.4.2.1 The existing static web system architecture 
 
The current static web system has two CoB-DMZ-Web and CoB-Web servers. The 
council’s static web system provides both simple/standard static and form-based web 
pages. The CoB-DMZ-Web server is located in the council’s DMZ area, whereas the 
CoB-Web server is located in the council’s internal network.  
 
Figure 5.2 depicts the council’s current architecture on the static web system including 
network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. The high level static web system currently in use by Council B 
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5.2.4.2.2 The existing CMS web system architecture 
 
The current CMS web system has two servers which are the CoB-DMZ-Web and the 
CoB-Database servers. It provides both simple/standard static and form-based web 
pages. The CoB-DMZ-Web acts as a CMS frontend web server whereas the CoB-
Database acts as a CMS management server. The CoB-Database server is located in the 
council’s internal network. Figure 5.3 illustrates the council’s current CMS system 
architecture including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The high level CMS web system currently in use by Council B 
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Both the CoB-DMZ-Web and CoB-Database servers interact with each other as part of 
a Web Content Management System (WCMS). The CoB-Database permits the council’s 
IT operational staff to manage and update web page information, prior to uploading the 
validated web pages from the CoB-Database server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server. 
 
This arrangement provides good security as there is no direct connection between the 
client and the CMS management server. The council’s residents, access general council 
information from the CMS frontend web server (the CoB-DMZ-Web) via the council’s 
website (http://www.cob.wa.gov.au). 
 
5.2.4.2.3 The existing online payment system architecture 
 
The council’s current online payment system is designed as a three-tiered client-server 
architecture. It consists mainly of two servers which include a frontend and web 
application server, and a backend database server as depicted in Figure 5.4. CoB-DMZ-
Web performs the application logic function by covering both frontend and application 
web features. The backend database (the CoB-Database) server performs the data logic. 
 
In addition, the external gateway security payment service (the online gateway) is 
employed by the council to provide a secured online payment system for its residents 
and is used for payments such as rates and infringements. The council’s online payment 
system communicates with the external gateway security payment service using the 
HTTPS protocol. 
 
Furthermore, the SSL protocol is used to provide an encrypted communication channel 
between the client’s web browser and the council’s online payment system. This 
method ensures secured private communications over the public Internet. The council 
uses 128-bit encryption with standard validation SSL certificate for its online payment 
SSL connection (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c).  
 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the council’s current online payment system architecture 
including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
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Figure 5.4. The high level online payment system currently in use by Council B 
 
5.2.5 Email system testing 
 
In this email system testing consists of five stages which are summarised as follows:  
 
 Network surveying includes discovery of the current Council B’s email system’s 
network architecture; 
 Auditing and configuration codes review of the Internet border router, the 
IDS/IPS, the firewalls and the switch devices; 
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 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the 
email and webmail servers; 
 Email spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark auditing on the email 
server; and 
 Email system security policy review. 
 
5.2.6 Online web system testing 
 
The online web system of the council can be categorised into three distinct application 
profiles which are the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment 
system. All of these online web systems share and partly share hardware for servers. 
More details of the servers are provided in the Testing stage 5.4.1. 
 
This online web system testing analysis which was carried out consists of five stages 
which are summarised as follows:  
 
 Network surveying, which includes the current Council B’s online web system’s 
network architecture, identified risks and mitigation recommendations; 
 Auditing, configuration codes review, identified risks of the Internet border 
router, the IDS/IPS, the firewalls and the switch devices related to Council B’s 
online web system; 
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the 
online web system’s servers;  
 Vendor security benchmark auditing on the online payment server; and 
 Online web system security policy review. 
 
5.3 Council B’s email system results 
 
The following sections explain all the results of the review and testings for the 
architecture design, the device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the email system 
servers, the email spoofing, the vendor security benchmark and the security policy in 
details. 
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5.3.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying 
 
This network surveying of the testing stage one consists of network surveying that 
collects information on the email system including the email server, the two spam 
blocker appliances, the current email architecture, identified issues and 
recommendations. Information for the following components of Council B’s email 
system were collected: 
 
 Overall network diagram for the Internet link, the DMZ infrastructure 
connectivity including the email system; 
 The Internet border router, the two Internet firewalls, the DMZ’s switch 
specification and the related email configuration codes; 
 The email server’s specification summary; and 
 The two spam blocker appliances’ specification summary. 
 
5.3.1.1 The email system devices 
 
The council’s email system consists of two specific devices type. These are the MS 
Exchange 2007 email server and the Cisco IronPort spam blockers. 
 
5.3.1.1.1 The email server 
 
The current email server had MS Exchange 2007 with the newest service pack 1 as the 
email application software. The software was running on MS Windows Server 2003 
Enterprise Edition with service pack 2. 
 
According to Microsoft TechNet (2007a), the current email server configuration may be 
considered as a simple single-server architecture combining the Mailbox server, the Hub 
Transport server and the CAS roles. However, the Edge Transport server and Unified 
Messaging server roles were not included or installed for the same reasons as Council A 
in that Cisco IronPort spam blockers are used to perform the same function as the MS 
Edge Transport server role. Furthermore, Council B also uses the Notel VoIP system for 
the Unified Messaging server role. Summary details are provided in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 A summary of the email server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Email application software MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1 
Email scanning software Trend Micro ScanMail for MS Exchange version 8.0.1181 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2  
Hardware VMware server 
IP address 172.20.130.224/16 
MS Exchange 2007 roles Mailbox, Hub Transport, CAS combined 
Email service protocols SMTP and HTTPS 
Other software Trend Micro OfficeScan Client 
 
5.3.1.1.2 The spam blocker appliance 
 
There are two spam blocker appliances (email GW1 and GW2) which are running on 
Cisco IronPort appliances. Each of the devices has two network interfaces for separating 
incoming and outgoing email network traffic. The two devices run concurrently as part 
of a redundancy strategy (active and standby mode). Table 5.2 summarises both the 
spam blocker appliance roles and specifications.  
 
Table 5.2 A summary of both the spam blocker appliance specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device name Email GW1 
Spam blocker application software Cisco IronPort C150 
OS Cisco IOS 
Hardware 2 GB RAM, 2 x 80 GB Serial Advanced Technology 
Attachment (SATA) drives 
Interfaces (1, 2) Gigabit Ethernet: A.B.C.98/27, A.B.C.99/27 
Feature roles Scan virus, block spam email, block email blacklist  
 
Device name Email GW2 
Spam blocker application software Cisco IronPort C150 
OS Cisco IOS 
Hardware 2 GB RAM, 2 x 80 GB SATA drives 
Interfaces (1, 2) Gigabit Ethernet: A.B.C.100/27, A.B.C.101/27 
Feature roles Scan virus, block spam email, block email blacklist 
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The purpose of these appliances is to filter all incoming and outgoing emails (SMTP) 
against virus and worm threats and to block spam emails. As compared to MS Exchange 
2007 server roles architecture (see previously discussed Section 4.3.1.1.1 for more 
details), these spam blocker appliances perform the same role as the MS Exchange 2007 
Edge Transport server role. 
 
5.3.1.2 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues 
 
The following sections describe the identified risk issues for the council’s email system. 
 
 Risk 1: Single point of failure 
 
As previously mentioned, the existing email architecture of Council B is made up of a 
simple single-server. According to Microsoft TechNet (2007a), the simple single-server 
(MS Exchange 2007) architecture should only be deployed in Windows’s SBS which is 
suitable for small network environments. Council B’s network is considered to be a 
medium size as it has over 1,000 mailboxes and over 600 staff (personal 
communications with Council B, 2010).  
 
As the current council’s email server performs three MS Exchange 2007 roles (CAS, 
Hub Transport and Mailbox Server roles). This may be considered as a single point of 
failure as all three MS Exchange Server roles are run by the single email server.  
 
 Risk 2: Same subnetwork 
 
The email server is located in the council’s internal network which has the same IP 
address group (subnet) as the other important servers with no additional ACL filtering 
for separation.  
 
As the other important servers are the database, financial and file servers, they may be 
open to potential security risks, such as virus attacks. Virus attacks and threats arising 
on the email server may possibly infiltrate and infect other servers within the same 
subnetwork thereby leading to interruptions to the IT services of the council.  
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 Risk 3: MS ActiveSync – Authentication 
 
MS ActiveSync supports three different authentication types which are the basic, 
certificate and token forms. Council B currently uses the basic authentication together 
with a SSL connection. This means that username and password are transmitted in clear 
text whereas the connection on the other hand, is encrypted. Basic authentication can be 
considered as the simplest as it provides the lowest level of security as compared to both 
certificate and token form authentication methods (Luckett et al., 2008).  
 
 Risk 4: MS Outlook Anywhere – Authentication  
 
MS Outlook Anywhere or RPC over TCP is disabled by default (Microsoft TechNet, 
2007b, c). However, Council B’s MS Outlook Anywhere is currently enabled. MS 
Outlook Anywhere deployed in Council B allows direct external access into the internal 
network using the basic client authentication method via the SSL connection. As the 
basic authentication method provides the lowest security, it is recommended that it be 
enhanced. 
 
5.3.2 Testing stage 2: The email system’s infrastructure – Internet border router, 
IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews 
 
This email system’s infrastructure testing stage consists of a review of the council’s 
email infrastructure data collections which are the Internet border codes, the IDS/IPS, 
the firewalls codes and the switch codes data collection. 
 
5.3.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
According to the council’s internetworking, the Internet border router acts as a gateway 
which allows the council network to be able to communicate with the outside world (the 
Internet). The Internet border router is designed for routing purposes in order to forward 
or route the internetworking traffics/protocols which serves the council network services 
such as email and WWW. In addition, the router provides the first layer of traffic 
filtering which means only permitted internetwork traffic or protocols are allowed to get 
in and out the council’s network.  
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Table 5.3 summarised the specifications of the Internet border router and the ACL codes 
for the email system. In addition, the risk issues uncovered and the possible risk 
mitigation recommendations are also presented. 
 
Table 5.3 A summary of the Internet border router specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device type Cisco 2811 
OS Cisco IOS version 12.2 
Memory 128 MB 
Interfaces (2) External: A.B.D.x/30, Internal: A.B.C.65/27 
 
5.3.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
IDS/IPS is a critical early warning system that may provide the necessary information to 
the network administrator/email administrator in order to protect the email server from 
attackers. The council’s Internet border router has its own built-in IDS/IPS. However, 
the IDS/IPS feature on the router was disabled.  
 
 
5.3.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
In the council’s internetworking, the two firewalls act as a main filtering for all 
incoming and outgoing internetwork traffic. In addition, they perform NAT as well. One 
of the firewall operates in an active mode and the other operates in a standby mode. 
Table 5.4 summarises the specifications of both the firewalls. 
 
Table 5.4 A summary of the firewall specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device type CheckPoint Firewall-1  
OS/model UTM-1 272 (270 series) 
Memory 512 MB 
Interfaces 4 x Ethernet 10/100/100 full duplex, 1 sync port 
IP address See Figure 5.5 for full details 
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Refer to Appendix B2 for the summary of the firewall configuration codes with respect 
to NAT of the email system. In addition, Appendix B3 demonstrates the summary of the 
firewall configuration codes with respect to the email system. 
 
 
5.3.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
Council’s B has only one Ethernet switch which provides network communication and 
connectivity between the Internet border router, the firewalls, the DMZ servers and the 
council’s internal network. The current overall hardware and software details of the 
switch are depicted in Table 5.5 whereas details on ports, VLANs including its 
connectivity are provided in Figure 5.5.  
 
Table 5.5 The email system: Current switch hardware and software details 
 
Attributes Details 
Device name CoB-admin-central 
Device type Cisco Catalyst 3750G switch 
OS Cisco IOS version 12.2 
Memory 128 MB 
Port 24 x 10/100 MB UTP Ethernet ports, 2 x GB SFP ports 
Operate at Layer 3 OSI 
VLAN number  1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 
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Figure 5.5. A current low level network diagram of the email system for Council B 
 
5.3.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issue for the council’s email infrastructure system (Internet border 
router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switches) are detailed in the following sections. 
 
 Risk 1: Poor ACL coding on the Internet border router 
 
The current Internet border router allows any IP traffic including TCP and UDP to get 
in and out the council network. This configuration may be considered contrary to the 
best practice recommendations of standard firewall configurations.  
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Nevertheless, the overall ACLs are sufficient to block some of the potential risky ports 
such as TCP port 161, 162, SNMP, Simple Network Management Protocol Trap 
(SNMPTRAP), Telnet, UDP port 259 as well as some private IP addresses. See 
Appendix B1 for details on a summary of the council’s Internet border access list code 
for the email system.  
 
 Risk 2: Internet border router’s IDS was disabled 
 
The IPS software feature on the Internet border router (Cisco 2811) is currently 
disabled. This can be a cause of potential security risk to IP spoofing and scanning 
attacks. There are various types of security attacks which rely on the IP spoofing 
method in order to begin an attack such as SMURF or Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP) flooding attack as well as DoS attacks (Network World, 2008). Such 
spoofing attacks may result in a loss of Internet connectivity for council’s network as 
well as disrupt the council’s community services.  
 
 Risk 3: No IPS feature on both the firewalls 
 
Currently there is no software IPS feature implementation on the two CheckPoint 
firewall Unified Threat Management (UTM)-1 272 (270 Series) devices. Therefore, 
both the incoming and outgoing SMTP email traffic is not inspected making the 
network vulnerable to a broad range of threats including DoS, man in the middle and 
other malicious attacks (Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., 2010). 
 
 Risk 4: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – spam blockers 
 
Both the two spam blockers (email GW1 and GW2) are currently accessible from 
anywhere within the council’s internal network via both HTTP and Telnet remote 
communication ports (see Appendix B3: Policy number 3). Both these remote access 
communication methods are considered insecure, due to the fact that all data, including 
passwords, communicated through these ports is in a plaintext (Microsoft TechNet, 
2004, 2005a, b).  
 
Furthermore, communication traffic can be intercepted by hackers through packet 
sniffers and the password can be used later for further malicious purposes. 
 
 140
 Risk 5: Inadequate firewall ACL coding - HTTP 
 
The current firewall rule allows both the spam blocker appliances access anywhere via 
HTTP port (see Appendix B3: Policy number 4). 
 
 Risk 6: Firewalls cannot provide deep inspection on HTTPS traffic 
 
The existing firewall (CheckPoint) cannot provide deep inspection on all HTTPS traffic 
(Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., 2010). This means that the council’s webmail 
(HTTPS) traffic is directly allowed into the council’s internal network without any 
inspection for potential unwanted malware. 
 
 Risk 7: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations 
 
Similar to Council A, there were some inadequate switch code security configurations 
on the current Ethernet switch. These inadequate configurations may lead to potential 
risks such as ARP spoofing, ARP poisoning and broadcast storm attacks. 
 
 Risk 8: Single point of failure 
 
As mentioned earlier, the council has only one switch which provides network 
communication and connectivity between the Internet border router, the firewalls, the 
DMZ servers and the council’s internal network. This stand alone switch may be 
considered as a single point of failure. In addition, it can be a source of potential risk in 
that the council’s internal network may be exposed to attack through the methods 
previously mentioned. 
 
5.3.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning, 
vulnerability testing and results 
 
Similar testing steps conducted at Council A, NMAP and GFI LANguard network 
scanning tools were used for the scanning test of the council’s email system. NMAP 
with GUI standard (open source Zenmap version 5.0) for MS Windows XP version was 
run. The slow comprehensive scan option was used in the test in order to collect as 
much information as possible from the email system relating to the TCP, UDP ports, 
vulnerabilities, patches, services, software and hardware. 
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In addition, GFI LANguard version 9.0 with full scan option was run in order to fully 
test and collect the council’s email system information. Both these scanning techniques 
allow deep information collection on the council’s email system.   
 
5.3.3.1 Services and system identification results 
 
The full results of the services and system identification of the MS Exchange 2007 
email server are presented in Appendices B4 and B5. However, there were no testing 
results for the two email gateway spam blocker appliances as neither of the testing 
software (NMAP and GFI LANguard) could obtain any services and system 
information, including patching information, for the two email gateway spam blocker 
appliances. 
 
5.3.3.2 Port scanning results  
 
Both NMAP and GFI LANguard network scanning tools were used to perform port 
scanning on the email server and on the two email gateway spam blocker appliances 
GW1 (A.B.C.99) and GW2 (A.B.C.101). 
 
Moreover, there were some issues uncovered such as the TCP and UDP ports which 
were found to be left opened unnecessarily. This was found to be the case on the email 
server but not on the two email gateway spam blocker appliances (GW1 and GW2). Full 
port scanning details of the council’s email server is provided in Appendix B6.  
 
5.3.3.3 Vulnerability testing results  
 
Similar to the vulnerability technique of Council A, the vulnerability is categorised into 
four levels which are high (H), medium (M), low (L) and potential (P) security levels. 
The vulnerability analysis was successfully executed on the email server. However, 
there were no vulnerability analysis results for the gateway spam blocker appliances as 
both the GFI LANguard and NMAP software did not yield any vulnerability 
information from the vulnerability testing. Full vulnerability results are provided in 
Appendix B7. 
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5.3.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council B’s email system are described 
as follows. 
 
 Risk 1: System information policy results for the email server 
 
There were inadequate measures of the system information policy’s configuration which 
includes password policy, security auditing policy and services. This inadequacy may 
lead to the potential risk of attacks against the organisation’s email system. 
 
 Risk 2: System patching status results for the email server 
 
The overall system patching status testing analysis of the council’s email server was 
carried out using GFI LANguard and NMAP scanning tools. A number of issues were 
uncovered. These related to missing and unimplemented system patching information 
thereby creating vulnerabilities and possible threats to the council’s email server (the 
CoB-email). The scan revealed that there were two missing patches on the email server. 
See more details in Appendix B5. 
 
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on the email server 
 
It was found that there were 22 opened TCP ports and eight opened UDP ports on the 
email server. These numbers include the unnecessarily opened ports. See Table 5.6 for 
more a total numbers of opened TCP and UDP ports of the council’s email server. The 
overall opened TCP and UDP ports as well as the possible mitigation recommendations 
are presented in Appendix B6.  
 
Table 5.6 List of the number of open TCP and UDP ports on the email server 
 
Server name Opened TCP ports Opened UDP ports  Comment 
Email server 22 8 Refer to Appendix B6 
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 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on the email server 
 
There were vulnerabilities discovered on the email server. As an example the TCP 
service port 110 (POP3) was left opened thereby presenting a vulnerability issue in the 
high security risk category. Table 5.7 displays the overall Council B’s vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, Appendix B7 provides full details of the identified risk issues for Council 
B’s email server. 
 
Table 5.7 The overall of Council B’s email server – vulnerabilities 
 
Server name H M L P Overall vulnerability level Comment 
Email server  2 1 7 2 High (10/10) Refer to Appendix B7 
 
5.3.4 Testing stage 4: Spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark email server 
auditing 
 
This spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark email server auditing stage 
consists of two testing steps which are the email system spoofing testing and specific 
vendor security benchmark auditing of MS Exchange 2007 on the email server. 
 
5.3.4.1 Email system spoofing testing results  
 
Several spoofing testings were carried out over the email server and both the network 
interfaces of each the email gateway spam blocker appliances (GW1 and GW2). The 
spoofing testings were all conducted using the CIS template. Moreover, a number of 
risk issues were identified from the spoofing testing. 
 
In addition, the egression testing over the council’s email system was successfully 
tested. This egression testing revealed that the council’s email system correctly 
disallowed sending an email from an internal address to either an internal or external 
address via a third-party POP3 server. Table 5.8 presents the egression testing result and 
recommendation. 
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Table 5.8 The egression testing result and recommendation 
 
Testing technique Purpose Result Recommendation 
Sending an email from one internal 
address to either an internal or 
external addresses using an external, 
a third-party POP server. 
To test egression Unsuccessful None 
 
5.3.4.2 Specific email security vendor auditing results 
 
The overall modified auditing checklist tables were adapted and from the specific 
security recommendations – The CIS Benchmark for MS Exchange 2007 for MS 
Windows Server 2003 Version 1.0 to suit Council B’s email system same as technique 
utilised in Council A. The Exchange Edge Transport and Unified Messaging server 
roles and all defaults with “N/A” status are not included in the overall modified auditing 
checklist tables. This is due to the fact that the existing MS Exchange 2007 architecture 
for Council B is not configured for the Edge Transport server role. 
 
The overall summary of the email MS exchange 2007 security benchmark testing 
checklist for Council B can be categorised into three server roles which are the Mailbox 
server, the Hub Transport server and the CAS roles. In terms of the Council B’s 
Mailbox server role, there were five mailboxes as follows: 
 
1) First storage group > Private mailbox store 1; 
2) Pub folders storage group > Public folder database; 
3) Second storage group > Private mailbox store 2; 
4) Temp storage group > Temp mailbox database; and 
5) Third storage group > Private mailbox store 3. 
 
In addition, Tables 5.28, 5.29 and 5.30 in Section 5.5.1.1.4 provide details of these 
auditing results relating to risks and mitigations. 
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5.3.4.3 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues for the email spoofing, the Mailbox server, the Hub Transport 
server and the CAS roles of Council B’s email server are presented as follows. 
 
 Risk 1: The email server allowed relaying 
 
The email server allows emails to be sent from both internal and external source 
addresses to the council’s internal email address destination. This email relaying can be 
a source of potential risk from spoofing attacks arising internally. 
 
 Risk 2: The spam blocker appliance 1 (email GW1) 
 
Emails from both internal and external source addresses to the council’s internal or 
external email address destinations are allowed to be sent from the outbound2 interface 
of the email GW1. This email relaying is a cause of potential risks to the council’s email 
system as it will then be possible for an intruder to Telnet to the outbound2 interface 
and directly send unauthorised emails. 
 
 Risk 3: The spam blocker appliance 2 (email GW2) 
 
Both internal and external relaying is allowed from the outbound interface of the email 
GW2. This mail relaying again may be a cause of potential risk to the council’s email 
system.  
 
 Risk 4: The Mailbox server role 
 
There were a number of mis-configurations on the Mailbox server role of the email (MS 
Exchange 2007) server. An example of this type of configuration error was the 
unlimited setting of the email send size. This unlimited setting could lead to a possible 
increase in unnecessary network traffic and may affect the speed of the council’s 
network traffic, by inadvertently causing a filling up of the storage capacity of the email 
server as well as the backup system. See Table 5.28 for more details. 
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 Risk 5: The Hub Transport server role 
 
The council’s Hub Transport server role has three groups which are the default CoB 
Gold, CoB Flourine and Client CoB Gold. In terms of following industry best practice 
recommendations by CIS (2007), the Hub Transport server role of the council’s email 
server should be reconfigured in order to increase its security. As an example, the IP 
range could be restricted for receive connectors. See Table 5.29 for more details. 
 
 Risk 6: The CAS role 
 
The CAS role with POP3 and IMAP related features are not included in the overall 
modified checklist auditing Table 5.30 as the email server is configured to support only 
SMTP and both POP3 and IMAP protocols are not supported. 
 
There were some mis-configurations on the CAS role. As an example, the MS 
ActiveSync password options on both the default and executive Nokia policy were 
disabled. Consequently, passwords are not required, thereby exposing the council’s 
email system to possible intrusion. See Table 5.30 for more details. 
 
5.3.5 Testing stage 5: The email system security policy review 
 
This email system security policy stage consists of the review of the email system 
security policy. There was no existing technical email system policy apart from a 
general information security which covered aspects of email usage (see Appendix B30).  
 
5.3.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues 
 
The lack of any technical email system security policy can contribute to potential risks 
such as interruption and misuse of the email services as previously discussed in Section 
4.3.5.1, to Council B’s email as well as the related systems.  
 
 Risk 1: Interruption of the email service 
 
Similarly to Council A, the lack of an email security guideline may be a cause of 
potential downtime to the email server as well as its services of Council B. 
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 Risk 2: Misuse of the email service 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the lack of an email security guideline at Council B can 
contribute to a cause of potential risks in terms of allowing unauthorised access as well 
as use of the email as a source to initiate email attacks to the council’s staff. 
 
5.4 Council B’s online web system results 
 
Council B’s online web system (the static web system, the CMS web system and the 
payment system) was audited and tested for the architecture, the intrusion detection, the 
device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the online web system servers, the 
vendor security benchmark auditing and the security policy review. The following 
sections describe all the results of these testings in detail. 
 
5.4.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying 
 
This network surveying stage involved making an audit of the online web system 
architecture together with the networking devices such as the router, the firewalls and 
the switch. The following network specifications and policy documents were collected 
for the council’s system: 
 
 The overall network diagram for the Internet link and the DMZ infrastructure 
connectivity; 
 The firewall device specification and ACL codes related to the council’s online 
web system; 
 The IDS/IPS, the Internet border, the DMZ switch specification and codes 
related to council’s online web system; and 
 The specifications summary of the online web system servers. 
 
The following sections describe the overall summary specifications of the online web 
system devices (the static web system, the CMS web system and the payment system) at 
Council B as well as the associated identified risks. 
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5.4.1.1 The static web system devices 
 
The static web system consists of two web servers (the CoB-DMZ-Web and the CoB-
Web) as previously mentioned. 
 
5.4.1.1.1 The CoB-DMZ-Web server 
 
The CoB-DMZ-Web server is located in the DMZ so as to minimise any potential risks 
arising from attackers to the council’s static web system. This web server provides the 
council’s specific information via static web pages including forms, to its residents as 
well as others. The summary specifications of the CoB-DMZ-Web server are presented 
in Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.9 A summary of the CoB-DMZ-Web server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device name CoB-DMZ-Web  
Domain name Cob.wa.gov.au 
Web server software MS IIS web server 6.0 
Other application software Trend Micro server protect 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 R2 with service pack 2 
Hardware Simple Standard Virtual Server (VMware) Small Computer System 
Interface (SCSI) C: 30 GB, E: 50 GB, F: 9 GB; memory physical 2 
GB and virtual 3.85 GB 
IP address A.B.C.121/27 
 
5.4.1.1.2 The CoB-Web server 
 
The CoB-Web is an in-house server, custom built to suite the council’s web system 
requirements. It is located in the council’s internal network. It allows the council’s IT 
operational staff (web administrator) to manage and update web pages information such 
as PDF and MP3 files, before pushing or uploading the validated web pages from the 
CoB-Web server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server. See Table 5.10 for more details.  
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Table 5.10 A summary of the CoB-Web server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device name CoB-Web  
Domain name (internal) CoB-Web.city.internal 
Web server software MS IIS web server 6.0 
Other application software Trend OfficeScan 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 R2 with service pack 2 
Hardware VMware SCSI C: 20 GB, E: 60 GB; memory physical 2 GB and virtual 
3.85 GB 
IP address 172.20.130.184/16 
 
5.4.1.2 The CMS web system devices 
 
As previously discussed in Section 5.2.4.2.2, the council’s CMS web system has two 
servers which are the CMS frontend web server (the CoB-DMZ-Web) and the CMS 
management server (the CoB-Database). The summary specifications of the CoB-
Database server are described as follows. However, the CoB-DMZ-Web server’s 
specifications are not included as it has been previously described in Section 5.4.1.1. 
 
5.4.1.2.1 The CMS frontend web server 
 
The specification details of the CoB-DMZ-Web server have been previously discussed 
in Section 5.4.1.1. 
 
5.4.1.2.2 The CMS management server 
 
The CoB-Database server works as the CMS management server as well as the backend 
database. It interacts with the CoB-DMZ-Web as part of a Web Content Management 
System (WCMS) as previously described in Section 5.2.4.2.2. Table 5.11 summarises 
the CMS management server (the CoB-Database) specifications. 
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Table 5.11 A summary of the CMS management server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device name CoB-Database (CoB-Database.city.internal) 
Web server software MS IIS web server 6.0 
Other application software Trend OfficeScan 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 with service pack 2 
Hardware VMware SCSI C: 30 GB, E: 50 GB, F: 12 GB; memory physical 4 
GB and virtual 7.27 GB 
IP address 172.20.130.148/16 
 
5.4.1.3 The online payment system devices 
 
The overall brief summary specifications of the council’s online payment servers 
(frontend web, application and backend database servers) are described as follows. 
 
5.4.1.3.1 The frontend web server 
 
The current frontend web server is located in the DMZ to diminish any potential risks 
which may take place from attackers to the council’s online payment system. It 
performs the first part of the application logic which provides the front line interface to 
the client web browser. The council’s residents can access the frontend web server 
through the council’s website (http://www.cob.wa.gov.au/Live/PayOnline.aspx), using 
their valid reference number for rates or infringement payments, whereas a valid 
payment number is required for dog registration renewals. The details of the frontend 
web server (the CoB-DMZ-Web server) specifications have been described earlier in 
Table 5.9. 
 
5.4.1.3.2 The application server 
 
Typically, in the online web payment system environment, the application server 
functions as a middle tier which interacts with the frontend DMZ web server and the 
backend database server. It synchronises the transactions of the application, processes 
necessary commands, and performs all calculations and queries of the data to and from 
the SQL backend database server. As previously mentioned, the CoB-DMZ-Web server 
performs both the frontend and application functions. 
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5.4.1.3.3 The backend database server 
 
The CoB-Database has the custom built database application running in conjunction 
with MS SQL Server 2005. The CoB-Database server works as the backend database 
which holds all the necessary information such as payment numbers, rates and 
infringement notice reference numbers, usernames, passwords and street addresses.  
Nevertheless, critical user information such as credit card numbers and expiry dates are 
not stored in the database tables.  
 
In addition, users’ data are stored in secured (encrypted) format. However, no further 
information about the encrypted details were provided by the council (personal 
communications with Council B, 2010). Furthermore, the CoB-Database server 
performs both functions which include the CMS and online payment backend database 
server functions. The backend database server specifications has been summarised 
earlier in the CMS section in Table 5.11. 
 
5.4.1.4 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of Testing stage 1 for Council B’s online payment system are 
described in the following sections. 
 
 Risk 1: The online payment system 
 
As mentioned earlier that the council’s online payment system consists of two servers 
(the CoB-DMZ-Web and the CoB-Database). The CoB-DMZ-Web provides both 
frontend and application features. This utilisation can be considered as a source of a 
potential risk due to the single point of failure in the case of the CoB-DMZ-Web server 
being compromised. 
 
5.4.2 Testing stage 2: The infrastructure of the online web system – Internet 
border router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews 
 
This second testing stage is made up of the review of the software configuration codes 
for the router, switch, firewalls, IDS and IPS devices. 
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5.4.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
Details of the Internet border router specifications were previously discussed in Section 
5.3.2.1. Moreover, the examination of the configuration codes from the Internet border 
router revealed the risk issue to be a vulnerability to an IP spoofing attack. 
 
5.4.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
This section covers the data collection, reviews and recommendations for the IDS/IPS 
features on the Internet border router and the two CheckPoint firewall UTM-1 272 
devices. Several risk issues were uncovered during the review process for these devices 
in relation to IDS and IPS in addition to the missing IPS software feature and the 
disabled IDS software feature. 
 
5.4.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
This firewall review section is separated into three groups which cover the static web, 
CMS web and online payment systems. More details of the council’s Internet firewalls 
specifications are located in Section 5.3.2.3. Appendix B8 shows the summary of the 
firewall configuration codes relevant to the online static web system’s servers (the CoB-
DMZ-Web and the CoB-Web). Examination revealed that only the web administrator 
can access the CoB-DMZ-Web server via TCP port 3389 for remote administration 
purposes from the designated computer (172.20.20.20/16). 
 
In addition, TCP port 445 MS file sharing protocol allows one-way access from the 
CoB-Web server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server. This allows the web administrator to 
upload web contents from the CoB-Web server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server. On the 
other hand, Appendix B9 shows the summary of the firewall configuration codes with 
respect to both the CMS web system servers. Furthermore, the issues that were revealed 
were associated with the firewall settings of the online payment system. Appendix B10 
displays the full firewall coding details with respect to the council’s online payment 
system. 
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5.4.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
As mentioned earlier, Council B has only one switch which provides network 
communication and connectivity between the Internet border router, the firewalls, the 
DMZ server and the council’s internal network. For more details in terms of the 
architecture, the configuration codes, the hardware specifications and identified risk 
issues see Section 5.3.2.4. However, details on ports and VLANs, including 
connectivity for the council’s online web system are provided in Figure 5.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. The low level online web system network diagram (including the static, the 
CMS and the online payment web systems) currently in use by Council B 
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5.4.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues 
 
The following section details the identified risk issues for the infrastructure of the online 
web system (Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switches) of 
Council B. 
 
 Risk 1: Poor ACL coding on the Internet border router 
 
The current ACL rule of the Internet border router allows any IP traffics get in and out 
the council’s network. According to best practice recommendations to standard router 
configurations, this setting is considered to be opened to cyber attacks such as IP 
spoofing and unauthorised network probing. 
 
 Risk 2: No inspection on web (HTTP) network traffic  
 
The incoming and outgoing web (HTTP) network traffic is not inspected (by IPS) which 
is a source of possible risks to attack from malware such as worms and Trojans. 
 
 Risk 3: The static web system: inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP outwards 
 
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows the CoB-DMZ-Web server access to 
anywhere through the HTTP port 80 (see Appendix B8: Policy number 4). This ACL 
setting is a source of potential risk in terms of the CoB-DMZ-Web server being used as 
a launch pad for staging further attacks. 
 
 Risk 4: The static web system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP inter-
device 
 
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows the CoB-DMZ-Web server access to the 
CoB-Web server which is located in the council’s internal network via HTTP port 80 
(see Appendix B8: Policy number 5). This can be a cause of potential risks as HTTP 
traffic from the DMZ network can directly access the internal network without any 
packet inspection.  
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 Risk 5: The static web system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTPS outwards 
 
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows both HTTP and HTTPS traffic from the 
internal CoB-Web server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server in the DMZ (see Appendix B8: 
Policy numbers 6 and 7). As per discussion with the web administrator, these ACL rules 
were not required as HTTP and HTTPS traffic should not be permitted in this direction. 
 
 Risk 6:The CMS web system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP inwards 
 
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows the CoB-DMZ-Web server which 
located in DMZ area access to the internal CoB-Database server via HTTP port 80 (see 
Appendix B9: Policy number 5). This is a source of potential risk as HTTP traffic from 
the DMZ network is able to access the internal network without any traffic inspection. 
 
 Risk 7: The CMS web system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTPS inwards 
 
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows the CoB-DMZ-Web server access to the 
internal CoB-Database server via HTTPS (see Appendix B9: Policy number 6). This is 
a source of potential risk to the internal database server as the HTTPS traffic from the 
DMZ network can directly flow to the council’s internal network without any 
completed or deep packet inspection.  
 
For example, there exists a potential risk from malware being spread through the 
HTTPS traffic if deep packet inspection is not performed (Cisco, 2002; Websense, 
2010). 
 
 Risk 8: The online payment system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTPS 
outwards 
 
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows HTTPS traffic from the CoB-DMZ-
Web server access to anywhere (any) (see Appendix B10: Policy number 4). This ACL 
setting is a source of potential risks in terms of the web server in the DMZ area being 
used as a launch pad for staging further attacks. 
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 Risk 9: The online payment system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – Sqlnet2 
 
The current ACL setting for the firewall permits communications between the CoB-
DMZ-Web server and the CoB-Database server in both directions (incoming and 
outgoing) via Oracle Sqlnet2 protocol (TCP ports: 1521, 1525 and 1526) (see Appendix 
B10: Policy numbers 6 and 7). This firewall rule is considered unnecessary due to the 
fact that the Oracle database server was decommissioned and is no longer in use having 
been replaced with the MS SQL server. 
 
Furthermore, these ACL rules can be a cause of potential risk to the CoB-Database 
server via Sqlnet2 protocol ports such as multi-threaded operating system server issues 
and disclosure of important information on the CoB-Database server. 
 
 Risk 10: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations 
 
This point has been previously discussed in Section 5.3.2.5. 
 
5.4.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning, 
vulnerability testing and results 
 
In this third testing stage similar techniques which were used in Section 5.5.3 of the 
email system were used. Both NMAP and GFI LANguard network scanning tools were 
used for all three testing steps (services and system identification, port scanning and 
vulnerability testing) for Council B’s online web system (including the static, the CMS 
and the online payment web systems) network scanning. 
 
5.4.3.1 Services and system identification results  
 
The results of the services and system identifications of the three servers which are the 
CoB-DMZ-Web (A.B.C.121), the CoB-Web (172.20.130.184) and the CoB-Database 
(172.20.130.148) are summarised in Appendices B13, B14 and B15. 
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5.4.3.2 Port scanning results 
 
In this port scanning testing section, the techniques used were similar to Section 5.3.3.2 
of the email system. Both NMAP and GFI LANguard were utilised to scan Council B’s 
online web system servers. Moreover, there were unnecessary TCP and UDP ports 
discovered in all three servers (the CoB-DMZ-Web, the CoB-Web and the CoB-
Database). Full details are provided in Appendices B16, B17 and B18. 
 
5.4.3.3 Vulnerability testing results  
 
The techniques that were used in this vulnerability testing phase were similar to Section 
5.3.3.3. There are four vulnerability groups which include the high, medium, low and 
potential security risks. There were vulnerabilities uncovered on all three servers of the 
council’s online systems (the CoB-DMZ-Web, the CoB-Web and the CoB-Database).  
 
5.4.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council B’s online web system are 
described as follows. 
 
 Risk 1: System information policy results for all the three servers 
 
The Windows configuration settings of all the three servers of the council’s online web 
systems were lacking in some respects in term of services, password and security 
auditing policies. This can lead to vulnerabilities to the council’s online web system. 
 
 Risk 2: System patching status results for all the three servers 
 
Testing for this section was done using GFI LANguard and NMAP scanning tools. 
There were no missing service packs and patches on the CoB-DMZ-Web server. 
However, there were missing service packs and patches on both the CoB-Web and the 
CoB-Database servers. These can be a source of potential risks to the council, 
particularly the CoB-Database server which holds the council’s client sensitive 
information. 
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 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on all the three servers 
 
There were 20 TCP and nine UDP opened ports which include unnecessary ports on the 
CoB-DMZ-Web server. These unnecessary opened ports can lead to a cause of potential 
risks in terms of unauthorised access to the DMZ web server. Table 5.12 presents the 
overall opened TCP and UDP ports for all the three servers. 
 
Additionally, Appendices B16, B17 and B18 provide the full details of the overall 
opened TCP and UDP service ports as well as the possible mitigation recommendations 
of the CoB-DMZ-Web, the CoB-Web and the CoB-Database servers respectively. 
 
Table 5.12 Overall opened TCP and UDP service ports of all the three servers 
 
Server names Opened TCP ports Opened UDP ports Comments 
CoB-DMZ-Web 20 9 Refer to Appendix B16 
CoB-Web 9 9 Refer to Appendix B17 
CoB-Database 10 9 Refer to Appendix B18 
 
 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on all the three servers 
 
There were vulnerabilities discovered on the CoB-DMZ-Web server such as the guest 
user account having access to application, security and system log files. Table 5.13 lists 
the overall vulnerability testing results of the three servers. 
 
The overall vulnerability testing results and the possible mitigation recommendations of 
the three servers are summarised in Appendices B19, B20 and B21 respectively.  
 
Table 5.13 Overall vulnerability of the three servers of Council B’s online web systems 
 
Server names H M L P Overall vulnerability levels Comments 
CoB-DMZ-Web 1 3 7 2 High (8/10) Refer to Appendix B19 
CoB-Web 1 0 6 1 High (10/10) Refer to Appendix B20 
CoB-Database 1 0 4 2 High (9/10) Refer to Appendix B21 
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5.4.4 Testing stage 4: Vendor security: Database security benchmark auditing 
 
This vendor security benchmark auditing stage consists of one testing step which is the 
database security benchmark auditing on the council’s backend database server (the 
CoB-Database). 
 
5.4.4.1 Database security benchmark results  
 
Similarly to Council A, MS SQL Server 2005 is an online web database application 
which is deployed in the council’s backend database server (the CoB-Database). The 
Security Configuration Benchmark for MS SQL Server 2005 version 1.2.0 January 
12th, 2010 from CIS was used in this audit as a prime benchmark auditing tool. 
 
The CIS benchmark auditing tool is categorised into nine groups as previously 
described in Section 4.4.4.1. The auditing was carried out on group one to six and group 
eight to nine. Group seven (replication) was not audited as there was no replication 
implemented in the council’s database system.  
 
5.4.4.2 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues for the configuration of the MS SQL 2005 database on the 
council’s backend server are presented as follow. 
 
 Risk 1: Inadequate configuration for the database application of the backend 
database server 
 
There were some security issues uncovered from the auditing. These security issues 
may lead to possible interruptions to the CoB-Database server. Table 5.14 presents the 
overall security issues uncovered from the CoB-Database server based on the eight 
category groups. 
 
See Appendices B22, B23, B24, B25, B26, B27, B28 and B29 for full details of all the 
results and findings including the possible mitigation recommendations based on the 
eight category groups respectively. 
 
 
 160
Table 5.14 The overall risks of the eight audited categories of the CoB-Database server 
 
Category no. Risks 
(H) 
Risks 
(M) 
Risks 
(L) 
Risks 
(P) 
Comments 
1) OS and network specification 
configuration 
1 3 10 2 Refers to Appendix B22 
2) SQL server installation and 
patches 
0 3 1 0 Refers to Appendix B23 
3)  SQL server settings 0 2 4 10 Refers to Appendix B24 
4) Access controls 0 1 0 0 Refers to Appendix B25 
5) Auditing and logging 0 0 0 43 Refers to Appendix B26 
6) Backup and disaster recovery 
procedures 
0 1 1 1 Refers to Appendix B27 
7) Replication N/A N/A N/A N/A None 
8) Application development best 
practices 
1 1 0 0 Refers to Appendix B28 
9) Surface area configuration tool 0 1 2 1 Refers to Appendix B29 
 
5.4.5 Testing stage 5: The online web system security policy review 
 
There was a general information security policy for online services usage. This general 
information security policy covered acceptable and prohibited usages of email, internet, 
data confidentiality, logon accounts, passwords and electronic fax. However, there was 
no existing related technical policy for the online web system in place at the council 
such as a network infrastructure related policy and a data security policy (see Appendix 
B30). 
 
5.4.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues 
 
This lack of related online web system security policy can create high risks to the 
council’s online web system. Similar to Council A, the cause of these risks could be 
characterised as follows: 
 
 Poor communication of risk; 
 Possible misdirection or resources; and  
 Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor 
management/strategic oversight. 
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 Risk 1: Poor communication of risk 
 
There was little or no discussion of ICT risk management in the weekly IT operation 
staff meetings (personal communications with Council B, 2010). The reasons for the 
non existence of risk management discussions was due to the lack of time as  the 
council’s IT operational team often have ample day to day operation tasks to manage, 
and the fact that the council has  no ICT risk management plan in place. 
 
 Risk 2: Possible misdirection of resources 
 
As a result of budget constraints in the council’s IT department, there was no budget 
allocation for the development of an ICT security related policy, including a specific 
technical security policy. The council’s IT department has fully allocated its budget, 
mainly to resources and day-to-day operations (personal communications with Council 
B, 2010). However, at the end of year 2010, general ICT and specific technical security 
policies were discussed due to the recommendations of the IT email and online web 
systems reports. 
 
In addition, just before the Christmas 2010, the CoB-DMZ-Web server was hacked into 
as a direct consequence of missing patches in the CoB-DMZ-Web server (personal 
communications with Council B, 2010). This security break has raised ICT security 
awareness among the council’s IT staff. 
 
 Risk 3: Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor 
management/strategic oversight 
 
This aspect was due to the fact that some of the council’s IT operational staff lack a 
reasonable knowledge of the details of IT security particularly in their area of 
responsibility. For example, the web system analyst has a good knowledge of web 
programming but little knowledge in web security related issues.  
 
In addition, this research acted upon the concerns of management and staff with regards 
to the identified security risks as expounded earlier. The resulting report and 
recommendations provided as a result of this research serve to equip management with 
a basis for support of these concerns and therefore herald a “call to action” for the 
respective councils. The security recommendations serve as a justification for an 
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internal review of the respective councils and act as a case for introduction of some 
form of policy tightening especially in regards to the online systems. In addition, the 
fact that some of the security risks arose as a result of a lack of training and personal 
professional development of staff should serve as strong case for future budgetary 
allocations in the area of ongoing staff training and up skilling. 
 
5.5 Analysis and discussion 
 
The analysis and discussion on both Council B’s email as well as online web systems 
(the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment system) are 
detailed in the following sections. 
 
5.5.1 Analysis 
 
The analysis can be separated into two sections for each of the analysis of Council B’s 
email and online web systems. 
 
5.5.1.1 Council B’s email system analysis – possible mitigations 
 
The following sections (Testing stages 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) describe the possible mitigation 
recommendations for the identified issues of Council B’s email system. Each of the 
mitigations described relate to the identified risk issue number. 
 
5.5.1.1.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
In order to mitigate this potential risk of a single point of failure, it is recommended that 
Council B deploys an extra dedicated server to only perform a CAS role. This additional 
server may be in the form of a VM or a physical server. In addition, the connection 
between the CAS and the Mailbox Server should be used with a high-bandwidth and 
low-latency connection as per Microsoft TechNet (2009, p. 2) which states that “the 
minimum recommended bandwidth is 100 Mbps, but a 1-Gpbs connection should be 
considered for enterprise data centres”. Therefore, a gigabit connection is strongly 
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recommended. The summary specifications of a new dedicated CAS are provided in 
Table 5.15. Figure 5.7 provides details of its architecture including the new CAS. 
 
Additionally, the existing email system does not currently have the Unified Messaging 
server role installed. However, in the medium to long term future Council B should 
consider combining or replacing it with the council’s current voice mail product 
provided its features have been updated and the cost is justified. 
 
Table 5.15 A summary recommendations of the new CAS specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Email application software MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1 
OS MS Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition with service pack 1  
Hardware VMware or equivalent 8 GB RAM, hard disks C: 20 GB, e: 100 GB 
MS Exchange 2007 role CAS 
MS Exchange support MS OWA, MS Outlook Anywhere, MS ActiveSync 
TCP/IP protocols HTTPS, RPC, LDAP 
IP network Different subnet with other email servers (isolate) 
Network connection Gigabit link between Client Access and Mailbox servers 
ACL Permits only allowed or required protocols 
Other software Virus protection software for server 
 
 Risk 2 
 
In order to further minimise and control any other potential risks that may occur, due to 
the email server being on the same subnet, it is recommended that the dedicated CAS 
may be configured to a different sub-network. In addition, ACL filtering may be 
implemented to only allow the required network protocols for communication between 
the new CAS and the network. See Figure 5.7 for more details. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
The use of either the certificate or token authentication methods may provide better 
mechanism security when compared with the basic authentication method (Luckett et 
al., 2008). In case of deploying certificate authentication method, it is recommended 
that Council B should ensure that its mobile clients still authenticate with the MS 
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ActiveSync protocol. This due to the fact that the “not all mobile devices can use 
certificate-based authentication” (Luckett et. al., 2008, p. 531). 
 
Alternatively, implementing token authentication method as an additional layer of 
authentication typically requires a third-party authentication solution which comes with 
additional costs, time and manpower. Table 5.16 summarises the options and 
recommendations for enhancing the client access security methods for Council B. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7. A recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an extra MS 
Exchange 2007 (CAS role) 
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 Risk 4 
 
It is known that NT LAN Manager (NTLM) provides better security than basic 
authentication (Luckett et al., 2008). Therefore, NTLM authentication may be used in 
conjunction with the SSL connection. 
 
Furthermore, the current firewall (CheckPoint Firewall-1) needs to be configured in 
order to handle NTLM authentication (Microsoft TechNet, 2007b, c). Table 5.16 
identifies the MS Outlook Anywhere current authentication methods of Council B and 
the enhancement recommendations. 
 
Table 5.16 Overall current and recommendations client access security methods over 
SSL for the email system of Council B 
 
Client-to-server 
connections 
Authentication 
options 
Council B current 
configuration 
Recommended authentication 
for Council B 
MS OWA Basic/form-based Form-based Form-based 
MS ActiveSync Basic/certificate/token Basic Certificate or token  
MS Outlook 
Anywhere 
Basic/NTLM Basic NTLM  
 
5.5.1.1.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
The council may wish to tighten its ACL filtering; this may be achieved by creating 
each individual ACL for each individual service usage. Recommended examples for the 
email service are shown in Table 5.17. 
 
Table 5.17 Possible examples of the Internet border ACL for the email system 
 
Rules Protocol 
types 
From 
(source) 
To 
(destination) 
Ports 
(service) 
Recommendations 
Permit TCP Any A.B.C.98-101 SMTP Yes 
Permit TCP Any A.B.C.89 HTTPS Yes 
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 Risk 2 
 
The Cisco IOS IPS software feature on the Internet border router (Cisco 2811) may be 
enabled in order to monitor and prevent potential IP spoofing and scanning attacks.  
Therefore, the Internet border router will act as a first protection layer for the 
Internetwork system of the council. More details are provided in Table 5.18. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
The IPS feature can be added to the two current firewalls (UTM-1 272) to increase its 
security. According to Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. (2010, p. 5), IPS 
features on CheckPoint firewall UTM-1 270 can perform the following: 
 “Network-layer protection blocks attacks such as DoS, port scanning and IP/ 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)/TCP-related; 
 Application-layer protection blocks attacks such as DNS cache poisoning, FTP 
bounce and improper commands; and 
 Detection methods signature-based, behavioural and protocol anomaly.”  
 
This added IPS feature may cause both the incoming and outgoing email (SMTP) traffic 
to be fully inspected. Consequently, vulnerability to the previously mentioned attacks 
will be minimised. In addition, the IPS can inspect other network protocols such as 
HTTP. Table 5.18 provides overall details of the identified issues and the 
recommendation solutions. 
 
Table 5.18 A summary of the IPS of the council’s internetwork system 
 
Products Current issues Recommendations Descriptions 
IPS on the Internet 
border router 
Disabled Enable (turn on) For blocking of any spoofing/scanning 
attacks. 
IPS on the firewall Non-existent Add this optional 
feature 
For real-time inspection of all required 
important network traffic (protocols) 
for the purposes of blocking and 
preventing any malicious or unwanted 
behaviour in real-time.  
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 Risk 4 
 
Accessing the two spam blocker appliances from the council’s internal network via 
HTTP or Telnet ports should be avoided or prohibited in order to conform to general 
best practice recommendations. HTTPS and Secure Shell (SSH) protocols were 
recommended to the council as alternatives for secure encrypted remote access 
mechanisms to the two spam blocker appliances so that all communications through 
these ports is encrypted. 
 
The HTTPS (TCP: 443) and SSH (TCP: 22) ports should both be opened on the 
firewalls for accessibility via the web interface as well as command line interface 
respectively. Moreover, both HTTPS and SSH services should also be enabled on the 
spam blocker appliances. 
 
  Risk 5 
 
Access to anywhere via port HTTP from either of the spam blocker appliances (email 
GW1 and GW2) in the council’s DMZ network should be limited or specified in order 
to match to best practice recommendations for standard firewall configurations. 
 
 Risk 6 
 
The council may consider deploying third-party solutions such as Cisco IronPort S-
Series web security appliance or Websense Content Gateway in order to perform full or 
deep inspection on the contents of HTTPS traffic (Cisco, 2002; Websense, 2010). 
 
In addition, other web protocols such as HTTP can also be deeply inspected. Full 
scanning of the contents of HTTPS traffic allows the council to identify and stop any 
potential malware lurking in the HTTPS traffic. This security measure will increase the 
Internet security of the council. 
 
Figure 5.8 illustrates all devices connectivity including the recommended CAS as well 
as the third-party solution in a high level network diagram.  
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Figure 5.8. An overall recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an 
extra MS Exchange 2007 (CAS role) and a third-party stateful device 
 
 Risk 7 
 
With reference to Table 5.19, it is recommended that all the measures that are currently 
not implemented or enabled be activated for optimum security in order to protect attacks 
against the council’s Ethernet switch. 
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Table 5.19 Switch security identified issues and recommendations 
 
Security features Recommendations 
ACL applied to block unwanted devices To do 
Access to the device via HTTP is disabled To do 
Access to the device via Telnet is disabled To do 
Activate Loop protection on all ports To do 
Apply appropriate log server Satisfactory 
Apply appropriate timestamps debug time Satisfactory 
Apply appropriate timestamps log time Satisfactory 
Apply appropriate time zone Satisfactory 
Appropriate SNMP used To do 
Appropriate VLAN used Satisfactory 
Best practice user name and/or password used To do 
Configure appropriate warning banner message To do 
Disable/shutdown unused switch ports To do 
Disable trunking on ports that do not need it Satisfactory 
Enable feature against ARP poisoning attacks To do 
Enable feature against ARP spoofing attacks To do 
Enable port broadcast storm control To do 
Enable port security limits MAC address to a port To do 
Ports connected to identified devices that do not support spanning-tree should 
be configured with BPDU filtering 
To do 
Ports not connected to anything yet should be configured with protection To do 
Set DTP on all ports not being used for trunking N/A 
Set strong password (MD5) for authenticating VTP message To do 
Strong password encryption (MD5) used To do 
TFTP service is disabled To do 
 
 Risk 8 
 
It is recommended that two additional switches should be deployed as follows: 
 
 The outside area: A new switch to connect the two firewalls and the Internet 
border router; and 
 The DMZ area: A new switch to connect the two firewalls and the DMZ servers. 
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On the other hand, the current switch can be used to connect between the firewall and 
the council’s internal network. The new switches recommendations are provided in 
Table 5.20. Figure 5.9 illustrates more details on ports, VLAN including its 
connectivity.  
 
Table 5.20 New switches hardware and software recommendations 
 
Attributes Details 
Device location The council’s outside network area 
Device type Cisco Catalyst 3560 switch (3560-12PC) 
OS Cisco IOS version 12.2 or higher 
Memory 128 MB 
Port Ethernet 10/100 ports with Power over Ethernet (PoE) and 1 dual-purpose 
10/100/1000 and SFP port 
Operate at Layer 2 OSI 
 
Attributes Details 
Device location The council’s DMZ network area 
Device type Cisco Catalyst 3560 switch (3560G-24TS) 
OS Cisco IOS version 12.2 or higher 
Memory 128 MB 
Port 24 Ethernet 10/100/1000 ports and 4 SFP-based gigabit Ethernet ports 
Operate at Layer 2 OSI 
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Figure 5.9. A current low level network diagram of the email system for Council B with 
the new recommended switches 
 
5.5.1.1.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
The overall system information policy testing results of the council’s email server are 
summarised in Tables 5.21 whereas full details of the overall system information policy 
testing results and recommendations are provided in Appendix B4. 
 
Table 5.21 Overall system information policy of Council B’s email server 
 
Server name Password policy Security audit policy Comment 
Email server  Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Refer to Appendix B4 
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 Risk 2 
 
Appendix B5 provides the specific details of the missing patches and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the email server. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
As previously discussed, there were 22 opened TCP and eight UDP ports. These opened 
ports included unnecessary ports. Table 5.22 presents the total number of recommended 
open TCP and UDP ports on the email server. 
 
Table 5.22 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on the 
email server 
 
Server name Recommended open 
TCP ports 
Recommended open 
UDP port 
Comment 
Email server 7 1 Refer to Appendix B6 
 
 Risk 4 
 
Refer to Appendix B7 for full details of the identified risk issues and the possible 
mitigation recommendations. 
 
5.5.1.1.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
The overall spoofing testing results for the council email server including possible 
mitigation recommendations are presented in Table 5.23. 
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Table 5.23 The spoofing testing results and recommendations for the email server 
 
Testing techniques Purposes Results Recommendations 
Telnet to the email server and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to another 
internal address. 
To test internal 
connectivity of the 
email server 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow mail 
relaying 
Sending an email from one 
external address to another 
external address using the 
target email server. 
To test external 
relaying of the 
email server  
Unsuccessful (does 
not allow relaying) 
None 
Sending an email from one 
internal address to an external 
address using the target email 
server. 
To test internal 
relaying of the 
email server  
Unsuccessful (does 
not allow relaying) 
None 
Sending an email from one 
external address to an internal 
address using the target email 
server. 
To test email 
relaying of the 
email server 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Should not allow mail 
relaying 
 
 Risk 2 
 
The overall results and mitigation recommendations of both the network interfaces of 
the spam blocker appliance 1 (email GW1) are provided in Tables 5.24 and 5.25. 
 
Table 5.24 The spoofing testing results and recommendations of the email GW1 
(inbound2.cob.wa.gov.au: A.B.C.98) 
 
Testing techniques Purposes Results Recommendations 
Telnet to the email GW1 and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to another 
internal address. 
To test internal 
connectivity of the 
email GW1 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
None 
Telnet to the email GW1 and 
sending an email from one 
external address to another 
external address using the 
spam blocker appliance. 
To test external 
relaying of the 
email GW1 
Unsuccessful (does 
not allow relaying) 
Block internal staff from 
directly accessing the 
device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet the email GW1 and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to an external 
address using the spam 
blocker appliance. 
To test internal 
relaying of the 
email GW1 
Unsuccessful (does  
not allow relaying) 
Block internal staff from 
directly accessing the 
device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet to the email GW1 and 
sending an email from one 
external address to an internal 
address using the spam 
blocker appliance. 
To test mail 
relaying of the 
email  GW1 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
None 
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Table 5.25 The spoofing testing results and recommendations of the email GW1 
(outbound2.cob.wa.gov.au: A.B.C.99) 
 
Testing techniques Purposes Results Recommendations 
Telnet to the email GW1 and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to another 
internal address. 
To test internal 
connectivity of the 
email GW1 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Block internal staff from 
directly accessing the 
device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet to the email GW1 and 
sending an email from one 
external address to another 
external address using the 
spam blocker appliance. 
To test external 
relaying of the 
email GW1 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Block internal staff from 
directly accessing the 
device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet the email GW1 and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to an external 
address using the spam 
blocker appliance. 
To test internal 
relaying of the 
email GW1 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Block internal staff from 
directly accessing the 
device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet to the email GW1 and 
sending an email from one 
external address to an internal 
address using the spam 
blocker appliance. 
To test mail 
relaying of the 
email GW1 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Block internal staff from 
directly accessing the 
device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
The overall spoofing testing results and mitigation recommendations of the spam 
blocker appliance 2 (email GW2) are provided in both Tables 5.26 and 5.27. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 175
Table 5.26 The spoofing testing results and recommendations of the email GW2 
(inbound.cob.wa.gov.au: A.B.C.100) 
 
Testing techniques Purposes Results Recommendations 
Telnet to the email GW2 and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to another 
internal address. 
To test internal 
connectivity of the 
email GW2 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
None 
Telnet to the email GW2 and 
sending an email from one 
external address to another 
external address using the 
spam blocker appliance. 
To test external 
relaying of the 
email GW2 
Unsuccessful (does 
not allow relaying) 
Block the internal staff 
from directly accessing 
the device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet the email GW2 and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to an 
external address using the 
spam blocker appliance. 
To test internal 
relaying of the 
email GW2 
Unsuccessful (does 
not allow relaying) 
Block the internal staff 
from directly accessing 
the device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet to the email GW2 and 
sending an email from one 
external address to an 
internal address using the 
spam blocker server. 
To test mail 
relaying of the 
email GW2 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
None 
 
Table 5.27 The spoofing testing results and recommendations of the email GW2 
(outbound.cob.wa.gov.au: A.B.C.101) 
 
Testing techniques Purposes Results Recommendations 
Telnet to the email GW2 and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to another 
internal address. 
To test internal 
connectivity of the 
email GW2 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Block the internal staff 
from directly accessing 
the device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet to the email GW2 and 
sending an email from one 
external address to another 
external address using the 
spam blocker appliance. 
To test external 
relaying of the 
email GW2 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Block the internal staff 
from directly accessing 
the device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet to the email GW2 and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to an 
external address using the 
spam blocker appliance. 
To test internal 
relaying of the 
email GW2 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Block the internal staff 
from directly accessing 
the device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
Telnet to the email GW2 and 
sending an email from one 
external address to an 
internal address using the 
spam blocker appliance. 
To test mail 
relaying of the 
email GW2 
Successful (allows 
relaying) 
Block the internal staff 
from directly accessing 
the device via Telnet and 
SMTP port. 
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 Risk 4 
 
Table 5.28 shows overall results of auditing the Mailbox server role of the council’s 
email server including the possible mitigations based on the CIS suggestions. 
 
Table 5.28 The overall results of auditing and recommendations Mailbox server role of 
the council’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council  B Recommendations 
Restrict email deletion retention 
1. Private mailbox store 1 
2. Public folder database 
3. Private mailbox store 2 
4. Temp mailbox database 
5. Private mailbox store 3 
7 (days) 
 
(days) 
7 
14 
7 
7 
7 
7 (days) 
Restrict mailbox deletion retention 
1. Private mailbox store 1 
2. Public folder database 
3. Private mailbox store 2 
4. Temp mailbox database 
5. Private mailbox store 3 
30 (days) (days) 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 (days) 
Restrict deletion of mail or mailboxes until archival 
1. Private mailbox store 1 
2. Public folder database 
3. Private mailbox store 2 
4. Temp mailbox database 
5. Private mailbox store 3 
Unchecked  
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Checked 
Mounting of mailbox database at startup 
1. Private mailbox store 1 
2. Public folder database 
3. Private mailbox store 2 
4. Temp mailbox database 
 5. Private mailbox store 3 
Unchecked  
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Ensure mailbox database cannot be overwritten 
1. Private mailbox store 1 
2. Public folder database 
3. Private mailbox store 2 
4. Temp mailbox database 
5. Private mailbox store 3 
Checked  
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Verify default mailbox storage limits (issue warning 
at,  prohibit send at, prohibit send and receive at) 
1. Private mailbox store 1 
3. Private mailbox store 2 
4. Temp mailbox database 
 5. Private mailbox store 3 
Custom KB 
For 1, 3-5 
1572864,  
2097152,  
2411520 
Custom 
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Table 5.28 The overall results of auditing and recommendations Mailbox server role of 
the council’s email server (continued) 
 
References Defaults Council  B Recommendations 
Ensure public folder database cannot be overwritten Checked Unchecked Unchecked 
Verify default public folder storage limits (issue 
warning, prohibit send and receive at (KB) 
Custom 1991680KB 
- 
10240KB 
Custom 
Audit public folder client access Custom Custom Custom 
Audit public folder administrative access Custom Custom Custom 
Verify proper permissions on public folder database Custom Custom Custom 
Mounting of public folder database at startup Unchecked Unchecked Unchecked 
Restrict email send size (mailbox identity, mail 
contact identity and distribution group identity) 
 Unlimited 
Unlimited 
Unlimited 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict mail receive size (mail box identity, mail 
contact identity and distribution group identity) 
 Unlimited 
Unlimited 
Unlimited 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict max recipients 5000 Unlimited 2000 
Audit mailbox spam bypass settings False False False 
AntiSpam updates Disabled Disabled Disabled 
Zero out deleted database pages 
1. Private mailbox store 1 
2. Public folder database 
3. Private mailbox store 2 
4. Temp mailbox database 
5. Private mailbox store 3 
False  
False 
False 
False 
False 
False 
True 
 
 Risk 5 
 
Table 5.29 demonstrates overall results of auditing the Hub Transport server role of the 
council’s email server including the mitigation recommendations based on the CIS 
suggestions. 
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Table 5.29 The overall results of auditing and mitigation recommendations Hub 
Transport server role of the council’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council  B Recommendations 
Audit DNS lookup servers 
1. Default CoB Gold 
2. CoB Flourine 
3. Client CoB Gold 
None  
Custom 
Custom 
Custom 
Custom 
Restrict mail send size (max send size, max message 
size) 
1. Default CoB Gold 
2. CoB Flourine 
3. Client CoB Gold 
30MB 
30MB 
MB 
 
20, 20 
20, 20 
20, 20 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict max recipients (max recipients per 
message) 
1. Default CoB Gold 
2. CoB Flourine 
3. Client CoB Gold 
5000  
 
5000 
200 
200 
2000 
Restrict mail receive size (max receive size, max 
message size, external dsn max message attach size 
and internal dsn max message attach size) 
1. Default CoB Gold 
2. CoB Flourine 
3. Client CoB Gold 
30MB 
30MB 
10MB 
10MB 
 
 
20, 20, 10 ,10 
20, 20, 10 ,10 
20, 20, 10 ,10 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict IP range for receive connectors None None Custom 
 
 Risk 6 
 
Table 5.30 shows overall results of auditing CAS role of the council’s email server 
including the mitigation recommendations based on the CIS suggestions. 
 
Table 5.30 The overall results of auditing and recommendations CAS role of the 
council’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council B Recommendations 
Remove legacy web applications Installed Removed Removed 
Restrict web authentication methods* See note See note See note 
Require SSL for web applications Checked 
Unchecked 
Checked 
Checked 
Checked 
Checked 
Disable web anonymous access Unchecked Unchecked Unchecked 
Enable logging for default website Checked Checked Checked 
 
 179
Table 5.30 The overall results of auditing and recommendations CAS role of the 
council’s email server (continued) 
 
References Defaults Council B Recommendations 
Enable policy for MS ActiveSync** None See note See note 
Forbid MS ActiveSync NonProvisionable 
devices 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
Checked  
 
Checked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Forbid MS ActiveSync simple device 
password 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
Checked  
 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Disable MS ActiveSync WSS/UNC access 
(windows file shares,  sharepoint services) 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
Checked 
Checked 
Checked, 
Checked 
Unchecked, 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Require MS ActiveSync password 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
Unchecked  
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Checked 
Require MS ActiveSync alphanumeric 
password 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
Unchecked  
 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Checked 
Require MS ActiveSync minimum 
password length 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
Checked, 4  
 
Unchecked, 3 
Unchecked, 3 
Checked, 8 
Require MS ActiveSync password 
expiration 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
Unchecked  
 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
60 
Restrict MS ActiveSync attachment size 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
Unchecked For both 1 & 2 
Unchecked, 
Unallocated 
Unchecked 
3MB 
Require MS ActiveSync policy refresh 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
None  
Unlimited 
01:00:00 
24.00:00:00 
Restrict MS ActiveSync maximum 
password attempts 
1. Default 
2. Executive Nokia policy 
8 Inactive 
Inactive 
8 
Require MS ActiveSync Certificate Based 
Authentication 
Ignore 
Client Certs 
Ignore Client Certs Require Client 
Certs 
Require MS ActiveSync inactivity lockout 
time 
Enabled Enabled Disabled 
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Note:  
Refers to restrict web authentication methods* 
This task is to ensure that unneeded authentication methods for MS Exchange web 
applications are disabled. These measures will limit the possibility for unauthorised 
clients to access any unneeded services. Refer to CIS (2007, p. 76), MS Exchange 2007 
recommendation “for web services and applications that cannot be disabled and 
removed from IIS ensure reasonable authentication methods are selected. These include 
Autodiscover, Exchange, EWS, Exadmin, Exchweb, MS-Exchange-ActiveSync, OAB, 
OWA, Public, and Unified Messaging”.  See more detail in Table 5.31. 
 
Table 5.31 The overall results and mitigation recommendations of auditing web 
authentication and access control of the council’s email server 
 
Council B Integrate Digest Basic Passport 
Autodiscover X  X  
Exchange X  X  
Exchange Web Services  (EWS) X    
Exadmin X  X  
Exchweb X  X  
MS-Exchange-ActiveSync   X  
Offline Address Book (OAB) X    
Outlook Web Access (OWA)   X  
Public X  X  
Unified Messaging (UM) X    
 
Recommendations Integrate Digest Basic Passport 
Autodiscover X    
Exchange X  X  
Exchange Web Services  (EWS) X    
Exadmin X    
Exchweb X    
MS-Exchange-ActiveSync   X*  
Offline Address Book (OAB)   X  
Outlook Web Access (OWA)   X  
Public X  X  
Unified Messaging (UM) X    
 
X represents enabled 
X* represents only if not using Certificate 
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Refers to enable policy for MS ActiveSync** 
This task creates and assigns policy for MS ActiveSync service. By enabling and 
configuring MS ActiveSync policy may assist to ensure that all corporate (Council B’s) 
mobile devices are in line with its policy. This therefore may reduce the potential risks 
of the MS Exchange infrastructure in case of a mobile device disappearing (out of sync) 
from the network (CIS, 2007).  
 
5.5.1.1.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risks 1 and 2 
 
A technical policy relating to infrastructure devices (firewall, IDS/IPS, router and 
switch) as well as server (email) policies and procedures are recommended and should 
be implemented in order to provide better security of the council’s email and related 
system. 
 
5.5.1.2 Council B’s online web system analysis – possible mitigations 
 
As previously discussed, Council B’s online web system consists of three sub systems 
which are the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment system. 
The possible mitigation recommendations for the identified issues of Council B’s online 
web system (all the three sub systems) are depicted in the following sections. 
Furthermore, each of the mitigations described relate to the identified risk issue number. 
 
5.5.1.2.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
In the interests of general best practices, it is recommended that both the frontend and 
application features should be installed on different servers. The CoB-DMZ-Web server 
may still act as the frontend web server, whereas a new additional server should be 
installed to function as the application server. The new application server should be 
configured using a different subnetwork that is separated from the current frontend web 
server (the CoB-DMZ-Web). It should be located inside on the internal network.  
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The application of appropriate firewall rules to control the network traffic between both 
servers is also advisable in order to reduce any unwanted network traffic as well as 
potential risks to the new application server. The recommended application server can 
be just a VMware with appropriate Random Access Memory (RAM) and Small 
Computer System Interface (SCSI) hard disk spaces. Virus protection software should 
also be installed on this new application server to protect against virus and worm 
attacks. Table 5.32 summarises the recommended application server specifications. 
 
Table 5.32 A summary of the additional application server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name Anyname (anyname.cob.wa.gov.au) 
Web server software MS IIS web server 6.0 or 7.0 (preferred) 
Other application software Custom built application and virus protection software 
OS MS Windows 2003 Server service pack 2 or MS Windows 2008 
(preferred) 
Hardware VMware C: 20 GB, E: 50 GB Hard Disk Drive (HDD) and virtual 
memory 4 GB 
IP address 172.20.x.x/16 
 
Additionally, it is recommended that the new application server should be separated 
from the backend database server (the CoB-Database). This separation can be done by 
placing the new application server on a different subnetwork or a VLAN from the 
backend database server. Moreover, appropriate ACLs should be configured to filter or 
control network traffic between both the subnets. These measures may prevent or 
mitigate any potential network security risks such as viruses, Trojans and DoS attacks 
infiltrating the database server from the new application server subnetwork. 
 
5.5.1.2.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
It is recommended that Council B tighten its ACL settings, by creating each individual 
ACL for each individual service usage for both the HTTP and HTTPS protocols to only 
allow HTTP and HTTPS protocols from any source to the council’s web server 
(A.B.C.121). This ACL configuration can restrict any unwanted access protocols as 
well as prevent potential risks such as DoS attacks to the web server.  
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 Risk 2 
 
The IDS/IPS software feature should be enabled on the Internet border router and a new 
IPS feature on the firewall may also be installed in order to inspect both the incoming 
and outgoing web network traffic. This can minimise any spoofing, scanning, malware, 
worm and DoS attacks from the incoming internetwork traffic. 
 
However, this IPS feature is not capable of inspecting secured web (HTTPS) network 
traffic (Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., 2010). Refer to previous discussion on 
Section 5.5.1.1.2: Risk 6 for a third-party HTTPS inspection solution.   
 
 Risk 3 
 
The aim of the frontend web server (CoB-DMZ-Web) is to only provide external access 
for Council B’s residents. Allowing the frontend web server access to anywhere is 
unnecessary and can be a source of potential risk as mentioned earlier. This risk may be 
easily mitigated by changing the permit rule’s destination from anywhere (any) which 
currently allows access to the DMZ, the internal and the external networks, to only 
access the external network (outside). 
 
 Risk 4 
 
It was recommended that this rule should be removed. As per discussion with the web 
administrator, this firewall rule was inadvertent and was subsequently removed by the 
IT operational staff. 
 
 Risk 5 
 
As per discussion with Council B’s Web administrator, the CoB-Web server is not 
required to communicate with the CoB-DMZ-Web server via HTTP or HTTPS. 
Consequently, it is advisable to remove both these rules. Figure 5.10 illustrate the 
council’s recommended static web system, including the network traffic protocols in a 
high level network diagram. 
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Figure 5.10. The recommended high level static web system including network traffic 
protocols for Council B 
 
 Risk 6 
 
It was recommended that this rule should be removed. As per discussion with the web 
administrator of the council, this firewall rule was inadvertent and was subsequently 
deleted by the IT operational staff. 
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 Risk 7 
 
It was recommended that this rule should be removed. According to the web 
administrator, this firewall rule was inadvertent and was subsequently eliminated by the 
IT operational staff. Figure 5.11 display the council’s recommended CMS static web 
system with network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11. The recommended high level CMS web system with network traffic 
protocols for Council B 
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 Risk 8 
 
This rule may be enhanced in terms of security by adjusting the destination from 
anywhere (any) to outside or, this rule can be restricted to allow the CoB-DMZ-Web 
server access only to the external Online Gateway through TCP: HTTPS port 
 
 Risk 9 
 
It was recommended that this rule should be removed. As per discussion with the web 
administrator, this firewall rule relating to the Sqlnet2 protocol was inadvertent and was 
subsequently removed by the IT operational staff. Figure 5.12 illustrates the 
recommended council’s online payment system architecture with an additional 
application server including the network traffic protocols. 
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Figure 5.12. The recommended high level online payment system with an additional 
application server including network traffic protocols for Council B 
 
 Risk 10 
 
In terms of the new switches detail recommendation, see previous discussion in Section 
5.5.1.1.2 Risk 8. However, details on ports and VLANs, including possible connectivity 
of for the new switch recommendations for the council’s online web system are 
provided in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13. The recommended low level online web system network diagram 
(including the static, the CMS and the online payment web systems) 
 
5.5.1.2.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
It is recommended to reconfigure the MS Windows password and revise the security 
auditing policies on all three council’s online web servers (the CoB-DMZ-Web, the 
CoB-Web and the CoB-Database) in order to avoid any potential vulnerability that may 
occur. Furthermore, Appendices B11, B12 and B13 provide full details of the overall 
system information policy testing results and recommendations of the servers of 
Council B’s online web systems. 
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 Risk 2 
 
There was one missing service pack and one missing critical patch on the CoB-Web 
server whereas the CoB-Database server had two missing service packs. In addition, the 
overall system patching testing analysis and the possible mitigation recommendations 
for the CoB-Web and the CoB-Database servers are presented in Appendices B14 and 
B15 respectively.s 
 
 Risk 3 
 
Table 5.33 presents the total number of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on all 
the council’s online payment servers. 
 
Table 5.33 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on all 
Council B’s online web servers 
 
Server names Recommended open 
TCP ports 
Recommended open 
UDP ports 
Comments 
CoB-DMZ-Web 3 2 Refer to Appendix B16 
CoB-Web 4 2 Refer to Appendix B17 
CoB-Database 5 3 Refer to Appendix B18 
 
 Risk 4 
 
Refer to Appendices B19, B20 and B21 for full details of the identified risk issues and 
the possible mitigation recommendations. 
 
5.5.1.2.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
See Appendices B22, B23, B24, B25, B26, B27, B28 and B29 for full details of all the 
results and findings including the possible mitigation recommendations based on the 
eight category groups respectively. 
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5.5.1.2.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risks 1, 2 and 3 
 
As per general best practice recommendations, Council B may consider implementing 
general information security as well as related online technical policies and procedures 
such as web server, database server and infrastructure (firewall, IDS/IPS, router and 
switch) policies and procedures. The use of new and stringent technical policies and 
procedures will enhance the security of the council’s online web system. 
 
5.5.2 Discussion 
 
The research activities conducted on Council B discovered that both the email and the 
online web system (the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment 
system) did not meet either the national or the industry standards in terms of best 
practices. This can be a cause of potential risk of attacks to the council’s email system, 
online web system as well as related ICT systems. Nevertheless, the mitigation 
recommendations have been presented in the analysis section of this thesis. 
 
Similar to the results of Council A, both the recommended frameworks of email and 
online web systems can be utilised in order to audit any IT security systems with similar 
environments. See Chapter 8: Section 8.3 for examples and details of how to adapt the 
frameworks to similar environments. 
 
There were seven main factors were found which can lead to the causes of potential 
risks in Council B’s email and online web systems similar to Council A. 
 
These factors include the lack of CIS and MS’s IT security standards awareness, 
inadequate domain or service specific knowledge, inefficient communication between, 
limited IT training as a result of restricted training budget, insufficient time for task 
completion and reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects. These factors 
pose risks which may lead to interruption to both the email and online web systems 
services.  
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In addition, this may cause the council to lose its creditability. Full details of these 
factors are described in the following paragraphs.  
 
Firstly, the lack of IT security standards awareness was examined. An audit which 
included several discussions with Council B’s network and web administrators as well 
as testing analyses, was carried out over a period of several months. This investigation 
revealed a number of potential risks due to the lack of security awareness.  
 
For example, both the email and online web systems’ architectures were not following 
the IT security industry best practices. The email server architecture was also not in 
conformity to the MS Exchange 2007 architecture recommendation. Furthermore, there 
is currently no IT security policy pertaining to the email and online web systems used in 
Council B.  Moreover, the architecture of the online payment system for Council B did 
not follow the good design recommendations of a multi-tiered (3) client-server 
architecture by Microsoft (Microsoft Corporation, 2010). 
 
In addition, the interviews revealed that limited IT security standards of best practice 
were applied during the implementation on both the email and online web systems, 
according to the network and the web administrators. Table 5.34 summarises the 
findings related to the lack of IT security standards or industrial best practices by the 
staff of Council B. 
 
Table 5.34 The summary of the issues uncovered related to the lack of IT security 
standards awareness by the IT staff 
 
Results related to lack of IT security standards awareness by IT staff of the council Council B 
Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed No 
IDS/IPS deployed and currently in use No 
Standalone external gateway switch deployed No 
Standalone DMZ switch deployed No 
Design of email server architecture based on the MS Exchange 2007 recommendations 
to best practices 
No 
Design of the online payment system conforming to recommendations of a multi-tiered 
client-server architecture 
No 
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Secondly, the inadequate domain or service specific knowledge was outlined. This was 
evident from incorrect and inadequate configuration of the Internet border router’s 
ACL, the DMZ switch’s codes, the firewall rules, the unnecessary ports and the services 
installed on the email and online payment servers.  
 
In addition, both the network and the web administrators were not formally trained in 
firewall and web security respectively (personal communications with Council B, 
2010). Instead, they have kept abreast with technology through self-instruction mainly 
done after-hours. Consequently, there was a slow uptake and reduced enthusiasm by the 
IT operational staff to embrace new developments in firewall and web security. See the 
following table for more details. 
 
Table 5.35 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific 
knowledge 
 
Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff 
of the council 
Council B 
Firewall configuration related to the email and online web systems Insufficient 
Switch configuration related to the email and online web systems Insufficient 
Setup and configuration of the email server application (MS Exchange 2007) Incorrect 
Setup and configuration of the online database application (MS SQL Server 2005) Incorrect 
Application of updated software patches on the email server No 
Application of updated software patches on the online web server No 
Application of updated software patches on the CMS server No 
Application of updated software patches on the online payment server No 
Internal email spoofing allowed Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email server Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online web server Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the CMS server Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online payment server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online web server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the CMS server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server Yes 
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Thirdly, the inefficient communication was highlighted. It was apparent that there were 
incorrect configurations of the firewall for both the DMZ web server and the backend 
database server, such as wrong port numbers, as a result of verbal communication. 
 
In addition, the lack of a change management process as well as IT recording auditing 
system may contribute to the inefficient communication between the IT operational 
staff. The use of a change management process will assist the council’s IT manager and 
staff to manage, plan and track their system more efficiently.  
 
Furthermore, a simple IT record auditing system such as a firewall log book would also 
helpful to the IT operational staff in terms of recording, reviewing and reporting. 
Additionally, the council has a total of 14 staff in its IT team which is further divided 
into separate groups such as the network and system administrations team, the web 
development team, the helpdesk team, the GIS and business software operation team 
and the IT management team. As a result, inter-staff communication may also be 
lacking due to poor interaction between the groups. Table 5.36 summarises the issues 
uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient communication between the council’s IT 
operational staff. 
 
Table 5.36 The summary of results uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient 
communication between the IT operational staff 
 
Results uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient communication between 
the IT operational staff 
Council B 
Existence of change management procedures  No 
Availability of simple specific technical log books  No 
Updated documentation of the IT email system  No 
Updated documentation of  the IT online web system  related  No 
 
Fourthly, the limited IT training as a result of a restricted training budget was examined. 
There is a restricted IT training budget allocated by the council according to the IT 
managerial staff. This problem of specific training may be alleviated in the future 
should more money be allocated towards a training budget by the council. See details in 
Table 5.37. 
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Table 5.37 The summary results related to the limited IT training as a result of limited 
training budget 
 
Issues uncovered in relation to the  limited IT training budget Council B 
Formal industry or equivalent  firewall training of the IT operational staff  No 
Formal industry or equivalent  training of the email application (MS Exchange 2007)  of 
the IT operational staff  
No 
Formal industry or equivalent training of database application (MS SQL Server 2005 or 
equivalent) of the IT operational staff. 
No 
Formal IT Security training of the  IT operational staff  No 
IT training yearly budget allocation for each IT operational staff member  Partly 
 Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT operational staff  Yes 
 
Fifthly, the matter of insufficient time for task completion was looked at. The 14 IT 
staff of Council B have to manage a daily routine covering a wide range of tasks in all 
areas including GIS, library, email, online payment, online website system, CMS, 
property management, communication and telephony systems.  
 
As a consequence, some tasks are perpetually left incomplete which in turn exacerbates 
the problem of limited time for individual study or research. In addition, there is no time 
left for documentation. Table 5.38 summarised the insufficient time for task completion 
by the council IT operational staff.  
 
Table 5.38 Results uncovered related to the insufficient time for task completion  
 
Issues uncovered in relation to the insufficient time for task completion Council B 
The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems task simultaneously Yes 
Use of enterprise information security policy  No 
Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security policy  No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT email system  No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – static web system No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – CMS web system No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – online payment system No 
 
 
 195
Sixthly, the factor of the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects was 
analysed. The council’s practice and reliance of outsourcing to solve the expertise 
problem has the disadvantage of a lack of knowledge transfer. 
 
For example, there was no proper documentation that the firewall project was handed 
over to the council’s IT operational staff apart from the notification of a simple ACL 
configuration rule (personal communications with Council B, 2010). This lack of 
handover procedures indicates poor contract management dealings with outsourcers. 
See Table 5.39 for more details. 
 
Table 5.39 Summary of issues uncovered relating to the reliance on external consultants 
for specific IT projects 
 
Issues in relation to the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects Council B 
Implementation of the email spam blocker appliances by external consultants Yes 
Appropriate documentation for the email spam blocker appliances  installation and 
management provided  by the external consultants 
Partly 
Implementation of the firewall system by external consultants Yes 
Appropriate documentation for the firewall installation and management provided  by 
the external consultants 
No 
Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application server by external consultants Yes 
Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 2007) installation and 
management provided by the external consultants 
No 
 
Finally, there was no valid testing environment in place at Council B. Council B’s IT 
department has a testing VM server for pilot testing different kinds of servers. However, 
the council’s IT department has no testing environment for network communication 
system.  
 
Having both servers and network testing environments would provide enormous 
benefits to the council such as minimising potential risks, flexibility and opportunity to 
gain better understanding of the new system. The following table demonstrates more 
details of the summary of issues uncovered related to the lack of a valid testing 
environment.  
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Table 5.40 Summary results uncovered related to no valid testing environment on place 
at the council 
 
Summary results related to the lack of a valid testing environment  Council B 
Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure No 
Existence of a testing environment for the email system No 
Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – static web system No 
Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – CMS web system No 
Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – online payment system Partly 
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CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS: A 
CASE STUDY OF COUNCIL C 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the results and findings as uncovered from 
the examination of email and online web systems at Council C. The chapter is 
comprised of five subsections, including (1) background information; (2) methodology; 
(3) Council’s C email system results; (4) Council’s C online web system results; and (5) 
analysis and discussion.  
 
6.1 Background information 
 
Council C is a WA local government council which has its own IT section. The IT 
section provides IT support and services to the staff and residential clients of the 
council. These IT services cover a range of services including GIS, library, email, 
online web information and online payment systems, similar to Councils A and B. 
Council C’s network infrastructure uses Ethernet network technology which currently 
connects its central and remote sites together in a star topology configuration. Council C 
connects to the outside world or the Internet via a leased fibre optic connection through 
an ISP. In addition, all the council’s remote sites are interconnected to the council’s 
central site via fibre optic, DSL and ADSL connections. Furthermore, the council owns 
licensed wireless connections which provide connectivity between the council’s central 
site and the two associated libraries. 
 
Similar to both Councils A and B’s email systems, Council C also deploys MS 
Exchange Server 2007 as the prime email server software whereas the email client 
software uses MS Outlook 2007. This email system provides both traditional email and 
webmail features to its staff. The email server serves over 900 mailboxes and over 500 
staff (personal communications with Council C, 2010).  
 
In terms of the online web system, both Councils B and C’s online web systems have 
their similarity in terms of the general static web, the CMS and the online payment 
systems. Council C’s online web system provides both online general information and 
payment services to its residents. 
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Although both the email and online web systems are managed in-house by the council’s 
IT staff, Council C does resort to external outsourcing in the case of unsolved problems 
or when implementing advanced ICT projects. 
 
Ideally, advanced ICT projects would require advanced ICT technical skills to create, 
implement or deploy. The followings are some typically advanced ICT projects, but not 
limited to: 
 Installation and/or  upgrade of core switching and routing network system; 
 Deployment of new redundancy firewall systems;  
 Deployment or upgrade of Voice over IP systems; 
 Deployment of fully secure wireless LAN systems; 
 Upgrade of database and financial systems; 
 Implementation of online payment systems; 
 Deployment of Storage Area Network (SAN) systems; and 
 Implementation of internet GIS mapping system (personal communications with 
Council C, 2008, 2009). 
 
6.2 Methodology 
 
This subsection aims to depict the overall methodology used in this research. It consists 
of pre-interview consultation, document review, interview investigation, existing 
architecture discovery, email system testing and online web system testing. 
 
6.2.1 Pre-interview consultation 
 
Council C’s pre-interview consultation is similar to both the pre-interview consultation 
of Councils A and B. However, the participants of the initial open-ended meetings were 
the council’s IT manager, the system administrator and the network administrator. 
 
The overall risk analysis was discussed and it was agreed that the analysis was to be 
done in stages in order to minimise any potential risks or interruptions to the council’s 
real-time Internet infrastructure, including the email and online web systems. 
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The time frame was set to five months for both the report deliverables which was the 
same time frame agreed upon by both Councils A and B. 
 
In addition, the ethics and contract agreements were signed in the second meeting and 
the contents of the contract agreements were the same as for Councils A and B. For 
example, the project was to be done at no cost to the council with the two reports as 
deliverables as well as the provision for the council to discontinue the project at any 
time of its choosing. 
  
6.2.2 Document review 
 
The hardware and software specifications relating to both the council’s email and online 
web systems documents were collected including specifications and records of 
configuration codes of the DMZ switch, the firewalls, the email server, the reverse 
proxy server, the static web server, the application server and the backend database 
server. In addition, a copy of the DMZ internetwork diagram was collected. However, 
there was no need for details of the Internet border router and IDS/IPS devices as both 
these devices were not deployed in the council’s internetwork system. 
 
From the interviews conducted with the IT manager and the system administrator, there 
was no ICT technical security policy on either the email or the online web systems in 
use, apart from an acceptable use of computing and communications facilities policy.  
 
6.2.3 Interview investigation 
 
Several interviews were carried out with the two main stakeholders as follows: 
 
 The council’s IT manager; and  
 The council’s IT Staff (the network and system administrators). 
 
The purpose of the face-to-face interview and discussion with the council’s IT manager 
was to obtain a general overview of the council’s ICT computer and network system, in 
particular the council’s email and online web systems. In addition, the specific project 
deliverables were discussed such as overall ICT system documentation, risk analysis 
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and feasible mitigation techniques of both the email and online web systems. Several 
interview techniques including face-to-face, telephone and email were used during the 
ongoing testing analysis interviews between the researcher, the network administrator 
and the system administrator. The interviews conducted with the network administrator 
were related to the council’s network connectivity including the firewalls and the 
switches. 
 
Furthermore, other related information such as the ACL configuration codes, the AD 
and the DNS were procured at this time. There were also a number of testing analysis 
interviews conducted with the system administrator that related to the configurations of 
the firewalls, the reverse proxy server, the email server, the backend database server, the 
CMS server, the static web server and the application server. 
 
6.2.4 Existing architecture discovery 
 
The existing architecture discovery of the email and online web systems of Council C is 
covered in this section in detail. 
 
6.2.4.1 The existing email system architecture of Council C 
 
The council’s email system consists mainly of one Exchange 2007 VMware server, and 
one reverse proxy server. The email server is located in Council C’s internal network 
whereas the reverse proxy server is situated in the DMZ area. Both devices are 
interconnected via the council’s internetwork infrastructure. The infrastructure has two 
firewalls and one core switch as its component devices. The switch also provides 
internal network connectivity for Council C’s network devices. In addition, only SMTP 
and HTTPS are allowed for email and webmail purposes similar to both Councils A and 
B. Furthermore, Council C uses 128-bit encryption with standard vailidation SSL 
certificate for thier webmail system (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c). 
 
In terms of the email system, the reverse proxy server communicates with the email 
Exchange server via HTTPS whereas the domain controller (10.1.1.210) server 
communicates via LDAP, radius and DNS ports. This communication mechanism 
allows the reverse proxy server to obtain email details and publish the associated 
webmail to the email users of Council C. More details are provided in Section 6.5.3 on 
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firewall rules and network port numbers. The mail exchanger record (MX record) of 
Council C is mail.coc.wa.gov.au and its corresponding Internet address is A.B.D.37.  
Figure 6.1 portrays all the devices connectivity, communication protocols and allowed 
email network traffic and related protocols in a high level network diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. A current high level network diagram with allowed email network traffic 
and related protocols for the email system of Council C 
 
6.2.4.2 The existing online web system’s architecture of Council C 
 
Council C’s online web system provides the community services for the council’s 
general information such as rates, libraries, events, facilities and jobs. At the time of the 
auditing, this online payment system was also used to provide online payment services 
to its residents for paying their rates, infringements and/or dog registrations. 
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The architecture of Council C’s online web system can be categorised into three groups, 
namely the static web, the CMS web and the online payment systems. 
 
6.2.4.2.1 The existing static web system architecture 
 
The static web system has one web server (the CoC-DMZ-Web server) which is located 
in the council’s DMZ network. The CoC-DMZ-Web server provides both 
simple/standard static and form based webpages. There were several UTP, TCP and IP 
network protocols that were being used for the static web system. Figure 6.2 depicts the 
council’s current architecture on the static web system including the network traffic 
protocols in a high level network diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. The high level static web system including network traffic protocols 
currently in use by Council C 
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6.2.4.2.2 The existing CMS web system architecture 
 
The CMS web system (the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers) provide 
simple/standard static and form based webpages. The CoC-DMZ-CMS server is located 
in the DMZ area in order to minimise any potential risks which may arise from attackers 
to Council C’s CMS web system. On the other hand, the CoC-CMS server is located in 
the council’s internal network.  
 
Figure 6.3 illustrates Council C’s current architecture on the CMS web server system 
including the network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. The high level CMS web system with network traffic protocols currently in 
use by Council C 
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Both the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers interact with each other as part of 
a WCMS. The CoC-CMS server allows the council’s IT operational staff to manage and 
update webpages information, before pushing the validated webpages from the CoC-
CMS to the CoC-DMZ-CMS servers. 
 
In addition, this connectivity provides better security as there is no direct connection 
between the client and the backend CMS server. The council’s residents are able to 
access the CoC-DMZ-CMS server via http://www.coc.wa.gov.au to view or search for 
general information of the council 
 
6.2.4.2.3 The existing online payment system architecture 
 
Council C’s current online payment system is multi-tiered (3-tier) client-server 
architecture. It consists mainly of the frontend web (Epathweb), the application 
(Epathway) and the backend database (Pathway) servers. The Epathweb and Epathway 
servers perform all of the application logic whereas the Pathway server performs the 
data logic.  
 
In addition, the external gateway security payment service (Commweb01) is used by the 
council to provide secure payments such as rates and infringements for its residents. 
Council C’s online payment system communicates with the external gateway security 
payment service via a HTTPS connection. 
 
Furthermore, the SSL protocol is used to provide an encrypted communication channel 
between the client’s web browser and the council’s online payment system. Council C 
uses 128-bit encryption with extended validation SSL certificate (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 
2011c). This method ensures secured private communications over the public Internet 
as well as it gives “high security web browsers information to clearly identify” 
(VeriSign Authentication Services, n.d., p. 1) the council website identity 
(Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c). 
 
Figure 6.4 demonstrates the council’s current online payment system architecture 
including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
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Figure 6.4. The high level diagram of the online payment system including network 
traffic protocols currently in use by Council C 
 
6.2.5 Email system testing 
 
Similar to both Councils A and B, the email system testing analysis consisted of five 
stages which are summarised as follows:  
 
 Network surveying of Council C’s email system, network architecture and 
network architecture recommendations; 
 Auditing and reviewing the configuration codes of firewalls, switch and reverse 
proxy devices; 
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the 
email server; 
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 Email spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark auditing on the email 
server; and 
 Email system security policy review. 
 
6.2.6 Online web system testing 
 
The online web system testing analysis had five stages similar to Councils A and B, as 
follows:  
 
 Network surveying, which included the current Council C’s online web system’s 
network architecture, identified risks and mitigation recommendations; 
 Auditing, configuration codes review, identified risks and mitigation 
recommendations of the IDS/IPS, the firewalls and the switch devices related to 
Council C’s online web system; 
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the 
council’s online web system’s servers; 
 Vendor security benchmark auditing on the online payment database server; and  
 Online web system security policy review. 
 
6.3 Council C’s email system results 
 
The review and testing results for the device configurations, the exposed vulnerabilities 
of all the email system servers, the email spoofing, the vendor security benchmark and 
the security policy for Council C are described in the following sections. 
 
6.3.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying 
 
This first testing stage consisted of network surveying that collected information on the 
email system including the email server, the external spam blocker appliance, and the 
current Exchange email architecture and followed by the corresponding 
recommendations (same as Chapters 4 and 5). Information for the following 
components of Council C’s email system was collected: 
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 Overall network diagram for Internet link, internal and DMZ infrastructure 
connectivity including the email system; 
 The council’s mail exchanger record (MX record); 
 The firewall devices specification and related email configuration codes; 
 The internal/DMZ switch specification and configuration codes; 
 The council’s reverse proxy and email servers specification summary; and 
 The external spam blocker appliance to the council’s specification summary. 
 
6.3.1.1 The email system devices 
 
Council C’s email system consists of three specific devices. This includes the MS 
Exchange 2007 email server, the external spam blocker appliance and the reverse proxy 
server. 
 
6.3.1.1.1 The email server 
 
Current application software of the email server has MS Exchange Server 2007 with 
service pack 1 installed. The email server’s operating software is running on MS 
Windows Server 2008 with service pack 1. Similar to both the email servers of Councils 
A and B, the current configuration of Council C’s email server is configured as a single-
server architecture in which two of the Exchange 2007 feature roles are not included 
which are the Edge Transport and the Unified Messaging server roles.  
 
This was due to the fact that Council C uses the external spam filtering service and the 
Nortel PBX digital telephony systems. Both these systems perform the same 
functionality as the Edge Transport and the Unified Messaging server roles respectively. 
Summary details are presented in the Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 A summary of the email server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Email application software MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1 
Email scanning software Sophos Anti-Virus 
OS MS Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition with service pack 1 
Hardware VMware server 
IP address 10.1.15.154, 255.0.0.0 
MS Exchange 2007 roles Mailbox, Hub Transport, CAS combined 
Email service protocols SMTP and HTTPS 
Other software  None 
 
6.3.1.1.2 The spam blocker appliance 
 
Webroot services is an external IT company which currently provides Internet filtering 
(email spam and web traffic) to Council C. Incoming SMTP email traffic is directly 
forwarded to Webroot services first, in order to remove viruses and block unwanted 
spam emails. Thereafter, only the desired email traffic is redirected to Council C’s email 
server.  
 
On the other hand, outgoing email traffic first arrives at the MS Exchange Server 2007, 
which then acts as a SMTP mail relay connector server. It forwards the email traffic to 
Webroot services which inspects and cleans any potential spam, prior to delivery of the 
emails to the recipients. The purpose of the external spam blocker appliance is to filter 
all incoming and outgoing SMTP emails to block malware, spyware and spam emails. 
More details for the external spam blocker appliance in terms of its current connectivity 
were provided in the high level network architecture diagram in Figure 6.1. 
 
6.3.1.1.3 The reverse proxy server 
 
Currently, there is a physical server which runs MS ISA 2006 which is being used as a 
reverse proxy server and is located in Council C’s DMZ internetwork. The purpose of 
the reverse proxy server is that it is used as an intermediary by the council’s Internet 
users who want to access the council’s internal web database and webmail by sending 
its requests indirectly. In addition, the use of the reverse proxy server increases the 
security strength of the council’s internal network. 
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Furthermore, in terms of the council’s email system, both the reverse proxy and the MS 
Exchange (2007) servers communicate securely via TCP port 443 (HTTPS) in a server-
to-server communication. The reverse proxy server is configured to publish a 
combination of popular methods including MS OWA, MS Exchange ActiveSync and 
MS Outlook Anywhere. Summary details of the reverse proxy server are provided in 
Table 6.2. Details of its current connectivity were provided in Figure 6.4. 
 
Table 6.2 A summary of the MS ISA server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Proxy application software MS ISA 2006 standard version 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2 
Hardware HP 360 Generation 6 
IP address A.B.C.183 255.255.255.240 
Interface 2 x Gigabit Ethernet (team) 
MS Exchange 2007 roles MS OWA, MS Exchange ActiveSync and MS Outlook Anywhere 
Email service protocol HTTPS 
Other software  IIS version 7.0 
 
6.3.1.2 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues 
 
The following sections explain the identified risk issues for the council’s email system. 
 
 Risk 1: Single point of failure 
 
The existing email architecture of Council C is made up of a simple single-server 
architecture similar to both Councils A and B. Council C’s email system was considered 
to be a medium-sized deployment which may pose the potential risk of a single point of 
failure as the current system has only one email server.  
 
The other potential risks to the email server are in the form of virus and malware 
attacks, which may allow attackers to steal the email credentials of the council’s staff or 
interrupt the email services of the council.  
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 Risk 2: Same subnetwork 
 
The current email server is located in the same subnetwork as the other important 
servers of the council such as the application, file and database servers. This 
configuration may cause a potential risk to the other important servers in the event of 
the email server getting compromised due to the fact that there was no filtering 
mechanism in place to separate network traffic between the email and other servers.  
 
 Risk 3: MS ActiveSync – Authentication 
 
The current email configuration for MS ActiveSync authentication was the same as the 
email system of Council B. Council C currently uses a basic authentication method 
together with a SSL connection.  
 
In comparison to both certificate and token form authentication methods, basic 
authentication is considered as the simplest authentication method (Luckett et al., 2008). 
This is due to the fact that the passwords in basic authentication are sent in clear text or 
plain text format which may expose them to sniffing or eavesdropping attacks.   
 
 Risk 4: MS Outlook Anywhere – Authentication  
 
Currently, Council C’s email system supports MS Outlook Anywhere with basic 
authentication via SSL connection to its staff. The basic authentication is considered to 
provide the lowest security as compared to the other authentication option (NTLM) 
(Luckett et al., 2008). 
 
6.3.2 Testing stage 2: The email system’s infrastructure – Internet border router, 
IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews 
 
This second stage can be separated into a data collection and review of Internet border 
router, IDS/IPS, firewall and switch reviews of the council’s email infrastructure.  
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6.3.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
Typically, an Internet border router acts as a gateway that permits the council’s network 
to be able to communicate with the outside world. It forwards or routes the network 
traffics or protocols which serves the council’s network services. However, Council C 
connects its internetwork directly via its firewall, which means that there is no existing 
Internet border router being deployed. 
 
6.3.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
The existing firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M security appliances) have an annual licensed 
IPS engine and are available with an add-on feature called Juniper Networks Deep 
Inspection Firewall Signature Packs. This IPS engine provides deep inspection of the 
council’s internetwork including protocol anomaly detection, stateful protocol 
signatures, IPS/Deep Inspection or DI attack pattern obfuscation and nightly updates of 
attack signatures (Juniper Networks, 2009).  
 
6.3.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
In the council’s internetwork, the two firewalls act as a main filter for all incoming and 
outgoing network traffic. Furthermore, they perform NAT, Port Address Translation 
(PAT) as well as IPS functions. However, both the firewalls do not provide antivirus 
and antispam checking as both these antivirus and antispam features require additional 
annual licenses.  
 
Nevertheless, both these features may not be required to be performed by the firewalls 
as the council uses the Sophos antivirus software to protect against virus attacks. 
However, one of the firewalls operates in the active mode and the other operates in a 
standby mode. More details of the firewall’s connectivity are provided in Figure 6.5. 
Table 6.3 summarises the brief specifications of both the firewalls. 
 
In addition, Appendix C1 shows the summary of the firewall codes with respect to the 
NAT/PAT of the council’s email system. On the other hand, Appendix C2 shows the 
summary of the firewall codes with respect to Council C’s email system. 
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Table 6.3 A summary of the firewalls specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device type Juniper firewall x 2 
OS/model SSG-350M series 
Memory 256 MB (based memory) 
Interfaces (fixed I/O) 4x10/100/1000 
Physical Interface Module 
(PIM) Slots 
5 
Wide Area Network (WAN) 
interface options (PIMS) 
Serial, T1, E1, ADSL/ADSL2/ADSL2+, G.SHDSL 
LAN interface options (uPIMS) 8x10/100/1000, 16x10/100/1000, and 6xSFP 
 
6.3.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
Council C’s network is considered as an Ethernet network environment. The council has 
only one switch, which provides network communication and connectivity between the 
firewalls, the DMZ servers and the council’s internal network. It is also a core switch, 
which interconnects all of Council C’s Intermediate Distribution Frames (IDFs) and 
servers. 
 
The current overall hardware and software details of the core switch are depicted in 
Table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4 The email system – current switch hardware and software details 
 
Attributes Details 
Device name C60175 (CoC-Core-Switch) 
Device type HP E5412 zl switch chassis (J8698A) 
OS K.14.41 
Memory 256 MB  
Switch port 12 open module slots; 1 RS-232C DB-9 console port; Supports a 
maximum of 48 10-GbE ports or 288 10/100/1000 ports or 288 
mini-GBICs, or a combination 
Operate at Layer 2/3 OSI 
VLANs 1, 2, 3, 10, 15, 17-19, 24-26, 29, 60, 80, 82, 100, 110-117, 200 
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Furthermore, details on ports and VLANs including its connectivity of the council’s 
email system are presented in Figure 6.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. A current low level network diagram of the email system for Council C 
 
6.3.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues for Council C’s email infrastructure system are detailed in the 
following sections. 
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 Risk 1: No Internet border router in place 
 
As mentioned earlier, there was no existing Internet border router deployed within the 
council’s internetwork system. A missing Internet border router means that the 
council’s internetwork system has only one layer of protection against any outside 
intrusion attacks such as spoofing and DoS.  
 
The council used two firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M security appliances) to provide 
several features such as routing, VPN, filtering and inspecting incoming and outgoing 
network traffic for the council’s internetwork system. This arrangement can be 
considered as a single point of failure for the several tasks that the firewalls serve. 
 
 Risk 2: No IDS/IPS on the Internet border router 
 
As previously described, there was no Internet border router deployed at Council C. The 
future deployment of an Internet border router with IDS/IPS feature can provide a first 
layer of defence against intrusion attacks such as spoofing and scanning. 
 
 Risk 3: Unnecessary ACL rule 
 
The firewall rule (see Appendix C1: Policy number 2) allows anyone to access the 
email server via the SMTP port. This accessibility to the email server is a potential risk 
to the email system of Council C, as unauthorised persons can potentially access the 
email server. 
 
 Risk 4: Not in use ACL rule 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C2: Policy number 5) translates the internal 
server (10.1.1.3) to the Exchange_gate2 name. 
 
 Risk 5: Duplicated ACL rule 
 
There are duplicated firewall policy rules (see Appendix C2: Policy numbers 14 and 
15). 
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 Risk 6: Duplicated ACL rule 
 
The current firewall rules allow anyone from the council’s internal network to access 
the firewall via several methods including HTTPS, SSH, console and Telnet ports. 
 
 Risk 7: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations 
 
On the current Council C’s core switch (HP C60175), there were some inadequate 
switch code security configurations, which may lead to potential security risks such as 
ARP spoofing, ARP poisoning and sniffing attacks.  
 
 Risk 8: Single point of failure 
 
Connectivity between the council’s outside (external), the DMZ and the inside (internal) 
networks were served by only one core switch which can be considered as a single point 
of failure. In case of the core switch failure, serious interruptions may be caused to the 
council’s core network, which includes downtime to the council’s staff as well as the 
online systems to its residents.  
 
6.3.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning, 
vulnerability testing and results 
 
Similar to testing steps conducted at Councils A and B, both NMAP and GFI LANguard 
network scanning tools were used to obtain information such as TCP, UDP ports, 
vulnerabilities, patches, services, software and hardware from the email system. NMAP 
with GUI standard (open source Zenmap version 5.0) for MS Windows XP version was 
run with slow comprehensive scan option. 
 
On the other hand, GFI LANguard version 9.0 with full scan option was also utilised. 
Running intense comprehensive as well as full scan options on both the applications 
will maximise the collection of information 
 
 
 
 
 216
6.3.3.1 Services and system identification results 
 
Appendices C3 and C4 summarise the results of the services and system identifications 
including system information and system patching status results for Council C’s email 
server (MS Exchange 2007). However, the researcher did not test against the reverse 
proxy server (ISA01) as per recommendation of the system administrator in order to 
minimise any potential downtime which may have occurred due to the fact that the 
ISA01 server provides services to a wide range of Council C’s computer systems. 
 
6.3.3.2 Port scanning results  
 
Similar techniques as carried out in Councils A and B were used for this purpose, in that 
both NMAP and GFI LANguard were used for port scanning on the email server. There 
was no unnecessarily opened UDP port found on the email server. However, there were 
some unnecessarily opened TCP ports found. Full details of the overall opened TCP and 
UDP ports are provided in Appendix C5. 
 
6.3.3.3 Vulnerability testing results  
 
In this testing stage, the vulnerability was categorised into four groups, which are high 
(H), medium (M), low (L) and potential (P) security vulnerabilities similar to Councils 
A and B. The vulnerability analysis was successfully conducted on the email server. 
Full details of the vulnerability testing results are provided in Appendix C6. 
 
6.3.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for the council’s email system are described 
as follows. 
 
 Risk 1: System information policy results for the email server 
 
The system information policy guidelines were not adhered to in parts, which can lead 
to a potential risk to the email server of Council C. The policy security measures not 
followed were the password, security auditing and services policies. 
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 Risk 2: System patching status results for the email server 
 
Both GFI LANguard and NMAP scanning tools were used to conduct the testing 
analysis of Council C’s email server. There was one missing service pack and two 
missing patches which may create a security vulnerability to the council’s email server. 
See Appendix C4 for full details. 
 
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on the email server 
 
It was found that there were 24 opened TCP ports which include the unnecessarily 
opened ports identified on the email server. Some of these opened TCP ports can be a 
source of potential security risks to the email server. 
 
See Table 6.5 for more a total numbers of opened TCP and UDP ports of the council’s 
email server. Furthermore, Appendix C5 provides full details of the overall opened TCP 
and UDP ports as well as the possible mitigation recommendations. 
 
Table 6.5 List of the number of open TCP and UDP ports on the email server 
 
Server name Opened TCP ports Opened UDP port Comment 
Email server 24 1 Refer to Appendix C5 
 
 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on the email server 
 
There were nine low and two potential risk category issues uncovered on the email 
server. For example, there were unnecessary TCP ports left opened such as POP3 and 
IMAP4 which may pose potential risks to the email server of the council. 
 
Table 6.6 presents the total number of vulnerabilities found on the council’s email 
server. See Appendix C6 for full details of the identified risk issues and the possible 
mitigation recommendations. 
 
Table 6.6 The overall of Council C’s email server – vulnerabilities 
 
Server name H M L P Overall vulnerability level Comment 
Email server  0 0 9 2 Medium (5/10) Refer to Appendix C6 
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6.3.4 Testing stage 4: Spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark email server 
auditing 
 
Two testing steps were undertaken; the email system spoofing testing and specific 
vendor security benchmark auditing of the MS Exchange 2007 on the council’s email 
server are included in this stage. 
 
6.3.4.1 Email system spoofing testing results  
 
Both the OSSTMM and CIS templates were successfully used for the email system 
spoofing testing and specific vendor security benchmark auditing (MS Exchange 2007) 
respectively on Council C’s email server. A number of identified risk issues were 
uncovered on the email server. 
 
In addition, egression testing similar to Councils A and B was successfully carried out 
on the email system of Council C. The egression testing result and recommendation is 
detailed in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7 Test egression result and recommendation – Council C’s email server 
 
Testing technique Purpose Result Recommendation 
Sending an email from one 
internal address to both 
internal and external addresses 
using an external, a third-party 
POP server. 
To test egression Unsuccessful Unsuccessful 
 
6.3.4.2 Specific email security vendor auditing results 
 
The auditing checklist in this section was adapted from the CIS – Exchange 2007 for 
Windows Server 2003 Version 1.0 in order to suit Council C’s email system in the same 
manner as both Councils A and B. 
 
Council C’s email server was not configured for the Edge Transport server and the 
Unified Messaging server roles. Therefore, the Edge Transport server and the Unified 
Messaging server roles are not included in the overall modified checklist auditing 
tables. 
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6.3.4.3 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues for the email spoofing, the Mailbox server, the Hub Transport 
server and the CAS roles of Council C’s email server are explains as follows. 
 
 Risk 1: The email server allowed relaying 
 
The email server may cause potential risks to spoofing attacks internally due to the fact 
that the email server allows emails to be sent from both internal and external addresses 
to any internal email addresses within Council C. 
  
 Risk 2: The Mailbox server role 
 
Council C’s Mailbox server role had one mailbox called GAIA which was stored at two 
different locations which were the Private Mailbox Store 1 and the Private Mailbox 
Store 2. A number of mis-configurations were uncovered on the Mailbox server role of 
the council’s email server. For example the “restrict max recipients” option was set to 
unlimited. This particular configuration setting may cause the possibility of unnecessary 
network traffic which may affect the council’s network performance. It may also be a 
potential risk to email flooding attacks. See Table 6.28 for more details. 
 
 Risk 3: The Hub Transport server role 
 
Council C’s Hub Transport server role has three groups which are the default GAIA, the 
application server using GAIA as a relay server and the client GAIA. As per industry 
best practice recommendations by CIS (2007), there were some misconfigurations or 
default configurations identified which should be reconfigured in order to increase the 
security of the email server. See Table 6.29 for more details. 
 
 Risk 4: The CAS role 
 
The CAS role has one default group which has some mis-configurations, for example 
the “require ActiveSync password” and the “ActiveSync password expiration” options 
were disabled (unchecked). These particular mis-configurations may lead to the 
possibility of potential risk to the email server from authentication vulnerabilities. See 
Table 6.30 for more details. 
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6.3.5 Testing stage 5: The email system security policy review 
 
There was no existing general and technical email policies apart from an acceptable use 
of computing and communications facilities policy (see Appendix C39) at Council C 
similar to both Councils A and B. Consequently, there were no policy and procedure 
guidelines for the council’s IT operational staff.  
 
6.3.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues 
 
The lack of a specific email system security policy can create a general cause of 
potential risk to the council’s email and other ICT related systems. These potential risks 
are the possible interruption and misuse of the email services similar to both Councils A 
and B. See previous discussion in Section 4.3.5.1. 
 
 Risk 1: Interruption of the email service 
 
Similarly to both Councils A and B, the lack of an email technical security policy may 
be a source of potential interruption to the council’s email server as well as its related 
system. 
 
 Risk 2: Misuse of the email service 
 
The lack of an email technical security guideline at the council may create a cause of 
potential risks such as allowing internal mail relaying and unauthorised access to the 
council’s staff. See previous discussion in Chapter 4 for more details. 
 
6.4 Council C’s online web system results 
 
Council C’s online web system, including the static web, the CMS and the online 
payment systems, was audited and tested for the architecture, the intrusion detection, the 
device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the online web system servers, the 
vendor security benchmark auditing on the backend database server and the online web 
system security policy review. The following sections depict all the results of these 
testings in detail. 
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6.4.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying 
 
This network surveying stage involved making an audit of the online web system 
architecture together with the networking devices such as the firewalls and the switch. 
The following network specifications and policy documents were collected: 
 
 The overall network diagram for the Internet link, the DMZ infrastructure, the 
LAN and the WAN connectivity; 
 The firewall device specification and the ACL codes related to Council C’s 
online web system; 
 The IDS/IPS, the DMZ switch specifications and configuration codes related to 
council’s online web system; and 
 The summary of online web system servers (the DMZ web server, the frontend 
CMS and the backend CMS servers) specifications and the online payment 
system servers (the frontend web, the application and the backend database 
servers) specifications summary. 
 
The overall summary specifications of Council C’s online web system devices (the 
static web system, the CMS web system and the payment system) are described in the 
following sections. 
 
6.4.1.1 The static web system devices 
 
As previously mentioned the static web system consists of a single web server which is 
the CoC-DMZ-Web server.  
 
6.4.1.1.1 The CoC-DMZ-Web server 
 
The CoC-DMZ-Web server is located in the DMZ area in order to reduce any potential 
risks that may arise from attackers. This web server presents Council C’s specific 
information via static webpages to its residents and others.  
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The volunteer website (www.coc.volunteers.com.au) is an example of the council’s 
specific information concerning its community. The CoC-DMZ-Web server 
specifications are summarised in Table 6.8. 
 
Table 6.8 A summary of the CoC-DMZ-Web server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name CoC-DMZ-Web (coc-dmz-web.coc.wa.gov.au) 
Web server software MS IIS web server 6.0 
Application software MS SQL Server 2000 8.00.194 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 with service pack 2 
Hardware HP physical server, 4GB Ram, hard disk size total 284 GB  
IP address A.B.C.181/28 
 
6.4.1.2 The CMS web system devices 
 
As previously discussed in Section 6.2.4.2.2 the CMS web system consists of two 
servers which are the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers.  
 
6.4.1.2.1 The frontend CMS server 
 
The CoC-DMZ-CMS server served as a frontend CMS web server. The summary 
specifications of the server are described in the following table. 
 
Table 6.9 A summary of the frontend CMS web server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name CoC-DMZ-CMS (www.coc.wa.gov.au) 
Web server software MS IIS web server 7.0 
Application software Sophos 
OS MS Windows Server 2008 with service pack 2 
Hardware HP physical server  
IP address A.B.C.186/28 
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6.4.1.2.2 The CMS management server 
 
The CoC-CMS server acts as the council’s backend CMS management server. The 
summary specifications of the server are displayed in Table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.10 A summary of the backend CMS server specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name CoC-CMS (CoC-CMS.coc.wa.gov.au) 
Web server software MS IIS web server 7.0 
Application software Sophos 
OS MS Windows Server 2008 x64 
Hardware VMware, virtual memory 7.5 GB, free virtual memory 5.85 GB  
IP address 10.1.15.184/8 
 
6.4.1.3 The online payment system devices 
 
Council C’s online payment servers (the frontend web, the application and the backend 
database servers) are summarised and briefly described as follows. 
 
6.4.1.3.1 The frontend web server 
 
The current frontend web server (the Epathweb) acts as application logic and is located 
in the DMZ area. It provides the frontline interface to the client web browser. Council 
C’s residents or others can access the frontend web server via the website 
https://secure.coc.com/epathway using their registered usernames and passwords for 
applications. Either of or a combination of a valid assessment, invoice and payment 
numbers are required for rate, infringement, registration and application payments.  
Table 6.11 summarises the frontend web server specifications. 
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Table 6.11 A summary of the frontend web server (the Epathweb) specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name Epathweb (epathweb.coc.wa.gov.au) 
Web server software MS IIS web server 6.0 
Application software Epathweb, MS SQL Server 2005 9.00.4035 service pack 3, Sophos 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 service pack 2 
Hardware HP (H343LGP), 1.5 GB RAM 
IP address A.B.C.179 
 
6.4.1.3.2 The application server 
 
The application server (the Epathway) operates as a middle tier application server which 
interacts with both the frontend DMZ web server as well as the backend database 
server. It is located in the council’s internal network and performs all necessary 
commands, calculations and SQL queries of the data from the backend database server. 
Table 6.12 summarises the council’s application server specifications. 
 
Table 6.12 A summary of the application server (the Epathway) specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name Epathway (epathway.coc.wa.gov.au) 
Web server software MS IIS web server 6.0 
Application software Epathway 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 service pack 2 
Hardware VMware, virtual memory 3.86 GB, free virtual memory 3.22 GB 
IP address 10.1.15.166/8 
 
6.4.1.3.3 The backend database server 
 
The backend database server (the Pathway) is located within the council’s internal 
network. It has the Pathway database application software running in conjunction with a 
MS SQL database Server 2005 application. The Pathway server operates as a backend 
database server which keeps all the necessary and important information such as 
usernames, passwords and street addresses.  
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However, any sensitive user information such as credit card numbers and expiry dates 
are not recorded in the database table. Table 6.13 presents more specification details of 
the council’s backend database server. 
 
Table 6.13 A summary of the backend database server (the Pathway) specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Name Pathway (pathway.coc.wa.gov.au) 
Web server software MS IIS web server 6.0 
Application software Pathway, MS SQL Server 2005 9.00.4035 service pack 3, Sophos 
OS MS Windows Server 2003 service pack 2 
Hardware VMware, virtual memory 7.34 GB, free virtual memory 5.02 GB 
IP address 10.1.15.162/8 
 
6.4.1.4 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of testing stage 1 for Council C’s online payment system are 
described in the following sections. 
 
 Risk 1: The online payment system 
 
As previously mentioned the Epathway application server is located within the council’s 
internal network and it has the same subnet or IP address range as the Pathway backend 
database server as well as other internal servers. This may be a potential risk to the 
council’s backend database and other internal servers.  
 
In case of the Epathweb frontend web server, which is located in the DMZ area being 
compromised, the attacks may carry on through the Epathway application server. This is 
due to the fact that the Epathway application server has direct communication (same 
subnet) with the Epathweb frontend web server. 
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6.4.2 Testing stage 2: The infrastructure of the online web system – Internet 
border router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews 
 
Testing stage 2 consists of the device and software configuration codes for the Internet 
border router, the switches, the firewalls, the IDS and the IPS. 
 
6.4.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
As previously mentioned, there is no Internet border router being used at the council. 
The overall recommendations of an Internet border router were also previously 
discussed in Section 6.3.2.1. The emphasis in this section is on suggesting appropriate 
Internet border router’s ACL codes which relate specifically to the online web system of 
the council. 
 
6.4.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
Each of the two currently operating firewalls has a built-in IPS engine. This engine is 
being used to provide deep inspection of all Council C’s internetwork traffic including 
protocol anomaly detection, stateful protocol signatures and IPS/DI attack pattern 
obfuscation as mentioned earlier in Section 6.5.2.2. 
 
In addition, both HTTP and HTTPS protocols are inspected in real-time. However, 
several risk issues were uncovered related to the IPS during the review process for both 
the firewall devices. For example there was no IPS inspection of the DNS traffic. 
 
6.4.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews  
 
This section is separated into three groups which are the static web (the CoC-DMZ-Web 
server), the CMS web (the CoC-DMZ-CMS and CoC-CMS servers) and the online 
payment (the Epathweb, the Epathway and the Pathway servers) systems. For more 
details of the council’s Internet firewalls specifications see Section 6.3.2.3. 
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A summary of all the firewall configuration codes related to the online static web 
system server (the CoC-DMZ-Web) is included in Appendix C7. The CoC-DMZ-Web 
server is used to communicate with the internal DNS server via a DNS port. It can also 
be used to communicate with any other device via the TCP port 2005. On the other 
hand, the firewall system allows any devices access to the CoC-DMZ-Web server via an 
IP (any) port. Currently, the IT operational staffs remotely manage the CoC-DMZ-Web 
server via TCP port 6502. 
 
Council C’s CMS web system consisted of the frontend web CMS (the CoC-DMZ-
CMS) and the CMS management (the CoC-CMS) servers as previously mentioned. The 
summary of the firewall configuration codes with respect to both the CMS web servers 
are provided in Appendix C8. In addition, a related firewall configuration code setting 
of the CMS web system was uncovered, which can be a cause of potential risk to the 
council’s CMS web system. 
 
In terms of the online payment system, Pathway is the application software which is 
currently being used for Council C’s online payment system similar to Council A. As 
previously mentioned in Section 6.2.4.2.3, Council C’s online payment system consists 
of three servers which are the frontend web server (the Epathweb), the application 
server (the Epathway) and the backend database server (the Pathway).  
 
The council’s online payment system also uses the reverse proxy server (ISA01) as a 
network traffic screener to filter incoming protocol (all IP) which is forwarded from the 
Epathweb server to the Epathway server. The summary of the firewall codes with 
respect to the three online payment system servers are presented in Appendix C9. 
 
6.4.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews 
 
Council C has only one switch which provides network communication and 
connectivity between the Internet connection (ISP), the firewalls, the DMZ servers and 
the council’s internal network as previously mentioned in Section 6.3.2.4. The switch is 
also a core switch which interconnects all of Council C’s Intermediate Distribution 
Frame (IDF) and servers. Accordingly, low level details on switch ports and VLANs 
including its connectivity for the council’s online web system are presented in Figure 
6.6. 
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Figure 6.6. A current low level network diagram of the online web system for Council 
C 
 
6.4.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues for the infrastructure of the online web system (Internet border 
router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switches) of Council C are detailed in the 
following sections. 
 
 Risk 1: No Internet border router in place 
 
See Section 6.3.2.5 for more details. 
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 Risk 2: No IDS/IPS inspect on the DNS traffic  
 
Currently, the council’s DMZ online web servers communicate with the council’s 
internal DNS server via a DNS service port. This may be considered as a cause of 
potential risk to DNS spoofing and DNS cache poisoning attacks. 
 
 Risk 3: The static web system: Unused firewall rules 
 
Currently, there are a number of unused firewall rules related to the council’s static web 
system, which are TCP port 2005 as well as Appendix C7: Policy numbers 28 and 29. 
As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, these firewall 
rules should be removed. 
 
 Risk 4: The static web system: Inadequate DNS traffic not inspected 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C7: Policy number 27) permits UDP: DNS 
network traffic from the council’s DMZ network to the two internal DNS servers which 
are located in the council’s internal network. The two DNS servers also act as domain 
controllers (primary and secondary).  
 
This can be a cause of potential risk to DNS attacks such as DNS cache poisoning, DNS 
amplification and reflection attacks which may lead to DoS or DDoS attack resulting in 
an interruption to the internal network of the council (Cisco, n.d.-a).  
 
 Risk 5: The static web system: Permits IP from the CoC-DMZ-Web to the specific 
external network 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C7: Policy number 30) allows the CoC-DMZ-
Web server to access the specific external network (Webexternal) via IP port (any TCP 
or UDP ports).  
 
This can be a cause of potential risk in the case of the static web server being 
compromised and controlled by an intruder to use as a proxy site from which attacks 
against the specific external network can be launched. This inadequate configuration 
can result in a bad reputation for the council as an easily compromisable site. 
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 Risk 6: The static web system: Allows IP from the CoC-DMZ-Web to the specific 
external network 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C7: Policy number 31) permits the CoC-DMZ-
Web server to access the specific external network (Nearmapserver) via IP port. This 
configuration can cause a potential risk to the specific external network. 
 
 Risk 7: The static web system: Allows IP from the internal network to the DMZ 
network 
 
The existing firewall rule (see Appendix C7: Policy number 32) allows the council’s 
internal network to access the DMZ network via any protocols (IP). This configuration 
can be a cause of potential risk as anyone from the council’s internal (inside) network 
has the ability to access the council’s DMZ network via any type of protocol. Therefore, 
internal attackers can utilise a variety of tools to compromise or gain knowledge of the 
council’s DMZ network information. 
 
 Risk 8: The CMS web system: DNS traffic not inspected 
 
Similar to the Risk 4, the current firewall rule permits UDP: DNS network traffic from 
the DMZ network to the two internal DNS servers. Furthermore, the CoC-DMZ-CMS 
server is required to obtain DNS information from the internal DNS servers via the 
UDP: DNS port. This basic configuration can cause a potential risk of DNS poisoning 
attacks. 
 
 Risk 9: The CMS web system: Allows IP from the internal network to the DMZ 
network 
 
The firewall rule permits any devices on the council’s internal network to access the 
DMZ network via any protocol ports (IP). This can be a cause of potential risk of 
unauthorised access from the internal network against all the DMZ resident devices. 
 
 Risk 10: The online payment system: Mapping a whole destination subnet 
 
There was a firewall rule which mapped the whole class C subnet of the external 
A.B.C.0 network to the name “Commweb01” (see Appendix C9: Policy number 4). As 
per discussion with the system administrator, the requirement is specific to a few hosts. 
 231
 Risk 11: The online payment system: No logging on both HTTP and HTTPS 
traffics 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C9: Policy number 5) allows both HTTP and 
HTTPS traffic without the logging feature from the external (outside) network to the 
frontend web server or the Epathweb (A.B.C.179) which is located in the council’s 
DMZ network. 
 
 Risk 12: The online payment system: Allows IP traffic from the Epathweb to the 
Epathway 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C9: Policy number 6) allows all traffic 
protocols (IP) from the Epathweb frontend web server to the Epathway application 
server (10.1.15.166) via the council’s reverse proxy server (ISA01). This configuration 
can cause a potential risk to the council’s online payment system allowing an attacker 
direct access to the other DMZ servers of the council, should the Epathweb frontend 
web server get compromised.  
 
 Risk 13: The online payment system: Allows HTTP traffic from the Epathweb to 
the external gateway payment service 
 
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C9: Policy number 7) allows both HTTP and 
HTTPS from the Epathweb frontend web server to the external gateway payment 
service (Commweb01). As per discussion with the system administrator, the permission 
to allow HTTP traffic was not required. 
 
 Risk 14: The online payment system: DNS traffic not inspected 
 
The current firewall rule allows any device in the council’s DMZ including the 
Epathweb frontend web server to communicate with the internal DNS server via the 
UDP: DNS port (see Appendix C9: Policy number 8). This rule can cause a potential 
risk to DNS poisoning attacks. See previously mentioned in Section 6.6.2.3 for more 
details. 
 
 Risk 15: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations 
 
This point has been previously explained in Section 6.3.2.5: Risk 7. 
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6.4.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning, 
vulnerability testing and results 
 
The testing techniques in this Testing stage 3 were the same as carried out for Councils 
A and B. Both NMAP and GFI LANguard were used in all three testing steps (services 
and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testings) for Council C’s 
online web system (including the static, the CMS and the online payment web systems) 
network scanning. 
 
6.4.3.1 Services and system identification results  
 
The overall results of the services and system identifications of the six servers which 
were the CoC-DMZ-Web, the CoC-DMZ-CMS, the CoC-CMS, the Epathweb, the 
Epathway and the Pathway are summarised in Appendices C12, C13, C14, C15, C16, 
C17, C18 and C19. Furthermore, there were inadequate settings on password and 
security auditing policies on all the six servers. 
 
6.4.3.2 Port scanning results 
 
Similar to both Councils A and B, both NMAP and GFI LANguard network scanning 
tools were used to test the council’s online web system servers. There were unnecessary 
TCP and UDP ports discovered in all the six servers. See the overall results in 
Appendices C20, C21, C22, C23, C24 and C25. 
 
6.4.3.3 Vulnerability testing results  
 
The same techniques as described in Section 6.3.3.3 were used in this vulnerability 
testing phase. There were vulnerabilities identified on all the six online web system 
servers which can lead to potential failures or interruptions to the council’s online web 
system. 
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6.4.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues 
 
The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council C’s online web system are 
explained as follows. 
 
 Risk 1: System information policy results for all the six servers 
 
Council C’s MS Windows current configuration settings for the six online web servers 
were lacking in that some services were missing and there were inadequate settings on 
password and security auditing policies. These inadequate settings can cause potential 
risks and create possible vulnerabilities to the council’s online web system. 
 
 Risk 2: System patching status results for all the six servers 
 
There were no missing service packs and patches on the CoC-CMS server. Furthermore, 
there were no service packs and system patching results for the CoC-DMZ-CMS as 
these were unobtainable due to the fact that access was denied to the server’s system 
service and identification status. 
 
In addition, there were a number of missing service packs and patches on the other four 
servers which can be a source of potential risks to the council, particularly to the 
Pathway server which holds the council’s client database information. 
 
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on all the six servers 
 
On the CoC-DMZ-CMS server, there were 24 TCP and two opened UDP ports which 
include unnecessary service ports such as FTP, MS-SQL and POP3 service ports which 
can cause a potential risk to the CoC-DMZ-CMS server.  
 
Furthermore, both the CoC-DMZ-Web and the Epathweb servers had unnecessarily 
opened TCP ports over 500 and 600 respectively. These opened TCP ports on the 
Epathweb server include a majority number of unnecessarily opened TCP ports such as 
Edonkey, FTP, finger, login, shell, POP2, POP3, printer and whois. These opened ports 
can lead to possible unauthorised access to the Epathweb server, misuse of its services 
and create a potential risk to the council’s internal network.  
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The overall opened TCP and UDP ports for all the six servers are provided in Table 
6.14. Furthermore, Appendices C20, C21, C22, C23, C24 and C25 present all the 
opened TCP and UDP ports as well as the possible mitigation recommendations for the 
six servers respectively. 
 
Table 6.14 Overall opened TCP and UDP service ports of all the six servers 
 
Server name Opened TCP ports Opened UDP ports Comment 
CoC-DMZ-Web 528 12 Refer to Appendix C20 
CoC-DMZ-CMS 24 2 Refer to Appendix C21 
CoC-CMS 13 1 Refer to Appendix C22 
Epathweb 653 10 Refer to Appendix C23 
Epathway 22 6 Refer to Appendix C24 
Pathway 21 7 Refer to Appendix C25 
 
 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on all the six servers 
 
As previously mentioned, there were vulnerabilities identified on all the six online web 
system servers. For example, there were low and potential security vulnerabilities 
discovered on the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers, such as the fact that FTP 
and POP3 services were enabled. The remote code execution vulnerability in MS 
DirectShow was uncovered on the Pathway server.  
 
The overall vulnerability testing analysis and possible mitigation recommendations of 
the six servers are summarised in Table 6.15. See Appendices C26, C27, C28, C29, C30 
and C31 for more details of the identified risk issues and the possible mitigation 
recommendations for all the six online web system servers respectively. 
 
Table 6.15 Overall vulnerability of the three servers of Council C’s online web systems 
 
Server name H M L P Overall  vulnerability level Comment 
CoC-DMZ-Web 7 0 10 5 High (10/10) Refer to Appendix C26 
CoC-DMZ-CMS 0 0 3 3 Low (3/10) Refer to Appendix C27 
CoC-CMS 0 0 5 1 Low (3/10) Refer to Appendix C28 
Epathweb 8 1 8 4 High (10/10) Refer to Appendix C29 
Epathway 3 0 7 2 High (10/10) Refer to Appendix C30 
Pathway 3 0 6 3 High (10/10) Refer to Appendix C31 
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6.4.4 Testing stage 4: Vendor security: Database security benchmark auditing 
 
Similar to both Councils A and B, this fourth stage testing has one testing step which is 
the database security benchmark auditing on the council’s online payment backend 
database server (the Pathway). 
 
6.4.4.1 Database security benchmark results  
 
Similar to both Councils A and B, Council C’s online payment backend database server 
runs MS SQL Server 2005 as a database application. The database application is also 
running, together with the Pathway application. Both applications are currently running 
on the Epathway server. In this database security benchmark auditing stage, the Security 
Configuration Benchmark for Microsoft SQL Server 2005 version 1.2.0 January 12th, 
2010 from CIS was used as a prime benchmark auditing tool. 
 
As previously mentioned in Sections 4.4.4.1 and 5.4.4.1, the CIS benchmark auditing 
tool is categorised into nine groups. However, this database security audit was 
conducted on seven groups only, which were one to six and group nine. Group seven 
(replication) was not audited as there was no replication implemented in the council’s 
database system. Furthermore, group eight (application development best practices) was 
also not audited as the council’s IT operational staff has no responsibility for developing 
or editing the council’s online webpage application. 
 
6.4.4.2 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues 
 
The following sections describe the identified risk issues for the configuration of the 
MS SQL 2005 database on the council’s backend server. 
 
 Risk 1: Inadequate configuration for the database application of the backend 
database server 
 
There were some security issues uncovered from all the seven tested categories. These 
security issues can possibly cause interruptions to the council’s Pathway backend 
database server. Table 6.16 displays the overall security issues uncovered 
(unsatisfactory) including risk rating of Council C’s Pathway backend database server 
based on the seven category groups. 
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The overall details of all the findings (satisfactory and unsatisfactory) and the possible 
mitigation recommendations are provided in Appendices C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, 
C37 and C38. 
 
Table 6.16 The overall risks of the seven audited categories of the Pathway backend 
database server 
 
Category no. Risks 
(H) 
Risks 
(M) 
Risks 
(L) 
Risks 
(P) 
Comments 
1) OS and network specification 
configuration 
1 4 9 4 Refers to Appendix C32 
2) SQL server installation and 
patches 
2 3 0 1 Refers to Appendix C33 
3) SQL server settings 1 0 3 10 Refers to Appendix C34 
4) Access controls 1 4 1  Refers to Appendix C35 
5) Auditing and logging 0 0 0 43 Refers to Appendix C36 
6) Backup and disaster recovery 
procedures 
2 1 3 1 Refers to Appendix C37 
9) Surface area configuration tool 0 0 2 0 Refers to Appendix C38 
 
6.4.5 Testing stage 5: The online web system security policy review 
 
This final testing stage consists of the review of the security policy for Council C’s 
online web system which includes the static web, the CMS and the online payment 
systems. As previously discussed in Section 6.3.5, there were no existing general and 
technical information security policies at Council C, apart from an acceptable use of 
computing and communications facilities policy (see Appendix C39). 
 
6.4.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues 
 
This lack of both general and technical information security policies can be considered 
as a cause of potential risks in terms of possible interruptions to Council C’s online web 
services. Similar to both Councils A and B, the cause of these risks could be 
characterised as follows: 
 Poor communication of risk; and 
 Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor 
management/strategic oversight. 
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 Risk 1: Poor communication of risk 
 
There were some but not frequent enough discussions of ICT risk management in the 
weekly IT operational staff meetings (personal communications with Council C, 2010). 
This was due to the fact that the council’s IT operational staff were often too busy 
managing their day to day operational tasks. 
 
 Risk 2: Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor 
management/strategic oversight 
 
This was due to the fact that some of Council C’s IT operational staff have a lack of 
technical knowledge of IT security. For example, there were some inadequate 
configurations on the firewalls and the core switch as a result of a lack of specific 
knowledge with regard to the device configuration. 
 
6.5 Analysis and discussion 
 
The details of analysis and discussion on both Council C’s email and online web 
systems (the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment system) 
are described in the following sections. 
 
6.5.1 Analysis 
 
The analyses of both Council C’s email and online web systems are divided into two 
sections which are the email and the online web systems. 
 
6.5.1.1 Council C’s email system analysis – possible mitigations 
 
The possible mitigation recommendations for the identified issues for Testing stages 1 
to 5 of the council’s email system are explained in the following sections.  
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6.5.1.1.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
In order to mitigate this type of potential risk, Council C should deploy an extra 
dedicated server to only perform a CAS role. This additional server would also reduce 
the load on the current MS Exchange server. 
 
Similarly to both Councils A and B, a high-bandwidth (Gigabit) connection is strongly 
recommended for the connection between the CAS and the Mailbox server (Microsoft 
Exchange Documentation Team, 2009). Summary specifications of a new dedicated 
CAS are provided in Table 6.17. 
 
Table 6.17 A summary recommendations of the new CAS specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Email application software MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1 
OS MS Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition with service pack 1  
Hardware VMware or equivalent 8 GB RAM, hard disks C: 20 GB, e: 100 GB 
MS Exchange 2007 role CAS 
MS Exchange support MS OWA, MS Outlook Anywhere, MS ActiveSync 
TCP/IP protocols HTTPS, RPC, LDAP 
IP network Different subnet with other email servers (isolate) 
Network connection Gigabit link between Client Access and Mailbox servers 
ACL Permits only allowed or required protocols 
Other software Virus protection software for server 
 
 Risk 2 
 
The new dedicated CAS should be configured to a different subnetwork in order to 
further minimise and control any other potential risks that may occur. Any unwanted 
network traffic which allows communication between both the current email server and 
the new dedicated CAS should be filtered. An ACL is an example of a filtering 
technique that could be used to control the Exchange email related protocols.  
 
Figure 6.7 illustrates all the devices connectivity including the recommended CAS in a 
high level network diagram. 
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Figure 6.7. A recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an extra MS 
Exchange 2007 server role (CAS role) 
 
 Risk 3 
 
The use of either the certificate or token authentication methods will offer a better 
security mechanism than basic authentication. Token authentication is strongly 
recommended as the council already has an existing token authentication system in 
place. Therefore, the council should consider incorporating the email system 
authentication with the existing token authentication system. Although this option is a 
cost saving as opposed to purchasing a new server and application software, more 
tokens/dongles and software licenses will be required. 
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In addition, implementing the token authentication method may provide an additional 
layer of authentication to the email system of the council. Table 6.18 summarises the 
options and recommendations for improving the client access security authentication 
methods for Council C. 
 
 Risk 4 
 
The mitigation recommendation is the same as for Council B, in that NTLM 
authentication may be considered for use with the current SSL connection in order to 
provide the best possible authentication method between the clients to the email server 
for the council’s MS Outlook Anywhere application. See Table 6.18 for more details. 
 
Table 6.18 Overall current and recommendations client access security methods over 
SSL for the email system of Council C 
 
Client-to-server 
connections 
Authentication 
options 
Council C current 
configurations 
Recommended 
authentications for Council C 
MS OWA Basic/form-based Form-based Form-based 
MS ActiveSync Basic/certificate/token Basic Token  
MS Outlook 
Anywhere 
Basic/NTLM Basic NTLM  
 
Additionally, if the council wishes to manage the in-house spam blocker appliance, then 
MS Forefront Security may be taken into consideration as an example of spam blocker 
appliance technology. This spam blocker appliance may enhance the security capability 
when integrated with the council’s current reverse proxy server (ISA 2006).  
 
According to Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team (2006, p. 7), “Forefront 
Security for Exchange server delivers comprehensive on-premise antivirus protection 
for Exchange Edge Transport, Hub Transport and Mailbox roles. Using a multiple-scan 
engine with content-filtering capabilities, Forefront Security for Exchange server offers 
layered protection against virus-laden messages”. See Figure 6.8 for more details. 
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Figure 6.8. Using MS Forefront Security for MS Exchange Server 2007 for virus 
protection 
(Source: Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team, 2006, p. 7) 
 
6.5.1.1.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
Council C can enhance its internetwork performance and security by deploying an 
Internet border router. An Internet border router will provide a first layer of traffic 
filtering by only permitting addressed network traffic in and out of the council’s 
network. This filtering function of the Internet border router can reduce the number of 
Internet-based worms prior to them reaching the firewall of Council C.  It will also ease 
the load on the existing firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M security appliances).  
 
Furthermore, the IPS feature of the Internet border router may more accurately identify, 
classify, and stop or block malicious traffic such as network spoofing and scanning in 
real-time. Table 6.19 summarises the specifications of the recommended Internet border 
router.  
 
In addition, with these recommendations to the council’s internetwork system structure, 
the council may further enhance efficiency in terms of redundancy and load balancing 
with the alternate Internet link using connections such as Hot Standby Router Protocol 
(HSRP) or Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP) technologies. However, more 
research may be required for this purpose in terms of protocols, equipment and costs. 
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Table 6.19 A summary of the new Internet border router specifications 
 
Attributes Details 
Device type Cisco 2911 or other equivalent vendor product 
OS 12.4(15)T3 or later 
Memory Standard 
Interfaces 3 integrated 10/100/1000 Ethernet ports (RJ-45 only) 
IP addresses A.B.D.x/27, A.B.D.x/27 
Security and other features Cisco IOS IPS, Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
(AAA), IOS firewall, voice and video support 
 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, in terms of filtering network traffic, Council C should 
consider tightening its ACLs when deploying an Internet border router, such as by 
blocking potential risky ports as well as private IP addresses.  
 
In addition, creating each individual ACL for each individual service usage constitutes a 
recommended best practice for standard router configurations. Examples for the email 
service and the appropriate ACL recommendations are shown in Table 6.20. 
 
Table 6.20 Possible examples of the Internet border ACL for the email system 
 
Policy 
no. 
Rules Protocol 
types 
From 
(source) 
To (destination) Ports 
(service) 
Recommendations 
1 Permit TCP Webroot 
services 
The MS Exchange 
Server 2007 
SMTP Yes 
2 Permit TCP Any The ISA 2006 
server 
HTTPS Yes 
 
 Risk 2 
 
According to Juniper Networks (2009), IPS/DI features on the firewalls (Juniper SSG-
350M security appliances) perform protocol anomaly detection, stateful protocol 
signatures and IPS/DI attack pattern obfuscation. Internet security can be increased 
significantly by simply enabling the IPS feature on both the existing firewalls (Juniper 
SSG-350M security appliances).  
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As previously discussed, the council’s firewalls have enabled their IPS feature. 
Therefore, no further action is required in terms of network infrastructure for the email 
system. The summarised overall IDS/IPS details and possible mitigation 
recommendations for the council’s internetwork are provided in Table 6.21. 
 
Table 6.21 A summary of the IDS/IPS of the council’s internetwork system 
 
Products Currents Recommendations Descriptions 
IDS/IPS on the 
new Internet 
border router 
Non-existent Deploy an Internet 
border router with 
integrated with IPS 
For blocking of any spoofing/scanning 
attacks and malicious traffic 
For reducing the load of the firewall’s IPS 
IPS on the firewall 
(DI) 
Installed No action is 
required 
For real-time DI of all required important 
network traffic such as HTTPS for the 
purposes of blocking and preventing 
application-level attacks, any malicious or 
unwanted behaviour in real-time. See note 
below for more details. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
As per discussion with the council’s system administrator, Policy number 2 in Appendix 
C1 is unnecessary and may pose a potential risk to Council C’s email system. 
According to the council’s SMTP policy, the source of incoming SMTP traffic should 
only come from the Webroot services. Therefore, this rule should be removed as it is 
redundant. 
 
 Risk 4 
 
As per discussion with the system administrator of Council C, the internal server 
(10.1.1.3) is no longer in use. Therefore, this rule can be safely removed. The removable 
of any unused firewall configuration codes can prevent any confusion which may arise 
in the future. 
 
  Risk 5 
 
According to Appendix C2, the Policy number 14 is duplicated with the Policy number 
15, and as such it can be safely removed. 
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 Risk 6 
 
Access to both the firewalls for administration purposes should be limited to an 
authorised staff member. Access to these devices via the Telnet port should be disabled 
as it poses a potential risk to sniffing attacks. Table 6.22 summarises the current and 
recommended access rules for both the firewalls. 
 
Table 6.22 A recommendation accessing methods summary of the firewalls 
 
Accessing 
types/from 
Current rules Recommendations Comments 
HTTP Enable Enable Redirect to HTTPS 
HTTPS Enable Enable Secured web access 
SSH Disable Enable Provide more security as compared to 
Telnet 
Telnet Enable Disable Insecure, potential to sniffing attacks 
Console Enable Enable Recommended to create strong user name 
and password with MD5 (if applicable) 
10.0.0.0 IP range Allow Limit IP range Should only allow to the council’s IT 
administrators access to the group’s IP 
subnet 
 
 Risk 7 
 
The council’s switch codes review is presented in Table 6.23 along with the 
recommendations, which may feasibly mitigate such attacks against the council’s core 
switch.  
 
Table 6.23 Council C’s switch security audit details 
 
Security features Recommendations 
ACL applied to block unwanted devices To do 
Access to the device via HTTP is disabled To do 
Access to the device via Telnet is disabled To do 
Activate loop protection on all ports To do 
Apply appropriate log server Satisfactory 
Apply appropriate timestamps debug time N/A 
Apply appropriate timestamps log time N/A 
Apply appropriate time zone Satisfactory 
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Table 6.23 Council C’s switch security audit details (continued) 
 
Security features Recommendations 
Appropriate SNMP in use To do 
Appropriate VLAN in use Satisfactory 
Best practice username and/or password in use To do 
Configure appropriate warning banner message To do 
Disable/shutdown unused switch ports To do 
Disable trunking on ports that do not need it Satisfactory 
Enable feature against ARP poisoning attacks To do 
Enable feature against ARP spoofing attacks To do 
Enable port broadcast storm control Satisfactory 
Enable port security limits MAC address to a port To do 
Ports connected to identified devices that do not support spanning-tree should 
be configured with BPDU filtering 
To do 
Ports not connected to anything yet should be configured with protection To do 
Set DTP on all ports not being used for trunking N/A 
Set strong password (MD5) for authenticating VTP message To do 
Strong password encryption (MD5) in use To do 
TFTP service is disabled To do 
 
 Risk 8 
 
Consequently, similar to Council B, it is recommended that two additional switches 
should be installed in the outside and the DMZ areas as follows: 
 
 The outside area: A new switch to connect the two firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M 
security appliances) and the new Internet border router; and 
 The DMZ area: A new switch to connect the two firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M 
security appliances) and the DMZ servers. 
 
With this in place, the current core switch may be used solely to connect between the 
two firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M security appliances) and the council’s internal 
network. The new switches recommendation details are provided in Table 6.24. 
Furthermore, Figure 6.9 illustrates the new switch recommendations, ports, VLANs 
including its connectivity.   
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 Table 6.24 New switches hardware and software recommendations for Council C 
 
Attributes Details 
Device location The council’s outside network area 
Device type HP 2610-24 (J9085A) OR HP 2810-24G (J9021A) switch 
OS Newest 
Memory Standard 
Port 24 auto-sensing 10/100 ports (IEEE 802.3 type 10Base-T, IEEE 802.3u type 
100Base-TX), 2 open mini-GBIC (SFP) slots 
Operate at Layer 2 OSI 
 
Device location The council’s DMZ network area 
Device type HP 2810-24G (J9021A) switch 
OS Newest 
Memory Standard 
Port 20 auto-sensing 10/100/1000 ports, 4 dual-personality ports - each port can be 
used as either an RJ-45 10/100/1000 port or an open mini-GBIC slot 
Operate at Layer 2 OSI 
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Figure 6.9. A low level network diagram of the email system for Council C with the 
new recommended switches 
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In addition, Figure 6.10 illustrates a recommended overall high level network diagram 
of the email system for Council C. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10. A recommended overall high level network diagram of the email system 
for Council C 
 
6.5.1.1.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
The overall system information policy testing results of Council C’s email system 
server are summarised in Table 6.25. Moreover, Appendix C3 provides full details of 
the overall system information policy testing results and recommendations of Council 
C’s email system server. 
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Table 6.25 the overall system information policy of the email server 
 
Server name Password policy Security audit policy Comment 
Email server  Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Refer to Appendix C3 
 
 Risk 2 
 
Appendix C4 provides full details of the missing service pack and patches as well as 
possible mitigation recommendations for updating the email server. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
As previously discussed, there were a total of 24 opened TCP ports including some 
unnecessarily opened ports. The total number of recommended open TCP ports on the 
email server is eight with only one open UDP port. Table 6.26 presents the total number 
of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on the email server. 
 
Table 6.26 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on the 
email server 
 
Server name Recommended open 
TCP ports 
Recommended open 
UDP port 
Comment 
Email server 8 1 Refer to Appendix C5 
 
 Risk 4 
 
Refer to Appendix C6 for full details of the identified risk issues and the possible 
mitigation recommendations. 
 
6.5.1.1.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
Council C’s email server allowed relaying of email messages for internal connectivity 
from both internal and external addresses to any internal email address. Table 6.27 
presents the overall spoofing testing results and recommendations for the email server 
of Council C.  
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Table 6.27 The spoofing testing results and recommendations for Council C’s email 
server 
 
Testing techniques Purposes Results Recommendations 
Telnet to the email server and 
sending an email from one 
internal address to another 
internal address. 
To test internal 
connectivity of the 
email server 
Successful (allow 
relaying) 
Should not allow 
email relaying 
See note 
Sending an email from one 
external address to another 
external address using the 
target email server. 
To test external 
relaying of the email 
server  
Unsuccessful (do not 
allow relaying) 
None 
Sending an email from one 
internal address to an external 
address using the target email 
server. 
To test internal 
relaying of the email 
server  
Unsuccessful (do not 
allow relaying) 
None 
Sending an email from one 
external address to an internal 
address using the target email 
server. 
To test email relaying 
of the email server 
Successful (allow 
relaying) 
Should not allow 
email relaying 
See note 
 
Note: 
Council C may block internal email relaying to the MS Exchange 2007 email server 
from unauthorised users by configuring the MS Exchange 2007 email server SMTP port 
to an alternative TCP port. The TCP port 587 is an alternative example which is 
recommended by Ganger (2007). This configuration will allow the Exchange client 
communicating with the Exchange server via TCP port 587 instead of typical SMTP 
port 25. Furthermore, Council C may configure both the firewalls to block their internal 
staff from directly accessing the email server via Telnet (TCP port 23) including SMTP 
(TCP port 25) ports. 
 
 Risk 2 
 
Table 6.28 presents overall results of the auditing of the Mailbox server role of Council 
C’s email server including the possible mitigation recommendations based on the CIS 
suggestions. 
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Table 6.28 The overall results of auditing and recommendations for the Mailbox server 
role of Council C’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council C Recommendations 
Restrict email deletion retention 
    Private mailbox stores 1, 2 
7 (days) 7, 7 (days) 7 (days) 
Restrict mailbox deletion retention 
    Private mailbox stores 1, 2 
30 (days) 3, 3 (days) 30 (days) 
Restrict deletion of emails or mailboxes until 
archival 
    Private mailbox stores 1, 2 
Unchecked Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Checked 
Mounting of mailbox database at startup 
    Private mailbox stores 1, 2 
Unchecked Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Ensure mailbox database cannot be overwritten 
    Private mailbox stores 1, 2 
Checked Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Verify default mailbox storage limits (issue 
warning, prohibit send, prohibit send and receive 
at (KB)) 
    Private mailbox stores 1, 2 
Custom Unassigned 
Unassigned 
Custom 
Ensure public folder database cannot be 
overwritten 
Checked Unchecked Unchecked 
Verify default public folder storage limits (issue 
warning, prohibit send, prohibit send and receive 
at (KB)) 
Custom Unassigned Custom 
Audit public folder client access Custom Unassigned Custom 
Audit public folder administrative access Custom Unassigned Custom 
Verify proper permissions on public folder 
database 
Custom Unassigned Custom 
Mounting of public folder database at startup Unchecked Unchecked Unchecked 
Restrict deletion of emails or mailboxes until 
archival 
Unchecked Unchecked Checked 
Restrict email send size (mailbox identity, email 
contact identity, distribution group identity) 
 Unlimited 
Unlimited 
Unlimited 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict email receive size (mailbox identity, 
email contact identity, distribution group 
identity) 
 Unlimited 
Unlimited 
Unlimited 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict max recipients 5000 Unlimited 2000 
Audit mailbox spam bypass settings False False False 
AntiSpam updates* Disabled Disabled See note 
Zero out deleted database pages 
    Private mailbox stores 1, 2 
False False 
False 
True 
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 Risk 3 
 
Table 6.29 presents overall results of auditing and recommendations for the Hub 
Transport server role of Council C’s email server. 
 
Table 6.29 The overall results of auditing and recommendations for the Hub Transport 
server role of Council C’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council C Recommendations 
Audit DNS lookup servers 
1. Default GAIA  
2. Relay server  
3. Client GAIA 
None  
Custom 
Custom 
Custom 
Custom 
Enable TLS for basic authentication Unchecked Unchecked Checked 
Restrict out of office responses None None Internal only 
Restrict email send size (max send size, 
max message size) 
1. Default GAIA  
2. Relay Server  
3. Client GAIA 
30MB 
30MB 
MB 
 
30, 30 
Unlimited 
10, 10 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict email receive size (max receive 
size, max message size, external dsn max 
message attach size, internal dsn max 
message attach size) 
1. Default GAIA  
2. Relay server  
3. Client GAIA 
30MB 
30MB 
10MB 
10MB 
MB 
 
 
30, 30, - ,- 
30, 30, - ,- 
30, 30, - ,- 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
10MB 
Restrict max recipients (max recipients per 
message) 
1. Default GAIA  
2. Relay server  
3. Client GAIA 
5000  
 
5000 
200 
200 
2000 
Restrict IP range for receive connectors None None Custom 
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 Risk 4 
 
The overall results of auditing CAS role of Council C’s email server including the 
recommendations are presented in Table 6.30. 
 
Table 6.30 The overall results of auditing and recommendations for the CAS role of 
Council C’s email server 
 
References Defaults Council C Recommendations 
Remove legacy web applications Installed Installed Removed 
Restrict web authentication methods** See note See note See note 
Require SSL for web applications Checked 
Unchecked 
Checked 
Checked 
Checked 
Checked 
Disable web anonymous access Unchecked Unchecked Unchecked 
Enable logging for default website Checked Checked Checked 
Enable policy for ActiveSync*** None None See note 
Forbid ActiveSync NonProvisionable devices Checked Checked Unchecked 
Forbid ActiveSync simple device password Checked Checked Unchecked 
Disable ActiveSync WSS/UNC access (Windows 
file shares,  sharepoint services) 
Checked 
Checked 
Checked 
Checked 
Unchecked 
Unchecked 
Require ActiveSync password Unchecked Unchecked Checked 
Require ActiveSync alphanumeric password Unchecked Unchecked Checked 
Require ActiveSync minimum password length Checked, 4 Checked, 3 Checked, 8 
Require ActiveSync password expiration Unchecked Unchecked 60 
Require ActiveSync password history 0 0 5 
Restrict ActiveSync attachment size Unchecked Unchecked 
Unallocated 
Unchecked, 3MB 
Require ActiveSync policy refresh None Unlimited 24.00:00:00 
Restrict ActiveSync maximum password attempts 8 8 8 
Require ActiveSync certificate based 
authentication 
Ignore Client 
Certs 
Ignore Client 
Certs 
Require Client Certs 
Require ActiveSync inactivity lockout time Checked, 15 Checked, 15 Checked, 15 
Disable Outlook Anywhere Enabled Enabled Disabled 
 
Note:   
Refers to AntiSpam updates* 
Council C is currently using an outside external antispam server as a combined email 
system. Therefore, this setting can remain as the default (disabled). 
 
 
 254
Refers to restrict web authentication methods** 
As per best practice recommendations by CIS (2007), this task is to ensure that 
unneeded authentication methods for MS Exchange web applications should be 
disabled.  
 
Refers to enable policy for ActiveSync*** 
The policy of ActiveSync should be enabled in order to reduce the potential risks to the 
MS Exchange infrastructure in case of a mobile device out of sync (failing) from the 
council’s network (CIS, 2007). See Table 6.31 for more detail. 
 
Table 6.31 The overall results of auditing web authentication and access control of 
Council C’s email server 
 
Council C Integrate Digest Basic Passport 
Autodiscover X  X  
Exchange   X  
Exchange Web Services  (EWS) X  X  
Exadmin   X  
Exchweb   X  
MS-Exchange-ActiveSync   X  
Offline Address Book (OAB)   X  
Outlook Web Access (OWA)   X  
Public   X  
Unified Messaging (UM) X  X  
 
Recommendations Integrate Digest Basic Passport 
Autodiscover X    
Exchange X  X  
Exchange Web Services  (EWS) X    
Exadmin X    
Exchweb X    
MS-Exchange-ActiveSync   X*  
Offline Address Book (OAB)   X  
Outlook Web Access (OWA)   X  
Public X  X  
Unified Messaging (UM) X    
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6.5.1.1.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risks 1 and 2 
 
In order to provide better security to the council’s email system, it is strongly 
recommended that an ICT security policy be implemented to cover all of aspects of the 
council’s network infrastructure, Internet border router, firewall, email and other ICT 
related systems. 
 
6.5.1.2 Council C’s online web system analysis – possible mitigations 
 
Council C’s online web system consists of three sub systems as previously discussed. 
The three sub systems are the static web system, the CMS web system and the online 
payment system. The following sections present the mitigation recommendations for the 
identified issues of all the three sub systems. Moreover, each of the mitigations 
described relate to the identified risk issue number. 
 
6.5.1.2.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
In the interests of general best practices, it is recommended that both the application and 
the backend database servers be placed separately into different subnetworks or a 
VLAN. Furthermore, appropriate ACLs should be configured to filter or control 
network traffic between both the subnets. These measures can prevent or mitigate any 
potential network security risks such as viruses, trojans and DoS attacks. 
 
6.5.1.2.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
It is recommended that an Internet border router be deployed as previously discussed on 
Section 6.5.1.1.2: Risk 1. Furthermore, it is also recommended to create an individual 
ACL for each service usage, such as permitting only HTTP traffic to the Epathweb 
server. Such ACL rules can restrict and allow only required access protocols to the web 
server. Therefore, it can minimise any potential vulnerability risks to the server. 
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 Risk 2 
 
Table 6.32 summarised overall IDS/IPS details and possible mitigation 
recommendations for Council C’s internetwork system related to the online web system. 
 
Table 6.32 A summary of the IDS/IPS of the council’s internetwork system for the online 
web system 
 
Products Settings Recommendations Descriptions 
IPS on the firewall 
(deep inspection) 
applied to HTTP and 
HTTPS protocols 
Applied No action is required For real-time deep inspection of 
web network traffic (HTTP and 
HTTPS) for the purposes of 
blocking and preventing 
application-level attacks, any 
malicious or unwanted 
behaviour in real-time. 
IPS on the firewall 
(deep inspection) 
applied to DNS 
protocol 
Not applied Apply deep inspection 
to DNS inbound 
protocol  
For real-time deep inspection of 
DNS traffic particulary the 
DNS packet size from DMZ 
web servers to the council DNS 
server. This can prevent against 
DNS spoofing, cache poisoning, 
amplification or reflection 
attacks (Cisco, n.d.-c). 
 
 Risk 3 
 
As per discussion with the system administrator, the TCP port 2005 and Appendix C7: 
Policy numbers 28 and 29 are no longer in use. Therefore, these firewall rules can be 
safely eliminated. The removal of unused firewall rules can prevent any potential 
confusion that may arise in the future to both the system and network administrators of 
the council. 
 
 Risk 4 
 
This firewall rule should be incorporated with the DNS deep inspection (filter) and log 
feature in order to prevent any potential DNS attacks against the council’s internal DNS 
servers (domain controllers). This DNS deep packet inspection will monitor the DNS 
packets (the message exchange) to ensure that both the IDS of the DNS queries and 
responses match (Cisco, n.d.-b). It also performs security checks on the size of the DNS 
packets such as checking that the maximum label length and the maximum domain 
name length are not longer than the DNS packet specifications (Cisco, n.d.-c). 
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 Risk 5 
 
As per discussion with the system administrator, this rule can be tightened by changing 
the allowed protocol from IP to TCP port 80 (HTTP) and TCP port 443 (HTTPS). 
 
 Risk 6 
 
As per discussion with the system administrator, this rule can be tightened by adjusting 
the allowed protocol from IP to any other required TCP or UDP protocols which can be 
investigated by the system administrator in the future. 
 
 Risk 7 
 
This rule opens all IP ports (all TCPs and UDPs) for the council’s inside network to 
access its DMZ network. This can pose a potential risk to Council C’s online web 
system. As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations,  this 
rule can be tightened by allowing the required TCP or UDP ports to specific user groups 
only, such as any ports for the IT administrator group, HTTP ports and HTTPS ports for 
normal Internet usage by the council’s IT staff.  
 
In addition, Figure 6.11 illustrates Council C’s recommended static web server system 
including the network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
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Figure 6.11. The recommended high level static web system including network traffic 
protocols for Council C 
 
 Risk 8 
 
All DNS traffic which flow from the DMZ network to the council’s internal network 
should be blocked or denied, otherwise this rule should be incorporated with the DNS 
deep inspection and log feature in order to prevent any potential DNS attacks against the 
council’s internal DNS servers (domain controllers). 
 
 Risk 9 
 
Only one-way communication is required from the CoC-DMZ-CMS server which is 
located in the council’s internal network to push web content information through the 
firewall via a HTTP port to the CoC-DMZ-CMS server. 
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As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, this rule 
should be changed from permitting an IP to permitting only the HTTP (see Appendix 
C8: Policy number 6). This rule change will limit the CoC-CMS server to access the 
CoC-DMZ-CMS server via the HTTP port only. 
 
In addition, this rule also allows the system administrator to manage the CoC-DMZ-
CMS using the DameWare Mini Remote Control (via TCP port 6129) and MS Terminal 
Services (via TCP port 3389) software. A new firewall rule should be created in order to 
allow only the authorised devices (computers) to access the CoC-DMZ-CMS server via 
both TCP ports 3389 and 6129. Figure 6.12 illustrates the council’s recommended CMS 
web system including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12. The recommended high level CMS web system with network traffic 
protocols for Council C 
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 Risk 10 
 
As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, the firewall 
rule can be tightened by mapping only the required IP addresses rather than the whole 
subnet. 
 
 Risk 11 
 
Security can be enhanced using this rule by turning on the log feature of the firewalls. 
 
 Risk 12 
 
As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, the port 
service should be changed from “any” (IP) protocol to the required protocol (TCP: 
HTTP). In addition, by activating both “IPS inspect (filter)” feature on the firewalls and 
“HTTP application layer inspect” on the reverse proxy server (ISA01), security can be 
enhanced and any potential risk related to its port service will be minimised. 
 
 Risk 13 
 
HTTPS is only required for a one-way communication protocol from the Epathweb 
frontend web server to the external gateway payment service (Commweb01). Therefore, 
the setting for HTTP traffic can be safely removed. 
 
 Risk 14 
 
In order to prevent any potential DNS attacks against the council’s online payment 
system, a new firewall rule should be created to allow only the Epathweb frontend web 
server to access both the internal DNS servers via the UDP: DNS port in conjunction 
with DNS deep inspection and enabling the log feature. 
 
 Risk 15 
 
Refer to previous comments in Section 6.5.1.1.2: Risk 7 for details. In addition, this rule 
allows the system administrator to manage the Epathweb frontend web server using the 
DameWare Mini Remote Control (via TCP port 6129) and NetOp Remote Control 
software (via TCP port 6502). 
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Therefore, creating a new firewall rule which allows the system administrator to 
manage the Epathweb frontend web server via both TCP ports 6129 and 6502 is 
recommended. Figures 6.13 illustrate the council’s recommended online payment 
system including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13. The recommended high level diagram of the online payment system 
including network traffic protocols for Council C 
 
Note: 
There were some critical firewall rules which were uncovered, that were not related to 
this thesis. Nevertheless, these firewall rules can be a source of potential risk against the 
council’s internal network. Therefore, the identified risk issues and possible mitigation 
recommendations were discussed with the system administrator and provided in a 
separate submitted report. 
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 Risk 16 
 
Details of the new switch recommendations were previously discussed in Section 
6.5.1.1.2: Risk 8. Furthermore, low level details on the new switch ports and VLANs 
including its connectivity for the council’s online web system are presented Figure 6.14.   
 
 
 
Figure 6.14. The recommended low level network diagram of the online web system for 
Council C with the two new recommended switches 
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6.5.1.2.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
There were poor Windows password configurations on the CoC-DMZ-Web, the CoC-
DMZ-CMS, the CoC-CMS and the Pathway servers. The Windows password policy on 
these servers should be reconfigured in order to prevent any potential vulnerability. In 
addition, the security audit policy on the CoC-CMS, the Epathweb, the Epathway and 
the Pathway servers should be reviewed as indicated in Appendices C12, C13, C14 and 
C15. 
 
 Risk 2 
 
It is recommended to install the missing service packs as well as patches to the four 
servers (the CoC-DMZ-Web, the Epathweb, the Epathway and the Pathway). 
Appendices C16, C17, C18 and C19 present the overall system patching testing analysis 
and the possible mitigation recommendations. 
 
 Risk 3 
 
As previously discussed, there were unnecessary open TCP and UDP ports on all the six 
servers, particularly the CoC-DMZ-Web and the Epathweb servers. Table 6.33 presents 
the total number of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on all the council’s online 
payment servers. 
 
Table 6.33 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on all 
Council C’s online web servers 
 
Server names Recommended open 
TCP ports 
Recommended open 
UDP ports 
Comments 
CoC-DMZ-Web 6 1 Refer to Appendix C20 
CoC-DMZ-CMS 4 1 Refer to Appendix C21 
CoC-CMS 7 1 Refer to Appendix C22 
Epathweb 4 1 Refer to Appendix C23 
Epathway 10 2 Refer to Appendix C24 
Pathway 11 3 Refer to Appendix C25 
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 Risk 4 
 
See Appendices C26, C27, C28, C29, C30 and C31 for full details of the identified risk 
issues and the possible mitigation recommendations for all the six online web system 
servers respectively. 
 
6.5.1.2.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risk 1 
 
The overall details of all the findings (satisfactory and unsatisfactory) and the possible 
mitigation recommendations are provided in Appendices C32, C33, C34, C35, C36, 
C37 and C38 respectively. 
 
6.5.1.2.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation 
 
 Risks 1 and 2  
 
As per recommendation to general best practices, the council may consider employing 
related online technical policies and procedures particularly for the online backend 
database as well as the web servers. In addition, policies and procedures for the 
council’s infrastructure such as the firewall, the IDS/IPS and the switch may be 
considered, as the infrastructure provides internetwork connectivity to the database and 
the online web servers. This will enhance the security of Council C’s online web 
system. 
 
6.5.2 Discussion 
 
In terms of general best practices, the research actions carried out on Council C 
identified that both the email and the online web system (the static web system, the 
CMS web system and the online payment system) did not meet the CIS and MS 
industry standards similar to both the results from Councils A and B. In addition, the 
recommended frameworks of email and online web systems were successfully utilised 
during the auditing period similar to both the results of Councils A and B. Chapter 8: 
Section 8.3 provides examples and details of how to use as well as adjust the 
recommended frameworks to other similar environments. 
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Six main factors were identified which can lead to the cause of potential risks and 
interruptions to the council’s email, online web and other related systems. Similar to 
Council A and B, these factors include the lack of IT security standards awareness, 
inadequate specific knowledge, limited IT training as a result of restricted training 
budget, insufficient time for task completion, reliance on external consultants for 
specific IT projects and no valid testing environment in place. The full details of these 
factors are explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
Firstly, the lack of IT security standards awareness was examined. There were several 
discussions with Council C’s network administrator and system administrator in this 
audit testing analyses, which was conducted over a period of five months. This 
investigation uncovered a number of potential risks due to the lack of security 
awareness such as both the email and online web systems’ architectures not following 
the CIS and MS IT security industry recommendations to best practices. 
 
Similar to both Councils A and B, the email server architecture was not in conformity to 
the MS Exchange 2007 architecture recommendation. According to the network 
administrator and the system administrator, the MS Exchange email server was 
designed and deployed by the council’s IT operational staff with some assistance from 
the external contractor. 
 
Another lack of IT security standards awareness was that council’s network architecture 
infrastructure did not have an Internet border router in place. Furthermore, the 
infrastructure used only one core switch to provide network connectivity for both the 
DMZ and the internal network areas. These factors can lead to be a cause of potential 
risks to the council’s network infrastructure system in terms of a single point of failure. 
 
Table 6.34 summarises the findings related to the lack of IT security standards or 
industrial best practices by the staff of Council C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 266
Table 6.34 The summary of the issues uncovered related to the lack of IT security 
standards awareness by the IT staff 
 
Results related to lack of IT security standards awareness by IT staff of the council Council C 
Internet border router deployed No 
Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed No 
Standalone external gateway switch deployed No 
Standalone DMZ switch deployed No 
Design of email server architecture based on the MS Exchange 2007 recommendations 
to best practices 
No 
 
Secondly, the inadequate domain or service specific knowledge was outlined. Similar to 
both Councils A and B, this was evident from incorrect and inadequate configurations 
on the DMZ switch, the firewall rules, the unnecessary ports and services installed on 
the related servers. Furthermore, according to both the network administrator and the 
system administrator, they were not formally trained in specific email and online web 
system related courses, or even any other general ICT security related courses.  
 
For example, system and network administrators did not attend any firewall, MS 
Exchange 2007 and MS SQL Server 2005 training courses. Instead, the IT operational 
staff have merely kept up-to-date with ICT developments through self instruction that 
was mainly done after working hours. See Table 6.35 for more details. 
 
Table 6.35 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific 
knowledge 
 
Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff 
of the council 
Council C 
Firewall configuration related to the email and online web systems Insufficient 
Switch configuration related to the email and online web systems Insufficient 
Setup and configuration of the email server application (MS Exchange 2007) Incorrect 
Setup and configuration of the online database application (MS SQL Server 2005) Incorrect 
Application of updated software patches on the email server No 
Application of updated software patches on the online web server No 
 267
Table 6.35 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific 
knowledge (continued) 
 
Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff 
of the council 
Council C 
Application of updated software patches on the CMS server No 
Application of updated software patches on the online payment server No 
Internal email spoofing allowed Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email server Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online web server Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the CMS server Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online payment server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online web server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the CMS server Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server Yes 
 
Thirdly, the limited IT training as a result of a restricted training budget was examined. 
According to the council’s IT manager, each year the IT operational staff received a 
very restricted training budget. Consequently, each of the IT operational staff had to 
take turns in training courses that occurred only every two or three years. See details in 
Table 6.36. 
 
Table 6.36 The summary results related to the limited IT training as a result of limited 
training budget 
 
Issues uncovered in relation to the  limited IT training budget Council C 
Formal industry or equivalent  routing training of the IT operational staff No 
Formal industry or equivalent  firewall training of the IT operational staff  No 
Formal industry or equivalent  training of the email application (MS Exchange 
2007)  of the IT operational staff  
No 
Formal industry or equivalent training of database application (MS SQL Server 
2005 or equivalent) of the IT operational staff. 
No 
Formal IT Security training of the  IT operational staff  No 
IT training yearly budget allocation for each IT operational staff member  Partly 
 Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT operational staff  Yes 
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Fourthly, the matter of insufficient time for task completion was looked at. Council C 
has eight IT operational staff including the IT manager. The IT operational staff have to 
manage a daily operation covering GIS, library, email, online payment, online website 
system, CMS, property management, communication and telephony systems.  
 
In terms of infrastructure, the network administrator and the system administrator 
provide support for the infrastructure as well as all the ICT related servers. Therefore, 
some tasks were continually left incomplete, with little or no time for documentation 
and individual self study. Table 6.37 summarised the insufficient time for task 
completion by the council IT operational staff. 
 
Table 6.37 Results uncovered related to the insufficient time for task completion 
 
Issues uncovered in relation to the insufficient time for task completion Council C 
The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems task simultaneously Yes 
Use of enterprise information security policy  No 
Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security policy  No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT email system  No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – static web system No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – CMS web system No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – online payment system No 
 
Fifthly, the matter of the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects was 
analysed. Council C also required external consultant to assist in implementing on some 
of their ICT projects such as wireless network, microwave link, email 2007 server and 
Pathway online payment server. However, they first tried to do as much as possible by 
themself before going to the external consultant (personal communications with Council 
C, 2010). 
 
There was an evident lack of knowledge transfer in the implementation of email 2007 
server such as partly email server installation documentation guide was given to the 
staff. This may point out that missed contract management by the council when dealing 
the project with the external consultant. 
 
See Table 6.38 for more details relating to the reliance on external consultants for 
specific IT projects (related to both the email and online web systems) by Council C. 
 269
Table 6.38 Summary of issues uncovered relating to the reliance on external consultants 
for specific IT projects 
 
Issues in relation to the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects Council C 
Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application server by external consultants Yes 
Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 2007) installation and 
management provided by the external consultants 
No 
Deployment of the online payment system by external consultants Partly 
Appropriate documentation for the online payment system (Epathweb) installation and  
management provided by the external consultants 
Partly 
 
Finally, there was no valid testing environment in place at Council C. There is a testing 
VM server environment at the council’s IT department for pilot testing on different 
kinds of servers such as email and online web servers. 
 
Similar to both Councils A and B, there was no network communication system testing 
environment for the IT department at Council C. The installation of a network testing 
environment would provide benefits to all the of council such as minimising potential 
risks as well as providing flexibility to the council’s IT operational staff during 
deployment of new devices. See the following table for more details. 
 
Table 6.39 Summary results uncovered related to no valid testing environment on place 
at the council 
 
Summary results related to the lack of a valid testing environment  Council C 
Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure No 
Existence of a testing environment for the email system No 
Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – static web system No 
Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – CMS web system No 
Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – online payment system Partly 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS  
7.1 Discussion 
 
The audit and analysis carried out at the three selected councils through the 
methodology described revealed several common security risks and deficiencies. It was 
identified that there was a prevalence of a lack of overall education, training and 
knowledge of security measures and issues, a lack of inter-staff communication and a 
lack of resources such as time and expertise. 
 
The overall limitations of the research were in relation to limited time for conduction of 
testing and scheduling of meetings. Other limitations were due to changing conditions 
associated with real time systems as well as deficiencies in database knowledge (SQL 
2005 Server). 
 
7.2 Findings 
 
This section is divided into two subsections, which include the seven common issues 
discovered as well as generic action plan checklist. 
 
7.2.1 The seven common issues discovered  
 
The following is list of the seven common factors uncovered during the email and 
online web systems testing process. 
 
 Lack of IT security standards awareness; 
 Inadequate domain or service specific knowledge; 
 Inefficient communication; 
 Limited IT training as a result of restricted training budget; 
 Insufficient time for task completion;  
 Reliance on external consultants  for specific IT projects; and 
 No valid testing environment in place at Council. 
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There were seven common security risk factors uncovered at both Councils A and B. 
However, there were six risk factors uncovered at Council C, the missing risk factor 
was the “Inefficient communication between the IT operational staff”. 
 
The following sections describe the seven factors in detail. 
 
1) Lack of IT security standards awareness: The two audits carried out included 
several discussions with the councils’ IT managerial and IT operational staff 
together with the email and online web testing analyses for each of the selected 
councils. The results of these audits indicated that there was a lack of IT security 
standards observance by the relevant IT operational staff. 
 
For example, the email server (MS Exchange 2007) architecture for all of the 
selected councils was not based on the MS Exchange 2007 best practice 
recommendations. Furthermore, the architecture of the online payment system 
for Council B did not follow the Microsoft best practice design 
recommendations of multi-tiered (3) client-server architecture (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2010). The following table describes the overall findings related to 
the lack of IT security standards awareness for generally accepted industrial best 
practice recommendations. 
 
Table 7.1 Overall findings related to the lack of IT security standards awareness for 
industrial best practices by the IT staff for the three selected councils 
 
Finding Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Internet border router deployed Yes Yes No 
Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link 
deployed 
No No No 
IDS/IPS deployed and currently in use No No Yes 
Standalone external gateway switch deployed Yes No No 
Standalone DMZ switch deployed Yes No No 
Design of email server architecture based on the MS 
Exchange 2007 recommendations to best practices 
No No No 
Design of the online payment system conforming to 
recommendations of a multi-tiered client-server architecture 
Yes No Yes 
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2) Inadequate domain or service specific knowledge: There was evidence of 
incorrect and insufficient configuration in all three selected councils’ 
internetwork infrastructure (the firewalls, the switches and the Internet border 
routers) and the related servers. To some extent this was attributed to the lack of 
formal Internet and web server knowledge that was attributed to insufficient 
training, according to the different IT operational staff from each of the selected 
councils. The discussions with the IT management staff revealed that the IT 
operational staff was not well versed in the administration of the firewalls, the 
web servers’ security, MS Exchange 2007 and MS SQL Server 2005. Table 7.2 
below presents the overall evidence related to the factor of the inadequate 
specific knowledge at Councils A, B and C. 
 
Table 7.2 Overall results uncovered related to the inadequate specific knowledge  
 
Finding Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Insufficient configuration on the Internet border router related 
to the email and online web systems 
No Yes N/A 
Insufficient configuration on the firewall related to the email 
and online web systems 
Yes Yes Yes 
Insufficient configuration on the switch related to the email 
and online web systems 
No Yes Yes 
Incorrect setup and configuration of the email server 
application (MS Exchange 2007) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Incorrect setup and configuration of the online database 
application (MS SQL Server 2005) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Application of updated software patches on the email server No No No 
Application of updated software patches on the online web 
server 
N/A No No 
Application of updated software patches on the CMS server N/A No No 
Application of updated software patches on the online 
payment server 
No No No 
Internal email spoofing allowed Yes Yes Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email 
server 
Yes Yes Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online 
web server 
N/A Yes Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the CMS 
server 
N/A Yes Yes 
Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online 
payment server 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7.2 Overall results uncovered related to the inadequate specific knowledge 
(continued) 
 
Finding Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server Yes Yes Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online web server N/A Yes Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the CMS server N/A Yes Yes 
Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server Yes Yes Yes 
 
3) Inefficient communication: There was no evidence of a change management 
processes in place or any simple specific technical log books evident at any of 
the three selected councils. The absence of such guidelines and recording 
demonstrated inefficient communication and handover procedures between the 
IT operational staff. The lack of communication was also evidenced by the 
inadequate or non-existent IT documentation of both the email and online web 
systems. The lack of change management, documentation and communication 
contributed to a lack of knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing. 
 
For example, at Council A, there was a missed configuration on the firewall 
relating to the online payment application and database servers due to the 
Pathway application administrator not informing the network administrator to 
update the firewall rule. Similarly at Council B there was a missed configuration 
on the firewall rule related to the unnecessarily opened database ports as result 
of lack of communication between the network administrator and the web 
developer. 
 
It should be noted that, the mis-communication ceased following the email and 
online web system testings, which included several interviews with the network 
and system administrators of Council C. However, the evident inadequate or 
non-existent IT documentation of both email and online web systems will 
continue to contribute to a lack of knowledge transfer in the near future. Table 
7.3 describes the overall findings that can contribute to the inefficient 
communication between the IT operational staff. 
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Table 7.3 Overall issues uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient communication  
 
Finding Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Existence of change management procedures No No No 
Availability of simple specific technical log books No No No 
Updated documentation of the IT email system No No No 
Updated documentation of  the IT online web system  related No No No 
 
4) Limited IT training for the IT operational staff as a result of restricted training 
budget: Several discussions with the IT operational staff at all three selected 
councils revealed that the IT training budget was limited. For example, each IT 
operational staff member was permitted to attend a maximum of one IT specific 
training course per year or every two years. This education policy contributed to 
insufficient specific knowledge for managing both the email and online web 
systems including the network infrastructure. The overall findings of the limited 
IT training for the IT operational staff as a result of restricted training budget are 
displayed in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4 Overall findings related to the limited IT training for the IT operational staff 
as a result of limited training budget 
 
Finding Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Formal industry or equivalent routing training of the IT 
operational staff 
Yes No No 
Formal industry or equivalent  firewall training of the IT 
operational staff 
No No No 
The IT operational staff were formally industry or equivalent 
trained on the switching related course 
Yes No No 
Formal industry or equivalent  training of the email 
application (MS Exchange 2007)  of the IT operational staff 
No No No 
Formal industry or equivalent training of database application 
(MS SQL Server 2005 or equivalent) of the IT operational 
staff 
No No No 
Formal IT Security training of the  IT operational staff Partly No No 
IT training yearly budget allocation for each IT operational 
staff member 
Yes Partly Partly 
Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT 
operational staff 
Yes Yes Yes 
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5) Insufficient time for documentation: This was evident from the lack of proper IT 
documentation such as, no IT enterprise security and no technical policies and 
procedures in relation to both the email and online web systems at all three 
selected councils. The various discussions with the IT operational and 
management staff in all three selected councils revealed that there was 
insufficient time allocated for efficient and appropriate task completion, due to  
excessive workload as staff are required to manage several complex tasks 
simultaneously.  
 
For example, the network administrator of Council B was responsible for the 
entire network infrastructure, the telephony system, the virtual servers and the 
backup systems. Similarly, Council C’s system administrator managed the 
database, the firewalls, the proxy, the email, the web, the applications and the 
virtual servers together with the backup systems.  
 
Table 7.5 provides the overall findings which related to the insufficient time for 
documentation.  
 
Table 7.5 Overall findings related to the insufficient time for documentation 
 
Finding Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems 
task simultaneously 
Yes Yes Yes 
Use of enterprise information security policy No No No 
Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security 
policy 
No No No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT email system No No No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – static 
web system 
No No No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – CMS 
system 
N/A No No 
Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – 
payment system 
No No No 
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6) Reliance on external consultant for specific IT projects: The reliance on external 
consultants was supported by the fact that the implementation of the email 
systems in all three selected councils was outsourced. The outsourced 
implementation of the email systems was exacerbated by the fact that no 
appropriate documentation was provided by the external consultants to be used 
as instruction manuals for the firewall, email installation and management. 
Consequently, this shortcoming in documentation and handover contributed to a 
lack of knowledge transfer in all three selected councils. The following table 
lists the overall findings which related to the reliance on external consultants for 
specific IT projects.  
 
Table 7.6 Overall findings related to the reliance on external consultants for specific IT 
projects 
 
Finding Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Implementation of the firewall system by external consultants Yes Yes No 
Appropriate documentation for the firewall installation and 
management provided  by the external consultants 
Partly Partly N/A 
Implementation of the email spam blocker appliances by 
external consultants 
Yes Yes N/A 
Appropriate documentation for the email spam blocker 
appliances  installation and management provided  by the 
external consultants 
Yes Yes N/A 
Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application 
server by external consultants 
Yes Yes Yes 
Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 
2007) installation and management provided by the external 
consultants 
No No No 
Deployment of the online payment system by external 
consultants 
Partly No Partly 
Appropriate documentation for the online payment system 
(Epathweb) installation and  management provided by the 
external consultants 
Partly N/A Partly 
 
In addition, in the case of all the three selected councils, no real costing and IT 
budgetary percentages either earmarked or allocated for external consultancy 
contracting were discussed or disclosed to the researcher. However, all of the 
three selected councils’ IT managers made mention of allocated IT budgets for 
each advanced ICT project that required external consultancy (personal 
communications with the three selected WA councils, 2008, 2009).  
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Furthermore, it was found that all the three selected IT managers did prefer to 
use external consultants for their advanced ICT projects and only used their own 
IT staff to basic ICT projects (personal communications with the three selected 
WA councils, 2008, 2009). 
 
The three selected councils’ IT managers emphasised that the reasons and 
benefits of using external contractors were the confidence and trust in external 
professional expertise as well as to minimise any potential risk of project failure 
that may occur during the process (personal communications with the three 
selected WA councils, 2009). In addition, the use of external consultants was 
most likely provided that the projects were considered to be advanced ICT 
ventures, regardless of whether internal IT staff had undergone specific training 
courses for the same assigned projects (personal communications with the three 
selected WA councils, 2009). 
 
7) No valid testing environment in place: All of the IT departments of the three 
selected councils did not have any mirrored  live testing environments  in place, 
apart from specific VM servers which were allocated as virtual testing servers 
for the database (Councils B and C only)  and online payment servers (all three 
councils). The project also noted that there were no testing systems for the 
network communication equipment at all three selected councils. Table 7.7 
displays more details of the summary of issues uncovered related to the lack of a 
valid testing environment.  
 
Table 7.7 Summary results uncovered related to the absence of a valid testing 
environment  
 
Findings Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure No No No 
Existence of a testing environment for the email system Partly Partly Partly 
Existence of a testing environment for the online payment 
system 
Partly Partly Partly 
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In addition, there were a total of 32 t common findings based on the seven factors at all 
three selected WA councils (A, B and C). These most common factors are listed in 
Table 7.8. 
 
Table 7.8 Overall summary of the most common deficiencies uncovered at all three 
selected WA councils 
 
Total Factor 
number 
Findings 
1 1 Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed 
2 1 Design of email server architecture based on the MS Exchange 2007 
recommendations to best practices 
3 1 Design of the online payment system conforming to recommendations of a 
multi-tiered client-server architecture 
4 2 Insufficient configuration on the firewall related to the email and online web 
systems 
5 2 Incorrect setup and configuration of the email server application (MS 
Exchange 2007) 
6 2 Incorrect setup and configuration of the online database application (MS SQL 
Server 2005) 
7 2 Application of updated software patches on the email server 
8 2 Application of updated software patches on the online payment server 
9 2 Internal email spoofing allowed 
10 2 Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email server 
11 2 Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online payment server 
12 2 Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server 
13 2 Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server 
14 3 Existence of change management procedures 
15 3 Availability of simple specific technical log books 
16 3 Updated documentation of the IT email system 
17 3 Updated documentation of  the IT online web system  related 
18 4 Formal industry or equivalent  firewall training of the IT operational staff 
19 4 Formal industry or equivalent  training of the email application (MS Exchange 
2007)  of the IT operational staff 
20 4 Formal industry or equivalent training of database application (MS SQL 
Server 2005 or equivalent) of the IT operational staff 
21 4 Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT operational staff 
22 5 The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems task 
simultaneously 
23 5 Use of enterprise information security policy 
24 5 Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security policy 
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Table 7.8 Overall summary of the most common deficiencies uncovered at all three 
selected WA councils (continued) 
 
Total Factor 
number 
Findings 
25 5 Updated  documentation of  the IT email system 
26 5 Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – static web system 
27 5 Updated  documentation of  the IT online web system – payment system 
28 6 Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application server by external 
consultants 
29 6 Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 2007) installation 
and management provided by the external consultants 
30 7 Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure 
31 7 Existence of a testing environment for the email system 
32 7 Existence of a testing environment for the online payment system 
 
7.2.2 Generic action plan and checklist 
 
The outcome of this research was a generic action plan for any organisation interested in 
tightening its system and infrastructure security.  This action plan was derived as a 
result of abstraction from the procedures carried out at the three selected WA councils.  
It emerged in the form of a checklist operating at three different levels that cover 
internetwork infrastructure, application services and documentation. At the 
infrastructure level, organisations should be concerned with the secure operation of 
devices such as the internet border router (outside communications), firewalls 
(screening) and switches (outside, DMZ and internal communications) as well as the 
general physical security of the whole installation. Within the application services level, 
organisations should be concerned with the security of their intranet and internet 
services such as email and online web services, whilst at the documentation level; the 
security focus should be on the general and specific ICT policy and procedures for 
standardisation and operational security.  
 
This generic action plan is depicted in Tables 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11 in the form of quick 
checklist designed for use by ICT managers or system administrators to formulate their 
action plans if needed for their regular system audits. Ideally, this action plan should be 
revisited every six months or at each device or application service change as 
appropriate. 
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Table 7.9 Recommended generic checklist 1: Internetworking 
 
Recommended generic checklist 1: Internetworking RT FW O-
SW 
D-
SW 
I-
SW 
Severity 
1 Physical security 
1.1 Place device in appropriate environment against  
dust, flood, etc. 
     Important 
1.2 Install temperature control system including air 
conditioner 
     Important 
1.3 Deploy appropriate uninterruptible power supply 
or alternative power supply 
     Critical 
1.4 Allow access to only authorised personnel      Critical 
1.5 Deploy surveillance system      Low 
2 Infrastructure architecture 
2.1 Redundancy or alternative link      Low 
2.2 Redundancy firewall architecture      Low 
2.3 Double firewall architecture      Low 
2.4 Deploy or enable IDS/IPS feature      Important 
2.5 Deploy or enable logging server      Important 
2.6 Deploy standalone external gateway or outside 
switch 
     Important 
2.7 Deploy standalone DMZ gateway or outside 
switch 
     Important 
2.8 Create multiple DMZs (if applicable)      Low 
3 Hardware and cabling 
3.1 Redundancy hardware: Dual power supply (if 
applicable) 
     Important 
3.2 Space each device physically for air flow      Low 
3.3 All required cables should connect properly      Important 
4 IOS/OS and application 
4.1 IOS/OS up-to-date      Critical 
4.2 Up-to-date patch/hot fix      Critical 
4.3 Disable unused ports and interfaces      Critical 
4.4 Disable unnecessary services      Critical 
4.5 Application up-to-date (if applicable)      Critical 
4.6 Install antivirus software (if applicable)      Critical 
5 Configuration of administrative, ACL and rules 
5.1 Secure administrative control      Critical 
5.2 Appropriate privilege level or viewing access to 
different user groups 
     Critical 
5.3 Apply different login name and password to 
internal network infrastructure 
     Important 
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Table 7.9 Recommended generic checklist 1: Internetworking (continued) 
 
Recommended generic checklist 1: Internetworking RT FW O-
SW 
D-
SW 
I-
SW 
Severity 
5.4 Disable and restrict commonly configured 
management services, such as SNMP (if 
applicable use SNMP v.3) 
     Important 
5.5 Appropriate configure timekeeping which 
required encrypted authentication 
     Important 
5.6 Appropriate ACL rules to protect against IP 
spoofing, probing and scanning 
     Critical 
5.7 Appropriate ACL rules to specific required 
services such as DNS, email, FTP and web 
     Critical 
5.8 Inspect critical external incoming network 
traffic such as HTTP and HTTPS 
     Important 
5.9 Screen unwanted and/or potential risk protocols 
such as IRC, Kazaa and MSN 
     Important 
5.10 Appropriate configuration of NAT and PAT      Critical 
5.11 Appropriate configuration to protect against 
ARP poisoning attacks 
     Important 
5.12 Apply appropriate VLAN setup and do not use 
vendor default VLAN setup 
     Important 
5.13 Appropriate configuration of switch port 
network and security control such as broadcast 
storm and port security (if applicable) 
     Important 
5.14 Appropriate configuration of trunking      Important 
 
RT  represents Internet border router 
FW  represents firewall 
O-SW  represents outside switch 
D-SW  represents DMZ switch 
I-SW  represents inside switch 
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Table 7.10 Recommended generic checklist 2: Application services 
 
Recommended generic checklist 2: Application 
services 
CMS Email Pay-
ment 
Static 
web 
Severity 
1 Physical security 
1.1 Place device in appropriate environment to 
protect against  dust, flood, etc. 
    Important 
1.2 Install temperature control system including 
air conditioner 
    Important 
1.3 Deploy appropriate UPS or alternative power 
supply 
    Critical 
1.4 Allow access to only authorised personnel     Critical 
1.5 Deploy surveillance system     Low 
2 Application architecture 
2.1 Separate both frontend CMS and backend web 
servers by placing the frontend CMS server at 
DMZ area (if applicable) and placing the 
backend CMS server within the internal 
network with its own isolated network or 
VLAN (if applicable) 
    Important 
2.2 Separate both traditional email (SMTP) and 
webmail servers by placing the webmail server 
in the DMZ or internal network (depending on 
vendor email architecture recommendations to 
best practices) and the SMTP server within 
internal network 
    Important 
2.3 Deploy or install email spam blocker to filter 
incoming email traffic before forwarding to 
email (SMTP) server. The spam blocker 
should be located in the DMZ area (if 
applicable) 
    Critical 
2.4 Deploy online payment system conforming to 
recommendations of a multi-tiered client-
server architecture by placing frontend online 
payment web server in DMZ area, and placing 
application server within the internal network 
with its own isolated network or VLAN 
    Critical 
2.5 Place static (or dynamic) web server in DMZ     Critical 
3 Hardware and cabling 
3.1 Redundancy hardware: Dual power supply, 
hard disk (if applicable) 
    Important 
3.2 All required cables should connect properly     Important 
3.3 Dedicate stand alone hardware and 
redundancy hard disks for critical servers such 
as database server 
    Important 
3.4 Appropriate assignment of high 
bandwidth/speed network to critical servers 
such as database, email client servers (if 
applicable) 
    Important 
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Table 7.10 Recommended generic checklist 2: Application services (continued) 
 
Recommended generic checklist 2: Application 
services 
CMS Email Pay-
ment 
Static 
web 
Severity 
4 Secure operating system 
4.1 OS up-to-date     Critical 
4.2 Up-to-date patch/hot fix/service pack     Critical 
4.3 Disable unused ports and services     Critical 
4.4 Disable unnecessary user accounts (e.g. guest)     Important 
4.5 Secure administrative control     Critical 
4.6 Install antivirus software     Critical 
5 Secure application software and data 
5.1 Applications update     Critical 
5.2 Application of up-to-date patch/hot fixes     Critical 
5.3 Disable default application login name and 
password (if applicable) 
    Important 
5.4 Create appropriate levels of role based 
authorisation of users 
    Important 
5.5 Apply appropriate alternative configuration 
port instead of default port such as SQL 
    Important 
5.6 Configure alternative internal email port to 
mitigate against email spoofing 
    Important 
5.7 Apply asymmetric encryption method to 
sensitive data such as customer credentials 
information 
    Critical 
5.8 Encrypt network traffic between servers 
(frontend, application and backend) if 
applicable 
    Important 
5.9 Limit access permission on all data folders     Important 
5.10 Regularly backup and secure all the data     Critical 
6 Administrative, monitoring and logging 
6.1 Allow only secure communication between 
server application and administrator terminal 
such as HTTPS, SSH 
    Critical 
6.2 Appropriate application of logging feature to 
all servers 
    Important 
6.3 Apply appropriate username and password for 
applications and operating systems 
    Important 
 
Payment  represents online web system – payment system 
Static web  represents online web system – static web system 
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Table 7.11 Recommended generic checklist 3: Workflow and documentation 
 
Recommended generic checklist 3: Workflow and documentation Severity 
1 Create/apply appropriate change management procedures Important 
2 Create/apply appropriate simple specific technical log books such as for firewall 
and servers 
Important 
3 General or enterprise ICT security policies Important 
4 Technical ICT security (issue-specific and systems-specific) policies such as 
network, remote access policies 
Important 
5 End-user ICT policies such as login and email usage policies Important 
6 Standards, guidelines and procedures – circulation, updates and enforcement Important 
7 Regularly team meeting to minimise potential of lack of communication between 
ICT staff  
Important 
8 Allocate sufficient training budget to its ICT staff (if applicable) Important 
9 All external consultancy work carried out should be fully documented and available 
on site 
Critical 
10 Appropriate deployment of testing environment for network infrastructure Important 
11 Appropriate deployment of testing environment for server, particularly critical 
servers such as database server 
Critical 
 
7.3 Limitations of the research 
 
There were a number of limitations of the research associated with the testing and 
analysis phases conducted at the three selected councils. They are presented below. 
 
1) Audit meetings cancelled or re-scheduled: Meetings with each of the selected 
councils were sometimes postponed as a result of unforeseen circumstances. This 
meant that delays were incurred in the testing and analyses cycles. These were 
further complicated when the testing and analyses cycles were time critical in that 
there were performance time windows for when they could be carried out on the 
online web systems. The fact that this research was done on a non-payment basis 
may have contributed to this attitude of ascribing little importance to the meetings 
or the time set aside for the testings. 
 
2) Real-time data difficulties during the analysis: As a result of data collection in real- 
time, several disruptions to data recordings occurred at all three selected councils. 
For instance, during the data collection and analysis process at Council A, the 
firewall configuration codes changed several times over a period of two weeks 
which meant that the reports had to be redone with the new configuration codes. In 
 285
addition, the email and online web systems at all three selected councils are real- 
time systems, requiring regular software updating such as patches and service 
packs. Any updates that occurred after the testing and analysis obfuscated the 
results and rendered the recommendations invalid. 
 
3) Limited time frame for data collection and reporting: The data collection and 
reporting process, which included two reports per council, had a one year time 
frame in which both the email and online web systems at the three selected councils 
had to be completed. However, due to the unforeseen circumstances, the data 
collection and reporting process had to be extended from 12 months to 15 months.  
 
4) Requests for additional testing outside the scope of the research: Two of the 
selected councils, Councils A and C, asked for additional testing analyses not 
covered by the parameters of the engagement.  
 
For example, Council A asked for security testing on their virtual servers, Citrix 
and remote access systems. Council C requested for in-depth security testing on 
their network infrastructure. These were not able to be carried out as they would 
have detracted from the main purpose of the research. 
 
5) Lack of specific database management skills in the selected councils: There was a 
lack of database management skills in MS SQL Server 2005 for the IT operational 
staff in all three selected councils. These caused small interruptions during the 
online web system testing period at all three selected councils, as additional time 
had to be allocated to figure out the formulation of the benchmarking for the online 
web system testing. 
 
As a consequence of the above mentioned difficulties, the research was limited to two 
systems only, viz. the email and online web systems. Online services such as the online 
library, online GIS and online GPS systems which normally form the suite of services, 
in addition to the email and online web systems, were outside the scope of this research.  
 
Furthermore, time constraints prevented the web application security testing as denoted 
in Figure 8.3 in chapter 8 to be performed. This limitation meant that vulnerability 
testing specific to web application architecture to attack scenarios was not performed. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
8.1 Conclusion 
 
Three research questions were formulated in order to investigate feasible solutions to 
the problems that were exposed in the initial audit. These research questions were 
outlined in Chapter 1 and relate to the level of security of the email and online web 
systems deployed at the selected councils in terms of standards, usage and possible 
improvement. 
 
The research activities carried out in this undertaking revolved around answering the 
three research questions postulated at the outset. The first question was to determine 
whether the current email and online web systems at the three selected councils (A, B 
and C) met with the relevant aforementioned IT security standards. The analyses that 
were conducted over a six-, 12- and 18-month period revealed that the implementation 
of these systems fell short of meeting these standards. Nevertheless, the research 
activity relating to this question provided recommendations to the selected councils to 
rectify the problems by implementing the proposed solutions so that those standards 
requirements could be met. 
 
The second research question queried whether the processes could be formulated into a 
framework that could be used to improve the strength of the security of the email and 
online web systems at the selected councils. This was demonstrated in the form of a 
methodology and regime of implementation and maintenance at the selected councils 
that if followed consistently and repetitively with respect to the nature of the system 
(email, online static, dynamic and payment) under review would ensure the security 
strength of the systems for the future as all processes would be documented by check 
listing each phase of the frameworks as denoted in Figure x and Figure y for the email 
and online web systems respectively.  
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The third question was to determine whether other organisations with similar 
architecture and environments could utilise the proposed data analysis frameworks for 
both the email and online web systems to suit their own individual and specific needs. 
This question was answered in the first instance by the selection of the three separate 
entities of Councils A, B and C.  
 
In the second instance, in as far as whether the frameworks are workable for other 
organisations are concerned, the frameworks have additional and generic stages which 
allow for substitutions of the parameters that uniquely characterise those systems under 
review. These substitutions have been already noted in the frameworks in Figure 8.1 
and Figure 8.2.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Data analysis framework for the analysis of the email system 
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Figure 8.2. Data analysis framework for the analysis of the online web system 
 
The provision of these examples of substitutions within the frameworks for the email 
and online web systems parameters peculiar to any other organisations, allow for 
generalisations and translatability fundamental to the concept of frameworks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 289
8.2 Recommendations 
 
Given the findings from this research, a number of recommendations were proposed to 
the three selected councils in WA. The IT operational staff of the three selected councils 
were given the option to implement the solutions provided in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 for 
Councils A, B and C respectively. In addition, a more formal methodological 
framework solution, as outlined in Chapter 3 could be utilised to be implemented as a 
management solution at any council and/or organisation with similar architecture, with 
a view to enhancing network security as per individual requirements. For example, any 
other council wishing only to apply the developed information security framework for 
the online web system testing of their static online web systems without database 
servers auditing, may simply adjust the developed information security framework to 
suit their specific requirements. This modification to the online web system framework 
may be achieved by a simple removal of Testing stage 4: Vendor security benchmark 
auditing as depicted in Figure 8.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3. A sample of the modified framework of the static online web system 
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Another example in Figure 8.4 illustrates how the current email security auditing 
framework can be used at similar organisations which have the same or a different email 
application software.  
 
For example, in case of an organisation using IBM Lotus Notes as their email 
application software, the only change to the framework is the vendor security 
benchmark auditing (on the email server) at stage 4. All other stages within the 
framework need not change. Specifically the only change would be in the auditing and 
best practices of IBM Lotus Notes instead of MS Exchange 2007 email applications in 
name only. The actual auditing steps would however, remain the same. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4. An example of the change required for a different email application  
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8.3 Future research directions 
 
The methodology used in the analysis of the online web system was limited to the 
review and analysis of the internetwork, the vulnerability assessment of the web, the 
application and backend database servers, the vendor security benchmark auditing on 
the database server and the review of the related security policy due to constraints of 
this research study. 
 
A future research direction would be to enhance the online web system framework by 
the addition of a web application security testing step in Testing stage 4 as denoted in 
Figure 8.5.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.5. A diagram of the testing process framework of the online web system with 
the additional web application testing phase 
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The added web application security testing steps would incorporate testing the processes 
and applications for vulnerability against attacks on web platforms, web service (XML), 
input validation, web database, web authentication and authorisation (Scambray et al., 
2006). See Figure 8.6 for more details. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6. A diagram of detailing the extra web application security testing steps that 
would be included in the framework 
 
This additional testing of the web application would cover the vulnerability issues 
related to a series of web threats and attack scenarios specific to the web application 
architecture deployed at each of the selected councils. In addition, the extra security 
testing in stage 4 would provide a defence strategy that could be deployed to mitigate 
any identified potential risks that the online web systems at these councils or other 
organsitions would be exposed to. 
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Another future direction would be to extend the security focus to the other online 
community services of the councils such as online library, online GIS and online GPS 
systems, in addition to the email and online web systems already covered in this 
research.  These additions to the framework are outlined in the Figure 8.7.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.7. The stage module diagram incorporating all five online services for the 
further security enhancement of the councils 
 
Figure 8.7 shows both the specific system testings as well as the finalised testings of the 
internetworking infrastructure devices and the policy review testing. The finalised 
testings would include services and system identification, port scanning, vulnerability 
and specific vendor assessment of the entire internetworking infrastructure devices such 
as the Internet border router, the DMZ switch(s), the firewall(s), the IDS/IPS and the 
reverse proxy server(s). Lastly, an overall ICT security policy review could also be 
included in any future undertaking.  
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This research has presented a multiple interpretive case based study of a method for 
security proofing an online communication service. This research was conducted 
through the extensive analysis of the email and online web systems of three selected 
councils. The analysis covered the details of network architecture, device 
configurations, port scanning, vulnerability testing, email and database auditing and 
related information security policy reviews. Data was gathered from stakeholders, 
organisation documents and network security audits (email and online web systems) in 
order to arrive at the conclusions put forward after the detailed analysis.  
 
In conclusion, this research is the first step in a series of steps that provides a simple 
network auditing mechanism for both email and online (static, dynamic and payment) 
web systems. As such, the auditing mechanism could be extended to cover an audit of 
personal online banking websites for policy and information provided to existing and 
future customers based on the system of scrutiny utilised in this research.  For example, 
the extension could commence with Australian banks and then be followed by similar 
audits to banks in other countries. Shifting the security focus in this way, could open up 
a myriad of other future research directions. 
 
Furthermore, the extensions and future directions should further satisfy the seven 
principles of research expounded upon earlier. For example, porting this research and its 
principles to other contexts satisfy the principle of hermeneutics, contextualisation and 
abstraction and generalisation. Exploration of different contexts and environments also 
satisfy the principle of interaction between the researcher and the subjects. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Additional results for Chapter 4 
 
Appendix A1: A summary of the firewall configuration codes (email-NAT) of Council 
A’s firewall 
 
Policy no. Rules From (source) To (destination) 
1 Translate A.B.C.82 192.168.1.92 
2 Translate A.B.C.89 172.16.25.251 
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Appendix A2: A summary of the firewall configuration codes of Council A’s email 
system 
 
Policy 
no. 
Rules Protocol 
types 
Interface From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 Permit TCP Outside Any 192.168.1.92 SMTP 
2 Permit TCP Inside 172.16.25.251 192.168.1.92 SMTP 
3 Permit TCP Inside 172.16.25.251 192.168.1.92 SSH 
4 Permit TCP Inside 172.16.25.70 192.168.1.92 MS-DS 
5 Permit UDP DMZ 192.168.1.92 Any DNS 
6 Permit TCP DMZ 192.168.1.92 Any HTTP 
7 Permit TCP DMZ 192.168.1.92 Any HTTPS 
8 Permit TCP DMZ 192.168.1.92 172.16.5.70 MS-DS 
9 Permit TCP DMZ 192.168.1.92 172.16.5.70 LDAP 
10 Permit TCP DMZ 192.168.1.92 172.16.25.251 SMTP 
11 Permit TCP DMZ 192.168.1.92 Any SMTP 
12 Permit TCP Inside 172.16.25.251 192.168.1.93 SMTP 
13 Permit TCP DMZ 192.168.1.93 172.16.25.251 SMTP 
14 Permit TCP DMZ 192.168.1.93 Any SMTP 
15 Permit TCP Inside 172.16.25.251 Any SMTP 
16 Permit TCP Inside 172.16.25.251 192.168.1.89 ms-wbt-server 
17 Permit TCP Inside 172.16.25.251 Any HTTPS 
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Appendix A3: A full details of system information policy results of Council A’s email 
server 
 
System information policy – CoA-email server (172.16.25.251) 
Services  
116 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length: 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age: 30 days 30 days 
Minimum password age: 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff:  Never force Force 
Password history:  3 passwords N/A 
 
Security auditing policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current 
settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account logon 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes No Yes Yes 
Audit object access No No Yes Yes 
Audit policy change No No Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No No Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system events No No Yes Yes 
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Appendix A4: A summary of both missing service packs and patches information of 
Council A’s email server 
 
Missing service pack (0) – email server (172.16.25.251) 
Product Severity Description Vulnerability  issue Recommendation 
N/A NA/ N/A N/A N/A 
 
Missing patches (9) – email server (172.16.25.251) 
Products Severities Descriptions Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
Windows Moderate KB961501 in Windows print spooler 
could allow remote code 
execution 
Deploy/patch  
Windows Important KB968537 in Windows kernel could 
allow elevation of privilege 
Deploy/patch asap 
Windows Important KB970238 in RPC could allow elevation 
of privilege 
Deploy/patch asap 
Windows Important KB970483 in IIS could allow elevation of 
privilege 
Deploy/patch asap 
Windows Important KB956803 in the MS Ancillary function 
driver could allow elevation 
of privilege 
Deploy/patch asap 
Windows N/A KB951072 cumulative time zone update 
for MS Windows OS 
Deploy/patch  
Exchange N/A KB960384 many vulnerabilities based on 
update rollup 7 for MS 
Exchange Server 2007 service 
pack 1 
Deploy an update rollup 7 
for MS Exchange Server 
2007 service pack 1 asap. 
Exchange Critical KB959241 many vulnerabilities based on 
update rollup 6 for MS 
Exchange Server 2007 service 
pack 1 
Deploy an update rollup 6 
for MS Exchange Server 
2007 service pack 1 
immediately. 
Exchange Important KB949870 many vulnerabilities based on 
update rollup 3 for MS 
Exchange Server 2007 service 
pack 1 
Deploy update rollup 3 for 
MS Exchange Server 2007 
service pack 1 asap. 
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Appendix A5: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendation on Council A’s email server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (31) – email server (172.16.25.251) 
Port no. Services Descriptions Products Recommendations 
25 SMTP Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol 
MS ESMTP Open 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol 
MS IIS webserver 6.0 Open 
110 POP3-proxy Post Office Protocol 3 AVG POP3 proxy 
8.5.373/8.5.374 
Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call MS Windows RPC Open 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS session service NetBIOS session service Open 
143 imap Internet message access 
protocol 
MS Exchange 2007 
imapd 
Close 
443 HTTPS HTTP over TLS/SSL MS IIS webserver 6.0 Open 
445 microsoft-ds MS-DS active directory, 
Windows shares 
MS Windows 2003 Open 
587 MS ESMTP email message submission MS ESMTP Close 
593 ncacn_http_ 
epmap 
HTTP RPC Ep Map MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
993 Imaps Internet message access 
protocol over SSL 
MS Exchange 2007 
imapd 
Close 
995 POP3S Post office protocol 3 over 
TLS/SSL 
MS Exchange 2007 
POP3d 
Close 
1046 msrpc MS Windows RPC  Close 
1052 ddt Dynamic DNS tools  Close 
1098 rmiactivation RMI activation  Close 
1114 mini-sql Mini SQL  Close 
1124 hpvmmcontrol HP VMM control  Close 
1127 kwdb-commn KWDB remote 
communication 
 Close 
1149 bvtsonar BVT sonar service  Close 
1192 caids-sensor caids sensors channel  Close 
1232 msrpc MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC Close 
1239 nmsd NMSD  Close 
1283 productinfo Product information  Close 
3128 ndl-aas Active API server port  Close 
3389 microsoft-rdp  MS terminal service Open 
6001-
6002, 
6004 
ncacn_http MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
8080 http-alt HTTP alternate  Open 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (31) – email server (172.16.25.251) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions Products Recommendations 
8400 cvp Commvault unified data 
management 
 Close 
8402 galaxy  Galaxy client event 
manager 
Close 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (5) – email server (172.16.25.251) 
Port no Services Descriptions Products Recommendations 
137 netbios-ns NETBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT 
netbios-ssn 
Open 
138 netbios-dgm NETBIOS datagram service  Close 
445 microsoft-ds Microsoft-DS SMB file 
sharing 
 Close if not required 
500 isakmp Internet Security 
Association and Key 
Management Protocol 
 Close 
4500 nat-t-ike IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 
3947) 
 Close 
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Appendix A6: A summary of Council A’s email server – the vulnerabilities and the 
possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council A’s email server 
(172.16.25.251) 
High security vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled It is a virtual server, no action is required. 
Services: TCP port 110 (POP3) open Should be disabled 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (7) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Services: FTP Should be disabled 
Services: HTTP Should be disabled if not required 
Services: HTTPS Satisfactory 
Services: IMAP Should be disabled 
Services: POP3 Should be disabled 
Services: SMTP Satisfactory 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (3) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists Rename the administrator account. 
Information:  Some IMAP4 server banners providing 
information to attacker 
The service POP3 server should be turned off. 
Information:  Some POP3 server banners providing 
information to attacker 
The service POP3 server should be turned off. 
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Appendix A7: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council A’s online 
payment system 
 
Policy 
no. 
Rules Protocol 
types 
From (source) To 
(destination) 
Ports (service) 
1 Translate N/A A.B.C.84 192.168.1.84 N/A 
2 Permit TCP Any A.B.C.84 https (443) 
3 Permit TCP 172.16.25.73 192.168.1.84 www (80) 
4 Permit TCP 172.16.25.75 192.168.1.84 www (80) 
5 Permit IP 172.16.21.21 (admin) 192.168.1.84 Any 
6 Permit IP 172.16.21.22 (admin) 192.168.1.84 Any 
8 Permit TCP 172.16.25.40 192.168.1.84 ms-wbt-server (3389) 
9 Permit TCP 172.16.25.227 192.168.1.84 avenue (2134) 
10 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.173 www (80) 
11 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.175 www (80) 
12 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 Any www (80) 
13 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 Any https (443) 
14 Permit UDP 192.168.1.84 Any domain (53) 
15 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.68 m-sql-s (1433) 
16 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.214 bb (1984) 
17 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.214 www (80) 
18 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.64 m-sql-s (1433) 
19 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.194 www (80) 
20 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.193 www (80) 
21 Permit TCP 192.168.1.84 172.16.25.227 avenue (2134) 
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Appendix A8: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council A’s CoA-DMZ-Epathway server 
 
System information policy – CoA-DMZ-Epathway server (192.168.1.84) 
Services  
102 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 0 char At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 42 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history No history N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current 
settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix A9: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council A’s CoA-Pathway server 
 
System information policy – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173) 
Services  
N/A (could not obtained the services information; access denied) 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 45 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 2 days 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 6 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current 
settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
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Appendix A10: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council A’s CoA-SQL server 
 
System information policy – CoA-SQL server (172.16.25.227) 
Services  
N/A (due to error connecting to WMI server: Access was denied) 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 45 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 2 days 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 6 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current 
settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
 
 320
Appendix A11: A summary of missing service pack and patches, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations for the CoA-Pathway server 
 
Missing service pack (1) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173) 
Product Filename Knowledge base Vulnerability issue Recommendation 
Virtual 
Studio 
VS80sp1-
KB926601-
X86-ENU.exe 
N/A Virtual studio 2005 
service pack 1 
Deploy/patch 
 
Missing patches (2) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
Windows Low N/A Windows IE 7 for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
SDK 
components 
Critical KB931906 MS07-028 security update 
for CAPICOM 
Deploy/patch asap 
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Appendix A12: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (22) – CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server (192.168.1.84) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol Close 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS 
webserver 6.0 
Close if not required 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows 
RPC 
Close if not required 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS session service Close if not required 
443 HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over TLS/SSL 
MS IIS webserver 6.0 
Open 
445 Microsoft-ds MS-DS active directory, Windows shares 
MS Windows 2003 
Close 
1025 MSRPC MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1038 MTQP Message Tracking Query Protocol Close 
1049 Flexlm FlexLM license manage Close 
3128 NDL-AAS Active API server port Close 
3389 Microsoft-rdp MS WBT server, MS terminal service Open 
5168 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows 
RPC 
Close 
5169 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows 
RPC 
Close 
5555 Omiback HP open view omniback Close 
5988 Tcpwrapped Tcpwrapped Close 
5989 SSL/TCPwrapped SSL/TCPwrapped Close 
8080 HTTP alternate Alternate HTTP port Open 
8400 CVP Commvault unified data management Close 
8402 Galaxy Galaxy client event manager Close 
8600 Asterix Surveillance data Close 
14247 Unassigned Unassigned Close 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (11) – CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server (192.168.1.84) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
1 Sockets des Troie Remote access/ICQ Trojan Close 
53 Domain Domain name server Open 
69 TFTP Trivial File Transfer Close 
137  NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS name service MS Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn 
Close if not required 
 
 322
The overall opened UDP service ports (11) – CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server (192.168.1.84) 
(continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
138 NetBIOS-dgm NetBIOS datagram service Close if not required 
445 ms-ds Microsoft-DS SMB file sharing Close 
500 Isakmp Internet security association and key 
management protocol 
Close if not required 
1755 WMS Microsoft Media Services (MMS, ms-
streaming) 
Close 
4500 Nat-t-ike IPSec NAT-traversal (RFC 3947) Close if not required 
8012 Ptakks Backdoor.Ptakks, remote access/keylogger Close 
61747 KiLo Remote access Close 
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Appendix A13: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoA-Pathway server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (22) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol Close 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS 
webserver 6.0 
Open 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows 
RPC 
Open 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS session service Open 
445 Microsoft-ds MS-DS active directory, Windows shares 
MS Windows 2003 
Open 
1025 MSRPC MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1049 Flexlm FlexLM license manage Close 
1068 Instl_bootc instl_bootc, installation bootstrap proto. Cli. Close 
3104 Autocuelog Autocue logger protocol Close 
3128 NDL-AAS Active API server port Close 
3389 Microsoft-rdp MS WBT server, MS terminal service Open 
4105 Ca-mq CA message queuing server Close 
4728 Capmux CA port multiplexer Close 
5988 Tcpwrapped Tcpwrapped Close 
5989 SSL/TCPwrapped SSL/TCPwrapped Close 
7166 aruba-
server/Flexlm 
Aruba eDiscovery Server Close if not required 
7188 Unassigned Unassigned Close 
8080 HTTP alternate Alternate HTTP port Open 
8400 CVP Commvault unified data management Close 
8402 Galaxy Galaxy client event manager Close 
14247 Unassigned Unassigned Close 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
5 RJE Remote job entry Close 
13 Daytime Daytime (RFC 867) Close 
18 MSP Message send protocol Close 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS name service MS Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn 
Open/ Close if not 
required 
138 NetBIOS-dgm NetBIOS datagram service Open/ Close if not 
required 
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The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
445 Microsoft-ds MS-DS SMB file sharing Open 
500 Isakmp Internet security association and key 
management protocol 
Close 
1051 Optima-vnet Optima VNET Close 
4500 Nat-t-ike IPSec NAT-traversal (RFC 3947) Close 
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Appendix A14: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoA-SQL server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (23) – CoA-SQL server (172.16.25.227) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol Close 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS 
webserver 6.0 
Open 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
111 Rpcbind SUN Remote Procedure Call Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows 
RPC 
Open 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS session service Open 
445 Microsoft-ds MS-DS active directory, Windows shares 
MS Windows 2003 
Open 
775 Rpcbind Entomb Close 
1042 MSRPC MS Windows RPC Open 
1050 Java-or-
OTGfileshare 
J2EE nameserver, also OTG, also called 
Disk/Application extender. Could also be 
MiniCommand backdoor OTGlicenseserv 
Close 
1215 MSRPC MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1433 MS-SQL-S MS-SQL-server Open 
1518 MSRPC MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC  
2134 Assigned Council A’s assigned port Open 
3104 Autocuelog Autocue logger protocol Close 
3128 NDL-AAS Active API server port Close 
3389 Microsoft-rdp MS WBT server, MS terminal service Open 
4105 CA-MQ CA Message Queuing server Close 
4443 MSRPC MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC Close 
4728 Capmux CA port multiplexer Close 
8080 HTTP alternate Alternate HTTP port Open 
8400 CVP Commvault unified data management Close 
8402 Galaxy Galaxy client event manager Close 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (14) – CoA-SQL server (172.16.25.227) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
111 Rpcbind SUN remote procedure call Close 
123 NTP Network time protocol Close 
135 MSRPC MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC Open/Close if not 
required 
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The overall opened UDP service ports (14) – CoA-SQL server (172.16.25.227) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS name service MS Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn 
Open/Close if not 
required 
138 NetBIOS-dgm NetBIOS datagram service Open/Close if not 
required 
161 SNMP SNMP Close 
445 Microsoft-ds Microsoft-DS SMB file sharing Open 
500 Isakmp Internet security association and key 
management protocol 
Close 
753 RRH Reverse Routing Header Close 
1025 MSRPC MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1026 Winrpc Windows RPC Close 
1069 Cognex-insight COGNEX-INSIGHT Close 
1434 MS-SQL-M Microsoft-SQL-monitor Open 
4500 Nat-t-ike IPSec NAT-traversal (RFC 3947) Close 
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Appendix A15: A summary of Council A’s CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server – the 
vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations  
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council A’s CoA-DMZ-
Epathweb server 
High security vulnerabilities (6) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Backdoor – open ports commonly used by 
Trojans: Sockets des Troie (1) 
Disable port 1 
Backdoor – open ports commonly used by 
Trojans: NetControle (1772) 
Disable port 1772 
Backdoor – open ports commonly used by 
Trojans: Ptakks (8012) 
Disable port 8012 
Backdoor – open ports commonly used by 
Trojans: KiLo (61747) 
Disable port 61747 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other 
removable drives 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 port 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (7) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Registry: Last logged-on username visible Should be disabled 
Registry: Windows AutoUpdate is enabled 
but requires user intervention for both 
patch download and installation 
No further action is required 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: HTTPS No further action is required 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended to rename this account. 
Information: Some POP3 server banners 
providing information to attacker 
Disable POP3 service port 
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Appendix A16: A summary of Council A’s CoA-Pathway server – the vulnerabilities 
and the possible mitigation recommendations  
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the Council A’s CoA-
Pathway server 
High security vulnerability (1) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 port 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
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Appendix A17: A summary of Council A’s CoA-SQL server – the vulnerabilities and 
the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the Council A’s CoA-SQL 
server 
High security vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Backdoor – open ports commonly used by 
Trojans: Force (1215) 
Disable port 1215 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 port 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (2)  
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: MS SQL server  
Information: Some POP3 server banners 
providing information to attacker 
Disable POP3 service port 
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Appendix A18: OS and network specification configuration 
 
OS and network specification configuration 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
1.1 Physical security Place the SQL server in an 
area where it will be 
physically secure. 
Satisfactory H 
1.2 Domain 
environment 
If the SQL Server is in a 
domain that is trusted by other 
domains, document the access 
granted by the trust. 
Satisfactory; only IT 
administrator groups are 
allowed to access the 
online backend database 
server. 
H 
1.3 SQL servers 
accessed via 
Internet 
If the SQL server is being 
accessed via the Internet, place 
the SQL Server inside a DMZ 
with the Web Server. 
Satisfactory; there is a 
frontend web (CoA-
DMZ-Epathweb) server 
located in the DMZ. 
H 
1.4 SQL servers 
accessed via 
Internet 
Put a firewall between your 
server and the Internet. 
Block TCP port 1433 and 
UDP port 1434 on your 
perimeter firewall. If named 
instances are listening on 
additional ports, block those 
too. In a multi-tier 
environment, use multiple 
firewalls to create more secure 
screened subnets 
Satisfactory; the SQL 
server is located be hide 
the Internet firewall, and 
both TCP port 1433 and 
1434 are blocked from 
external access. 
H 
1.5 Encryption Implement SSL. Use the fully-
qualified DNS name of the 
frontend web server in the 
certificate to help prevent 
masquerading. 
Satisfactory; the 
Epathway frontend server 
uses SSL and fully 
qualified DNS name. 
H 
1.6 Test and 
development servers 
Maintain test and development 
servers on a separate network 
segment from the production 
servers. 
Not satisfactory (the test 
and development servers 
are on the same class C 
network). 
H 
1.7 Dedicated server Install SQL server on a 
computer that does not provide 
additional services, e.g., Web 
or mail services. 
Satisfactory; the SQL 
server is only for SQL 
database operation. 
M 
1.8 OS benchmark 
configuration 
Configure Windows 2003 
server level I benchmark 
settings with the following 
modifications: 
  
1.8.1 Windows accounts Make sure the Windows guest 
account is disabled. 
Satisfactory M 
1.8.2 Disk subsystem Use RAID for critical data 
files. 
Satisfactory; raid level 10: 
database and temp drives 
raid level 5: backup drive. 
M 
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OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
1.8.3 Separate partitions Create separate partitions for 
OS/SQL program files, SQL 
data files, and SQL transaction 
logs. 
Satisfactory M 
1.8.4 Volume / partition 
type 
Format all volumes with 
NTFS 
Satisfactory H 
1.9 Services Disable the following services 
on a SQL server machine 
  
1.9.1  Alerter Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
P 
1.9.2  Clipbook server Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
P 
1.9.3  Computer browser Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.4  DHCP client Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.5  Distributed file system Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Manual. 
L 
1.9.6  Distributed transaction 
coordinator 
Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.7  Fax service Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.8  Internet connection sharing Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.9  IPSec policy agent Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.10  License logging Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.11  Logical disk manager 
administrative service 
Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic 
(this service is needed by 
the system administrator). 
L 
1.9.12  Messenger Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.13  NetMeeting remote desktop 
sharing 
Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.14  Network DDE Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.15  Network DDE DSDM Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.16  Print spooler Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.17  Remote access connection 
manager 
Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.18  Remote registry Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic 
L 
1.9.19  Removable storage Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.20  RunAs service Satisfactory;  (disabled) M 
1.9.21  Smart card Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.22  Smart card helper Satisfactory;  (disabled) P 
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 OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
1.9.23  Task scheduler Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
P 
1.9.24  Telephony Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.25  Telnet Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.26  Windows installer Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.10 MSSQL server 
service account 
Use a low-privileged local or 
Domain account for the MS 
SQL server service. 
Satisfactory M 
1.11 SQL server agent 
service account 
Use a low-privileged domain 
account for SQL server agent 
if replication, DTS, or other 
inter-server connection is 
required. 
Satisfactory M 
1.12 Local users group 
membership 
Assign the local service 
account as a member of only 
the users group. 
Satisfactory M 
1.13 Domain service 
account group 
membership 
Make a domain service 
account a member of only 
non-privileged groups. 
N/A; the current 
configuration does not use 
the domain service account 
group. 
M 
1.14 SQL server service 
account rights 
Grant the SQL server service 
account(s) the following 
rights: 
N/A; there is no SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Act as part of the OS.  L 
  Log on as a batch job  L 
  Replace a process-level token  L 
  Bypass traverse checking  L 
  Adjust memory quotas for a 
process 
 M 
  Permission to start SQL server 
active directory helper 
 L 
  Permission to start SQL writer  M 
1.15 SQL server agent 
service account 
rights 
Grant the SQL server agent 
service account(s) the 
following rights: 
N/A; there is no SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Act as part of the OS  L 
  Log on as a batch job  L 
  Replace a process-level token  L 
  Bypass traverse checking  L 
  Adjust memory quotas for a 
process 
 M 
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OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
1.16 Integration service 
account rights 
Grant the integration service 
account(s) the following 
rights: 
N/A; there is no SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Permission to write to the 
application event log 
 L 
  Bypass traverse checking  L 
  Create global objects  M 
  Impersonate a client after 
authentication 
 L 
1.17 SQL server services 
account rights 
Deny the service account the 
“Log on locally” right. 
Satisfactory M 
1.18 SQL server services 
account rights 
If a service account is a 
domain account, configure the 
account to have the Windows 
permission “Log on To” the 
database server only. 
Satisfactory M 
1.19.1 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Create dedicated user accounts 
specifically for proxies, and 
only use these proxy user 
accounts for running job steps. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
1.19.2 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Only grant the necessary 
permissions to proxy user 
accounts. Grant only those 
permissions actually required 
to run the job steps that are 
assigned to a given proxy 
account. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
1.19.3 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Do not run the SQL server 
agent service under a MS 
Windows account that is a 
member of the Windows 
administrators group. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
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Appendix A19: MS SQL server installation and patches audit details  
 
MS SQL server installation and patches audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
2.1 SQL server install 
platform 
Avoid installing SQL server 
on a domain controller. 
Satisfactory   M 
2.2 Patches and hotfixes Ensure the current SQL 
server service pack and 
hotfixes are installed. 
Satisfactory; currently 
updating both service pack 
and critical hotfixes every 
three months 
H 
2.3 SQL server ports Change SQL server default 
ports from 1433 and 1434. 
Satisfactory  H 
2.4 Naming conventions In naming SQL Server 
instances, limit the instance 
name to less than 16 
characters with no reference 
to a version number or other 
sensitive information. 
Satisfactory; currently the 
name is less than 16 
characters (11). 
L 
2.5 SQL server instances Keep an inventory of all 
versions, editions and 
languages of SQL Server. 
Not satisfactory; there is no 
inventory process. 
P 
2.6 Authentication mode Select Windows 
authentication mode. 
Not satisfactory (currently 
the council uses both 
Windows and SQL server 
authentication modes). 
M 
2.7 Rename sa account The “sa” account should be 
renamed to something that is 
not easily identifiable as the 
“sa” account. 
ALTER LOGIN sa WITH 
NAME = <new name> 
Not satisfactory; the 
council uses the default 
account (sa). 
M 
2.8 Strong password Use a strong password for 
the “sa” login account. 
Satisfactory M 
2.9 Sample databases Do not install the sample 
databases. Delete all sample 
databases if they already 
exist. 
Satisfactory; there is no 
sample database installed. 
L 
2.10 Initialisation 
parameter 
C2 Audit Mode– set to 1 if 
no custom defined audit trace 
is enabled 
Satisfactory; the current 
setup is 1. 
P 
2.11 Initialisation 
parameter 
Remote Access– set to 0 
unless replication is being 
used or the requirement is 
justified 
Satisfactory; the current 
setup is 0. 
M 
2.12 Initialisation 
parameter 
Scan for Startup Procedures– 
set to 0 unless justified 
Satisfactory; the current 
setup is 0. 
L 
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Appendix A20: MS SQL server setting audit details  
 
MS SQL server setting audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
3.1 SQL server 
configuration 
manager 
Disable the “Named Pipes” 
network protocol. 
Not satisfactory L 
3.2 SQL server 
properties 
The following settings are 
recommended: 
  
3.2.1 Auto restart SQL 
server 
Set the SQL server service start 
mode to “Automatic” 
Satisfactory L 
3.2.2 Auto restart SQL 
server agent 
If the SQL server agent is 
required, set the “SQL server 
agent” start mode to “Automatic”. 
Satisfactory L 
3.2.3 Distributed 
transaction 
coordinator 
Set the “distributed transaction 
coordinator” service start mode to 
“Disabled” if this service is not 
required. 
N/A L 
3.2.4 Cross database-
ownership chaining 
Disable the 
cross_db_ownership_chaining 
option. 
Satisfactory M 
3.2.5 Advanced server 
settings 
Do not enable direct modifications 
to the system catalogs. 
N/A M 
3.2.6 Backup/restore from 
tape timeout 
Set the backup/restore from tape 
timeout period to “Try for 5 
minutes” 
Not satisfactory; 
(currently set to 
“Wait Indefinitely”) 
L 
3.2.7 Media retention Set the default backup media 
retention to the minimum number 
of days needed to retain a full 
backup of the database. Ideally, 
this should be as high as your 
resources permit. 
Satisfactory L 
3.3 Data directory The default data directory should 
be a dedicated data partition 
Not satisfactory; 
(c:\programfiles\micr
osoft SQL 
server\mssql\data) 
M 
3.4 Data directory The default log directory should be 
a dedicated partition separate from 
all programs and data 
Not satisfactory; 
(c:\programfiles\micr
osoft SQL 
server\mssql\logs) 
M 
3.5 Replication Do not enable replication. N/A L 
3.6 Other SQL server 
configuration 
options 
Set the number of logs retained 
based on the maximum number of 
restarts and log cyclings which 
may occur within your desired log 
retention window. The default 
value of 6 may be too low for 
many installations. 
Satisfactory; the 
default is 6. 
P 
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MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
3.7 Database mail Disable database mail where 
messaging is not required. 
Satisfactory L 
3.8 Trace messages Error log/include execution trace 
messages = off 
Satisfactory P 
3.9 User-defined stored 
procedures 
Ensure that all user-defined 
stored procedures are stored in 
encrypted format. 
Not satisfactory; 
stored in unencrypted 
format. 
H 
3.10 User-defined 
extended stored 
procedures 
Avoid using user-defined 
extended stored procedures. If 
extended functionality is 
required, use Common 
Language Runtime (CLR) 
assemblies instead. 
Not installed L 
3.11 Extended stored 
procedures 
Disable access to the following 
extended stored procedures: 
  
3.11.1  xp_available media Satisfactory L 
3.11.2  xp_cmdshell Satisfactory L 
3.11.3  xp_dirtree Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.4  xp_dsninfo Satisfactory P 
3.11.5  xp_enumdsn Satisfactory P 
3.11.6  xp_enumerrorlogs Satisfactory P 
3.11.7  xp_enumgroups Satisfactory P 
3.11.8  xp_eventlog Satisfactory P 
3.11.9  xp_fixeddrives Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.10  xp_getfiledetails Satisfactory P 
3.11.11  xp_getnetname Satisfactory P 
3.11.12  xp_logevent Satisfactory P 
3.11.13  xp_loginconfig Satisfactory P 
3.11.14  xp_msver Satisfactory P 
3.11.15  xp_readerrorlog Satisfactory P 
3.11.16  xp_servicecontrol Satisfactory P 
3.11.17  xp_sprintf Satisfactory P 
3.11.18  xp_sscanf Satisfactory P 
3.11.19  xp_subdirs Satisfactory P 
3.12 SQLmail extended 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
SQLMail extended stored 
procedures: 
  
3.12.1  xp_deletemail Satisfactory P 
3.12.2  xp_findnextmsg Satisfactory P 
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 MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
3.12.3  xp_get_mapi_default_profile Satisfactory P 
3.12.4  xp_get_mapi_profiles Satisfactory P 
3.12.5  xp_readmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.6  xp_sendmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.7  xp_startmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.8  xp_stopmail Satisfactory P 
3.13 WebTask extended 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
WebTask extended stored 
procedures. Delete the 
xpweb70.dll file that implements 
the following WebTask extended 
stored procedures: 
  
3.13.1  xp_cleanupwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.13.2  xp_convertwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.13.3  xp_dropwebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.4  xp_enumcodepages Satisfactory  P 
3.13.5  xp_makewebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.6  xp_readwebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.7  xp_runwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.14 OLE automation 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
OLE automation stored 
procedures: 
  
3.14.1  sp_OACreate Satisfactory  L 
3.14.2  sp_OADestroy Satisfactory L 
3.14.3  sp_OAGetErrorInfo Satisfactory  L 
3.14.4  sp_OAGetProperty Satisfactory L 
3.14.5  sp_OAMethod Satisfactory  L 
3.14.6  sp_OASetProperty Satisfactory L 
3.14.7  sp_OAStop Satisfactory L 
3.15 Registry access 
extended stored 
procedures 
Disable access to the following 
registry access extended stored 
procedures: 
  
3.15.1  xp_regaddmultistring Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.2  xp_regdeletekey Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.3  xp_regdeletevalue Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.4  xp_regenumvalues Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
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MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
3.15.5  xp_regremovemultistring Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.6  xp_regwrite Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.16 Advanced setting SQL server event 
forwarding/forward events to a 
different server = off 
Satisfactory; (off). L 
3.17 SQL server browser 
service 
Disable SQL server browser 
service 
Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
L 
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Appendix A21: MS SQL server access controls audit details 
 
MS SQL server access controls audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
4.1 Permissions on OS 
tools 
Restrict access to the 
executables in the System32 
directory e.g. Explorer.exe and 
cmd.exe. 
Not satisfactory 
(administrator has full 
control, Power users set 
to modify, and user 
group set to execute). 
H 
4.2 SQL server install 
directory 
permissions 
Modify the permissions to the 
[Drive]:\Program 
Files\Microsoft SQL server 
directory. 
Satisfactory; remove the 
Users group’s 
permission to run 
executables. 
H 
4.3 SQL server database 
instance directory 
permissions 
Delete or secure old setup files. 
Protect files in the <system 
drive>:\Program 
Files\Microsoft SQL 
Server\MSSQL.X\MSSQL\Inst
all, e.g., sqlstp.log, sqlsp.log 
and setup.iss. “X” represents 
the installations of various SQL 
server installs due to the fact 
that multiple instances of SQL 
server or SQL express can be 
installed. 
Satisfactory; access to 
the current install folder 
is allowed for the system 
administrator groups 
only. 
M 
4.4 Assigning system 
administrators role 
When assigning database 
administrators to the system 
administrators role, map their 
Windows accounts to SQL 
logins, and then assign them to 
the role. 
Satisfactory M 
4.5 SQL logins Remove the default 
BUILTIN\administrators SQL 
login. 
Not satisfactory; the 
BUILTIN\administrators 
SQL login is still exits. 
M 
4.6 SQL logins Ensure that all SQL logins have 
strong passwords. 
Satisfactory M 
4.7 OS guests access Deny database login for the 
guests OS group. 
Satisfactory H 
4.8 Fixed server roles Only use the fixed server roles 
sysadmin, server admin, setup 
admin etc, to support DBA 
activity. 
Satisfactory L 
4.9 SQL server database 
users and roles 
Remove the guest user from all 
databases except master and 
tempdb. 
Not satisfactory; (the 
guest user stills exist). 
M 
4.10 Statement 
permissions 
Grant DDL statement 
permissions to only the 
database and schema owner, 
not individual users. 
Satisfactory M 
4.11 Database owners 
permissions 
Ensure dbo owns all user-
created database schemas 
Not satisfactory L 
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MS SQL server access controls audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
4.12 Low-privileged 
users 
Do not grant object permissions 
to PUBLIC or GUEST. 
N/A M 
4.13 Stored procedure 
permissions 
Grant executes permissions on 
stored procedures to database 
roles (not users). 
Satisfactory M 
4.14 Using the GRANT 
option 
Do not assign the GRANT 
option of object permission to a 
user or role. 
N/A M 
4.15 SQL server agent 
subsystem privileges 
Restrict proxy access to 
required/approved subsystems. 
N/A; no proxy access. M 
4.16 User-defined 
database roles 
Create user-defined database 
roles to assign permissions to 
objects in the database when a 
pre-defined database role does 
not supply the appropriate 
permissions to a group of users. 
N/A; no user defined 
database roles. 
M 
4.17 Database roles Avoid nesting database roles. Satisfactory M 
4.18 Users and roles Ensure that the members of the 
roles (users/groups/other roles) 
in the target database actually 
exist. 
Satisfactory L 
4.19 Application roles Use application roles to limit 
access to data to users of 
specific applications. Use 
encryption to protect the role 
name and password in the 
connection string. Use 
“EXECUTE AS WITH NO 
REVERT” or “WITH 
COOKIE” to allow individuals 
to access the application 
without knowing the password. 
N/A M 
4.20 Use of predefined 
roles 
Avoid assigning predefined 
roles to PUBLIC or GUEST. 
N/A; no predefined roles 
created. 
L 
4.21 Linked or remote 
servers 
Use linked servers rather than 
remote servers where required. 
Remove any unused linked 
servers or disable this feature. 
N/A L 
4.22 Linked or remote 
servers 
Configure linked or remote 
servers to use Windows 
authentication where required. 
Disable linked servers 
otherwise. 
Not satisfactory; 
(currently the council 
uses both windows and 
SQL authentications). 
M 
4.23 Linked server logins Allow linked server access only 
to those logins that need it. 
Disable linked servers 
otherwise. 
Satisfactory M 
4.24 Ad Hoc data access Disable ad hoc data access on 
all providers for all users except 
members of the sysadmin fixed 
role. 
N/A L 
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Appendix A22: MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details  
 
MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
5.1 Auditing – general Prepare a schedule for 
reviewing audit information 
regularly. 
Not satisfactory; currently 
there is no auditing 
schedule. 
P 
5.2 SQL server 
properties – security 
tab 
Through the SQL server 
management studio, enable 
auditing for SQL server. 
Satisfactory P 
5.3 SQL server logs SQL server audit data must be 
protected from loss. The SQL 
server and SQL server agent 
logs must be backed up before 
they are overwritten. 
Satisfactory; the default 
setup is 6. 
P 
5.4 SQL profiler Use SQL profiler to generate 
and manage audit trails. 
Satisfactory P 
5.5 Profiler events Capture the following events 
using SQL profiler 
  
  Event   
5.5.1  Audit add DB user event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.2  Audit add login to server Role Not satisfactory P 
5.5.3  Audit add member to DB role Not satisfactory P 
5.5.4  Audit add role event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.5  Audit addlogin event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.6  Audit app role change 
password 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.7  Audit backup/restore Not satisfactory P 
5.5.8  Audit broker conversation Not satisfactory P 
5.5.9  Audit broker login Not satisfactory P 
5.5.10  Audit change audit Not satisfactory P 
5.5.11  Audit change database owner Not satisfactory P 
5.5.12  Audit DBCC Not satisfactory P 
5.5.13  Audit database management Not satisfactory P 
5.5.14  Audit database object access Not satisfactory P 
5.5.15  Audit database object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.16  Audit database object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.17  Audit database object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.18  Audit database operation Not satisfactory P 
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MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
5.5.19  Audit database principal 
impersonation 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.20  Audit database principal 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.21  Audit database scope GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.22  Audit login change password Not satisfactory P 
5.5.23  Audit login change property Not satisfactory P 
5.5.24  Audit login Not satisfactory P 
5.5.25  Audit login failed Not satisfactory P 
5.5.26  Audit login GDR event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.27  Audit logout Not satisfactory P 
5.5.28  Audit object derived 
permission event 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.29  Audit schema object access Not satisfactory P 
5.5.30  Audit schema object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.31  Audit schema object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.32  Audit schema object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.33  Audit server alter trace Not satisfactory P 
5.5.34  Audit server object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.35  Audit server object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.36  Audit server object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.37  Audit server operation Not satisfactory P 
5.5.38  Audit server principal 
impersonation 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.39  Audit server principal 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.40  Audit server scope GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.41  Audit server starts and stops Not satisfactory P 
5.5.42  Audit statement permission 
event 
Not satisfactory P 
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Appendix A23: MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details  
 
MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration items Action / recommended 
Parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
6.1 Backups – general Use full database backups 
combined with differential or 
transaction log backups to 
restore the database to a 
specific point in time. 
Satisfactory; currently the 
council’s backup is done 
nightly. 
M 
6.2 System databases It is important to include the 
system databases in your 
backup plan i.e. the master, 
msdb and model databases. 
Satisfactory M 
6.3 Backing up master 
database 
Backup the master database 
when any of the following 
events occur: 
 A database is created or 
deleted 
  Login accounts are created, 
deleted or modified 
Server-wide or database 
settings are modified 
Satisfactory M 
6.4 Backing up MSDB 
database 
Backup the msdb database 
when any of the following 
events occur: 
Alerts, jobs, schedules or 
operators are created, deleted 
or modified 
Satisfactory M 
6.5 Backup media Password protects the backup 
media. 
Satisfactory H 
6.6 Access to backup files Restrict access to the backup 
files to system administrators. 
Satisfactory H 
6.7 Access to backup files Restrict restore permissions to 
DBAs 
Satisfactory; currently, 
only the system 
administrator group can 
restore the backup files. 
H 
6.8 Recommended 
periodic 
administrative 
procedures 
Run the MS baseline security 
analyser weekly and follow 
the security recommendations 
as closely as possible to 
secure the OS. 
Not satisfactory; the MS 
baseline security analyser 
not in use. 
L 
6.9 Recommended 
periodic 
administrative 
procedures 
Run the SQL best practices 
analyser regularly and note 
any changes to the 
environment. 
Not satisfactory; the SQL 
best practices analyser not 
in use. 
L 
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MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration items Action / recommended 
Parameters 
Council A Risk 
levels 
6.10 Enable password 
policy enforcement 
When a password change 
mechanism is introduced into 
clients and applications; 
enable password expiration. 
Always specify 
MUST_CHANGE when 
specifying a password on 
behalf of another principal. 
Not satisfactory; no 
enforce password policy 
M 
6.11 Periodic scan of role 
members 
Periodically scan fixed server 
and database roles to ensure 
that only trusted individuals 
are members. 
Not satisfactory; currently, 
there are only a few users. 
Periodic scan may is 
recommended when 
number of users increases. 
L 
6.12 Periodic scan of 
stored procedures 
Verify stored procedures that 
have been set to AutoStart are 
secure. 
Not satisfactory; no 
AutoStart enabled. 
P 
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Appendix A24: Council A’s information security policy 
 
A97/7041 – Council A community access to the Internet policy  
Recommendation 
 
1. That the following libraries policy (4) - community access to the Internet - be 
adopted: 
 
Libraries Policy (4) 
 
Subject:  Community access to the Internet 
Objective 
To ensure our community has access to a local 
gateway of knowledge and information necessary to 
enhance lifelong learning, literacy, education, 
independent decision making and cultural, business or 
personal development. 
 
The policy aims to clarify the conditions of use for 
community access to the Internet. 
 
Policy statement 
The Council A library and information service provides 
community access to the Internet through its public 
library system which includes: 
 
 AH Bracks library. 
 Bull Creek library. 
 Canning Bridge library. 
 Civic Square library. 
 Willagee library. 
 
 
Community access to the Internet through the Council 
A public library system is based on the following: 
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A) Conditions of use. 
B) Management of use. 
C) The principles of equity and access. 
 
1. Conditions of use 
 
A) Community access to the Internet will be available during 
the normal library hours of operation;  
B) The maximum length of any one session will be limited to 
thirty (30) minutes.  Any change to this condition will be 
at the discretion of the branch librarian;  
C) Search and read facilities only are available for public use;  
D) Facilities such as e-mail and file transfer are not available 
for public use; 
E) Print facilities will be available and charged at a rate of 
20¢ per page which will be subject to an annual review; 
and 
F) The Council A does not guarantee or accept any liability 
for the accuracy, authoritativeness, timeliness or 
usefulness of any information retrieved from the Internet. 
  
2. Management of use 
 
A) The staff of the Council A libraries under the direction of 
the manager library and information services and the 
respective branch librarian, will be responsible for 
managing the use of community access to the Internet; 
B) Prospective users of the Internet will be encouraged to book 
their session in advance to avoid unnecessary delays; 
C) Booking in advance may not be necessary if the Internet is 
not being used. It should be noted a pre booked session will 
take precedence over casual use; and 
D) Library users are expected to comply with all local, state, 
and federal laws while using the Internet. Users found to 
have violated any laws, (including but not limited to those 
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concerning copyright, fraud, privacy, or obscenity) or who 
access information that is considered unacceptable 
according to common community standards and that would 
not be included in the normal print collection while using 
library facilities or equipment will have their privileges 
revoked. 
 
3. Equity and access 
 
 The principle that all members of the community are entitled to 
have access to library services and resources and that such 
person should not be discriminated against on the grounds of 
age, sex, race, religion, national origin, disability, economic 
conditions, individual lifestyle or political or social views are 
recognised and will be upheld where possible within this policy.   
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Appendix B: Additional results for Chapter 5 
 
Appendix B1: A summary of the Internet border access list code for the email system 
of Council B 
 
Policy no. Rule Protocol type From (source) To (destination) Port (service) 
1 Permit IP Any Any Any 
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Appendix B2: A summary of the firewall configuration codes (email-NAT) of Council 
B’s firewall 
 
Policy no. Rule From (source) To (destination) 
1 Translate A.B.C.89 172.20.130.224 
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Appendix B3: A summary of the firewall configuration codes of Council B’s email 
system 
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol types From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 Permit TCP CoB Internal 
LAN 
A.B.C.99 
A.B.C.101 
SMTP 
2 Permit TCP Any A.B.C.98 
A.B.C.100 
SMTP 
3 Permit TCP CoB Internal 
LAN 
A.B.C.98 
A.B.C.100 
HTTP,HTTPS, 
Telnet, 
IronPort_quarantine 
4 Permit TCP A.B.C.98 
A.B.C.100 
Any HTTP,HTTPS, 
SMTP, 
Global_Catalogue 
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Appendix B4: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council B’s email server 
 
System information policy– CoB-email server (172.20.130.224) 
Services  
135 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length: 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age: 45 days 30 days 
Minimum password age: 2 days 0 day 
Force logoff:  Never force Force 
Password history:  6 passwords N/A 
 
Security auditing policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current 
settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
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Appendix B5: A summary of missing patches information of Council B’s email server  
 
Missing patches (5) – email server (172.20.130.224) 
Products Severities Descriptions Vulnerabilities Recommendations 
MS 
Windows 
N/A KB890830 It helps remove specific 
prevalent malicious software 
from computers that are 
running MS Windows Server 
2003, and other Windows OS. 
Deploy/patch  
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB938464 MS08-052 - addresses a 
vulnerability in MS Windows 
vulnerabilities in GDI+ could 
allow remote code execution 
(954593) 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Exchange 
N/A KB960384 Many vulnerabilities based on 
update rollup 7 for MS 
Exchange Server 2007 service 
pack 1 
Deploy an update rollup 7 
for MS Exchange Server 
2007 service pack 1 asap 
MS 
Exchange 
Critical KB959241 Many vulnerabilities based on 
update rollup 6 for MS 
Exchange Server 2007 service 
pack 1 
Deploy an update rollup 6 
for MS Exchange Server 
2007 service pack 1 
immediately. 
MS 
Exchange 
Important KB949870 Many vulnerabilities based on 
update rollup 3 for MS 
Exchange Server 2007 service 
pack 1 
Deploy update rollup 3 for 
MS Exchange Server 2007 
service pack 1 asap 
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Appendix B6: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendation on Council B’s email server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (21) – email server (172.20.130.224) 
Port no. Services Descriptions Products Recommendations 
25 SMTP SMTP MS ESMTP Open 
80 HTTP HTTP MS IIS webserver 6.0 Open 
110 POP3 POP3 MS Exchange Server 
2007 POP3 
Close 
135 MSRPC MS RPC MS Windows RPC Open 
139 NetBIOS -
ssn 
NetBIOS Session Service NetBIOS Session 
Service 
Open 
443 HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
over TLS/SSL 
MS IIS webserver 6.0 Open 
445 MS-ds MS-DS Active Directory, 
Windows shares 
MS Windows 2003 Open 
587 email 
message 
submission 
email message submission 
(SMTP) 
MS ESMTP Close 
593 ncacn_http_ 
epmap 
HTTP RPC Ep Map MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
1075 MSRPC MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC Close 
1091 MSRPC MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC Close 
1123 MSRPC MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC Close 
1163 MSRPC MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC Close 
1165 MSRPC MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC Close 
1248 MSRPC MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC Close 
3389 MS-RDP MS Remote Session MS Terminal Service Open 
6001 ncacn_http MS RPC for MS Exchange 
(information store) 
MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
6002 ncacn_http MS RPC (directory referral) MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
6004 ncacn_http MS RPC (DSProxy/NSPI) MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
8400 cvp Commvault Unified Data 
Management 
 Close 
8402 galaxy  Galaxy Client Event 
Manager 
Close 
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The overall opened UDP service ports (8) - email server (172.20.130.224) 
Port no. Services Descriptions Products Recommendations 
123 NTP Network Time Protocol  Close 
137 NetBIOS -ns NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT 
netbios-ssn 
Open 
138 NetBIOS -
dgm 
NetBIOS Datagram Service MS Windows Close 
161 SNMP Simple Network 
Management Protocol 
SNMP v1 server (public) Close 
445 MS-ds MS-DS SMB file sharing MS Windows Close if not required 
500 isakmp Internet Security 
Association and Key 
Management Protocol 
MS Windows Close 
1434 ms-sql-m MS SQL Server MS SQL Server 
9.00.4035.00 
Close if not required 
4500 nat-t-ike IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 
3947) 
MS Windows Close 
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Appendix B7: A summary of Council B’s email server – the vulnerabilities and the 
possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the email server 
(172.20.130.224) 
High security vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled It is a virtual server, no action is required. 
Services: TCP port 110 (POP3) open Should be disabled 
 
Medium security vulnerability (1) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
SNMP Should be disabled if not required 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (7) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Services: Alter service enabled Should be disabled if not required 
Services: HTTP Should be disabled if not required 
Services: SMTP Satisfactory 
Services: HTTPS Satisfactory 
Services: POP3 open Should be disabled 
  
 
Potential vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account 
exists 
Rename the administrator account. 
Information:  Some POP3 server banners 
providing information to attacker 
The service POP3 server should be turned off. 
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Appendix B8: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council B’s static 
web system with respect to the CoB-DMZ-Web and the CoB-Web servers 
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol types From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 MIP Address CoB-DMZ-Web A.B.C.121/27 N/A 
2 MIP Address CoB-Web 172.20.130.184/16 N/A 
3 Permit TCP Any CoB-DMZ-Web HTTP 
4 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web Any HTTP 
5 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web CoB-Web HTTP 
6 Permit TCP CoB-Web CoB-DMZ-Web HTTP 
7 Permit TCP CoB-Web CoB-DMZ-Web HTTPS 
8 Permit TCP CoB-Web CoB-DMZ-Web 445 
9 Permit TCP 172.20.20.20/16 CoB-DMZ-Web 3389 
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Appendix B9: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council B’s CMS 
web system with respect to the CoB-DMZ-Web and the CoB-Database servers 
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol types From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 MIP Address CoB-DMZ-Web A.B.C.121/27 N/A 
2 MIP Address CoB-Database 172.20.130.148/16 N/A 
3 Permit TCP Any CoB-DMZ-Web HTTP 
4 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web Any HTTP 
5 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web CoB-Database HTTP 
6 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web CoB-Database HTTPS 
7 Permit TCP CoB-Database CoB-DMZ-Web HTTP 
8 Permit TCP CoB-Database CoB-DMZ-Web HTTPS 
9 Permit TCP 172.20.20.20/16 CoB-DMZ-Web 3389 
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Appendix B10: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council B’s online 
payment system 
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol types From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 MIP Address Online Gateway x.x.x.x N/A 
2 Permit TCP Any CoB-DMZ-Web HTTP 
3 Permit TCP Any CoB-Database HTTPS 
4 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web Any HTTP 
5 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web Any HTTPS 
6 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web CoB-Database Sqlnet2 
7 Permit TCP CoB-DMZ-Web CoB-Database 1443 
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Appendix B11: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council B’s CoB-DMZ-Web server 
 
System information policy– CoB-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.121) 
Services  
115 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 45 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 2 days 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 6 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current 
settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
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Appendix B12: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council B’s CoB -Web server 
 
System information policy – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184) 
Services  
111 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 45 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 2 days 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 6 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current 
settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
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Appendix B13: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council B’s CoB –Database server 
 
System information policy– CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148) 
Services  
117 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 45 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 2 days 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 6 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current 
settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
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Appendix B14: A summary of missing service pack and patches, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations for the CoB-Web server  
 
Missing service pack (1) – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184) 
Product Filename Knowledge base Vulnerability issue Recommendation 
Virtual 
Studio 
VS80sp1-
KB926601-
X86-ENU.exe 
N/A Virtual Studio 2005 
service pack 1 
Deploy/patch 
 
Missing patches (3) – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS 
Windows 
N/A KB890830 MS Windows malicious 
software removal tool - 
April 2009 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
N/A N/A MS Windows IE 7 for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
SDK 
components 
Critical KB931906 MS07-028 security update 
for CAPICOM 
Deploy/patch asap 
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Appendix B15: A summary of missing service packs and patch, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations for the CoB-Database server  
 
Missing service packs (2) – CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148) 
Products Filenames Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
Visual 
Studio 
VS80sp1-
KB926601-X86-
ENU.exe 
N/A Visual Studio 2005 
service pack 1 
Deploy/patch  
Office OWC11SP3.CAB N/A MS Office 2003 service 
pack 3 
Deploy/patch 
 
Missing patch (1) – CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148) 
Product Severity Knowledge base Vulnerability issue Recommendation 
MS 
Windows 
N/A KB890830 MS Windows malicious 
software removal tool x64 
- April 2009 
Deploy/patch 
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Appendix B16: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoB-DMZ-Web server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (20) – CoB-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.121) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
25 SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, MS ESMTP 
6.0.3790.1830 
Close 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS webserver 
6.0 
Open 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC Open/close if not 
required 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS Session Service Close if not required 
443 HTTPS MS IIS webserver 6.0 Open 
445 MS-DS MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares, MS 
Windows 2003 
Open/close if not 
required 
554 RTSP Real-Time Streaming Protocol,  MS  Windows 
Media Server 9.1.1.5001 
Close if not required 
1025 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1040 NETSAINT Netsaint status daemon, If this service is not 
installed beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
1047 TROJAN remoteNC, If this service is not installed beware 
could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
1052 MSRPC MSMQ, If this service is not installed beware could 
be Trojan: Fire HacKer, Slapper 
Close if not required 
1056 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1057 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1080 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1720 H.323/Q.931 Interactive media Close if not required 
1755 WMS Windows media service Close if not required 
3389 MS-rdp MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service Open 
8400 CVP Commvault Unified Data Management Close if not required 
8402 Galaxy Galaxy Client Event Manager Close if not required 
8600 Asterix Surveillance Data Close if not required 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoB-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.121) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
67 DHCPs Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Server; also used by 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 
Close 
123 NTP Network Time Protocol Close 
137 NetBIOS -ns NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT netbios-
ssn 
Open/Close if not 
required 
138 NetBIOS -
dgm 
NetBIOS Datagram Service Close if not required 
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The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoB-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.121) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
161 SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol Close if not required 
445 MS-ds MS-DS SMB file sharing Open/close if not 
required 
500 isakmp Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol 
Close 
1755 WMS MS Media Services (MMS, ms-streaming) Close 
4500 nat-t-ike IPSec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947) Close 
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Appendix B17: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoB-Web server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (9) – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
25 SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, MS ESMTP 
6.0.3790.1830 
Close 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS webserver 
6.0 
Open 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC Open 
139 NetBIOS -
ssn 
NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and Printer 
Sharing 
Open 
445 MS-DS MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares Open/close if not 
required 
1025 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
3389 MS-RDP MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service Open 
8400 CVP Commvault Unified Data Management Close if not required 
8402 Galaxy Galaxy Client Event Manager Close if not required 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184) 
Port no. Services Descriptions,  Actions and products Recommendations 
123 NTP Network Time Protocol Close 
137 NetBIOS -ns NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT  Open/ Close if not 
required 
138 NetBIOS -
dgm 
NetBIOS Datagram Service Close 
161 SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol Close if not required 
445 MS-DS MS-DS SMB file sharing Open 
500 ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol 
Close 
3456 IISrpc-or-vat Also VAT default data; If this service is not 
installed beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
4128 RedShad If this service is not installed beware could be 
Trojan 
Close if not required 
4500 Nat-t-ike IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947) Close 
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Appendix B18: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoB-Database server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (10) – CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS webserver 
6.0 
Close if not required 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC Open 
139 NetBIOS -
SSN 
NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and Printer 
Sharing 
Open 
445 MS-DS MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares Open 
1037 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC; If 
this service is not installed beware could be 
Trojan: Arctic , Dosh, KWM, MoSucker 
Close if not required 
1433 MS-SQL-S MS SQL Server 2005 Open 
2383 MS-OLAP-4 MS OLAP Close if not required 
3389 MS-RDP MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service Open 
8400 CVP Commvault Unified Data Management Close if not required 
8402 Galaxy Galaxy Client Event Manager Close if not required 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148) 
Port no. Services Descriptions,  actions and products Recommendations 
123 NTP Network Time Protocol Close 
137 NetBIOS -NS NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT netbios-
ssn (workgroup: CoB-SHIRE) 
Open/Close if not 
required 
138 NetBIOS -
DGM 
NetBIOS Datagram Service Close 
161 SNMP Simple network management protocol Close if not required 
162 SNMP TRAP Simple network management protocol trap Close if not required 
445 MS-DS MS-DS SMB file sharing Open 
500 ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key 
Management Protocol 
Close 
1434 MS-SQL-M MS SQL Server database management system 
Monitor; MS SQL Server 9.00.4035.00 
Open 
4500 NAT-T-IKE IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947) Close 
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Appendix B19: A summary of Council B’s CoB-DMZ-Web server – the vulnerabilities 
and the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the council’s CoB-DMZ-Web 
server 
High security vulnerability (1) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other 
removable drives. 
 
Medium security vulnerabilities (3) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: Guest users have access to the 
application log 
Disable guest access by creating a DWORD key named 
"RestrictGuestAccess" with value of "1" 
(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/System/CurrentControlSet/Se
rvices/EventLog/Application) 
Registry: Guest users have access to the 
security log 
Disable guest access by creating a DWORD key named 
"RestrictGuestAccess" with value of "1" 
(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/System/CurrentControlSet/Se
rvices/EventLog/Security). 
Registry: Guest users have access to the 
system log 
Disable guest access by creating a DWORD key named 
"RestrictGuestAccess" with value of "1" 
(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/System/CurrentControlSet/Se
rvices/EventLog/System) 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (7) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Registry: Last logged-on username visible Should be disabled 
Services: Alerter service enabled Should be disabled 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: SMTP Disable SMTP service port 
Services: HTTPS No further action is required 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended to rename this account. 
Information: User WMUS_COB-
MANGANESE never logged on 
It is recommended to remove this account if not used. 
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Appendix B20: A summary of Council B’s CoB-Web server – the vulnerabilities and 
the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the council’s CoB-Web 
server 
High security vulnerability (1) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other 
removable drives. 
 
Medium security vulnerability (0) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (6) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Services: Alerter service enabled Should be disabled 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: SMTP Disable SMTP service port 
Web: IIS: Frontpage check Disable the Frontpage extensions which currently are 
installed on this computer. 
 
Potential vulnerability (1)  
Section: Type Recommendation 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended to rename this account. 
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Appendix B21: A summary of Council B’s CoB-Database server – the vulnerabilities 
and the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the council’s CoB-Database 
server 
High security vulnerability (1) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other 
removable drives. 
 
Medium security vulnerabilities (0) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (4) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Services: Alerter service enabled Should be disabled 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (2)  
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended to rename this account. 
Information: MS SQL Server No further action is required 
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Appendix B22: OS and network specification configuration 
 
OS and network specification configuration 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
1.1 Physical security Place the SQL server in an 
area where it will be 
physically secure. 
Satisfactory H 
1.2 Domain 
environment 
If the SQL Server is in a 
domain that is trusted by other 
domains, document the access 
granted by the trust. 
Satisfactory; only IT 
administrator groups are 
allowed to access the 
online backend database 
server. 
H 
1.3 SQL servers 
accessed via 
Internet 
If the SQL server is being 
accessed via the Internet, place 
the SQL Server inside a DMZ 
with the Web Server. 
Satisfactory; there is a 
frontend web (CoB-DMZ-
Web) server located in the 
DMZ. 
H 
1.4 SQL servers 
accessed via 
Internet 
Put a firewall between your 
server and the Internet. 
Block TCP port 1433 and 
UDP port 1434 on your 
perimeter firewall. If named 
instances are listening on 
additional ports, block those 
too. In a multi-tier 
environment, use multiple 
firewalls to create more secure 
screened subnets 
Satisfactory; the SQL 
server is located be hide 
the Internet firewall, and 
both TCP port 1433 and 
1434 are blocked from 
external access. 
H 
1.5 Encryption Implement SSL. Use the fully-
qualified DNS name of the 
frontend web server in the 
certificate to help prevent 
masquerading. 
Satisfactory; the frontend 
server uses SSL and fully 
qualified DNS name. 
H 
1.6 Test and 
development servers 
Maintain test and development 
servers on a separate network 
segment from the production 
servers. 
Not satisfactory; the test 
and development servers 
are on the same class B 
network. 
H 
1.7 Dedicated server Install SQL server on a 
computer that does not provide 
additional services, e.g., Web 
or mail services. 
Satisfactory; the SQL 
server is only for SQL 
database operation. 
M 
1.8 OS benchmark 
configuration 
Configure Windows 2003 
server level I benchmark 
settings with the following 
modifications: 
  
1.8.1 Windows accounts Make sure the Windows guest 
account is disabled. 
Satisfactory M 
1.8.2 Disk subsystem Use RAID for critical data 
files. 
Not satisfactory; 
VMware with SCSI hard 
disks. 
M 
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OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
1.8.3 Separate partitions Create separate partitions for 
OS/SQL program files, SQL 
data files, and SQL transaction 
logs. 
Not satisfactory; both 
SQL data files and 
transaction logs are located 
in different folders but in 
the same drive partition. 
M 
1.8.4 Volume / partition 
type 
Format all volumes with 
NTFS 
Satisfactory H 
1.9 Services Disable the following services 
on a SQL server machine 
  
1.9.1  Alerter Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
P 
1.9.2  Clipbook server Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.3  Computer browser Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.4  DHCP client Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.5  Distributed file system Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Manual. 
L 
1.9.6  Distributed transaction 
coordinator 
Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.7  Fax service Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.8  Internet connection sharing Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.9  IPSec policy agent Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.10  License logging Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.11  Logical disk manager 
administrative service 
Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic 
(this service is needed by 
the system administrator). 
L 
1.9.12  Messenger Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.13  NetMeeting remote desktop 
sharing 
Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.14  Network DDE Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.15  Network DDE DSDM Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.16  Print spooler Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.17  Remote access connection 
manager 
Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.18  Remote registry Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.19  Removable storage Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.20  RunAs service Satisfactory;  (disabled) M 
1.9.21  Smart card Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.22  Smart card helper Satisfactory;  (disabled) P 
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 OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
1.9.23  Task scheduler Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
P 
1.9.24  Telephony Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
P 
1.9.25  Telnet Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.26  Windows installer Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.10 MSSQL server 
service account 
Use a low-privileged local or 
Domain account for the MS 
SQL server service. 
Satisfactory M 
1.11 SQL server agent 
service account 
Use a low-privileged domain 
account for SQL server agent 
if replication, DTS, or other 
inter-server connection is 
required. 
Satisfactory M 
1.12 Local users group 
membership 
Assign the local service 
account as a member of only 
the users group. 
Not satisfactory; there is 
no assigned user in the 
“Users” group. 
M 
1.13 Domain service 
account group 
membership 
Make a domain service 
account a member of only 
non-privileged groups. 
N/A; the current 
configuration does not use 
the domain service account 
group. 
M 
1.14 SQL server service 
account rights 
Grant the SQL server service 
account(s) the following 
rights: 
N/A; there is no SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Act as part of the OS.  L 
  Log on as a batch job  L 
  Replace a process-level token  L 
  Bypass traverse checking  L 
  Adjust memory quotas for a 
process 
 M 
  Permission to start SQL server 
active directory helper 
 L 
  Permission to start SQL writer  M 
1.15 SQL server agent 
service account 
rights 
Grant the SQL server agent 
service account(s) the 
following rights: 
N/A; there is no SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Act as part of the OS  L 
  Log on as a batch job  L 
  Replace a process-level token  L 
  Bypass traverse checking  L 
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OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
  Adjust memory quotas for a 
process 
 M 
1.16 Integration service 
account rights 
Grant the integration service 
account(s) the following 
rights: 
N/A; there is no SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Permission to write to the 
application event log 
 L 
  Bypass traverse checking  L 
  Create global objects  M 
  Impersonate a client after 
authentication 
 L 
1.17 SQL server services 
account rights 
Deny the service account the 
“Log on locally” right. 
Satisfactory M 
1.18 SQL server services 
account rights 
If a service account is a 
domain account, configure the 
account to have the Windows 
permission “Log on To” the 
database server only. 
Not satisfactory; currently 
the domain/sqladmin 
account can log on to all 
computers. 
M 
1.19.1 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Create dedicated user accounts 
specifically for proxies, and 
only use these proxy user 
accounts for running job steps. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
1.19.2 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Only grant the necessary 
permissions to proxy user 
accounts. Grant only those 
permissions actually required 
to run the job steps that are 
assigned to a given proxy 
account. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
1.19.3 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Do not run the SQL server 
agent service under a MS 
Windows account that is a 
member of the Windows 
administrators group. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
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MS SQL server installation and patches audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
2.1 SQL server install 
platform 
Avoid installing SQL server 
on a domain controller. 
Satisfactory   M 
2.2 Patches and hotfixes Ensure the current SQL 
server service pack and 
hotfixes are installed. 
Satisfactory; currently 
updating both service pack 
and critical hotfixes every 
three months 
H 
2.3 SQL server ports Change SQL server default 
ports from 1433 and 1434. 
Satisfactory  H 
2.4 Naming conventions In naming SQL Server 
instances, limit the instance 
name to less than 16 
characters with no reference 
to a version number or other 
sensitive information. 
Satisfactory; currently the 
name is less than 16 
characters (11). 
L 
2.5 SQL server instances Keep an inventory of all 
versions, editions and 
languages of SQL Server. 
Not satisfactory; there is 
no inventory process. 
P 
2.6 Authentication mode Select Windows 
authentication mode. 
Not satisfactory; currently 
the council uses both 
Windows and SQL server 
authentication modes. 
M 
2.7 Rename sa account The “sa” account should be 
renamed to something that is 
not easily identifiable as the 
“sa” account. 
ALTER LOGIN sa WITH 
NAME = <new name> 
Not satisfactory; the 
council uses the default 
account (sa). 
M 
2.8 Strong password Use a strong password for 
the “sa” login account. 
Satisfactory M 
2.9 Sample databases Do not install the sample 
databases. Delete all sample 
databases if they already 
exist. 
Satisfactory; there is no 
sample database installed. 
L 
2.10 Initialisation 
parameter 
C2 Audit Mode– set to 1 if 
no custom defined audit trace 
is enabled 
Satisfactory; the current 
setup is 1. 
P 
2.11 Initialisation 
parameter 
Remote Access– set to 0 
unless replication is being 
used or the requirement is 
justified 
Not satisfactory (the 
current setup is 1). 
M 
2.12 Initialisation 
parameter 
Scan for Startup Procedures– 
set to 0 unless justified 
Satisfactory; the current 
setup is 0. 
L 
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MS SQL server setting audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
3.1 SQL server 
configuration 
manager 
Disable the “Named Pipes” 
network protocol. 
Not satisfactory L 
3.2 SQL server 
properties 
The following settings are 
recommended: 
  
3.2.1 Auto restart SQL 
server 
Set the SQL server service start 
mode to “Automatic” 
Satisfactory L 
3.2.2 Auto restart SQL 
server agent 
If the SQL server agent is 
required, set the “SQL server 
agent” start mode to “Automatic”. 
Satisfactory L 
3.2.3 Distributed 
transaction 
coordinator 
Set the “distributed transaction 
coordinator” service start mode to 
“Disabled” if this service is not 
required. 
N/A L 
3.2.4 Cross database-
ownership chaining 
Disable the 
cross_db_ownership_chaining 
option. 
Satisfactory M 
3.2.5 Advanced server 
settings 
Do not enable direct modifications 
to the system catalogs. 
N/A M 
3.2.6 Backup/restore from 
tape timeout 
Set the backup/restore from tape 
timeout period to “Try for 5 
minutes” 
Not satisfactory; 
currently set to “Wait 
Indefinitely” 
L 
3.2.7 Media retention Set the default backup media 
retention to the minimum number 
of days needed to retain a full 
backup of the database. Ideally, 
this should be as high as your 
resources permit. 
Not satisfactory 
(currently set to 0.) 
L 
3.3 Data directory The default data directory should 
be a dedicated data partition 
Not satisfactory; 
(c:\programfiles\micr
osoft SQL 
server\mssql\data) 
M 
3.4 Data directory The default log directory should be 
a dedicated partition separate from 
all programs and data 
Not satisfactory; 
(c:\programfiles\micr
osoft SQL 
server\mssql\logs) 
M 
3.5 Replication Do not enable replication. N/A L 
3.6 Other SQL server 
configuration 
options 
Set the number of logs retained 
based on the maximum number of 
restarts and log cyclings which 
may occur within your desired log 
retention window. The default 
value of 6 may be too low for 
many installations. 
Satisfactory; the 
default is 6. 
P 
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MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
3.7 Database mail Disable database mail where 
messaging is not required. 
Satisfactory L 
3.8 Trace messages Error log/include execution trace 
messages = off 
Satisfactory P 
3.9 User-defined stored 
procedures 
Ensure that all user-defined 
stored procedures are stored in 
encrypted format. 
Not satisfactory; 
stored in unencrypted 
format. 
H 
3.10 User-defined 
extended stored 
procedures 
Avoid using user-defined 
extended stored procedures. If 
extended functionality is 
required, use Common 
Language Runtime (CLR) 
assemblies instead. 
Not installed L 
3.11 Extended stored 
procedures 
Disable access to the following 
extended stored procedures: 
  
3.11.1  xp_available media Satisfactory L 
3.11.2  xp_cmdshell Satisfactory L 
3.11.3  xp_dirtree Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.4  xp_dsninfo Satisfactory P 
3.11.5  xp_enumdsn Satisfactory P 
3.11.6  xp_enumerrorlogs Satisfactory P 
3.11.7  xp_enumgroups Satisfactory P 
3.11.8  xp_eventlog Satisfactory P 
3.11.9  xp_fixeddrives Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.10  xp_getfiledetails Satisfactory P 
3.11.11  xp_getnetname Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.12  xp_logevent Satisfactory P 
3.11.13  xp_loginconfig Satisfactory P 
3.11.14  xp_msver Satisfactory P 
3.11.15  xp_readerrorlog Satisfactory P 
3.11.16  xp_servicecontrol Satisfactory P 
3.11.17  xp_sprintf Satisfactory P 
3.11.18  xp_sscanf Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.19  xp_subdirs Satisfactory P 
3.12 SQLmail extended 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
SQLMail extended stored 
procedures: 
  
3.12.1  xp_deletemail Satisfactory P 
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 MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
3.12.2  xp_findnextmsg Satisfactory P 
3.12.3  xp_get_mapi_default_profile Satisfactory P 
3.12.4  xp_get_mapi_profiles Satisfactory P 
3.12.5  xp_readmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.6  xp_sendmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.7  xp_startmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.8  xp_stopmail Satisfactory P 
3.13 WebTask extended 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
WebTask extended stored 
procedures. Delete the 
xpweb70.dll file that implements 
the following WebTask extended 
stored procedures: 
  
3.13.1  xp_cleanupwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.13.2  xp_convertwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.13.3  xp_dropwebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.4  xp_enumcodepages Satisfactory  P 
3.13.5  xp_makewebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.6  xp_readwebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.7  xp_runwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.14 OLE automation 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
OLE automation stored 
procedures: 
  
3.14.1  sp_OACreate Satisfactory  L 
3.14.2  sp_OADestroy Satisfactory L 
3.14.3  sp_OAGetErrorInfo Satisfactory  L 
3.14.4  sp_OAGetProperty Satisfactory L 
3.14.5  sp_OAMethod Satisfactory  L 
3.14.6  sp_OASetProperty Satisfactory L 
3.14.7  sp_OAStop Satisfactory L 
3.15 Registry access 
extended stored 
procedures 
Disable access to the following 
registry access extended stored 
procedures: 
  
3.15.1  xp_regaddmultistring Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.2  xp_regdeletekey Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.3  xp_regdeletevalue Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.4  xp_regenumvalues Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
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MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
3.15.5  xp_regremovemultistring Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.6  xp_regwrite Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.16 Advanced setting SQL server event 
forwarding/forward events to a 
different server = off 
Satisfactory; (off). L 
3.17 SQL server browser 
service 
Disable SQL server browser 
service 
Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
L 
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MS SQL server access controls audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
4.1 Permissions on OS 
tools 
Restrict access to the 
executables in the System32 
directory e.g. Explorer.exe and 
cmd.exe. 
Not satisfactory; 
administrator has full 
control, Power users set 
to modify, and user 
group set to execute. 
H 
4.2 SQL server install 
directory 
permissions 
Modify the permissions to the 
[Drive]:\Program 
Files\Microsoft SQL server 
directory. 
Not satisfactory; 
currently the council’s 
local administrator and 
user groups and is 
allowed. 
H 
4.3 SQL server database 
instance directory 
permissions 
Delete or secure old setup files. 
Protect files in the <system 
drive>:\Program 
Files\Microsoft SQL 
Server\MSSQL.X\MSSQL\Inst
all, e.g., sqlstp.log, sqlsp.log 
and setup.iss. “X” represents 
the installations of various SQL 
server installs due to the fact 
that multiple instances of SQL 
server or SQL express can be 
installed. 
Satisfactory; access to 
the current install folder 
is allowed for the system 
administrator groups 
only. 
M 
4.4 Assigning system 
administrators role 
When assigning database 
administrators to the system 
administrators role, map their 
Windows accounts to SQL 
logins, and then assign them to 
the role. 
Satisfactory M 
4.5 SQL logins Remove the default 
BUILTIN\administrators SQL 
login. 
Not satisfactory; the 
BUILTIN\administrators 
SQL login is still exits. 
M 
4.6 SQL logins Ensure that all SQL logins have 
strong passwords. 
Satisfactory M 
4.7 OS guests access Deny database login for the 
guests OS group. 
Satisfactory H 
4.8 Fixed server roles Only use the fixed server roles 
sysadmin, server admin, setup 
admin etc, to support DBA 
activity. 
Satisfactory L 
4.9 SQL server database 
users and roles 
Remove the guest user from all 
databases except master and 
tempdb. 
Not satisfactory; the 
guest user stills exist. 
M 
4.10 Statement 
permissions 
Grant DDL statement 
permissions to only the 
database and schema owner, 
not individual users. 
Satisfactory M 
4.11 Database owners 
permissions 
Ensure dbo owns all user-
created database schemas 
Not satisfactory L 
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MS SQL server access controls audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
4.12 Low-privileged 
users 
Do not grant object permissions 
to PUBLIC or GUEST. 
N/A M 
4.13 Stored procedure 
permissions 
Grant executes permissions on 
stored procedures to database 
roles (not users). 
Satisfactory M 
4.14 Using the GRANT 
option 
Do not assign the GRANT 
option of object permission to a 
user or role. 
N/A M 
4.15 SQL server agent 
subsystem privileges 
Restrict proxy access to 
required/approved subsystems. 
N/A; no proxy access. M 
4.16 User-defined 
database roles 
Create user-defined database 
roles to assign permissions to 
objects in the database when a 
pre-defined database role does 
not supply the appropriate 
permissions to a group of users. 
N/A; no user defined 
database roles. 
M 
4.17 Database roles Avoid nesting database roles. Satisfactory M 
4.18 Users and roles Ensure that the members of the 
roles (users/groups/other roles) 
in the target database actually 
exist. 
Satisfactory L 
4.19 Application roles Use application roles to limit 
access to data to users of 
specific applications. Use 
encryption to protect the role 
name and password in the 
connection string. Use 
“EXECUTE AS WITH NO 
REVERT” or “WITH 
COOKIE” to allow individuals 
to access the application 
without knowing the password. 
N/A M 
4.20 Use of predefined 
roles 
Avoid assigning predefined 
roles to PUBLIC or GUEST. 
N/A; no predefined roles 
created. 
L 
4.21 Linked or remote 
servers 
Use linked servers rather than 
remote servers where required. 
Remove any unused linked 
servers or disable this feature. 
N/A L 
4.22 Linked or remote 
servers 
Configure linked or remote 
servers to use Windows 
authentication where required. 
Disable linked servers 
otherwise. 
Not satisfactory; 
currently the council 
uses both windows and 
SQL authentications. 
M 
4.23 Linked server logins Allow linked server access only 
to those logins that need it. 
Disable linked servers 
otherwise. 
Satisfactory M 
4.24 Ad Hoc data access Disable ad hoc data access on 
all providers for all users except 
members of the sysadmin fixed 
role. 
N/A L 
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MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
5.1 Auditing – general Prepare a schedule for 
reviewing audit information 
regularly. 
Not satisfactory; currently 
there is no auditing 
schedule. 
P 
5.2 SQL server 
properties – security 
tab 
Through the SQL server 
management studio, enable 
auditing for SQL server. 
Satisfactory P 
5.3 SQL server logs SQL server audit data must be 
protected from loss. The SQL 
server and SQL server agent 
logs must be backed up before 
they are overwritten. 
Satisfactory; the default 
setup is 6. 
P 
5.4 SQL profiler Use SQL profiler to generate 
and manage audit trails. 
Satisfactory P 
5.5 Profiler events Capture the following events 
using SQL profiler 
  
  Event   
5.5.1  Audit add DB user event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.2  Audit add login to server Role Not satisfactory P 
5.5.3  Audit add member to DB role Not satisfactory P 
5.5.4  Audit add role event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.5  Audit addlogin event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.6  Audit app role change 
password 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.7  Audit backup/restore Not satisfactory P 
5.5.8  Audit broker conversation Not satisfactory P 
5.5.9  Audit broker login Not satisfactory P 
5.5.10  Audit change audit Not satisfactory P 
5.5.11  Audit change database owner Not satisfactory P 
5.5.12  Audit DBCC Not satisfactory P 
5.5.13  Audit database management Not satisfactory P 
5.5.14  Audit database object access Not satisfactory P 
5.5.15  Audit database object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.16  Audit database object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.17  Audit database object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.18  Audit database operation Not satisfactory P 
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MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
5.5.19  Audit database principal 
impersonation 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.20  Audit database principal 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.21  Audit database scope GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.22  Audit login change password Not satisfactory P 
5.5.23  Audit login change property Not satisfactory P 
5.5.24  Audit login Not satisfactory P 
5.5.25  Audit login failed Not satisfactory P 
5.5.26  Audit login GDR event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.27  Audit logout Not satisfactory P 
5.5.28  Audit object derived 
permission event 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.29  Audit schema object access Not satisfactory P 
5.5.30  Audit schema object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.31  Audit schema object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.32  Audit schema object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.33  Audit server alter trace Not satisfactory P 
5.5.34  Audit server object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.35  Audit server object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.36  Audit server object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.37  Audit server operation Not satisfactory P 
5.5.38  Audit server principal 
impersonation 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.39  Audit server principal 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.40  Audit server scope GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.41  Audit server starts and stops Not satisfactory P 
5.5.42  Audit statement permission 
event 
Not satisfactory P 
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MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration items Action / recommended 
Parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
6.1 Backups – general Use full database backups 
combined with differential or 
transaction log backups to 
restore the database to a 
specific point in time. 
Satisfactory; currently the 
council’s backup is done 
nightly. 
M 
6.2 System databases It is important to include the 
system databases in your 
backup plan i.e. the master, 
msdb and model databases. 
Satisfactory M 
6.3 Backing up master 
database 
Backup the master database 
when any of the following 
events occur: 
 A database is created or 
deleted 
  Login accounts are created, 
deleted or modified 
Server-wide or database 
settings are modified 
Satisfactory M 
6.4 Backing up MSDB 
database 
Backup the msdb database 
when any of the following 
events occur: 
Alerts, jobs, schedules or 
operators are created, deleted 
or modified 
Satisfactory M 
6.5 Backup media Password protects the backup 
media. 
Satisfactory H 
6.6 Access to backup files Restrict access to the backup 
files to system administrators. 
Satisfactory H 
6.7 Access to backup files Restrict restore permissions to 
DBAs 
Satisfactory; currently, 
only the system 
administrator group can 
restore the backup files. 
H 
6.8 Recommended 
periodic 
administrative 
procedures 
Run the MS baseline security 
analyser weekly and follow 
the security recommendations 
as closely as possible to 
secure the OS. 
Satisfactory; the MS 
baseline security analyser 
is in use. 
L 
6.9 Recommended 
periodic 
administrative 
procedures 
Run the SQL best practices 
analyser regularly and note 
any changes to the 
environment. 
Satisfactory; the SQL best 
practices analyser is in use. 
L 
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MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration items Action / recommended 
Parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
6.10 Enable password 
policy enforcement 
When a password change 
mechanism is introduced into 
clients and applications; 
enable password expiration. 
Always specify 
MUST_CHANGE when 
specifying a password on 
behalf of another principal. 
Not satisfactory; no 
enforce password policy 
M 
6.11 Periodic scan of role 
members 
Periodically scan fixed server 
and database roles to ensure 
that only trusted individuals 
are members. 
Not satisfactory; 
currently, there are only a 
few users. Periodic scan 
may is recommended when 
number of users increases. 
L 
6.12 Periodic scan of 
stored procedures 
Verify stored procedures that 
have been set to AutoStart are 
secure. 
Not satisfactory; no 
AutoStart enabled. 
P 
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Appendix B28: Application development best practices  
 
Application development best practices 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended 
Parameters 
Council B Risk 
levels 
8.1 Ownership chaining Use ownership chaining within 
a single database to simplify 
permissions management. 
Not satisfactory  M 
8.2 Role assignments Assign permissions to roles 
rather than users. The principle 
of “Least Privilege” applies, 
thus users should not be given 
access to roles they do not need 
for their job function. 
Satisfactory M 
8.3 Encrypted 
connections 
Enable encrypted connections 
between the user and the 
database server. 
Not satisfactory; no 
encrypted connections 
between the user and the 
CoB-Database server. 
H 
8.4 Error handling Do not propagate errors back to 
the user. 
Satisfactory P 
8.5 User input Prevent SQL injection by 
validating all user input before 
transmitting it to the database 
server. 
Satisfactory H 
8.6 Developer awareness Increase awareness of issues 
such as cross-site scripting, 
buffer overflows, SQL injection 
and dangerous APIs. 
Satisfactory L 
8.7 Developer awareness Identify categories of threats 
that apply to your application, 
such as denial of service, 
escalation of privileges, 
spoofing, data tampering, 
information disclosure and 
repudiation. 
Satisfactory L 
8.8 Security reviews Add security reviews to all 
stages of the application 
development lifecycle (from 
design to testing). 
Satisfactory L 
8.9 Distributing 
SQLEXPRESS 
If you distribute 
SQLEXPRESS, install 
SQLEXPRESS using Windows 
security mode as the default. 
N/A L 
8.10 Net-Libraries If SQLEXPRESS will operate 
as a local data store, disable any 
unnecessary client protocols. 
N/A L 
8.11 Customer awareness Let your customers know that 
your product includes 
SQLEXPRESS so that they can 
be prepared to install or accept 
SQLEXPRESS -specific 
software updates. 
N/A L 
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Appendix B29: Surface area configuration tool audit details 
 
Surface area configuration tool audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended parameters Council B Risk 
levels 
9.1 Ad Hoc Remote 
Queries 
Disable Ad Hoc Remote Queries 
where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.2 CLR integration Disable CLR integration where not 
required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.3 DAC Disable the remote dedicated 
administrator connection where not 
required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.4 Database mail Disable database mail where 
messaging is not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.5 Native XML web 
services 
Do not configure XML web services 
endpoints where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.6 OLE automation Disable OLE automation where not 
required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.7 Service broker Do not configure service broker 
endpoints where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.8 SQL mail Do not enable SQL mail where not 
required or where database mail 
could be used instead. 
Satisfactory L 
9.9 Web assistant Disable web assistant where not 
required. 
Satisfactory P 
9.10 xp_cmdshell Disable the xp_cmdshell stored 
procedure where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.11 Ad Hoc data 
mining 
Disable ad hoc data mining queries 
where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.12 Anonymous 
connections 
Disable anonymous connections to 
the analysis services where not 
required. 
Satisfactory M 
9.13 Linked objects “Enable links to other instances” 
should be disabled where not 
required. 
Not satisfactory L 
9.14 Linked objects “Enable links from other instances” 
should be disabled. where not 
required. 
Not satisfactory L 
9.15 User-defined 
functions 
Disable loading of user-defined 
COM functions where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.16 Scheduled events 
and report delivery 
Disable scheduled events and report 
delivery where not required. 
Not satisfactory P 
9.17 Web service and 
HTTP access 
Disable web service and HTTP 
access where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.18 Windows integrated 
security 
Enable Windows integrated security 
for report data source connections. 
Not satisfactory M 
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Appendix B30: Council B’s information security policy 
 
Protocol Name: Online Services Usage Protocol 
Keywords Acceptable use, prohibited use, email and Internet, data confidentiality, logon 
accounts, passwords, electronic fax 
Protocol This Protocol provides guidance on the acceptable business use and 
incidental personal use when using the City’s online services to ensure that 
the services are used in an appropriate and professional manner. It also 
provides guidance on the use of logon accounts, passwords and email 
etiquette.   
 
The purpose of this Protocol is to safeguard the City as well as individuals 
from the misuse of the City’s email, Internet and electronic fax 
communications systems.   
 
Any queries regarding this Protocol should be directed to the Manager IT on 
Ext xxxx. 
 
Related policies (Council/City) Code of Conduct Policy 4-1 
Records Management Policy 8-4 
Related documentation (Plans/Legislative 
Authority) 
Your Record Keeping Responsibilities 
State and Commonwealth legislation including but not 
limited to: 
State Records Act – 2000 
Freedom of Information Act 1992 
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 
Copyright Act 1968 
Public Service Regulations 1968 
Criminal Code – Section 85 
Protocol/procedure owner Manager IT 
Last reviewed September 2009 
Flowchart  
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PROTOCOL PROCEDURE 
 
Protocol name: Online Services Usage Protocol 
 
Objectives 
 
This Protocol has been developed to: 
 
 Maintain and protect the availability, reliability, confidentiality, integrity and 
security of all networked systems and related data from risk or inappropriate use;  
 To ensure the City’s internal computer network and related systems are used in 
an appropriate manner consistent with business needs and best practice; 
 To define acceptable and unacceptable use of the City’s online services; and 
 To educate users about their responsibilities.   
 
Scope 
 
The Online Services Usage Protocol applies to: 
 
 All employees of the City; and 
 The use of the Council network and related systems, including Internet, email 
and electronic fax.   
 
Employee responsibilities 
 
When using City information systems, officers are expected to be aware of their 
responsibilities to: 
 
 Comply with all legislative and administrative requirements; 
 Ensure any action taken serves to enhance the services of the City and will not 
bring the City into disrepute; 
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 Be informed of all security requirements and risks related to the use of Internet 
and email facilities and ensure that the facilities are not compromised by their 
actions; and 
 Seek advice if they are unsure of what is required. 
 
Non-compliance with the Online Services Usage Protocol 
 
Non-compliance with this protocol may result in loss of access privileges or disciplinary 
action and will be subject to the provisions of Policy 4-1 - Code of Conduct and the 
Corporate Protocol – Managing Employee Relations Issues or provisions of other 
relevant State or Commonwealth legislation. Directors and Managers are responsible for 
Business Unit compliance with this protocol.   
 
Acceptable use 
 
The City’s network and related systems are provided primarily for conducting the City’s 
business or directly related to the mission, charter or work tasks of the City. Users are 
expected to treat systems with due care and ensure that all communications are 
professional and respectful to others.   
 
New employees agree to the Online Services Usage Protocol at Induction when they 
sign a copy of this document and all employees agree to the Protocol on each occasion 
they log in.    
 
Prohibited uses  
 
Prohibited uses include: 
 
 A use which is in breach of the law; 
 A use which is in breach of the City’s Code of Conduct;   
 Personal gain or for profit, including private business, commercial activity, 
advertising or gambling; 
 Unauthorised copy or transmission of copyright material; 
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 Accessing or distributing material or emails which may be illegal, offensive, 
threatening or harassing to others or discriminatory on the basis of race, religion, 
political beliefs, sexual orientation, physical features or age;   
 Deliberately accessing material perceived as indecent, obscene or pornographic; 
 Misrepresentation of persons without the expressed consent of those other 
persons; 
 Breaching confidentiality; 
 Political lobbying; 
 Unauthorised use, release or destruction of corporate records; 
 Unauthorised access to or use of systems; 
 Downloading unauthorised software; 
 Downloading large files containing picture images, live pictures or graphics 
which increases the load on the network or slows down the system for other 
uses. This includes: 
o Computer games  
o Music files 
o Radio or television stations broadcasting via the Internet; 
 Non-compliance with or deliberate avoidance of the City’s procedures for 
filtering of viruses, malware or otherwise filtered content;   
 Use of Internet services to interfere with or disrupt network users, services or 
equipment; 
 Use of Internet services to develop programs designed to harass other users or 
infiltrate a computer system, and/or damage or alter the software components, 
e.g. implant viruses; 
 Use for fundraising or public relations activities not specifically related to the 
City’s activities; 
 Subscriptions to electronic newsletters that are not related to work or 
professional development; 
 Spending excessive time on personal usage which impacts on completion of an 
employee’s work; and 
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 Distributing chain letters or spam. 
 
Where a genuine reason exists to access sites that would normally be regarded as 
inappropriate, Managers are required to nominate the staff members requiring access 
and written authorisation by the relevant Director is required before access will be 
given. 
 
Personal use 
 
Incidental personal use of online services, including email, Internet and electronic faxes, 
is permitted so long as it does not interfere with work, is not detrimental to the City’s 
business, does not involve unethical behaviour and does not involve any of the 
prohibited uses listed above. Communications relating to professional development are 
permitted.   
 
All Internet use, whether on City business or personal use, is subject to content filtering 
that restricts access to illegal or otherwise undesirable or unapproved content. Personal 
use is entirely at the risk of the individual staff member. 
 
Monitoring of emails, Internet use, electronic faxes and business records 
 
All activities on the network may be monitored or recorded to protect the City from 
potential consequences that may occur through misuse. Users consent to monitoring 
when they agree to the Online Services Usage Protocol. The City maintains a log of 
Internet and email access transactions for all users and examines unusual usage patterns. 
The City is able to determine the sites visited and the times they were accessed. The 
City has the right to review, audit, intercept, access and disclose all activities received 
or sent via the Internet or email.   
 
All incoming and outgoing email is retained in an archive, which is separate from the 
Record Keeping system. All archived email is potentially subject to a legal discovery 
order (providing records for court proceedings) or similar forms of legal process. 
 
The CEO, Directors and Managers may determine what is regarded as appropriate use 
of the Internet or email and may restrict, suspend or close a user at any time.   
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Access to business records 
 
The City respects the rights of employees to privacy, however, reserves the right to 
access business records created by all employees and to investigate any suspected 
improper conduct on the part of an employee. Officers authorised by the CEO may 
investigate alleged breaches of the City’s Code of Conduct.   
 
Mailbox privacy 
 
Access to another user’s email account without the user’s permission or the 
authorisation of a Manager is not permitted. Only officers from IT are permitted to 
access individual email boxes and only if: 
 
 A request is formally logged via the IT Service Desk Request; 
 The mailbox owner makes the request; or 
 The written request is signed by a Manager, Director or the CEO stating the 
reason for the request. Each request will be judged on its merits and further 
justification may be requested by the Manager IT if there are any doubts to the 
validity of the request. 
 
Where the requests for access arise from statutory obligations, legal discovery orders or 
similar legal obligations, the request will be complied with. Access by IT staff will be 
for the duration of the requested task only.   
 
Confidentiality 
 
Information on the City’s systems is for the purposes of conducting the City’s business 
and must not be disclosed to third parties. (See the Protocol on Data Privacy).  
 
Corporate records 
 
Email and electronic fax communications are subject to the same legal, privacy, records 
management and Freedom of Information obligations as a letter, memo or report.  Users 
should: 
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 Ensure that all content in emails and faxes is expressed in a professional manner; 
and 
 Ensure that emails and electronic faxes which are considered corporate records 
are stored to the City’s Records Management System. Refer to Your Record 
Keeping Responsibilities. 
 
Other legal obligations 
 
There is a range of legislation which applies to users of information systems, designed 
to promote compliance with record keeping and copyright provisions, and to restrict 
illegal practices and the availability of inappropriate material. These include but are not 
restricted to the: 
 
 State Records Act – 2000; 
 Freedom of Information Act 1992; 
 Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000; 
 Copyright Act 1968; 
 Public Service Regulations 1968; and 
 Criminal Code – Section 85. 
 
The Council and the user can be held liable for illegal activities, such as breaches of 
copyright or licensing agreements, disclosing confidential information, sending 
libellous, defamatory, offensive or racist content in emails and accessing inappropriate 
material. Staff members must at all times comply with their legal obligations under 
relevant legislation. Any unauthorised access or attempted access of any 
Commonwealth or state computing and/or network system or violation of Australian 
Commonwealth or State laws is subject to criminal prosecution.   
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SCHEDULE 1 – ELECTRONIC MAIL ETIQUETTE 
 
 
 
Schedule 1 presents some general guidelines for electronic mail etiquette.   
 
 Check emails regularly, at least daily; 
 Reply to emails promptly in accordance with the Customer Service Charter; 
 Check the calendar function of Outlook daily; 
 Maintain the Inbox, Sent Items and Deleted Items. Delete unwanted items 
regularly to maintain available system space; 
 Store emails which contain corporate records to the Records Management 
System; 
 Ensure that an Out of Office message is set up for periods of absence or leave.  
Under exceptional circumstances a Business Unit Manager may request IT to 
activate an Out of Office message if a staff member has unplanned leave for a 
significant period of time, e.g. sickness; 
 Staff are responsible for managing delegated access to their mailbox by other 
users;  
 Avoid sending emails to the group CoB All Staff. If the matter relates to City 
business it is recommended that a News Item on the intranet is published. This 
reduces email traffic;   
 Avoid sending internal emails with large attachments as this may slow down the 
network. It is better to place the attachment on the Intranet and use a link in an 
email or in a News Item;   
 Emails which exceed 20 megabytes in size will be blocked from being 
transmitted to external recipients. Consult the IT Service Desk for assistance in 
these instances. Note that an external email recipient’s system may not 
necessarily be able to receive large emails;  
 Do not use emails instead of formal contracts or agreements because of the 
potential for forgery or misrepresentation. Note that emails are considered 
written records and are legally binding; and 
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 Ensure that emails have a confidentiality note in the signature block as set out 
below. 
 
Email signatures 
 
All email text should be black with no backgrounds or wallpapers.  The signature block 
should be set in your email options so that it will be used by default on all emails.  
(Refer to the Intranet - How do I?) 
 
GivenName FamilyName    - 10 point Arial, bold 
Position or Title     - 10 point Arial, normal 
Council B     - 10 point Arial, normal 
 
Tel: 08 9xxx xxxx      - 8 point Arial, normal 
Mobile: 0xxx xxx xxx    - 8 point Arial, normal 
Fax: 08 9xxx xxxx     - 8 point Arial, normal 
Email:givenname.familyname@CouncilB.wa.gov.au  - 8 point Arial, normal 
 
Council B 
The information contained in this communication may be confidential or commercially sensitive.  If you are not the 
intended recipient you must not copy this communication, disclose its contents to any other party, or take any action in 
reliance on it.  Please delete and destroy all copies and immediately notify the sender on 9xxx xxxx, or by reply message. 
 
Logon accounts and passwords 
 
 A logon and password is created following an authorised New User Request 
(See How Do I – Forms.) Users are provided with a secure temporary password 
which they are forced to change immediately upon next login; 
 Expired accounts require an authorised New User Request before they will be 
reactivated; 
 Each user requires his/her own log on and password to use the City’s network 
and all systems. This is to prevent unauthorised access and to facilitate 
confidentiality and security of all networked systems and related data;   
 Logon accounts are the means to validate a user’s identity to access the City’s 
network or application systems; 
 Logon accounts are derived from a unique combination of the user’s first name 
and initial characters of their surname; 
 Shared workstations, e.g. workstation used for the issuing of books in libraries 
or handling customer enquiries are given a generic logon which reflects the 
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function. Access through generic logons to fileservers, email and corporate 
applications are restricted to functions that do not require user accountability or 
security network security; 
 Users maintain their own passwords; 
 Avoid keeping a paper copy of passwords; 
 Temporary passwords provided when users forget or lock their password 
account will only be supplied following positive identification of the user;  
 Passwords are not to be divulged to third parties and details are not to be 
provided to other users to enable their use of a specific application;   
 Change passwords when there is an indication of possible system or password 
compromise; and 
 Passwords must comply with system enforced password rules.These rules are 
displayed when prompted by the system to change your password.   
 
Closing down and locking the workstation 
 
 The PC automatically locks following a period of inactivity; 
 It is the responsibility of all system users to ensure that they activate the 
workstation locking mechanism before leaving their desks using the 
CTRL+Alt+Delete keys to ensure the PC is secure while unattended; and 
 Users should shut down the PC at the close of each business day. 
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Appendix C: Additional results for Chapter 6 
 
Appendix C1: A summary of the firewall configuration codes (email-NAT) of Council 
C’s firewall 
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol 
types 
From (source) To 
(destination) 
Ports 
(service) 
1 MIP (mapped 
IP) 
TCP Webrootservices A.B.C.37 SMTP 
2 MIP TCP Any A.B.C.37 SMTP 
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Appendix C2: A summary of the firewall configuration codes of Council C’s email 
system 
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol 
types 
From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 Translate Address ISA-Exchange A.B.C.184 N/A 
2 Translate Address BDC-1 10.1.1.150 N/A 
3 Translate Address BDC-2 10.1.1.210 N/A 
4 Translate Address Exchange-gate1 10.1.15.154 N/A 
5 Translate Address Exchange-gate2 10.1.1.3 N/A 
6 Add Address BDC-1 Domaincon N/A 
7 Add Address BDC-2 Domaincon N/A 
8 Permit TCP Exchange-gate1 Any SMTP 
9 Permit TCP ISA-Exchange Exchange-gate1 HTTPS 
10 Permit TCP Any ISA-Exchange HTTPS 
11 Inspect TCP Any ISA-Exchange HTTPS 
12 Permit TCP/UDP ISA-Exchange Domaincon DNS 
13 Permit TCP ISA-Exchange Domaincon LDAP (389) 
14 Permit UDP ISA_Exchange Domaincontrollers Radius (1812, 
1813) 
15 Permit UDP ISA_Exchange Domaincontrollers Radius (1812, 
1813) 
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Appendix C3: A full details of system information policy results of Council C’s email 
server 
 
System information policy – exchange.coc.wa.gov.au (10.1.15.154) 
Services  
157 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length: 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age: 91 days 30 days 
Minimum password age: 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff:  Never force Force 
Password history:  8 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current settings) 
Failure 
(current 
settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account logon 
events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit logon events Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object access No No Yes Yes 
Audit policy change No No Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No No Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system events No No Yes Yes 
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Appendix C4: A summary of both missing service pack and patches information of 
Council C’s email server 
 
Missing service pack (1) – email server (10.1.15.154) 
Product Severity Description Vulnerability  issue Recommendation 
MS 
Windows 
N/A MS Windows 
Server 2008 
service pack 2 
standalone x64-
based systems 
(KB948465) 
Service pack 2 for MS 
Windows Server 2008 is an 
update to MS Windows Server 
2008 that supports new kinds of 
hardware and emerging 
hardware standards, and 
includes all updates delivered 
since service pack 1. 
Deploy/patch  
 
Missing patches (2) – email server (10.1.15.154) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS 
Windows 
Moderate KB969897 MS09-019 cumulative security 
update for MS Internet 
Explorer 7 for MS Windows 
Server 2008 x64 edition  
Deploy/patch  
MS 
Windows 
N/A KB951072 Update for MS Windows 
Server 2008 x64 edition 
Deploy/patch 
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Appendix C5: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendation on Council C’s email server 
  
The overall opened TCP service ports (24) – email server (10.1.15.154) 
Port no. Services Descriptions Products Recommendations 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol  Close 
25 SMTP Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol 
MS ESMTP Open 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol 
MS IIS webserver 7.0 Open 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 MS Exchange Server 2007 
POP3 
Close 
135 MSRPC Microsoft Remote 
Procedure Call 
MS Windows RPC Open 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS session service NetBIOS session service Open 
143 IMAP4 Internet Message Access 
Protocol 4 
MS Exchange 2007 imapd Close 
443 HTTPS Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol over TLS/SSL 
MS IIS webserver 6.0 Open 
445 MS-DS MS-DS Active Directory, 
Windows shares 
MS Windows 2003 Open 
587 Email 
message 
submission 
Email message 
submission (SMTP) 
MS ESMTP Close 
593 Ncacn_http_ 
epmap 
HTTP RPC Ep Map MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
993 Imaps Internet Message Access 
Protocol over SSL 
MS Exchange 2007 imapd Close 
1028 MSRPC LSASS MS Windows RPC, 
Possibility of a Trojan 
attack if not installed 
 
Close 
1029 MSRPC InetInfo MS Windows RPC, 
Possibility of a Trojan 
attack if not installed 
 
Close 
1058 MSRPC MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC Close 
3389 Microsoft-rdp MS terminal service MS terminal service Open to authorised 
users only 
5357 HTTP MS HTTPAPI MS HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 
(SSDP/UPnP) 
Close 
6001 Ncacn_http MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
6002 Ncacn_http MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
6004 Ncacn_http MS Windows RPC MS Windows RPC over 
HTTP 1.0 
Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (24) – email server (10.1.15.154) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions Products Recommendations 
6129 Damewaremr DameWare mini remote 
control 
DameWare mini remote 
control 
Close if not required 
6969 Tcpwrapped   Close 
8080 HTTP-ALT HTTP alternate  Open 
10000 Snet-sensor-
mgmt 
Webmin and Oracle Possibility of a Trojan 
attack if not installed 
 
Close 
 
The overall opened UDP service port (1) – email server (10.1.15.154) 
Port no. Service Description Product Recommendation 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS name service, 
(workgroup: COCSHIRE) 
Microsoft Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn 
Open 
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Appendix C6: A summary of Council C’s email server – the vulnerabilities and the 
possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s email server 
(10.1.15.154) 
Low security vulnerabilities (9) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Registry: Last logged-on username visible Should be disabled 
Services: HTTP Should be disabled if not required 
Services: FTP Should be disabled 
Services: SMTP Satisfactory 
Services: HTTPS Satisfactory 
Services: TCP port 110 (POP3) open Should be disabled 
Services: IMAP4 Should be disabled 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists Rename the administrator account 
Information:  IMAP4 server banner provides 
information to attacker 
IMAP banners should be omitted or changed to 
something more generic 
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Appendix C7: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council C’s static 
web system with respect to the CoC-DMZ-Web server 
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol types From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 MIP Address A.B.C.181 CoC-DMZ-Web N/A 
2 MIP Address HeadOffice 10.0.0.0/8 N/A 
3 MIP Address BDC-1 10.1.1.210 N/A 
4 MIP Address BDC-2 10.1.1.150 N/A 
5 MIP Address Wbaseline1 X.X.X.101 N/A 
6 MIP Address Wbaseline2 X.X.X.11 N/A 
7 MIP Address Wbaseline3 X.X.X.157 N/A 
8 MIP Address NearMap #01 Y.Y.X.0/24 N/A 
9 MIP Address NearMap #02 Y.Y.Y.0/24 N/A 
10 MIP Address NearMap #03 Y.Y.Z.0/24 N/A 
11 MIP Address Busgov V.V.V.122 N/A 
12 Set Group Domaincon N/A N/A 
13 Set Group Winbaseline N/A N/A 
14 Set Group Webexternal N/A N/A 
15 Set Group Nearmapserver N/A N/A 
16 Add Address BDC-1 Domaincon N/A 
17 Add Address BDC-1 Domaincon N/A 
18 Add Address Wbaseline1 Winbaseline N/A 
19 Add Address Wbaseline2 Winbaseline N/A 
20 Add Address Wbaseline3 Winbaseline N/A 
21 Add Address Busgov Webexternal N/A 
22 Add Address NearMap#01 Nearmapserver N/A 
23 Add Address NearMap #02 Nearmapserver N/A 
24 Add Address NearMap #03 Nearmapserver N/A 
25 Set TCP src-port 2005 des-port  0-65535 2005 
26 Permit, 
inspect 
TCP Any 
(outside/untrust) 
CoC-DMZ-Web HTTP, HTTPS 
27 Permit UDP Any (DMZ) Domaincon DNS 
28 Permit TCP CoC-DMZ-Web HeadOffice 2005 
29 Permit IP CoC-DMZ-Web Winbaseline Any 
30 Permit IP CoC-DMZ-Web Webexternal Any 
31 Permit IP CoC-DMZ-Web Nearmapserver Any 
32 Permit IP Any (inside/trust) Any (DMZ) Any 
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Appendix C8: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council C’s CMS 
web system with respect to the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers 
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol types From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 MIP Address A.B.C.186 CoC-DMZ-CMS N/A 
2 MIP Address F.F.F.169 Seamless web 
service 
N/A 
3 Permit, 
inspect, 
log 
TCP Any (outside) CoC-DMZ-CMS HTTP, HTTPS 
4 Permit, 
log 
TCP CoC-DMZ-CMS Seamless web 
service 
HTTP 
5 Permit UDP Any (DMZ) Domaincon DNS 
6 Permit IP Any (inside/trust) Any (DMZ) Any 
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Appendix C9: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council C’s online 
payment system  
 
Policy no. Rules Protocol types From (source) To (destination) Ports (service) 
1 MIP Address A.B.C.179 Pathway-server N/A 
2 MIP Address 10.1.15.166 Pathway-app N/A 
3 MIP Address A.B.C.183 ISA01 N/A 
4 MIP Address N.N.N.0/24 Commweb01 N/A 
5 Permit, 
inspect 
TCP Any (outside) Pathway-server HTTP, HTTPS 
6 Permit, 
log 
IP ISA01 (DMZ) 
source address 
Pathway-server 
Pathway-app Any 
7 Permit, 
log 
TCP Pathway-server Commweb01 HTTP, HTTPS 
8 Permit UDP Any (DMZ) Domaincon DNS 
9 Permit IP Any 
(inside/trust) 
Any (DMZ) Any 
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Appendix C10: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-Web server 
 
System information policy – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) 
Services  
140  
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 0 char At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 42 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history No history N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current settings) 
Failure 
(current settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon 
events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege 
use 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix C11: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-CMS server 
 
System information policy – CoC-DMZ-CMS server (A.B.C.186) 
Services  
N/A – could not obtained (access denied) 
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 0 char At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 42 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history No history N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current settings) 
Failure 
(current settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Audit logon 
events 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Audit privilege 
use 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
N/A N/A Yes Yes 
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Appendix C12: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council C’s CoC-CMS server 
 
System information policy – CoC-CMS server (10.1.15.184) 
Services  
145  
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 6 chars At least 8 chars 
Maximum password age 91 days 30 days 
Minimum password age 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 8 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current settings) 
Failure 
(current settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit logon 
events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit privilege 
use 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
No No Yes Yes 
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Appendix C13: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council C’s Epathweb server 
 
System information policy – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) 
Services  
126  
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 10 chars No action required 
Maximum password age 30 days No action required 
Minimum password age 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 10 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current settings) 
Failure 
(current settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit logon 
events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege 
use 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
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Appendix C14: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council C’s Epathway server 
 
System information policy – Epathway server (10.1.15.166) 
Services  
124  
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 6 chars No action required 
Maximum password age 91 days No action required 
Minimum password age 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 8 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current settings) 
Failure 
(current settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account 
logon events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit logon 
events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit object 
access 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit policy 
change 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit privilege 
use 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system 
events 
Yes No Yes Yes 
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Appendix C15: A full details of system information policy results and 
recommendations of Council C’s Pathway server 
 
System information policy – Pathway server (10.1.15.162) 
Services  
118  
 
Password policy 
Types Current settings Recommendations 
Minimum password length 6 chars No action required 
Maximum password age 91 days No action required 
Minimum password age 0 day 0 day 
Force logoff Never force Force 
Password history 8 passwords N/A 
 
Security audit policy 
Auditing policies Success 
(current settings) 
Failure 
(current settings) 
Success 
(recommendations) 
Failure 
(recommendations) 
Audit account logon 
events 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit account 
management 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit directory 
service access 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit logon events No No Yes Yes 
Audit object access No No Yes Yes 
Audit policy change No No Yes Yes 
Audit privilege use No No Yes Yes 
Audit process 
tracking 
No No Yes Yes 
Audit system events No No Yes Yes 
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Appendix C16: A summary of missing service packs and patch, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations for the CoC-DMZ-Web server  
 
Missing service packs (2) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) 
Products Filenames Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
Office MAINSP3ff.ca
b 
N/A Office XP service pack 3 Deploy/patch 
SQL server SQL2000-
KB884525-
SP4-x86-
ENU.EXE 
N/A 2000 service pack 4 for 
database components 
Deploy/patch 
 
Missing patch (0) – CoC-DMZ-Web (A.B.C.181) 
Product Severity Knowledge base Vulnerability issue Recommendation 
Not 
available 
Not available Not available Not available Not available 
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Appendix C17: A summary of missing service packs and patches, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations for the Epathweb server 
 
Missing service packs (5) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) 
Products Filenames Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
Visual 
Studio 
VS80sp1-
KB926601-
X86-ENU.exe 
N/A Visual Studio 2005 
service pack 1 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
dotnetfx35.exe KB951847 MS.NET framework 3.5 
service pack 1 and .NET 
framework 3.5 family 
update x86 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
NDP20SP2-
KB958481-
x86.exe 
KB951847 MS.NET framework 3.5 
service pack 1 and .NET 
framework 3.5 family 
update x86 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
NDP30SP2-
KB958483-
x86.exe 
KB951847 MS.NET framework 3.5 
service pack 1 and .NET 
framework 3.5 family 
update x86 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
NDP35SP1-
KB958484-
x86.exe 
KB951847 MS.NET framework 3.5 
service pack 1 and .NET 
framework 3.5 family 
update x86 
Deploy/patch 
 
Missing patches (37) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS09-024 Important KB957646 Security update for MS 
Office XP 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-021 Important KB969680 Security update for MS 
Excel 2002 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-027 Important KB969602 Security update for MS 
Word 2002 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-017 Important KB957781 Security update for MS 
PowerPoint 2002 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-010 Important KB933399 Security update for MS 
Office XP 
Deploy/patch 
MS08-056 Moderate KB956464 Security update for MS 
Office 2002 
Deploy/patch 
MS08-052 Important KB953405 Security update for MS 
Office XP 
Deploy/patch 
MS08-044 Important KB921596 Security update for MS 
Office XP 
Deploy/patch 
MS08-041 Critical KB955440 Security update for 
Access Snapshot Viewer 
2002 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS08-027 Important KB950129 Security update for MS 
Publisher 2002 
Deploy/patch 
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Missing patches (37) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS08-017 Critical KB932031 Security update for MS 
Office Web Components 
2000 for MS Office XP 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS08-015 Critical KB946985 Security update for MS 
Outlook 2002 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS08-013 Important KB944423 Security update for MS 
Office XP 
Deploy/patch 
MS07-013 Important KB920816 Security update for MS 
Office XP 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-020 Important KB970483 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-019 Moderate KB969897 Cumulative security 
update for MS Internet 
Explorer 7 for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-026 Important KB970238 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-025 Important KB968537 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-022 Moderate KB961501 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-011 Critical KB961373 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS09-012 Important KB956572 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-012 Important KB952004 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-013 Critical KB960803 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS09-015 Important KB959426 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-010 Important KB923561 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
N/A Important KB890830 MS Windows Malicious 
Software Removal Tool - 
April 2009 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-007 Important KB960225 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
N/A Important KB960715 Update Rollup for 
ActiveX Killbits for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS09-001 Critical KB958687 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS08-071 Critical KB956802 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
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Missing patches (37) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS08-076 Important KB954600 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS08-076 Important KB952069 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS08-068 Important KB957097 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS08-069 Important KB954459 Security Update for MS 
Microsoft XML Core 
Services 6.0 service pack 
2 
Deploy/patch 
MS08-069 Critical KB955069 Security update for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS07-040 Critical KB928365 Security update for 
Microsoft .NET 
framework, version 2.0 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS07-050 Critical KB938127 Security update for MS 
Internet Explorer 7 for 
MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
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Appendix C18: A summary of missing service packs and patches, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations for the Epathway server 
 
Missing service packs (4) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166) 
Products Filenames Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS 
Windows 
dotnetfx35.exe KB951847 Microsoft .NET 
framework 3.5 service 
pack 1 and .NET 
framework 3.5 family 
update 
Deploy/patch  
MS 
Windows 
DP20SP2-
KB958481-
x86.exe 
KB951847 Microsoft .NET 
framework 3.5 service 
pack 1 and .NET 
framework 3.5 family 
update 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
NDP30SP2-
KB958483-
x86.ex 
KB951847 Microsoft .NET 
framework 3.5 service 
pack 1 and .NET 
framework 3.5 family 
update 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
NDP35SP1-
KB958484-
x86.exe 
KB951847 Microsoft .NET 
framework 3.5 service 
pack 1 and .NET 
framework 3.5 family 
update 
Deploy/patch 
 
Missing patches (22) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS Office Important KB969559 MS09-024 security update 
for the 2007 MS Office 
system 
Deploy/patch  
MS Office Important KB969613 MS09-027 security update 
for the 2007 MS Office 
system 
Deploy/patch 
MS Office Important KB969604 MS09-027 security update 
for MS Word 2007 
Deploy/patch 
MS Office Important KB969682 MS09-021 security update 
for MS Excel 2007 
Deploy/patch 
MS Office Important KB969679 MS09-021 security update 
for the 2007 MS Office 
system 
Deploy/patch 
MS Office Important KB957789 MS09-017 security update 
for MS PowerPoint 2007 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB970483 MS09-020 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
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Missing patches (22) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166)  (continued) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB970238 MS09-026 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB956803 MS08-066 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB954459 MS08-069 security update 
for MS XML core 
services 6.0 SP 2 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
N/A N/A MS Windows Internet 
Explorer 7 for Windows 
Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB944653 MS07-067 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB941569 MS07-068 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB933854 MS07-040 security update 
for Microsoft .NET 
framework, version 1.1 
service pack 1 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB938127 MS07-050 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB926122 MS07-039 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB925398 MS06-078 security update 
for MS Windows Media 
Player 6.4 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Windows 
Low KB929123 MS07-034 cumulative 
security update for MS 
Outlook Express for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB924667 MS07-012 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Moderate KB932168 MS07-020 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB930178 MS07-021 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS SQL 
server 
Critical 925673 MS06-061 MS XML 6.0 
RTM security update 
Deploy/patch asap 
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Appendix C19: A summary of missing service packs and patches, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations for the Pathway server 
 
Missing service packs (5) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162) 
Products Filenames Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS 
Windows 
dotnetfx35.exe KB951847 Microsoft .NET framework 
3.5 service pack 1 and 
.NET framework 3.5 
family update 
Deploy/patch  
MS 
Windows 
NDP20SP2-
KB958481-
x86.exe 
KB951847 Microsoft .NET framework 
3.5 service pack 1 and 
.NET framework 3.5 
family update 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
NDP30SP2-
KB958483-
x86.exe 
KB951847 Microsoft .NET framework 
3.5 service pack 1 and 
.NET framework 3.5 
family update 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
NDP35SP1-
KB958484-
x86.exe 
KB951847 Microsoft .NET framework 
3.5 service pack 1 and 
.NET framework 3.5 
family update 
Deploy/patch 
MS Office OWC11SP3.C
AB 
N/A MS Office 2003 service 
pack 3  
Deploy/patch 
 
Missing patches (15) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB970238 MS09-026 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch  
MS 
Windows 
Important KB970483 MS09-020 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB956803 MS08-066 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB954459 MS08-069 security update 
for MS XML core services 
6.0 service pack 2 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important N/A MS Internet Explorer 7 for 
MS Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB944653 MS07-067 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB941569 MS07-068 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
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Missing patches (15) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162) (continued) 
Products Severities Knowledge base Vulnerability issues Recommendations 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB933854 MS07-040 security update 
for Microsoft .NET 
framework, version 1.1 
service pack 1 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB938127 MS07-050 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB925398 MS06-078 security update 
for MS Windows media 
player 6.4 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB926122 MS07-039 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Important KB924667 MS07-012 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
MS 
Windows 
Low KB929123 MS07-034 cumulative 
security update for MS 
Outlook Express for MS 
Windows Server 2003 
Deploy/patch  
MS 
Windows 
Critical KB930178 MS07-021 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch asap 
MS 
Windows 
Moderate KB932168 MS07-020 security update 
for MS Windows Server 
2003 
Deploy/patch 
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Appendix C20: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoC-DMZ-Web server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) 
Port 
no. 
Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
6 N/A Unassigned  Close 
7 echo echo Close 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol;  MS FTP service Close 
22 SSH Secure Shell Open; SSH_3.8 Close if not required 
24 Priv-mail Any private mail system Close 
25 SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol; MS ESMTP 
6.0.3790.3959 
Close 
30 N/A Unassigned Close 
32 N/A Unassigned Close 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol; MS IIS webserver 
6.0 
Open 
81 hosts2-ns HOSTS2 Name Server Close 
82 xfer XFER Utility Close 
83 mit-ml-dev MIT ML device Close 
85 mit-ml-dev MIT ML device Close 
88 Kerberos-sec Kerberos Close if not required 
90 dnsix DNSIX security attribute token map Close 
99 metagram Metagram relay Close 
106 POP3pw  Close 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
125 locus-map Locus PC-Interface Net Map Ser Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and printer 
sharing 
Close if not required 
144 news NeWS window system Close 
146 iso-tp0 ISO-IP0 Close 
161 snmp SNMP Close if not required 
163 cmip-man CMIP/TCP manager Close 
211 914c/g Texas instruments 914C/G terminal Close 
212 anet ATEXSSTR Close 
222 rsh-spx Berkeley rshd with SPX auth Close 
259 esro-gen Efficient short remote operations Close 
280 http-mgmt http-mgmt Close 
301 N/A Unassigned Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
389 ldap Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Close if not required 
406 imsp Interactive Mail Support Protocol Close 
417 onmux Onmux Close 
443 HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over TLS/SSL; MS 
IIS webserver 6.0 
Open 
445 MS-ds MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares MS 
Windows 2003 
Close if not required 
464 kpasswd kpasswd Close 
465 SMTPS SMTP secure Close 
481 dvs DVS Close 
500 isakmp Security association and key management 
protocol 
Close if not required 
512 exec Remote Execution-- Allows remote execution 
of commands without logon. 
Close 
513 login Remote Login-- Remote term service that 
operates via telnet process- but with automatic 
auth performed based on trust. If no trust- will 
prompt for username/password logon similar to 
telnet. 
Close 
524 NPC NCP Close 
544 kshell krcmd Close 
625 apple-xsvr-
admin 
Apple Close 
636 ldapssl ldap protocol over TLS/SSL (was sldap) Close if not required 
648 RRP Registry Registrar Protocol (RRP) Close 
667 disclose Campaign contribution disclosures - SDR 
Technologies 
Close 
668 mecomm MeComm Close 
691 resvc MS Exchange routing engine Close 
700 epp Extensible Provisioning Protocol Close 
714 iris-xpcs IRIS over XPCS Close 
722 unknown Unassigned Close 
726 unknown Unassigned Close 
765 webster Webster Close 
777 multiling-http Multiling HTTP Close 
783 spamassasin Apache SpamAssassin spamd Close 
787 qsc QSC Close 
800 mdbs_daemon Mdbs_daemon Close 
801 device Device Close 
808 ccproxy-http CCProxy HTTP/Gopher/FTP (over HTTP) 
proxy 
Close 
873 rsync rsync Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
888 accessbuilder AccessBuilder Close 
898 sun-
manageconsole 
Solaris Management Console Java listener 
(Solaris 8 & 9) 
Close 
900 unknown unknown Close 
901 samba-swat Samba SWAT tool Close 
903 iss-console-mgr ISS Console Manager Close 
912 apex-mesh APEX relay-relay service Close 
990 FTPs FTP protocol, control, over TLS/SSL Close if not required 
992 Telnets Telnet protocol over TLS/SSL Close if not required 
1007 unknown unknown Close 
1009 unknown Unassigned Close 
1010 surf surf  or possibility Doly Trojan Close 
1025 MSRPC MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1026 LSA-or-nterm nterm remote_login network_terminal Close 
1029 ms-lsa Ms-lsa Close 
1031 iad2 BBN IAD Close 
1034 zincite-a Zincite.A backdoor Close 
1035 multidropper A Multidropper Adware, or PhoneFree Close 
1036, 
1037 
unknown unknown Close 
1038 mtqp Message Tracking Query Protocol Close 
1039 MSRPC MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
1040 netsaint Netsaint status daemon Close 
1041 danf-ak2, 
Trojan 
AK2 Product , Dosh, RemoteNC; , If these 
services are not installed beware could be 
Trojan 
Close 
1042 Unknown; bla 
Trojan 
BLA Trojan; If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
1043 boinc BOINC client control Close 
1044-
1049 
unknown unknown Close 
1050 java-or-
OTGfileshare 
J2EE nameserver, also OTG, also called 
Disk/Application extender. Could also be 
MiniCommand backdoor OTGlicenseserv 
Close 
1051 optima-vnet Optima VNET Close 
1052 ddt Dynamic DNS tools Close 
1053, 
1056, 
1057 
unknown unknown Close 
1059 nimreg Nimreg Close 
 
 
 425
The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
1061, 
1064-
1065 
unknown unknown Close 
1066 fpo-fns FPO-FNS Close 
1067 instl_boots Installation bootstrap protocol serv. Close 
1070-
1072, 
1077 
unknown unknown Close 
1081 unknown unknown Close 
1083 ansoft-lm-1 Anasoft license manager Close 
1084 ansoft-lm-2 Anasoft license manager Close 
1087, 
1088, 
1090, 
1097-
1100, 
1104-
1107 
unknown unknown Close 
1112 msql mini-sql server Close if not required 
1114, 
1117, 
1121, 
1122, 
1124, 
1126, 
1130-
1132, 
1137, 
1147, 
1148, 
1152, 
1163, 
1165, 
1174 
unknown unknown Close 
1185, 
1186, 
1192, 
1213, 
1217 
unknown unknown Close 
1218 aeroflight-ads AeroFlight-ADs Close 
1234 hotline If these services are not installed beware could 
be Trojan 
Close 
1248 hermes hermes Close 
1259, 
1271, 
1272, 
1287, 
1301, 
1309 
unknown unknown Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
1311 rxmon RxMon Close 
1322, 
1328, 
1334 
unknown unknown Close 
1352 lotusnotes Lotusnotes Close 
1433 ms-sql-s MS-SQL-Server Close if not required 
1434 ms-sql-m MS-SQL-Server Close if not required 
1443 Ies-lm Integrated engineering software Close 
1455 Ies-lm Integrated engineering software Close 
1461 Ibm_wrless_lan IBM Wireless LAN Close 
1503 imtc-mcs Databeam Close 
1521 oracle oracle Close 
1556, 
1580, 
1594, 
1641, 
1658 
unknown unknown Close 
1666 netview-aix-6 netview-aix-6 Close 
1700 mps-raft mps-raft Close 
1718 h323gatedisc h323gatedisc Close 
1755 wms Windows media service Close 
1761 landesk-rc LANDesk Remote Control Close 
1782 hp-hcip hp-hcip Close 
1783, 
1812, 
1840 
unknown unknown Close 
1863 MSNP MSNP Close 
1864 paradym-31 Paradym 31 Port Close 
1935 RTMP Adobe Flash media server connection port, 
Real Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP) 
Close 
1971, 
1972 
unknown unknown Close 
1998 x25-svc-port cisco X.25 service (XOT) Close 
2000 callbook "RemoteAnywhere" installs a webserver on 
this port. NeWS/OpenWin (Sun's older 
variation of X-Windows) uses this port. 
Close 
2001 dc dc or nfr20 web queries; If these services are 
not installed beware could be Trojan 
Close 
2003 finger GNU finger (cfingerd) Close 
2005 deslogin encrypted symmetric telnet/login Close 
2008 conf conf Close 
2009 news news Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
2013 raid-am raid-am Close 
2020 xinupageserver Xinupageserver Close 
2021 servexec Servexec Close 
2040 lam Lam Close 
2045 cdfunc Cdfunc Close 
2047 dls Dls Close 
2048 dls-monitor Dls-monitor Close 
2103 zephyr-clt Zephyr serv-hm connection Close 
2105 eklogin Kerberos (v4) encrypted rlogin Close 
2106 ekshell Kerberos (v4) encrypted rshell Close 
2111 kx X over kerberos Close 
2121 ccproxy-ftp CCProxy FTP Proxy Close 
2160 unknown unknown Close 
2161 apc-agent APC 2161 Close 
2190, 
2191, 
2222, 
2251, 
2260, 
2288 
unknown unknown Close 
2301 HTTP HP Proliant System Management 2.0.1.104 
(CompaqHTTPServer 9.9) 
Close 
2323 unknown unknown Close 
2381 HTTP Compaq insight manager HTTP server 5.7 Close 
2382 unknown unknown Close 
2383 ms-olap4 MS OLAP 4 Close 
2393, 
2394, 
2399 
unknown unknown Close 
2601 zebra zebra vty Close 
2605 bgpod BGPd vty Close 
2607 unknown unknown Close 
2701 sms-rcinfo SMS remote control (control) SMS remote 
control agent 
Close if not required 
2702 sms-xfer SMS XFER Close if not required 
2710, 
2717, 
2800 
unknown unknown Close 
2809 corbaloc CORBA LOC Close 
2869 UPnP Framework Allows a computer to receive UPnP discovery 
requests from other computers and devices. 
Close 
 
 428
The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
2909, 
2910, 
2968 
unknown unknown Close 
2998 iss-release ISS RealSecure IDS Remote Console Admin 
port 
Close 
3001 nessus Nessus Security Scanner Daemon Close 
3017, 
3050, 
3071 
unknown unknown Close 
3128 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
3211 unknown unknown Close 
3260 iscsi iSCSI port Close 
3261 unknown unknown Close 
3268 globalcatLDAP MS global catalogue Close 
3269 globalcatLDAPssl MS global catalogue with LDAP/SSL Close 
3301, 
3323, 
3324 
unknown unknown Close 
3333 dec-notes DEC Notes Close 
3351, 
3367, 
3371 
unknown unknown Close 
3389 MS-rdp MS terminal service Open 
3390, 
3404, 
3476, 
3493, 
3517, 
3527, 
3546, 
3551, 
3659 
unknown unknown Close 
3690 svn Subversion Close 
3809, 
3814, 
3851, 
3869, 
3871, 
3889, 
3914, 
3918 
unknown unknown Close 
3986 mapper-ws-ethd MAPPER workstation server Close 
3995 unknown unknown Close 
4000 remoteanything If these services are not installed beware 
could be Trojan 
Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
4001, 
4003, 
4005, 
4011 
unknown unknown Close 
4125 rww Remote Web Workplace for MS  
Windows Small Business Server 
Close 
4126 unknown unknown Close 
4224 xtell Xtell messenging server Close 
4343 unicall UNICALL Close 
4446, 
4567 
unknown unknown Close 
4899 radmin RAdmin Port Close 
4900 unknown unknown Close 
4998 maybe-veritas maybe-veritas Close 
5000 upnp Universal plug and play service, If these 
services are not installed beware could be 
Trojan 
Close 
5001 complex-link Yahoo messenger chat, If these services 
are not installed beware could be Trojan 
Close 
5003 filemaker FileMaker, Inc. - Proprietary transport Close 
5009 airport-admin Apple AirPort WAP administration Close 
5050 mmcc multimedia conference control tool Close 
5051 ida-agent ITA Agent, Symantec Intruder Alert Close 
5054 unknown unknown Close 
5060 sip SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) Close 
5080 unknown unknown Close 
5101 admdog chili!soft asp Close 
5200, 
5222, 
5225, 
5226, 
5280, 
5357 
unknown unknown Close 
5431 park-agent PARK AGENT Close 
5440 unknown unknown Close 
5500 hotline Hotline file sharing client/server Close 
5510 secureidprop secureidprop-ace/server services Close 
5544 unknown unknown Close 
5550 sdadmind ACE Server services Close 
5555 freeciv Freeciv gameplay Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
5560 isqlplus Oracle web enabled SQL interface 
(version 10g+) 
Close 
5566, 
5633, 
5730 
unknown unknown Close 
5800 vnc-http VNC (Virtual Network Computing)  
HTTP Access 
Close 
5801 vnc-http-1 VNC (Virtual Network Computing)  
HTTP Access 
Close 
5802 vnc-http-2 VNC (Virtual Network Computing)  
HTTP Access 
Close if not required 
5811, 
5815, 
5877 
unknown unknown Close 
5901 vnc-1 VNC display 1 Close 
5904, 
5907, 
5910, 
5915, 
5922, 
5925, 
5950, 
5962, 
5963, 
5987, 
5988 
unknown unknown Close 
5998 ncd-diag NCD Diagnostics Telnet Close 
5999 ncd-conf NCD Configuration Telnet Close 
6000 X11 X Window System Close 
6001 X11:1 X Window Server Close 
6003 X11:3 X Window Server Close 
6004 X11:4 X Window Server Close 
6005 X11:5 X Window Server Close 
6006 X11:6 X Window Server Close 
6059 X11:59 X Window Server Close 
6101 backupexec Veritas BackupExec Close 
6106 isdninfo isdninfo Close 
6129 damewaremr DameWare Mini Remote Control Open 
6156 unknown unknown Close 
6346 gnutella gnutella-svc (Gnutella P2P file-sharing 
system) 
Close 
6502 netop-rc NetOp Remote Control (by Danware Data 
A/S) 
Open 
6547 powerchuteplus Powerchuteplus Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
6566, 
6567, 
6580, 
6646 
unknown unknown Close 
6666, 
6668, 
6669 
irc IRC (Internet Relay Chat), many 
Trojans/backdoors also use this port 
Close 
6692 unknown unknown Close 
6699 napster Napster File (MP3) sharing software Close 
6788 unknown unknown Close 
6881 bittorrent-tracker BitTorrent Close 
6901 unknown unknown Close 
6969 tcpwrapped NMAP tcpwrapped Close 
7001 afs3-callback callbacks to cache managers Close 
7007 afs3-bos basic overseer process Close 
7025 unknown unknown Close 
7200 fodms FODMS FLIP Close 
7443, 
7496, 
7512, 
7676, 
7741, 
7777, 
7778, 
7800, 
7911, 
7921 
unknown unknown Close 
7937 nsrexecd Legato NetWorker Close 
7999 unknown unknown Close 
8000 http-alt HTTP Alternate (official) for Apache Close if not required 
8001 unknown If these services are not installed beware 
could be Trojan 
Close 
8002 teradataordbms Teradata ORDBMS Close 
8007 ajp12 Apache JServ Protocol 1.x Close 
8008 HTTP HTTP alternate (official) Close 
8009 ajp13 Default configuration Tomcat  Close 
8010 xmpp Extensible Messaging and Presence 
Protocol (XMPP) (formerly named 
Jabber) file transfers 
Close 
8021 ftp-proxy Common FTP proxy port Close 
8022, 
8031, 
8042, 
8045 
unknown unknown Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
8082 blackice-alerts Blackice alerts sent to this port Close 
8085-
8090, 
8093, 
8099, 
8181 
unknown unknown Close 
8194 sophos Sophos Remote Management System Open 
8291, 
8292, 
8400 
unknown unknown Close 
8443 https-alt HTTPS alternate (official) for Apache Close if not required 
8600, 
8649, 
8651, 
8654, 
8800, 
8873, 
9003, 
9010, 
9011 
unknown unknown Close 
9040 tor-tans Tor TransPort, www.torproject.org Close 
9080, 
9081 
unknown unknown Close 
9090 zeus-admin Zeus admin server Close 
9099 unknown unknown Close 
9101, 
9102 
jetdirect Port numbers 9101 and 9102 are for 
parallel ports 2 and 3 on the three-port HP 
Jetdirect external print servers 
Close 
9111 DragonIDSConsole Dragon IDS Console Close 
9207, 
9415, 
9418, 
9503 
unknown unknown Close 
9594 msgsys Message system Close 
9595 pds Ping Discovery Service Close 
9666 unknown unknown Close 
9876 sd Session Director Close 
9877, 
9878, 
9898 
unknown unknown Close 
9900 iua IUA Close 
9968 unknown unknown Close 
9999 abyss Abyss web server remote web 
management interface 
Close 
10000 snet-sensor-mgmt SecureNet Pro Sensor https management 
server or apple airport admin 
Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
10003, 
10004, 
10009, 
10010, 
10012, 
10024, 
10025, 
10215, 
10617, 
10628, 
11111, 
12174 
unknown unknown Close 
13783 netbackup VERITAS NetBackup - One-time 
password user authentication daemon 
Close if not required 
14000, 
14238, 
14441, 
15660, 
16000, 
16001, 
16012, 
16992 
16993, 
18040, 
19350, 
19780 
unknown unknown Close 
20005 btx xcept4 (Interacts with German Telekom's 
CEPT videotext service) 
Close 
20031, 
20221, 
20222, 
20828, 
25734, 
27352 
Unknown unknown Close 
31038, 
32768 
unknown unknown Close 
32774 Sometimes-rpc11 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box  Close 
32775 Sometimes-rpc13 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box  Close 
32776 Sometimes-rpc15 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box  Close 
32780 Sometimes-rpc23 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box  Close 
32781-
32783, 
34572, 
40911, 
41511 
unknown unknown Close 
44442, 
44443 
coldfusion-auth ColdFusion advanced security/siteminder 
authentication port 
Close 
45100, 
48080 
unknown unknown Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
49153, 
49154, 
49157, 
49158, 
49160, 
49161, 
49163, 
4965 
unknown unknown Close 
50000 iiimsf Internet/Intranet input method server 
framework 
Close 
50003, 
50006, 
50300, 
50389, 
50800, 
51493, 
52822, 
52848, 
54328, 
55056, 
55555, 
55600, 
56737, 
56738, 
57797, 
58080, 
60020, 
60443, 
61532 
unknown unknown Close 
62078 iphone-sync Apparently used by iPhone while 
synchronising 
Close 
63331, 
64623, 
64680, 
65129, 
65389 
unknown unknown Close 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (12) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
53 Domain Domain Name Server Open 
123 NTP Network Time Protocol Close 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS Name Service, MS File and 
printer sharing 
Close if not required 
138 NetBIOS-dgm NetBIOS Datagram Service, MS File and 
printer sharing 
Close if not required 
161 SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol Close 
445 ms-ds MS-DS SMB file sharing, MS Common 
Internet File System (CIFS) for file sharing 
Close if not required 
1434 ms-sql-m MS SQL Server 8.00.194 Close if not required 
 
 435
The overall opened UDP service ports (12) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions and products Recommendations 
1719 H323gatestat H.323 Gatestat Close 
2427 MGCP Cisco Media Gateway Control Protocol  Close 
3456 IISrpc-or-vat IIS RPC or VAT default data Close 
5060 SIP Session Initiation Protocol Close 
34125 unknown unknown Close 
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Appendix C21: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoC-DMZ-CMS server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (24) – CoC-DMZ-CMS server (A.B.C.186) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol Close 
80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS webserver 
6.0 
Open 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Wins RPC Close if not required 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS Session Service Close if not required 
445 ms-ds MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares, MS 
Windows 2003 
Close if not required 
1021, 
1077, 
1093 
unknown unknown Close if not required 
1433 ms-sql-s Microsoft-SQL-Server Close 
2161 apc-agent APC 2161 Close if not required 
2500 rtsserv Resource Tracking System Server Close if not required 
2701 sms-rcinfo SMS Remote Control (control) SMS Remote 
Control Agent 
Close if not required 
3128 ndl-aas Active API Server Port, If these services are not 
installed beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
3389 microsoft-rdp MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service Open 
5550 sdadmind ACE Server services Close if not required 
6129 damewaremr DameWare Mini Remote Control Open 
6792, 
7911,  
unknown unknown Close if not required 
8080 HTTP 
alternate 
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) - alternative 
ports used for web traffic. 
Open 
9943 unknown unknown Close if not required 
10000 snet-sensor-
mgmt 
SecureNet Pro Sensor https management server or 
apple airport admin, If these services are not 
installed beware could be Trojan, TCP Door, XHX 
Close if not required 
12000 cce4x ClearCommerce Engine 4.x  Close 
49155 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Wins RPC Close if not required 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (2) – CoC-DMZ-CMS server (A.B.C.186) 
Port no. Services Descriptionss, actions and products Recommendations 
53 UDP domain Open 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn (workgroup: CMSWORKGROUP) 
Close if not required 
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Appendix C22: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the CoC-CMS server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (13) – CoC-CMS server (10.1.15.184) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol;  MS FTP service Close 
80 HTTP MS HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP) Open 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC Open 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and Printer 
Sharing 
Open 
445 microsoft-ds Microsoft-DS Active Directory, Windows shares Open 
3128 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
3389 microsoft-rdp MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service Open 
6129 damewaremr DameWare Mini Remote Control Open 
6969 acmsoda “Backdoor.Assasin.D Trojan - opens a backdoor on 
one of the following ports: 5695,6595,6969,27589. 
Backdoor.Assasin opens port 27589, 
Backdoor.Assasin.B opens port 6969, 
Backdoor.Assasin.C opens port 6595, and 
Backdoor.Assasin.D opens port 5695 to listen for 
commands from the attacker. 
Other Trojans that use this port: GateCrasher, IRC 
3/IRC Hack, Net Controller, Priority, Danton, 
2000Cracks.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-j, p. 1) 
Close 
8080 http_alt HTTP alternate Open 
10000 snet-sensor-
mgmt 
SecureNet Pro Sensor https management server or 
apple airport admin 
Close if not required 
49155 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
 
The overall opened UDP service port (1) – CoC-CMS server (10.1.15.184) 
Port no. Service Description, action or product Recommendation 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn (workgroup: COCGROUP) 
Open 
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Appendix C23: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the Epathweb server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179)  
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
1 tcpmux TCP Port Service Multiplexer Close 
3 compressnet Compression process Close 
9 discard “Discard server - this protocol is only installed on 
machines for test purposes. The service listening at 
this port (both TCP and UDP) simply discards any 
input.”  (Speed Guide, n.d.-a, p. 1) 
Close 
13 daytime Daytime service [RFC 867] - responds with the 
current time of day. Different machines respond 
with slightly different date/time format, so port can 
be used to fingerprint machines. 
Close 
17 qotd Responds with Quote of the Day. See [RFC 865]; 
Skun Trojan also uses this port. 
Close 
19 chargen “Generates and replies with a stream of characters 
(TCP) or a packet containing characters (UDP). 
Should be disabled if there is no specific need for 
it, source for potential attacks. [RFC 864]; Skun 
Trojan also uses this port.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-b, 
p. 1) 
Close 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol;  MS FTP service Close 
24 priv-mail Any private mail system Close 
30 unknown unknown Close 
43 whois WHOIS protocol (official) Close 
79 finger “Finger protocol (official); Finger Security 
Concerns: Provides key host info to attacker; 
Trojans that also use this port: ADM worm, Back 
Orifice 2000 (BO2K), CDK Trojan (ports 79, 
15858), Firehotcker (ports 79, 5321).” (Speed 
Guide, n.d.-c, p. 1) 
Close 
80 HTTP MS HTTP webserver 6.0 Open 
81 hosts2-ns HOSTS2 Name Server Close 
82 xfer XFER utility Close 
83 mit-ml-dev MIT ML device Close 
85 mit-ml-dev MIT ML device Close 
89 su-mit-tg SU MIT Telnet gateway Close 
90 metagram Metagram relay Close 
99 metagram Metagram relay Close 
100 newacct unauthorised use Close 
106 POP3pw Eudora compatible PW changer Close 
109 POP2 Post Office Protocol - version 2 Close 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
119 NNTP Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) - used 
for retrieving newsgroup messages (official) 
Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC Close 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and printer 
sharing 
Close 
146 iso-tp0 ISO-IP0 Close 
161 SNMP SNMP Close 
179 bgp Border Gateway Protocol Close 
211 914c/g Texas instruments 914C/G terminal Close 
212 anet ATEXSSTR Close 
254, 255 unknown unknown Close 
259 esro-gen Efficient short remote operations Close 
280 http-mgmt http-mgmt Close 
301, 306 unknown Unassigned Close 
311 asip-webadmin Mac OS X Server admin (officially AppleShare IP 
Web administration) 
Close 
406 imsp Interactive Mail Support Protocol Close 
416 silverplatter Silverplatter Close 
417 onmux Onmux Close 
427 svrloc Server location Close 
443 HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over TLS/SSL; MS 
IIS webserver 6.0 
Open 
445 MS-ds MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares MS 
Windows 2003 
Close 
458 appleqtc Apple quick time Close 
464 kpasswd kpasswd Close 
465 SMTPS SMTP Secure Close 
481 dvs/ph Dvs or PH service Close 
500 isakmp Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol 
Close 
512 exec Remote execution-- Allows remote execution of 
commands without logon. 
Close 
513 login Remote login-- Remote term service that operates 
via telnet process- but with automatic auth 
performed based on trust. If no trust- will prompt 
for username/password logon similar to telnet.  
Close 
514 shell Used by rsh and (also rcp), interactive shell 
without any logging; Some vulnerabilities of this 
port: RPC Backdoor, Whacky, ADM worm 
Close 
515 printer Printing services, listening for incoming 
connections; Trojans using this port: MscanWorm, 
lpdw0rm, Ramen. 
Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
543 klogin Kerberos login Close 
544 kshell Kerberos remote shell Close 
545 ekshell Kerberos encrypted remote shell Close 
555 dsf dsf; Trojans that use this port: 711 Trojan (Seven 
Eleven), Ini-Killer, Net Administrator 
(NeTadmin), Phase Zero, Stealth Spy 
Close 
593 http-rpc-epmap HTTP RPC Ep Map Close 
616 unknown unknown Close 
617 sco-dtmgr SCO Desktop Administration Server or Arkeia 
(www.akriea.com) backup software 
Close 
625 apple-xsvr-
admin 
Apple Close 
631 ipp Internet Printing Protocol Close 
636 ldapssl ldap protocol over TLS/SSL (was sldap) Close 
646 ldp Label Distribution Protocol, a routing protocol 
used in MPLS networks (official) 
Close 
648 RRP Registry Registrar Protocol (RRP) Close 
666 doom “Used by the game Doom (ID Software), 
however, because of the cool connotations, this 
port is also used by numerous Trojan 
horses/backdoors.  
Here is a list: Attack FTP, Back Construction, 
BLA Trojan, Cain & Abel, NokNok, Satans Back 
Door - SBD, ServU, Shadow Phyre, th3r1pp3rz 
(the rippers), lpdw0rm,  Backdoor.FTP_Ana.C - 
backdoor Trojan, 03.2003. Affects all current 
Windows versions.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-d, p. 1) 
Close 
667 disclose Campaign contribution disclosures - SDR 
Technologies 
Close 
668 mecomm MeComm Close 
683 corba-iiop Corba-iiop Close 
687, 
705, 711 
unknown unknown Close 
714 iris-xpcs IRIS over XPCS Close 
720, 
722, 726 
unknown unknown Close 
749 kerberos-adm Kerberos administration Close 
777 multiling-http Multiling HTTP, Trojans that use this port: 
AimSpy (AIM trojan), Un-Detected ( a.k.a. 
Backdoor.TDS, 4Fuk, 
Trojan.Win32.TrojanRunner.Levil, U4 ). 
Close 
783 spamassasin Apache SpamAssassin spamd Close 
800 mdbs_daemon Mdbs_daemon Close 
801 device Device Close 
808 ccproxy-http CCProxy HTTP/Gopher/FTP (over HTTP) proxy Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
873 rsync rsync Close 
880 unknown unknown Close 
898 sun-
manageconsole 
Solaris Management Console Java listener 
(Solaris 8 & 9) 
Close 
911, 987 unknown unknown Close 
990 FTPs FTP protocol, control, over TLS/SSL Close 
992 Telnets telnet protocol over TLS/SSL Close 
999 garcon “Port used by ScimoreDB database system; 
Trojans that run on this port: DeepThroat (a.k.a. 
DTV2, DTV3, BackDoor-J), F0replay (a.k.a. 
WiNNUke eXtreame), WinSatan.” (Speed 
Guide, n.d.-e, p. 1) 
Close 
1000 cadlock cadlock Close 
1001 unknown unknown Close 
1002 window-icfw Windows Internet connection firewall or Internet 
locator server for NetMeeting. 
Close 
1009, 
1011, 
1022 
unknown unknown Close 
1023 netvenuechat Nortel NetVenue Notification, Chat, Intercom Close 
1026 LSA-or-nterm Nterm remote_login network_terminal Close 
1027 IIS IIS Close 
1029 ms-lsa Ms-lsa Close 
1030 iad1 BBN IAD Close 
1031 iad2 BBN IAD Close 
1032 Iad3 BBN IAD Close 
1035 multidropper A Multidropper Adware, or PhoneFree Close 
1036, 
1037 
unknown unknown Close 
1038 mtqp Message Tracking Query Protocol Close 
1039 msrpc MS Windows RPC Close 
1041 danf-ak2, 
Trojan 
AK2 Product , Dosh, RemoteNC; , If these 
services are not installed beware could be Trojan 
Close 
1042 unknown, bla 
Trojan 
BLA Trojan; If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
1043 boinc BOINC Client Control Close 
1044-
1047, 
1049 
unknown unknown Close 
1051 optima-vnet Optima VNET Close 
1053 unknown unknown Close 
1055 ansyslmd ANSYS - license manager Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
1056, 
1057 
unknown unknown Close 
1058 nim nimreg, IBM AIX Network installation manager 
(NIM) (official) 
Close 
1059 nimreg  Close 
1060 polestar POLESTAR Close 
1062 veracity Veracity Close 
1064 unknown unknown Close 
1069 cognex-insight  Close 
1070, 
1072, 
1074, 
1075 
unknown unknown Close 
1077 unknown unknown Close 
1080 socks “Socks Proxy is an Internet proxy service, 
potential spam relay point. 
Common programs using this port: Wingate 
Trojans/worms that use this port as well: 
Bugbear.xx - wide-spread mass-mailing worm, 
many variants. 
SubSeven - remote access Trojan, 03.2001. 
Afects all current Windows versions.  
WinHole - remote access Trojan, 01.2000 (a.k.a. 
WinGate, Backdoor.WLF, BackGate). Affects 
Windows 9x. 
Trojan.Webus.C - remote access Trojan, 
10.12.2004. Affects all current Windows 
versions. Connects to an IRC server (on port 
8080) and opens a backdoor on TCP port 10888 
or 1080.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-f, p. 1) 
Close 
1082 unknown unknown Close 
1083 ansoft-lm-1 Anasoft License Manager Close 
1084 ansoft-lm-2 Anasoft License Manager Close 
1085-
1092, 
1095 
unknown unknown Close 
1096, 
1099, 
1100, 
1105, 
1108, 
1111 
unknown unknown Close 
1112 msql mini-sql server Close 
1113, 
1117, 
1119, 
1121 
Unknown unknown Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
1123, 
1131, 
1132, 
1141, 
1145, 
1147, 
1148, 
1152, 
1154, 
1165, 
1166, 
1169, 
1174, 
1183, 
1185, 
1187, 
1192 
unknown unknown Close 
1199, 
1201, 
1216 
unknown unknown Close 
1234 hotline If these services are not installed beware could 
be Trojan 
Close 
1236, 
1244 
unknown unknown Close 
1248 hermes hermes Close 
1271, 
1277, 
1287, 
1296, 
1300, 
1309, 
1310 
unknown unknown Close 
1311 rxmon RxMon Close 
1417 timbuktu-srv1 Timbuktu Service 1 Port Close 
1433 ms-sql-s MS-SQL-Server 2005 9.00.4035; SP3 Close if not required 
1434 ms-sql-m MS-SQL-Server Close if not required 
1443 Ies-lm Integrated engineering software Close 
1455 Ies-lm Integrated engineering software Close 
1461 Ibm_wrless_lan IBM Wireless LAN Close 
1494 citrix-ica Citrix XenApp Independent Computing 
Architecture (ICA) thin client protocol 
Close 
1500 vlsi-lm VLSI License Manager Close 
1501 sas-3 Satellite-data Acquisition System 3 Close 
1503 imtc-mcs Databeam Close 
1524 ingreslock Ingres; If these services are not installed beware 
could be Trojan 
Close 
1533 virtual-places Virtual Places software Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
1580, 
1583, 
1594 
unknown unknown Close 
1600 issd Issd Close 
1641 unknown unknown Close 
1658 unknown unknown Close 
1666 netview-aix-6 netview-aix-6 Close 
1717 fj-hdnet fj-hdnet Close 
1718 h323gatedisc h323gatedisc Close 
1755 wms Windows media service Close 
1782 hp-hcip hp-hcip Close 
1783, 
1801, 
1839, 
1840 
unknown unknown Close 
1864 paradym-31 Paradym 31 Port Close 
1875 unknown unknown Close 
1900 upnp “UPnP discovery/SSDP is a service that runs by 
default on WinXP, and creates immediately 
exploitable security vulnerability for any 
network-connected system. Filtering this port 
proactively prevents XP systems from being 
remotely compromised by malicious worms or 
intruders.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-g, p. 1) 
Close 
1914 unknown unknown Close 
1935 RTMP Adobe Flash Media Server connection port, Real 
Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP) 
Close 
1947, 
1971, 
1972, 
1974 
unknown unknown Close 
1998 x25-svc-port Cisco X.25 over TCP (XOT) service Close 
1999 tcp-id-port “Cisco identification port. 
Some Trojans also use this port: Back Door, 
SubSeven, TransScout 
Backdoor.Bifrose.C (05.19.2005) - Trojan that 
opens a backdoor on port 1999/tcp, and sends 
information to a remote server.” (Speed Guide, 
n.d.-h, p. 1) 
Close 
2000 callbook Callbook; If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
2001 dc dc or nfr20 web queries; If these services are not 
installed beware could be Trojan 
Close 
2002 globe Globe; If these services are not installed beware 
could be Trojan 
Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
2003 finger GNU finger (cfingerd) Close 
2005 deslogin encrypted symmetric telnet/login Close 
2006 invokator invokator Close 
2007 dectalk dectalk Close 
2008 conf conf Close 
2013 raid-am raid-am Close 
2021 servexec servexec Close 
2022 down down Close 
2033 glogger glogger Close 
2038 objectmanager objectmanager Close 
2040 lam lam Close 
2042 isis isis Close 
2045 cdfunc Cdfunc Close 
2049 NFS “Network File System (NFS) - remote filesystem 
access. (RFC 1813). A commonly scanned and 
exploited attack vector. Normally, access to 
portmapper is needed to find which port this 
service runs on, but since most installations run 
NFS on this port, hackers/crackers can bypass 
portmapper and try this port directly.” (Speed 
Guide, n.d.-i, p. 1) 
Close 
2065 dlsrpn Data Link Switch Read Port Number Close 
2068 advocentkvm Advocent KVM Server Close 
2100 unknown unknown Close 
2105 eklogin Kerberos (v4) encrypted rlogin Close 
2107, 
2119 
unknown unknown Close 
2121 ccproxy-ftp CCProxy FTP Proxy Close 
2144 unknown unknown Close 
2161 apc-agent APC 2161 Close 
2170, 
2190, 
2196, 
2200, 
2222, 
2260 
unknown unknown Close 
2301 HTTP HP Proliant System Management 2.0.1.104 
(CompaqHTTPServer 9.9) 
Close 
2323 unknown unknown Close 
2381 HTTP Compaq Insight Manager HTTP server 5.7 Close 
2382 unknown unknown Close 
2383 ms-olap4 MS OLAP 4 Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
2399 unknown unknown Close 
2401 cvspserver CVS network server Close 
2492 unknown unknown Close 
2500 rtsserv Resource Tracking system server Close 
2522, 
2525 
unknown unknown Close 
2601 zebra zebra vty Close 
2602 ripd RIPd vty Close 
2605 bgpod BGPd vty Close 
2607, 
2608 
unknown unknown Close 
2638 sybase Sybase database Close 
2701 sms-rcinfo SMS Remote Control (control) SMS Remote 
Control Agent 
Close 
2710, 
2717, 
2725, 
2811, 
2875, 
2910, 
2920 
unknown unknown Close 
2967 symantec-av Symantec AntiVirus (rtvscan.exe) Close 
2968 unknown unknown Close 
2998 iss-release ISS RealSecure IDS Remote Console Admin 
port 
Close 
3000 ppp User-level ppp daemon, or chili!soft asp Close 
3001 nessus Nessus Security Scanner Daemon Close 
3005 deslogin encrypted symmetric telnet/login Close 
3006 deslogind deslogind Close 
3013, 
3017, 
3030, 
3031, 
3050, 
3071 
unknown unknown Close 
3128 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
3168, 
3211, 
3221 
unknown unknown Close 
3260 iscsi iSCSI port Close 
3261 unknown unknown Close 
3268 globalcatLDAP MS Global Catalog Close 
3283 netassistant Apple Remote Desktop Net Assistant reporting 
feature 
Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
3323-
3325 
unknown unknown Close 
3333 dec-notes DEC Notes Close 
3367, 
3369-
3371, 
3476, 
3493, 
3517, 
3527, 
3546, 
3551, 
3659 
unknown unknown Close 
3689 rendezvous Rendezvous Zeroconf (used by Apple/iTunes) Close 
3690 svn Subversion Close 
3703, 
3737, 
3766, 
3784, 
3827, 
3828, 
3851, 
3878, 
3880 
unknown unknown Close 
3905 mupdate Mailbox Update (MUPDATE) protocol Close 
3914, 
3918, 
3920, 
3945, 
3971 
unknown unknown Close 
3986 mapper-ws-ethd MAPPER workstation server Close 
3995 unknown unknown Close 
4002 mlchat-proxy mlnet - MLChat P2P chat proxy Close 
4003, 
4005, 
4006 
unknown unknown Close 
4545 lockd NFS lock daemon/manager Close 
4125 rww Remote Web Workplace for MS Windows 
Small Business Server 
Close 
4129 unknown unknown Close 
4224 xtell Xtell messenging server Close 
4343 unicall UNICALL Close 
4443 pharos Pharos Close 
4445, 
4446, 
4449 
unknown unknown Close 
 
 
 448
The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
4662 edonkey eDonkey file sharing (Donkey) Close 
4848 unknown unknown Close 
4998 maybe-veritas maybe-veritas Close 
5003 filemaker FileMaker, Inc. - Proprietary transport Close 
5009 airport-admin Apple AirPort WAP Administration Close 
5030 unknown unknown Close 
5051 ida-agent ITA agent, Symantec intruder alert Close 
5054 unknown unknown Close 
5060 SIP SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) Close 
5061 sip-tls SIP-TLS Close 
5080 unknown unknown Close 
5100 admd (ChiliSoft ASP manager for Cobalt RaQ) or 
Yahoo pager 
Close 
5120, 
5200, 
5221, 
5222, 
5225, 
5269 
unknown unknown Close 
5280, 
5298, 
5357 
unknown unknown Close 
5405 pcduo RemCon PC-Duo - new port Close 
5414 unknown unknown Close 
5432 postgresql PostgreSQL database server Close 
5440 unknown unknown Close 
5500 hotline Hotline file sharing client/server Close 
5550 sdadmind ACE server services Close 
5555 freeciv Freeciv gameplay Close 
5631 pcanywheredata pcANYWHEREdata, Symantec pcAnywhere 
(version 7.52 and later) 
Close if not required 
5633, 
5718 
unknown unknown Close 
5800 vnc-http VNC (Virtual Network Computing)  HTTP 
access 
Close 
5810 unknown unknown Close 
5811, 
5815, 
5825, 
5850, 
5859, 
5862 
unknown unknown Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
5901 vnc-1 VNC display 1 Close 
5902 vnc-2 VNC display 2 Close 
5903 vnc-3 VNC display 3 Close 
5904, 
5907, 
5910, 
5915, 
5950, 
5952, 
5960, 
5962, 
5963, 
5987, 
5988, 
5989 
unknown unknown Close 
5999 ncd-conf NCD Configuration Telnet Close 
6003 X11:3 X Window Server Close 
6005 X11:5 X Window Server Close 
6007 X11:7 X Window Server Close 
6025 unknown unknown Close 
6059 X11:59 X Window Server Close 
6100 unknown unknown Close 
6112 dtspc CDE subprocess control Close 
6129 damewaremr DameWare mini remote control Open 
6156 unknown unknown Close 
6346 gnutella gnutella-svc (Gnutella P2P file-sharing 
system) 
Close 
6502 netop-rc NetOp remote control (by Danware Data A/S) Open 
6510 unknown unknown Close 
6543 mythtv Mythtv; If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
6547 powerchuteplus Powerchuteplus Close 
6565-
6567, 
6646 
unknown unknown Close 
6666, 
6668, 
6669 
irc IRC (Internet Relay Chat), many 
Trojans/backdoors also use this port 
Close 
6689, 
6692 
unknown unknown Close 
6699 napster Napster File (MP3) sharing software Close 
6779 unknown unknown Close 
6789 ibm-db2-admin IBM DB2 Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
6792, 
6839, 
6901 
unknown unknown Close 
6969 tcpwrapped NMAP tcpwrapped Close 
7000 afs3-fileserver file server itself, msdos; ; If these services are 
not installed beware could be Trojan 
Close 
7001 afs3-callback callbacks to cache managers Close 
7002 afs3-prserver users & groups database Close 
7007 afs3-bos basic overseer process Close 
7100 font-service X Font Service Close 
7103, 
7106 
unknown unknown Close 
7200 fodms FODMS FLIP Close 
7201 dlip DLIP Close 
7443, 
7625, 
7676, 
7741, 
7777 
unknown unknown Close 
7800, 
7911, 
7920, 
7921 
unknown unknown Close 
7937 nsrexecd Legato NetWorker Close 
7938 lgtomapper Legato portmapper Close 
7999 unknown unknown Close 
8000 http-alt HTTP Alternate (official) for Apache Close if not required 
8001 unknown If these services are not installed beware could 
be Trojan 
Close 
8002 teradataordbms Teradata ORDBMS Close 
8007 ajp12 Apache JServ Protocol 1.x Close 
8008 HTTP HTTP Alternate (official) Close if not required 
8009 ajp13 Default configuration Tomcat  Close 
8011, 
8022, 
8031, 
8042, 
8045 
unknown unknown Close 
8081 blackice-icecap ICECap user console Close 
8082 blackice-alerts Blackice Alerts sent to this port Close 
8087-
8090, 
8093, 
unknown unknown Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
8100, 
8180, 
8181 
unknown unknown Close 
8193-
8194 
sophos Sophos Remote Management System Close 
8200, 
8222, 
8290, 
8291, 
8500, 
8600, 
8649, 
8654, 
8800, 
8873, 
8994 
unknown unknown Close 
9000 cslistener CSlistener; If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
9009, 
9011 
unknown unknown Close 
9050 tor-socks Tor SocksPort Close 
9071, 
9080, 
9081, 
9091 
unknown unknown Close 
9101-
9102 
jetdirect HP JetDirect card Close 
9110 unknown unknown Close 
9111 DragonIDSCon
sole 
Dragon IDS Console Close 
9207, 
9290, 
9418, 
9485, 
9500, 
9575, 
9593 
unknown unknown Close 
9594 msgsys Message System Close 
9595 pds Ping Discovery System Close 
9666 unknown unknown Close 
9876 sd Session Director, True Image Remote Agent, 
Wireshark, NMAP use this port. 
Trojans that also use this port: Cyber Attacker, 
Rux, Backdoor.Lolok 
Close 
9898, 
9943, 
9968 
unknown unknown Close 
 
 
 452
The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
9900 iua IUA Close 
9999 abyss Abyss web server remote web management 
interface; ; If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
10000 snet-sensor-
mgmt 
SecureNet Pro Sensor https management 
server or apple airport admin 
Close 
10002-
10004, 
10010, 
10012, 
10025, 
10215, 
10243, 
10617, 
10621, 
10628, 
10778, 
11110, 
11111, 
11967, 
12265, 
13456 
unknown unknown Close 
13782-
13783 
netbackup VERITAS NetBackup, bpcd client Close 
14442 unknown unknown Close 
15000 hydap Hypack Data Aquisition Close 
15003, 
15004, 
15660, 
16001, 
16012, 
16016, 
16018, 
16992, 
16993, 
17877, 
17988, 
18040, 
18988, 
19101, 
19283, 
19315, 
19842, 
20000 
unknown unknown Close 
20005 btx xcept4 (Interacts with German Telekom's 
CEPT videotext service) 
Close 
20828, 
21571, 
22939, 
23502, 
24800, 
25734 
unknown unknown Close 
 
 
 453
The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
26214, 
27352, 
27353, 
27355, 
27356, 
27551, 
28201, 
30000, 
30718, 
30951 
unknown unknown Close 
31337 Elite inetd.conf;  If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close 
32768, 
32769 
unknown unknown Close 
32770 sometimes-rpc3 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box Close 
32772 sometimes-rpc7 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box 
(status) 
Close 
32773 sometimes-rpc9 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box 
(rquotad) 
Close 
32774 sometimes-rpc11 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box 
(rusersd) 
Close 
32775 sometimes-rpc13 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box 
(status) 
Close 
32777 sometimes-rpc17 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box 
(walld) 
Close 
32778 sometimes-rpc19 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box 
(rstatd) 
Close 
32779 sometimes-rpc21 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box Close 
32780 sometimes-rpc23 Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box Close 
32781-
32785, 
33899, 
35500 
unknown unknown Close 
38292 landesk-cba landesk-cba Close 
40193, 
41511, 
44176 
unknown unknown Close 
44443 coldfusion-auth ColdFusion Advanced Security/Siteminder 
Authentication Port 
Close 
45100, 
48080, 
49152-
49156, 
49159, 
49160, 
49163, 
49165, 
49175, 
49176 
unknown unknown Close 
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
49400 HTTP Compaq Diagnostics httpd 
(CompaqHTTPServer 5.7) 
Close 
49999 unknown unknown Close 
50002 iiimsf Internet/Intranet Input Method Server 
Framework 
Close 
50006, 
50500, 
50636, 
51493, 
52673, 
52848, 
52869, 
54045, 
55056, 
55555, 
56737, 
56738, 
57294, 
60020, 
60443, 
61532, 
61900 
unknown unknown Close 
62078 iphone-sync Apparently used by iPhone while syncing Close 
63331, 
64680, 
65129, 
65389 
unknown unknown Close 
 
The overall opened UDP service ports (10) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
53 UDP domain Open 
123 NTP Network Time Protocol Close 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn 
Close if not required 
138 NetBIOS-dgm NetBIOS Datagram Service Close if not required 
161 SNMP SNMP Close 
445 ms-ds MS-DS SMB file sharing Close if not required 
500 isakmp Internet Security Association and Key 
Management Protocol 
Close if not required 
1719 h323gatestat h323gatestat Close 
4500 nat-t-ike IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947) Close if not required 
5060 SIP Session Initiation Protocol Close 
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Appendix C24: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the Epathway server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (22) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol;  MS FTP service Close 
80 HTTP MS HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP) Open 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
135 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC Open 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS Session Service for MS file and printer 
sharing 
Open 
445 ms-ds MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares Open 
1025 MSRPC MS Windows RPC Open/Close if not 
required 
1079 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
1080 sophos Sophos message router Open 
1658 MSRPC MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
3128 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
5800 vnc-http VNC (Virtual Network Computing)  HTTP Access Close if not required 
5900 vnc Virtual Network Computer display 0 Close if not required 
6129 damewaremr DameWare Mini Remote Control Open 
6502 netop-rc NetOp Remote Control (by Danware Data A/S) Open 
6969 acmsoda “Backdoor.Assasin.D Trojan - opens a backdoor on 
one of the following ports: 5695,6595,6969,27589. 
Backdoor.Assasin opens port 27589, 
Backdoor.Assasin.B opens port 6969, 
Backdoor.Assasin.C opens port 6595, and 
Backdoor.Assasin.D opens port 5695 to listen for 
commands from the attacker. 
Other Trojans that use this port: GateCrasher, IRC 
3/IRC Hack, Net Controller, Priority, Danton, 
2000Cracks” (Speed Guide, n.d.-j, p. 1) 
Close 
8080 http_alt HTTP alternate Open 
8192 sophos Sophos message router (Interoperable Object 
Reference Service) 
Open 
8193 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
8194 sophos Sophos message router Open 
10000 snet-sensor-
mgmt 
SecureNet Pro Sensor https management server or 
apple airport admin 
Close if not required 
49155 MSRPC MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC Close if not required 
 
 
 456
The overall opened UDP service ports (10) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166) (continued) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
123 NTP Network Time Protocol Close 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS Name Service Microsoft Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn (workgroup: COCWORKGROUP) 
Open 
138 NetBIOS-
dgm 
NetBIOS Datagram Service Close if not required 
445 ms-ds MS-DS SMB file sharing Open/ Close if not 
required 
500 isakmp Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol 
Close if not required 
4500 nat-t-ike IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947) Close if not required 
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Appendix C25: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible 
mitigation recommendations of the Pathway server 
 
The overall opened TCP service ports (21) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol;  MS FTP service Close 
80 HTTP Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP) Open 
110 POP3 Post Office Protocol 3 Close 
135 MSRPC Microsoft Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows 
RPC 
Open 
139 NetBIOS-ssn NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and Printer 
Sharing 
Open 
445 ms-ds MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares Open 
1025 MSRPC Microsoft Windows RPC Open/Close if not 
required 
1062 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
1063 sophos Sophos message router Open 
1433 ms-sql-s Microsoft SQL Server 2005 9.00. 4035; SP3 Open 
3128 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
5800 vnc-http VNC (Virtual Network Computing)  HTTP access Close if not required 
5900 vnc Virtual Network Computer display 0 Close if not required 
6129 damewaremr DameWare Mini Remote Control Open 
6502 netop-rc NetOp Remote Control (by Danware Data A/S) Open 
6969 acmsoda “Backdoor.Assasin.D Trojan - opens a backdoor on 
one of the following ports: 5695,6595,6969,27589. 
Backdoor.Assasin opens port 27589, 
Backdoor.Assasin.B opens port 6969, 
Backdoor.Assasin.C opens port 6595, and 
Backdoor.Assasin.D opens port 5695 to listen for 
commands from the attacker. 
Other Trojans that use this port: GateCrasher, IRC 
3/IRC Hack, Net Controller, Priority, Danton, 
2000Cracks.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-j, p. 1) 
Close 
8080 http_alt HTTP alternate Open 
8192 sophos Sophos message router (Interoperable Object 
Reference Service) 
Open 
8193 tcpwrapped Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed 
beware could be Trojan 
Close if not required 
8194 sophos Sophos message router Open 
10000 snet-sensor-
mgmt 
SecureNet Pro Sensor https management server or 
apple airport admin 
Close if not required 
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The overall opened UDP service ports (7) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162) 
Port no. Services Descriptions, actions or products Recommendations 
123 NTP Network Time Protocol Close 
137 NetBIOS-ns NetBIOS Name Service Microsoft Windows NT 
NetBIOS-ssn (workgroup: COCWORKGROUP) 
Open 
138 NetBIOS-
dgm 
NetBIOS Datagram Service Close if not required 
445 ms-ds Microsoft-DS SMB file sharing Open/close if not 
required 
500 IPSec isakmp Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol 
Close if not required 
1434 ms-sql-m Microsoft SQL Server 2005 9.00. 4035.00; SP3 Open 
4500 nat-t-ike IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947) Close if not required 
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Appendix C26: A summary of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-Web server – the vulnerabilities 
and the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-Web 
server 
High security vulnerabilities (7) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Backdoors: Open ports commonly used by  
Trojans (3): Duddie (2002), Duddie (2004) 
and Duddie (2005) 
Disable TCP ports 2002, 2004 and 2005 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other 
removable drives. 
Services: POP3 server might be vulnerable 
to a remote buffer overflow exploit 
Disable POP3 service port 
Software: APSB07-18:  Adobe Acrobat 
mailto: vulnerability 
It is recommended that affected users update to Adobe 
Reader 8.1.1 or Acrobat 8.1.1. 
Software: SANS07C1: Multiple 
vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader earlier 
than 8.0.0 
It is recommended that affected users update to Adobe 
Reader 8.1.1 or Acrobat 8.1.1 or newer. 
 
Medium security vulnerability (0) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (10) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Mail: SMTP server allows relaying Should be disabled if not required 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Registry: Last logged-on username visible Should be disabled 
Registry: Windows AutoUpdate is enabled 
but require user intervention for both patch 
download and installation 
No further action is required 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: SSH If this computer is not administered via secure shell, the 
SSH service is most likely unnecessary 
Services: SMTP Disable SMTP service port 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
Services: HTTPS No further action is required 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 service port 
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The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-Web 
server (continued) 
Potential vulnerabilities (5) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended to rename this account 
Information: User kris-h never logged on It is recommended to remove this account if not used 
Information: MS SQL server Uninstall MS SQL server if not used 
Information: Some POP3 server banners 
providing information to attacker 
The service: POP3 service should be turned off 
Information: USB devices installed over 
time 
This check generates a list of all USB devices that have 
been connected to the scanned computer 
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Appendix C27: A summary of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-CMS server – the 
vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-CMS 
server 
High security vulnerability (0) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Medium security vulnerability (0) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (3) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 service port 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (3) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended to rename this account 
Information: User serveradministrator 
never logged on 
It is recommended to remove this account if not used 
Information: User SophosSAUCMSWEB0 
never logged 
It is recommended to remove this account if not used 
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Appendix C28: A summary of Council C’s CoC-CMS server – the vulnerabilities and 
the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s CoC-CMS server 
High security vulnerability (0)  
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Medium security vulnerability (0) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (5) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 service port 
 
Potential vulnerability (1) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended that the account be  renamed  
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Appendix C29: A summary of Council C’s Epathweb server – the vulnerabilities and 
the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council’s Epathweb server 
High security vulnerabilities (8) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other 
removable drives. 
Miscellaneous: OVAL:5793: MSXML 
Memory Corruption Vulnerability 
Patch Security Update for Windows Server 2003 
(KB955069) 
Services: POP3 server might be vulnerable 
to a remote buffer overflow exploit 
Disable POP3 service port 
Software: OVAL:6237: Remote Code 
Execution Vulnerability in Microsoft 
DirectShow (CVE-2009-1537) 
Patch Security Update for Windows Server 2003 x64 
Edition (KB951698) 
Software: OVAL:5897: Word Record 
Parsing Vulnerability 
Check and Patch Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-042, 
Vulnerability in Microsoft Word Could Allow Remote 
Code Execution (955048) 
Software: OVAL:332: Word Count 
Vulnerability 
Patch Security Update for Word 2003 (KB929057) 
Web: OVAL:4582: Uninitialized Memory 
Corruption Vulnerability 
Check and Patch from Microsoft Security Bulletin MS07-
057, Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer  
Web: OVAL:2109: ActiveX Object 
Vulnerability 
Check and Patch from Microsoft Security Bulletin MS07-
045 
 
Medium security vulnerability (1) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
WEB: OVAL:4480: Uninitialized Memory 
Corruption Vulnerability 
Check And Patch from Microsoft Security Bulletin 
MS07-069, Cumulative Security Update for IE 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (8) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Registry: Last logged-on username visible Should be disabled 
Registry: Windows AutoUpdate is enabled 
but require user intervention for both patch 
download and installation 
No further action is required 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
Services: HTTPS No further action is required 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 service port 
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The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s Epathweb server 
(continued) 
Potential vulnerabilities (4) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: User opsuser never logged on It is recommended to remove this account if not used 
Information: User 
SophosSAUEPATHWEB0 never logged 
on 
It is recommended to remove this account if not used 
Information: User ckbuser never logged on It is recommended to remove this account if not used 
Information: Some POP3 server banners 
providing information to attacker 
The service: POP3 service should be turned off 
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Appendix C30: A summary of Council C’s Epathway server – the vulnerabilities and 
the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s Epathway server 
High security vulnerabilities (3) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other 
removable drives. 
Services: POP3 server might be vulnerable 
to a remote buffer overflow exploit 
Disable POP3 service port 
Software: OVAL:6237: Remote Code 
Execution Vulnerability in MS 
DirectShow (CVE-2009-1537) 
Patch security update for Windows Server 2003 x64 
Edition (KB951698) 
 
Medium security vulnerability (0) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (7) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Registry: Last logged-on username visible Should be disabled 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 service port 
Web: IIS: Frontpage check Should be uninstalled if not required 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (2) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended to rename this account 
Information: Some POP3 server banners 
providing information to attacker 
The service: POP3 service should be turned off 
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Appendix C31: A summary of Council C’s Pathway server – the vulnerabilities and 
the possible mitigation recommendations 
 
The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s Pathway server 
High security vulnerabilities (3) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other 
removable drives. 
Services: POP3 server might be vulnerable 
to a remote buffer overflow exploit 
Disable POP3 service port 
Software: OVAL:6237: Remote Code 
Execution Vulnerability in Microsoft 
DirectShow (CVE-2009-1537) 
Patch Security Update for Windows Server 2003 x64 
Edition (KB951698) 
 
Medium security vulnerability (0) 
Section: Type Recommendation 
None None 
 
Low security vulnerabilities (6) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Registry: AutoShareServer Should be turned off 
Registry: AutoShareWKS Should be turned off 
Registry: Last logged-on username visible Should be disabled 
Services: HTTP No further action is required 
Services: FTP Disable FTP service port 
Services: POP3 Disable POP3 service port 
 
Potential vulnerabilities (3) 
Section: Types Recommendations 
Information: Administrator account exists It is recommended to rename this account 
Information: MS SQL server No further action is required 
Information: Some POP3 server banners 
providing information to attacker 
The service: POP3 service should be turned off 
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Appendix C32: OS and network specification configuration 
 
OS and network specification configuration 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
1.1 Physical security Place the MS SQL server in an 
area where it will be 
physically secure. 
Satisfactory H 
1.2 Domain 
environment 
If the MS SQL Server is in a 
domain that is trusted by other 
domains, document the access 
granted by the trust. 
Satisfactory; only IT 
administrator groups are 
allowed to access the 
server. 
H 
1.3 MS SQL servers 
accessed via 
Internet 
If the MS SQL server is being 
accessed via the Internet, place 
the MS SQL Server inside a 
DMZ with the Web Server. 
Satisfactory; there is a 
frontend web (Epathway) 
server located in the 
DMZ. 
H 
1.4 MS SQL servers 
accessed via 
Internet 
Put a firewall between your 
server and the Internet. 
Block TCP port 1433 and 
UDP port 1434 on your 
perimeter firewall. If named 
instances are listening on 
additional ports, block those 
too. In a multi-tier 
environment, use multiple 
firewalls to create more secure 
screened subnets 
Satisfactory; the MS SQL 
server is located be hide 
the Internet firewall, and 
both TCP port 1433 and 
1434 are blocked from 
external access. 
H 
1.5 Encryption Implement SSL. Use the fully-
qualified DNS name of the 
server in the certificate to help 
prevent masquerading. 
Satisfactory; the 
Epathway frontend server 
uses SSL and fully 
qualified DNS name. 
H 
1.6 Test and 
development servers 
Maintain test and development 
servers on a separate network 
segment from the production 
servers. 
Not satisfactory; the test 
and development servers 
are on the same class A 
network. 
H 
1.7 Dedicated server Install the MS SQL server on a 
computer that does not provide 
additional services, e.g., web 
or mail services. 
Satisfactory; the MS SQL 
server is only for MS 
SQL database operation. 
M 
1.8 OS benchmark 
configuration 
Configure Windows Server 
2003 level I benchmark 
settings with the following 
modifications: 
  
1.8.1 Windows accounts Make sure the Windows guest 
account is disabled. 
Satisfactory M 
1.8.2 Disk subsystem Use RAID for critical data 
files. 
Satisfactory; raid level 10: 
database and temp drives 
RAID level 5: backup 
drive. 
M 
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OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
1.8.3 Separate partitions Create separate partitions for 
OS/SQL program files, SQL 
data files, and SQL 
transaction logs. 
Satisfactory M 
1.8.4 Volume / partition 
type 
Format all volumes with 
NTFS 
Satisfactory H 
1.9 Services Disable the following services 
on a SQL server machine 
  
1.9.1  Alerter Satisfactory P 
1.9.2  Clipbook server Satisfactory P 
1.9.3  Computer browser Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.4  DHCP client Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.5  Distributed file system Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Manual. 
L 
1.9.6  Distributed transaction 
coordinator 
Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.7  Fax service Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.8  Internet connection sharing Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.9  IPSec policy agent Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic. 
L 
1.9.10  License logging Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.11  Logical disk manager 
administrative service 
Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic 
(this service is needed by 
the system administrator). 
L 
1.9.12  Messenger Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.13  NetMeeting remote desktop 
sharing 
Satisfactory; (disabled). P 
1.9.14  Network DDE Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.15  Network DDE DSDM Satisfactory; (disabled). L 
1.9.16  Print spooler Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Manual. 
L 
1.9.17  Remote access connection 
manager 
Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Manual 
L 
1.9.18  Remote registry Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic 
(this service is needed by 
the system administrator) 
L 
1.9.19  Removable storage Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Manual 
P 
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 OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
1.9.20  RunAs service Satisfactory;  (disabled) M 
1.9.21  Smart card Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Manual 
P 
1.9.22  Smart card helper Satisfactory;  (disabled) P 
1.9.23  Task scheduler Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic 
(this service is needed by 
the system administrator) 
P 
1.9.24  Telephony Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Automatic 
P 
1.9.25  Telnet Satisfactory;  (disabled) L 
1.9.26  Windows installer Not satisfactory; currently 
set to Started Manual 
L 
1.10 MS SQL server 
service account 
Use a low-privileged local or 
Domain account for the MS 
SQL server service. 
Not satisfactory; currently 
uses local administrator 
(high-privileged). 
M 
1.11 SQL server agent 
service account 
Use a low-privileged domain 
account for the MS SQL 
server agent if replication, 
DTS, or other inter-server 
connection is required. 
Not satisfactory; currently 
uses local administrator 
(high-privileged). 
M 
1.12 Local users group 
membership 
Assign the local service 
account as a member of only 
the users group. 
Not satisfactory; there is 
no assigned user in the 
“users” group. 
M 
1.13 Domain service 
account group 
membership 
Make a domain service 
account a member of only 
non-privileged groups. 
N/A; the current 
configuration does not use 
the domain service account 
group. 
M 
1.14 MS SQL server 
service account 
rights 
Grant the MS SQL server 
service account(s) the 
following rights: 
N/A; there is no MS SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Act as part of the OS.  L 
  Act as part of the OS.  L 
  Log on as a batch job  L 
  Replace a process-level token  L 
  Bypass traverse checking  M 
  Adjust memory quotas for a 
process 
 L 
  Permission to start the MS 
SQL server active directory 
helper 
 M 
  Permission to start the MS 
SQL writer 
 M 
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OS and network specification configuration (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
1.15 MS SQL server 
agent service 
account rights 
Grant the MS SQL server 
agent service account(s) the 
following rights: 
N/A; there is no MS SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Act as part of the OS  L 
  Log on as a batch job  L 
  Replace a process-level token  L 
  Bypass traverse checking  L 
  Adjust memory quotas for a 
process 
 M 
1.16 Integration service 
account rights 
Grant the integration service 
account(s) the following 
rights: 
N/A; there is no MS SQL 
service account assigned. 
 
  Log on as a service  M 
  Permission to write to the 
application event log 
 L 
  Bypass traverse checking  L 
  Create global objects  M 
  Impersonate a client after 
authentication 
 L 
1.17 SQL server services 
account rights 
Deny the service account the 
“Log on locally” right. 
Satisfactory M 
1.18 SQL server services 
account rights 
If a service account is a 
domain account, configure the 
account to have the Windows 
permission “Log on To” the 
database server only. 
Not satisfactory; 
currently the 
domain/sqladmin account 
can log on to all 
computers. 
M 
1.19.1 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Create dedicated user accounts 
specifically for proxies, and 
only use these proxy user 
accounts for running job steps. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
1.19.2 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Only grant the necessary 
permissions to proxy user 
accounts. Grant only those 
permissions actually required 
to run the job steps that are 
assigned to a given proxy 
account. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
1.19.3 SQL server proxy 
accounts 
Do not run the SQL server 
agent service under a MS 
Windows account that is a 
member of the Windows 
administrators group. 
N/A; there is no proxy 
account assigned. 
M 
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Appendix C33: MS SQL server installation and patches audit details  
 
MS SQL server installation and patches audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
2.1 MS SQL server 
install platform 
Avoid installing MS SQL 
server on a domain 
controller. 
Satisfactory   M 
2.2 Patches and hotfixes Ensure the current MS SQL 
server service pack and 
hotfixes are installed. 
Satisfactory; currently 
updating both service pack 
and critical hotfixes every 
three months 
H 
2.3 MS SQL server ports Change MS SQL server 
default ports from 1433 and 
1434. 
Not satisfactory; the 
council uses both default 
TCP ports (1433 and 1434). 
H 
2.4 Naming conventions In naming MS SQL Server 
instances, limit the instance 
name to less than 16 
characters with no reference 
to a version number or other 
sensitive information. 
Satisfactory; currently the 
name is less than 16 
characters (11). 
L 
2.5 MS SQL server 
instances 
Keep an inventory of all 
versions, editions and 
languages of MS SQL 
Server. 
Not satisfactory; there is 
no inventory process. 
P 
2.6 Authentication mode Select Windows 
authentication mode. 
Satisfactory   M 
2.7 Rename sa account The “sa” account should be 
renamed to something that is 
not easily identifiable as the 
“sa” account. 
ALTER LOGIN sa WITH 
NAME = <new name> 
Not satisfactory; the 
council uses the default 
account (sa). 
M 
2.8 Strong password Use a strong password for 
the “sa” login account. 
Not satisfactory; 
according to the system 
administrator the password 
is classified as a medium 
level password. 
M 
2.9 Sample databases Do not install the sample 
databases. Delete all sample 
databases if they already 
exist. 
Satisfactory; there is no 
sample database installed. 
L 
2.10 Initialisation 
parameter 
C2 Audit Mode– set to 1 if 
no custom defined audit trace 
is enabled 
Not satisfactory; the 
current setup is 0. 
P 
2.11 Initialisation 
parameter 
Remote Access– set to 0 
unless replication is being 
used or the requirement is 
justified 
Not satisfactory; the 
current setup is 1. 
M 
2.12 Initialisation 
parameter 
Scan for Startup Procedures– 
set to 0 unless justified 
Satisfactory; the current 
setup is 0. 
L 
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Appendix C34: MS SQL server setting audit details  
 
MS SQL server setting audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
3.1 MS SQL server 
configuration manager 
Disable the “Named Pipes” 
network protocol. 
Not satisfactory L 
3.2 MS SQL server 
properties 
The following settings are 
recommended: 
  
3.2.1 Auto restart MS SQL 
server 
Set the MS SQL server service 
start mode to “Automatic” 
Satisfactory L 
3.2.2 Auto restart MS SQL 
server agent 
If the MS SQL server agent is 
required, set the “MS SQL 
server agent” start mode to 
“Automatic”. 
Satisfactory L 
3.2.3 Distributed transaction 
coordinator 
Set the “distributed transaction 
coordinator” service start mode 
to “Disabled” if this service is 
not required. 
N/A L 
3.2.4 Cross database-
ownership chaining 
Disable the 
cross_db_ownership_chaining 
option. 
Satisfactory M 
3.2.5 Advanced server 
settings 
Do not enable direct 
modifications to the system 
catalogs. 
N/A M 
3.2.6 Backup/restore from 
tape timeout 
Set the backup/restore from tape 
timeout period to “Try for 5 
minutes” 
Satisfactory L 
3.2.7 Media retention Set the default backup media 
retention to the minimum 
number of days needed to retain 
a full backup of the database. 
Ideally, this should be as high as 
your resources permit. 
Not satisfactory; 
currently the setting 
has not been 
configured. 
L 
3.3 Data directory The default data directory should 
be a dedicated data partition 
Satisfactory; 
(e:\mssql\data) 
M 
3.4 Data directory The default log directory should 
be a dedicated partition separate 
from all programs and data 
Satisfactory; 
(e:\mssql\logs) 
M 
3.5 Replication Do not enable replication. N/A L 
3.6 Other SQL server 
configuration options 
Set the number of logs retained 
based on the maximum number 
of restarts and log cyclings 
which may occur within your 
desired log retention window. 
The default value of 6 may be 
too low for many installations. 
Satisfactory; the 
default is 6. 
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 473
MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
3.7 Database mail Disable database mail where 
messaging is not required. 
Satisfactory L 
3.8 Trace messages Error log/include execution trace 
messages = off 
Satisfactory P 
3.9 User-defined stored 
procedures 
Ensure that all user-defined 
stored procedures are stored in 
encrypted format. 
Not satisfactory; 
stored in unencrypted 
format. 
H 
3.10 User-defined 
extended stored 
procedures 
Avoid using user-defined 
extended stored procedures. If 
extended functionality is 
required, use Common 
Language Runtime (CLR) 
assemblies instead. 
Not installed L 
3.11 Extended stored 
procedures 
Disable access to the following 
extended stored procedures: 
  
3.11.1  xp_available media Satisfactory L 
3.11.2  xp_cmdshell Satisfactory L 
3.11.3  xp_dirtree Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.4  xp_dsninfo Satisfactory P 
3.11.5  xp_enumdsn Satisfactory P 
3.11.6  xp_enumerrorlogs Satisfactory P 
3.11.7  xp_enumgroups Satisfactory P 
3.11.8  xp_eventlog Satisfactory P 
3.11.9  xp_fixeddrives Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.10  xp_getfiledetails Satisfactory P 
3.11.11  xp_getnetname Satisfactory P 
3.11.12  xp_logevent Satisfactory P 
3.11.13  xp_loginconfig Satisfactory P 
3.11.14  xp_msver Satisfactory P 
3.11.15  xp_readerrorlog Satisfactory P 
3.11.16  xp_servicecontrol Satisfactory P 
3.11.17  xp_sprintf Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.18  xp_sscanf Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.11.19  xp_subdirs Satisfactory P 
3.12 SQL Mail extended 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
SQL Mail extended stored 
procedures: 
  
3.12.1  xp_deletemail Satisfactory P 
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 MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
3.12.2  xp_findnextmsg Satisfactory P 
3.12.3  xp_get_mapi_default_profile Satisfactory P 
3.12.4  xp_get_mapi_profiles Satisfactory P 
3.12.5  xp_readmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.6  xp_sendmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.7  xp_startmail Satisfactory P 
3.12.8  xp_stopmail Satisfactory P 
3.13 WebTask extended 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
WebTask extended stored 
procedures. Delete the 
xpweb70.dll file that implements 
the following WebTask extended 
stored procedures: 
  
3.13.1  xp_cleanupwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.13.2  xp_convertwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.13.3  xp_dropwebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.4  xp_enumcodepages Satisfactory  P 
3.13.5  xp_makewebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.6  xp_readwebtask Satisfactory P 
3.13.7  xp_runwebtask Satisfactory  P 
3.14 OLE automation 
stored procedures 
Disable access to the following 
OLE automation stored 
procedures: 
  
3.14.1  sp_OACreate Satisfactory  L 
3.14.2  sp_OADestroy Satisfactory L 
3.14.3  sp_OAGetErrorInfo Satisfactory  L 
3.14.4  sp_OAGetProperty Satisfactory L 
3.14.5  sp_OAMethod Satisfactory  L 
3.14.6  sp_OASetProperty Satisfactory L 
3.14.7  sp_OAStop Satisfactory L 
3.15 Registry access 
extended stored 
procedures 
Disable access to the following 
registry access extended stored 
procedures: 
  
3.15.1  xp_regaddmultistring Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.2  xp_regdeletekey Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.3  xp_regdeletevalue Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.4  xp_regenumvalues Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
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MS SQL server setting audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration  
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
3.15.5  xp_regremovemultistring Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.15.6  xp_regwrite Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
P 
3.16 Advanced setting MS SQL server event 
forwarding/forward events to a 
different server = off 
Satisfactory; (off). L 
3.17 MS SQL server 
browser service 
Disable MS SQL server browser 
service 
Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
L 
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Appendix C35: MS SQL server access controls audit details 
 
MS SQL server access controls audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
4.1 Permissions on OS 
tools 
Restrict access to the 
executables in the System32 
directory e.g. Explorer.exe and 
cmd.exe. 
Satisfactory; remove the 
Users group’s 
permission to run 
executables. 
H 
4.2 MS SQL server 
install directory 
permissions 
Modify the permissions to the 
[Drive]:\Program 
Files\Microsoft SQL server 
directory. 
Satisfactory; remove the 
Users group’s 
permission to run 
executables. 
H 
4.3 MS SQL server 
database instance 
directory 
permissions 
Delete or secure old setup files. 
Protect files in the <system 
drive>:\Program 
Files\Microsoft SQL 
Server\MSSQL.X\MSSQL\Inst
all, e.g., sqlstp.log, sqlsp.log 
and setup.iss. “X” represents 
the installations of various SQL 
server installs due to the fact 
that multiple instances of SQL 
server or SQL express can be 
installed. 
Satisfactory; access to 
the current install folder 
is allowed for the system 
administrator groups 
only. 
M 
4.4 Assigning system 
administrators role 
When assigning database 
administrators to the System 
Administrators role, map their 
Windows accounts to SQL 
logins, and then assign them to 
the role. 
Satisfactory M 
4.5 MS SQL logins Remove the default 
BUILTIN\administrators SQL 
login. 
Not satisfactory; the 
BUILTIN\administrators 
SQL login is still exits. 
M 
4.6 MS SQL logins Ensure that all SQL logins have 
strong passwords. 
Not satisfactory; 
enforce strong password 
policy. 
M 
4.7 OS guests access Deny database login for the 
guests OS group. 
Not satisfactory; the 
guest user is disabled, 
but the guests OS group 
is enabled. 
H 
4.8 Fixed server roles Only use the fixed server roles 
sysadmin, server admin, setup 
admin etc, to support a database 
administrator activity. 
Satisfactory L 
4.9 MS SQL server 
database users and 
roles 
Remove the guest user from all 
databases except master and 
tempdb. 
Satisfactory; disabled the 
guest user for all 
databases. 
M 
4.10 Statement 
permissions 
Grant data definition language 
or data description language 
statement permissions to only 
the database and schema owner, 
not individual users. 
Not satisfactory M 
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 MS SQL server access controls audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
4.11 Database owners 
permissions 
Ensure database owner owns all 
user-created database schemas 
Not satisfactory L 
4.12 Low-privileged 
users 
Do not grant object permissions 
to PUBLIC or GUEST. 
N/A M 
4.13 Stored procedure 
permissions 
Grant executes permissions on 
stored procedures to database 
roles (not users). 
Satisfactory M 
4.14 Using the GRANT 
option 
Do not assign the GRANT 
option of object permission to a 
user or role. 
N/A M 
4.15 MS SQL server 
agent subsystem 
privileges 
Restrict proxy access to 
required/approved subsystems. 
N/A; no proxy access. M 
4.16 User-defined 
database roles 
Create user-defined database 
roles to assign permissions to 
objects in the database when a 
pre-defined database role does 
not supply the appropriate 
permissions to a group of users. 
N/A; no user defined 
database roles. 
M 
4.17 Database roles Avoid nesting database roles. Satisfactory M 
4.18 Users and roles Ensure that the members of the 
roles (users/groups/other roles) 
in the target database actually 
exist. 
Satisfactory L 
4.19 Application roles Use application roles to limit 
access to data to users of 
specific applications. Use 
encryption to protect the role 
name and password in the 
connection string. Use 
“EXECUTE AS WITH NO 
REVERT” or “WITH 
COOKIE” to allow individuals 
to access the application 
without knowing the password. 
N/A M 
4.20 Use of predefined 
roles 
Avoid assigning predefined 
roles to PUBLIC or GUEST. 
N/A; no predefined roles 
created. 
L 
4.21 Linked or remote 
servers 
Use linked servers rather than 
remote servers where required. 
Remove any unused linked 
servers or disable this feature. 
N/A L 
4.22 Linked or remote 
servers 
Configure linked or remote 
servers to use Windows 
authentication where required. 
Disable linked servers 
otherwise. 
Not satisfactory; 
currently the sa account 
is used instead of 
windows authentication 
domain user.  
M 
4.23 Linked server logins Allow linked server access only 
to those logins that need it. 
Disable linked servers 
otherwise. 
Satisfactory M 
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MS SQL server access controls audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
4.24 Ad Hoc data access Disable ad hoc data access on 
all providers for all users except 
members of the sysadmin fixed 
role. 
N/A L 
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Appendix C36: MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details  
 
MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
5.1 Auditing – general Prepare a schedule for 
reviewing audit information 
regularly. 
Not satisfactory; currently 
there is no auditing 
schedule. 
P 
5.2 MS SQL server 
properties – security 
tab 
Through the MS SQL server 
management studio, enable 
auditing for SQL server. 
Satisfactory P 
5.3 MS SQL server logs MS SQL server audit data 
must be protected from loss. 
The MS SQL server and MS 
SQL server agent logs must be 
backed up before they are 
overwritten. 
Satisfactory; the default 
setup is 6. 
P 
5.4 MS SQL profiler Use MS SQL profiler to 
generate and manage audit 
trails. 
Satisfactory P 
5.5 Profiler events Capture the following events 
using MS SQL profiler 
Currently there is no 
template created yet.  
 
  Event   
5.5.1  Audit add database user event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.2  Audit add login to server role Not satisfactory P 
5.5.3  Audit add member to DB role Not satisfactory P 
5.5.4  Audit add role event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.5  Audit add login event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.6  Audit app role change 
password 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.7  Audit backup/restore Not satisfactory P 
5.5.8  Audit broker conversation Not satisfactory P 
5.5.9  Audit broker login Not satisfactory P 
5.5.10  Audit change audit Not satisfactory P 
5.5.11  Audit change DB owner Not satisfactory P 
5.5.12  Audit database consistency 
check 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.13  Audit database management Not satisfactory P 
5.5.14  Audit database object access Not satisfactory P 
5.5.15  Audit database object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.16  Audit database object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.17  Audit database object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.18  Audit database operation Not satisfactory P 
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MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
Levels 
5.5.19  Audit database principal 
impersonation 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.20  Audit database principal 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.21  Audit database scope GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.22  Audit login change password Not satisfactory P 
5.5.23  Audit login change property Not satisfactory P 
5.5.24  Audit login Not satisfactory P 
5.5.25  Audit login failed Not satisfactory P 
5.5.26  Audit login GDR event Not satisfactory P 
5.5.27  Audit logout Not satisfactory P 
5.5.28  Audit object derived 
permission event 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.29  Audit schema object access Not satisfactory P 
5.5.30  Audit schema object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.31  Audit schema object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.32  Audit schema object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.33  Audit server alter trace Not satisfactory P 
5.5.34  Audit server object GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.35  Audit server object 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.36  Audit server object take 
ownership 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.37  Audit server operation Not satisfactory P 
5.5.38  Audit server principal 
impersonation 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.39  Audit server principal 
management 
Not satisfactory P 
5.5.40  Audit server scope GDR Not satisfactory P 
5.5.41  Audit server starts and stops Not satisfactory P 
5.5.42  Audit statement permission 
event 
Not satisfactory P 
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Appendix C37: MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details  
 
MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration items Action / recommended 
parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
6.1 Backups – general Use full database backups 
combined with differential or 
transaction log backups to 
restore the database to a 
specific point in time. 
Satisfactory; currently the 
council’s backup is done 
nightly. 
M 
6.2 System databases It is important to include the 
system databases in your 
backup plan i.e. the master, 
msdb and model databases. 
Satisfactory M 
6.3 Backing up master 
database 
Backup the master database 
when any of the following 
events occur: 
 A database is created or 
deleted 
  Login accounts are created, 
deleted or modified 
Server-wide or database 
settings are modified 
Satisfactory M 
6.4 Backing up MSDB 
database 
Backup the msdb database 
when any of the following 
events occur: 
Alerts, jobs, schedules or 
operators are created, deleted 
or modified 
Satisfactory M 
6.5 Backup media Password protects the backup 
media. 
Not satisfactory; there is 
no password protect. 
H 
6.6 Access to backup files Restrict access to the backup 
files to system administrators. 
Not satisfactory; currently 
all domain users can access 
the backup files. Access 
should be granted only to 
the system administrator 
group. 
H 
6.7 Access to backup files Restrict restore permissions to 
database administrators 
Satisfactory; currently, 
only the system 
administrator group can 
restore the backup files. 
H 
6.8 Recommended 
periodic 
administrative 
procedures 
Run the MS baseline security 
analyser weekly and follow 
the security recommendations 
as closely as possible to 
secure the OS. 
Not satisfactory; the MS 
baseline security analyser 
not in use. 
L 
6.9 Recommended 
periodic 
administrative 
procedures 
Run the MS SQL best 
practices analyser regularly 
and note any changes to the 
environment. 
Not satisfactory; the MS 
SQL best practices 
analyser not in use. 
L 
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MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details (continued) 
Item 
no. 
Configuration items Action / recommended 
Parameters 
Council C Risk 
levels 
6.10 Enable password 
policy enforcement 
When a password change 
mechanism is introduced into 
clients and applications; 
enable password expiration. 
Always specify 
MUST_CHANGE when 
specifying a password on 
behalf of another principal. 
Not satisfactory; no 
enforce password policy 
M 
6.11 Periodic scan of role 
members 
Periodically scan fixed server 
and database roles to ensure 
that only trusted individuals 
are members. 
Not satisfactory; 
currently, there are only a 
few users. Periodic scan 
may is recommended when 
number of users increases. 
L 
6.12 Periodic scan of 
stored procedures 
Verify stored procedures that 
have been set to AutoStart are 
secure. 
Not satisfactory; no 
AutoStart enabled. 
P 
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Appendix C38: Surface area configuration tool audit details 
 
Surface area configuration tool audit details 
Item 
no. 
Configuration 
items 
Action/recommended parameters Council C Risk 
levels 
9.1 Ad Hoc Remote 
Queries 
Disable Ad Hoc Remote Queries 
where not required. 
Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
L 
9.2 CLR integration Disable CLR integration where not 
required.. 
Satisfactory L 
9.3 DAC Disable the remote dedicated 
administrator connection where not 
required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.4 Database mail Disable database mail where 
messaging is not required. 
Not satisfactory; 
(enabled). 
L 
9.5 Native XML web 
services 
Do not configure XML web services 
endpoints where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.6 OLE automation Disable OLE automation where not 
required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.7 Service broker Do not configure service broker 
endpoints where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.8 SQL Mail Do not enable SQL Mail where not 
required or where database mail 
could be used instead. 
Satisfactory L 
9.9 Web assistant Disable web assistant where not 
required. 
Satisfactory P 
9.10 xp_cmdshell Disable the xp_cmdshell stored 
procedure where not required. 
Satisfactory L 
9.11 Ad Hoc data 
mining 
Disable ad hoc data mining queries 
where not required. 
N/A; no analysis 
services installed. 
L 
9.12 Anonymous 
connections 
Disable anonymous connections to 
the analysis services where not 
required. 
N/A; no analysis 
services installed. 
M 
9.13 Linked objects “Enable links to other instances” 
should be disabled where not 
required. 
N/A; no analysis 
services installed. 
L 
9.14 Linked objects “Enable links from other instances” 
should be disabled where not 
required. 
N/A; no analysis 
services installed. 
L 
9.15 User-defined 
functions 
Disable loading of user-defined 
COM functions where not required. 
N/A; no analysis 
services installed. 
L 
9.16 Scheduled events 
and report delivery 
Disable scheduled events and report 
delivery where not required. 
N/A; no analysis 
services installed. 
P 
9.17 Web service and 
HTTP access 
Disable web service and HTTP 
access where not required. 
N/A; no analysis 
services installed. 
L 
9.18 Windows integrated 
security 
Enable Windows integrated security 
for report data source connections. 
N/A; no analysis 
services installed. 
M 
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Appendix C39: Council C’s information security policy  
 
 
Acceptable Use of Computing and Communications Facilities 
Council C: COMPUTING SERVICES 
POLICY: POL-M-019 
 
1 Purpose 
 
1.1 The purpose of this policy is to establish a Council C position concerning the 
proper use of the City’s computing and communication resources. 
 
1.2 The policy is intended to cover City staff use of the following facilities: 
 
 All computer hardware, network and communications equipment; 
 All computer software and applications, including all Internet 
applications; and 
 Telephones and fax machines. 
 
2 Policy 
 
2.1 Council C encourages its staff to enhance customer service, productivity and 
increase knowledge through the use of available computing and electronic 
communications resources (including the use of the Internet) within the bounds of 
their employment and relevant legal and ethical requirements. These resources 
belong to the City and its suppliers and can only be used in the manner authorised. 
City staff should treat the resources with respect, always be courteous and 
professional in their use and represent the City in the best possible way. 
 
2.2 Use of City computing or communication resources by a staff member should be 
restricted to employment related purposes and associated behaviour must be in 
keeping with the City’s Code of Conduct for employees and legislation applying 
within the State of Western Australia. 
 
2.3 Limited personal use of facilities is also permitted provided: 
 
 It does not unduly affect or interfere with the proper performance of the 
duties and responsibilities of the staff member with the City; 
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 It does not unduly affect or interfere with the ability of other City staff 
members to perform their duties and responsibilities; or 
 It does not involve illegal or unethical behaviour. 
 
2.4 Common sense should dictate what is and is not employment related, and also 
what constitutes illegal and unethical behaviour in this regard. Notwithstanding 
this general comment, however, the following are specifically prohibited: 
 
 Private commercial activities for the purpose of personal gain; 
 Accessing, distributing or disclosing material prohibited by policy or 
law; 
 Breaching confidentiality; 
 Unauthorised copy or transmission of copyrighted material; 
 Transmitting threatening, abusive, defamatory or offensive material; 
 Distributing chain letters; 
 False representation; 
 Unauthorised access to, use or release of Council C information; and 
 Unauthorised access to or use of computers and software programmes. 
 
2.5 When using the City’s computing and communications resources and facilities, 
staff members are expected to be aware of their responsibilities to: 
 
 Comply with all policy, legislative and administrative arrangements; 
 Ensure any action taken serves to enhance the services provided by the 
City; 
 Not bring the City into disrepute; 
 Be informed of all security arrangements related to the use of computer 
facilities; 
 In particular the security risks involved of using the Internet and ensure 
that this is not compromised by their actions; and 
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 Seek advice if they are unsure about the status of their actions. 
 
2.6 While it is the individual City staff member’s responsibility to use the resources 
appropriately, the City’s Managers also have a responsibility to deal with 
deliberate and inadvertent breaches of this policy. 
 
Systems are routinely monitored to ensure satisfactory levels of service. 
Monitoring may also be carried out upon the direction of the Chief Executive 
Officer or as a result of inquiries, investigations or Freedom of Information 
requests. In these circumstances, information may be scrutinised or made public. 
 
2.7 City staff who breach this policy may be dealt with under relevant industrial 
award or general industrial law provisions or any relevant legislation. 
 
I have read the Council C policy on Acceptable Use of Computing and Communications 
Facilities and hereby agree to the terms and conditions. 
 
Applicant’s Name: _____________________________________________________ 
Applicant’s Signature: __________________________________________________ 
Date: ________________________________________________________________ 
